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“Human Capital” explores the relationships between the moral imperatives of the 
antislavery movement in the New England and the mid- Atlantic, and their connections to 
evolving manufacturing and agricultural political economies premised on free labor regimes. 
Tracing the sweep of history from the British-American imperial crisis through the American 
Revolution, and into the Early American Republic, “Human Capital” argues that northeasterners 
like Rhode Island textile capitalist and abolitionist Moses Brown, radical democrats like Thomas 
Paine, and political economists like Tench Coxe developed visions of capitalism in which chattel 
slavery’s gradual abolition in the northeastern states acted as a spur to economic development. 
These visions, it shows, brought them into direct political and economic conflict with southern 
planters and a small, but wealthy and powerful number of northeastern merchants at the national 
level by 1820, precisely as the Missouri Crisis over slavery’s proposed western expansion 
reached a crescendo. The dissertation concludes by laying the intellectual and political-economic 
groundwork for antebellum abolitionism by emphasizing the under-appreciated bridge figure of 
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Introduction: The Problems of Slavery, Abolitionism, and Capitalism in Early America 
 
 
In July 1823, Quaker abolitionist Benjamin Lundy’s newspaper Genius of Universal 
Emancipation featured “THE FATHERS OF EMANCIPATION,” an extract of a letter from “an 
aged member of the Abolition Society, in Pennsylvania.” The man described his experiences 
fighting the African slave trade to the United States in 1787 and 1788. He witnessed a ship 
anchor off a secluded island near Port Penn, Delaware, sixty miles southeast of Philadelphia, 
advertised as “From Guinea, with 1500 Slaves on board.” “This electrified me,” he remembered, 
“and I kept strict eye and ear, and close mouth to all that passed” until after the master and 
supercargo had negotiated with customers and went on to enjoy an evening of “feasting and 
drinking.” He rushed an express letter to Pennsylvania Governor and Pennsylvania Abolition 
Society (PAS) president Benjamin Franklin warning him of the ship's presence and purpose, 
which arrived within thirty hours. But because the ship never entered Pennsylvania's jurisdiction, 
the PAS could not press charges against the ship's owner, master, supercargo, and crew under 
Pennsylvania state law. 
His efforts bore fruit soon after, however, because the “affair roused the public sentiment; 
it gave energy to the exertions of the Abolition Society to attend the election, to have proper men 
elected.” After abolitionist “champion” William Lewis secured election to the state assembly 
from Philadelphia, the aged abolitionist described how Lewis set about creating an antislavery 
coalition able to pass supplemental legislation to the Keystone State's 1780 slavery abolition law. 
The assembly committee assigned to report the bill contained a mixture of abolitionists and 
slaveholders. Lewis even convinced slaveholding colleague General Joseph Meister to support 
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the bill, and it passed. The 1788 act patched loopholes in the 1780 law, including restricting 
masters’ right to transport slaves and servants out of state, and providing stricter penalties for 
engaging in the foreign slave trade. It is certainly fair to say that the grizzled abolitionist's rangy 
narrative from personal experience to the successful passage of antislavery legislation was fuzzy 
and teleological. On the other hand, by 1823 Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, New 
England, and the Old Northwest states had abolished slavery, or had recently finished fighting 
off its legalization, in the case of Illinois. To Lundy, the old Pennsylvania abolitionist's lessons 
rang true: antislavery politics could work.1  
National antislavery politics emerged from economic and social conditions created by the 
wave of abolitionism which swept across the northeastern states in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, generating significant tension in debates over national political economy.2 Ten years 
after Lundy printed the Revolutionary Era abolitionist’s remembrance of fighting the slave trade, 
his Genius of Universal Emancipation spilled over with detailed coverage of the Nullification 
Crisis, a national political conflict over national tariff policy with inescapable connections to the 
growing conflict between slavery and freedom in the antebellum United States. The crisis, a 
product of import tariffs narrowly rammed through Congress at the end of John Quincy Adams’s 
term as president in 1827, and cynically backed by southern Democrats as a political ploy in 
                                                           
1 Genius of Universal Emancipation, III (July 1823), pp. 9-10. On the Pennsylvania Abolition Society’s 
antislavery work in Early Republic, see Edward Needles, An Historical Memoir of the Pennsylvania 
Society… (New York: Arno Press, 1969 [1848]); Richard S. Newman, The Transformation of American 
Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 
esp. Ch. 1-3, is the most thorough modern account of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society and its activities.  
2 The terms “Northeast” and “northeastern” refer to the states which abolished chattel slavery and 
participation in the foreign slave trade before 1833: Vermont, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. While the political economies and 
social structures of these states differed, I group them together because each state instituted chattel 
slavery abolition by the first decade of the nineteenth century. “Northern” and “North” refer to the 
antebellum period, to include the Old Northwest region.  
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hopes of generating northeastern support for the party of Jackson, clearly favored northeastern 
manufacturing interests that had long clamored for protective tariffs to encourage American 
consumption of American-made manufactures. Protective tariffs had long been opposed by 
power slaveholding interests in Congress and the state legislatures, in concert with a small but 
influential faction of northeastern merchants that specialized in importing a wide array of 
European manufactures. Slavery escalated what might have been a relatively benign political 
dispute over commercial policy, but the peculiar institution always had a way of rearing its 
divisive head in debates over how to orient American political economy.  
 Lundy’s newspaper, as it had since its founding in 1821, put its finger on the pulse of the 
politics of slavery and abolitionism in its coverage of the Nullification Crisis. In May 1833, the 
Genius included long extracts from South Carolinian George McDuffie’s analysis of the Crisis, 
with trenchant commentary on the leader of the South Carolina Nullification Convention’s 
thoughts on American political economy. According to the Genius’s report of McDuffie’s 
comments on the convention proceedings, South Carolina slaveholders complained that 
northerners “told us, openly, that we must pay for the vice in our institutions: that the free labor 
of the north must not—shall not be degraded to the same footing as the slave labor of the south.” 
McDuffie accused politicians from the free North of attempting to foment civil war by 
supporting the national tariff policy, an insistence that the Genius found ridiculous, given that the 
Palmetto State’s Nullification Convention had openly discussed the prospect of secession. “In 
our opinion,” the Genius editorialized, slavery “never was a topic which those disposed to make 
war on the Union, could press into service of their cause, with less prospect of converting it to 
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the purpose intended, than the slave question.”3 Abolitionists did not pick the fight, in other 
words, the South Carolinian slaveholders did, but they claimed to be victims of free state 
economic aggression. 
For all the conflict that the Nullification Crisis generated between the sections, even 
staunch abolitionists continued to believe the Union could continue to persist. A further editorial 
comment even suggested that southern slavery could be beneficial to free labor, that slavery is 
“most advantageous to free labor in its present location [because] it aids the climate in 
diversifying the products of the different sections of the country.” This was a surprising 
admission from avowed abolitionists, but a close parsing of this statement reveals the Genius’s 
real agenda—slavery, if it must exist in the southern states, should be contained to the southern 
states. This, in other words, was a non-extension of slavery argument, and the editorial went 
further in suggesting that “if southern cultivation were carried on by the same class and character 
of people as it is in the north, the skill of the cultivator would soon supply all his wants from the 
soil, and exclude from his market much that is now drawn from the north.” If labor in the South 
was not debauched to the status of chattel slavery, if slaves could be extended self-ownership, 
then manufacturing would take root and conflicts over national tariff policy would be moot. 
Slaveholders should become free labor capitalists, the Genius concluded, but southern planters 
and their political representatives remained hell-bent on preventing the loss of their slave 
property. The furor over the Tariff of Abominations rustled up by the nullifiers disguised the 
                                                           
3 Genius of Universal Emancipation XIII (May 1833), p. 105. In April 1833, Lundy left his residence in 
Washington D.C. to continue his travels in Texas and Mexico, seeking land to settle free black 
communities. He apparently continued to contribute to the Genius while on his travels, but left daily 
operations in the hands of “friends, who had given proofs of their capability, and of their devotion to the 
cause.” Benjamin Lundy, Life, Travels and Opinions of Benjamin Lundy..., Thomas Earle, ed. (New York: 




“grand spring” of southern agitation. “The tariff is the scape-goat,” proclaimed the Genius, “but 
slavery is the bitter root” from which conflict grew.4 
As reflected in the Nullification Crisis, in the seventy years between 1763 and 1833, an 
already-existent political-economic divergence between the Northeast and the Upper and Lower 
South continued to widen, especially after the establishment of the American Republic and in the 
decades of the Early Republic, as the nation expanded into the Northwest and Southwest. By 
1833, the national political schism over the relationship of capitalism to slavery and abolitionism 
in the American republic threatened to tear the nation asunder, a polity that encompassed a huge 
swath of the North American continent, tens of millions of acres of land, contained capital goods 
valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, produced bounteous agricultural yields, and hosted 
increasingly complex systems of financial exchange and conducted extensive international trade. 
But the problem of slavery, abolitionism, and capitalism in nineteenth century America was a 
paradox that generated conflict at every turn: a nation split between two incompatible labor 
systems. Chattel slavery denied self-ownership to the enslaved, but it made many fortunes for 
large slaveholders, endowing the most influential of the slaveholding classes with staggering 
wealth and political power disproportionate to their numbers. While the southern slave 
economies harbored a respectable middle class of slaveholders as well as small-scale farmers 
that owned a handful of slaves, chattel slavery created a political economy of exaggerated wealth 
inequality between slaveholding and non-slaveholding whites, maintaining cohesion through the 
powerful social and cultural adhesive of white supremacy.   
                                                           
4 Genius of Universal Emancipation XIII (May 1833), pp. 105-106.  
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Meanwhile, the northeastern and later northwestern states—the free North, by the 
antebellum period—contained political economies structured on the free household model, in 
which patriarchal family units unbound to an external authority operated as free agents in 
economic conditions which supported the rise of domestic manufacturing and increased 
agricultural productivity within the reach of farm families. The free household model was not 
perfect, and did not inherently guarantee the security and happiness of every person in the free 
North. Social stratification accelerated in the 1840s and 1850s, the work regimes of many free 
household members left much to be desired, especially in the growing industrial zones of the 
Northeast, and social problems often plagued free state communities and individual households. 
But spurred by moral and political economy of northeastern abolitionism in the Revolutionary 
Era, which resulted in the abolition of slavery in New England and the mid-Atlantic, the free 
household model came to dominate the free North by the 1830s. In moral terms, northeastern 
state slavery abolition eliminated the sin of slavery, the legal right to buy, own, and sell other 
human beings as articles of property, rights which northeastern communities rose in opposition 
against in the Revolutionary Era and Early Republic. This was the moral economy of 
abolitionism: popular disdain for chattel slavery and the slave trade as unfair and immoral modes 
of economic organization, alongside a dislike for poltical and economic power of slaveholders.  
The political economy of northeastern abolitionism developed by men like Rhode Island 
abolitionist and textile capitalist Moses Brown, and members of Early National northeastern 
abolition societies, emphasized the use of state authority to promote the free household unit and 
domestic manufacturing and agricultural improvements designed to capitalize on family labor. 
Tench Coxe, a Treasury department official and foremost Early American political economist, 
while not an abolitionist in the more familiar mold of antebellum Garrisonian moral suasionists, 
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developed a vision of American political economy that included a place for slave-grown cotton 
but prioritized the interests of the northeastern free household model. Northeastern abolitionists 
and advocates of antislavery political economy envisioned society free of the inhibitive effects of 
chattel slavery on the cultural trait of industriousness, and the material development of industrial 
capability, by promoting the free household as the bedrock labor unit of the region. Many also 
envisioned state and local governments in which the political power of slaveholders could be 
subdued; the national government, however, was a different story.  
The core argument of this dissertation is at clear odds with a surge of “slavery 
capitalism” scholarship that yokes antebellum northern capitalism directly to southern chattel 
slavery. Those works are often persuasive in describing the contours of slavery-based capitalist 
regional economies of the Upper and Lower South, and later the southwestern Cotton Kingdom, 
where chattel slaves produced export commodity crops in violent and dehumanizing conditions. 
When slavery capitalism scholars assert an antebellum northern capitalism inextricably linked to 
southern chattel slavery, however, they do not account for the clear divergences of the American 
regional economies, evident before the American Revolution and which accelerated in the Early 
Republic. 
 In treating economic development outside the plantation context, the “slavery 
capitalism” historians tend to identify finance and international trade as the nation’s economic 
engines, downplaying or outright ignoring free household agriculture and the domestic 
manufacture of a multitude of goods, the backbone northeastern regional capitalism. Commerce 
and finance were important, but large merchants and financiers constituted only a wealthy 
minority in the Northeast, and their power did not go unchallenged. In political contests related 
to slavery and the slave trade, the interests of slaveholders most often aligned with those of 
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wealthy urban merchants. Northeastern antislavery analysts and politicians grounded their 
visions of American economic development in agricultural and manufacturing improvements 
designed to capitalize on the free household model. They sought to expand the consumption of 
domestic goods by free households and a growing pool of single wage workers, and northeastern 
state abolition of chattel slavery complemented these broader developments.5 
The key work in “slavery capitalism” scholarship is Edward Baptist’s 2014 opus The 
Half Has Never Been Told. Despite focusing almost exclusive attention on the slave economy of 
the New South, Baptist claims that cotton, and therefore slavery, played an indispensable role in 
the development of northern capitalism by the 1840s and 1850s. This argument assumes that 
antebellum northern capitalism emerged almost entirely on the back of cotton textile 
manufacturing, which ignores free household agriculture almost entirely, and also reduces the 
vibrant manufacturing economy of the antebellum North to dependence on one fiber. I argue that 
reducing free state capitalist development to cotton textiles and the finance networks of southern 
slavery not only posits a narrow and restrictive basis for northern capitalism, but also American 
textile manufacturing development. If Baptist is correct, Americans did not wear woolens, linens, 
cotton-linen and cotton-woolen blends, and the only basis for American industrialization was 
                                                           
5 The best introduction to the new slavery capitalism literature are the essays collected in Sven Beckert 
and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). See also Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global 
History (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the 
Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Calvin Schermerhorn, The Business of and the 
Rise of American Capitalism, 1815-1860 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Walter Johnson, The 
River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013). For a critique that emphasizes the limitations of the slavery capitalism approach, see James Oakes, 
“Slavery and Capitalism and the Civil War,” International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 89 (Spring 
2016), pp. 196-220. Another critique that interrogates the trend’s theoretical limitations and points out 
factual inaccuracies committed by Baptist, in particular, is Alan M. Olmsted and Paul W. Rhode, “Cotton, 




textiles. In the early stages of the growth of American mechanized textile manufacturing in the 
Early Republic, cotton from the Lower South played a relatively insignificant role, and 
northeastern manufacturing pursuits encompassed the production of hundreds of consumer goods 
and industrial inputs aside from textiles. 
Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton, another key work in the emergent “slavery capitalism” 
scholarship, shows that cotton was a significant input for capitalist development—but primarily 
for Great Britain and Europe. A recent edited volume by Beckert and Seth Rockman, Slavery’s 
Capitalism, brings together a variety of scholarly perspectives in the “slavery capitalism” 
paradigm.6 Among the most persuasive of these essays are works by Caitlin Rosenthal, Joshua 
D. Rothman, and Bonnie Martin, which provide fine-grained analysis of the contours of the 
southern slave economies, framing southern slavery as a uniquely modern form of capitalism. 
Andrew Shankman’s essay reveals deep conflict between the dueling political economies of 
slavery and freedom at the pivotal turning point of 1819-1820.7 On the other hand, essays which 
develop the argument of northeastern “complicity” with the growth and persistence of southern 
and West Indian slavery assume narrow, export-trade and finance-based capitalist economies 
more reminiscent of the southern economies than the free household agriculture and domestic 
manufacturing-based Northeast.8 As this dissertation shows, the northeastern colonial and Early 
                                                           
6 Caitlin Rosenthal, “Slavery’s Scientific Management: Masters and Management”; Bonnie Martin, 
“Neighbor-to-Neighbor Capitalism: Local Credit Networks and the Mortgaging of Slaves”; Joshua D. 
Rothman, “The Contours of Cotton Capitalism: Speculation, Slavery, and Economic Panic in Mississippi, 
1832-1841,” in Beckert and Rockman eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, pp. 62-86; 107-121; 122-145.  
7 Andrew Shankman, “Capitalism, Slavery, and the New Epoch: Mathew Carey’s 1819,” in Ibid., pp. 243-
261.  
8 Eric Kimball, “‘What Have We To Do With Slavery?’: New Englanders and the Slave Economies of the 
West Indies,”; Stephen Chambers, “‘No Country But Their Counting Houses’: The U.S.-Cuba-Baltic 
Circuit, 1809-1812”; Calvin Schermerhorn, “The Coastwise Slave Trade and a Mercantile Community of 
Interest,” in Ibid., pp. 181-194; 195-208; 209-224. The first of these essays disinters an interpretation of Eric 
Williams’s famed argument that the proceeds of British Caribbean sugar plantations funded British 
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National economies exhibited far more diversification and complexity than the Upper and Lower 
South, conditions which laid the basis for northeastern state abolition of chattel slavery and the 
slave trade beginning in the 1780s, and which the settlement and establishment of free household 
based agricultural economies in the Old Northwest complemented.  
When “slavery capitalism” historians claim that antebellum northern prosperity depended 
on southern cotton and slavery, they presuppose a degree of political and economic integration 
between the sections that did not exist in reality. They downplay antimonies between slave-labor 
and free household economies that existed even as the thirteen British North American colonies 
battled for independence from the Empire, antimonies which further widened in the Early 
Republic. Put another way, this scholarship elides the basic fact that chattel slavery abolition 
happened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, setting the Northeast (and later the 
Old Northwest) and Upper and Lower South on different developmental trajectories. As this 
dissertation argues, northeastern state abolition of slavery was a process initiated and completed 
with a rapidity unprecedented in the Atlantic world, and contemporaries clearly understood the 
difference the transformation of northeastern abolition wrought.  
The relationship between the political and moral ideologies of the American Revolution 
to the emergence of organized transatlantic antislavery movements has long absorbed historians.9 
                                                           
capitalism, and attempts to apply it to New England. See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941).  
9 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1975). See also Davis’s essays in conversation with Thomas Bender and John Ashburn in The 
Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism As A Problem in Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1992).  Robin Blackburn’s several works on the construction and abolition of New 
World slavery are also crucial, though they tend to focus on the Caribbean. See Blackburn, The American 
Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights (London: Verso, 2011); The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery: 
1776-1848 (London Verso, 1988); The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-
1800 (London: Verso, 1997). See also Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of 
British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). These works only partially 
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The foundational work on the Age of Revolutions and the problems of slavery and antislavery, 
and their relationship to capitalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries is David Brion Davis’s 
The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. In this magisterial work, Davis explores the 
relationships between abolitionists—in particular British and American Quakers—and a 
capitalist mentalité that emerged over the course of the eighteenth century. 
 Birthed in large part from Quaker business networks, an “antislavery international” 
which coordinated slave trade abolition campaigns, and in the American northeastern states 
chattel slavery abolition, became the nerve center of abolitionism in the Anglo-Atlantic world. 
Davis’s analysis of abolitionism and capitalism draws out multiple ambiguities: Quaker (and 
non-Quaker) abolitionists did not pursue their campaigns against slavery and the slave trade 
because they stood to reap direct financial benefits from abolition, and yet the moral core of 
abolitionism was tempered by the social differentiation that capitalist relations generated.  
For Davis, the core ambiguity that begs explanation is how the relationship between a 
movement aimed to eradicate an oppressive and morally destructive regime (chattel slavery) was 
prosecuted by many of the same people who trumpeted an emergent economic regime 
(capitalism) which was clearly not egalitarian. Little needs to be said about the often destructive 
impact that industrial capitalism had on workers and their families, and Quaker abolitionists were 
quite clear about their desires to inure wage laborers to work discipline regimes that undermined 
their individual and family economic autonomy. Thus, abolitionism must not be characterized as 
                                                           
address northeastern state abolition, as they adopt “Atlantic,” or global frameworks. The last work to 
systematically examine northern state slavery abolition as a regional phenomenon unleashed by the 
American Revolution is Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), although Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s Cause: A History of 
Abolition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016) does devote some attention to the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, emphasizing black activism.  
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wholly righteous, nor should capitalism be treated as an unqualified boon to all classes in 
American society. This dissertation does not directly attempt to resolve these deep ambiguities, if 
they can be at all, but to situate American northeastern abolitionism in the economic context in 
which it flowered: the spread of agrarian, proto-industrial, and mercantile capitalism, an 
outgrowth of the massive transformation of the American Revolution.  
A direct outgrowth of the Revolution, the organization of abolition societies in the 
American Northeast (and the Chesapeake) spurred the development of abolitionist political 
programs. The activities of abolition societies varied in response to local and state contexts; 
some societies focused primarily on fighting the African and intercontinental slave trades, others 
on securing state-level abolition legislation. To different degrees and with varying resources, 
northeastern abolition societies organized petition campaigns to state and national governments, 
pressed for the passage and subsequent enforcement of state-level abolition legislation, created 
programs to promote moral and economic uplift for freed black Americans, and worked to 
uphold state and national slave trade prohibitions and regulatory legislation. Scholars have 
debated the overarching aims and effectiveness of groups like the Pennsylvania Abolition 
Society, the New-York Manumission Society, and the Providence Society for Abolishing the 
Slave-Trade, to name a few prominent examples. To date, there is a significant historiography 
that emphasizes the slow and halting processes of northeastern state abolition of the slave trade 
and slavery, and the continued existence of racial oppression. 10 
                                                           
10 The touchstone for literature which stresses northeastern abolition’s halting nature, though it does not 
entirely endorse northern state abolition’s incompleteness, is Zilversmit, The First Emancipation. Gary B. 
Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, Freedom By Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Joanne Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual Emancipation and 
“Race” in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Richard Newman, The 
Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of  
North Carolina Press, 2002); Emily Blanck, Tyrannicide: Forging an American Law of Slavery in Revolutionary 
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Whether they were elitist conservatives or precursors to modern-day liberalism, 
northeastern abolitionists and their societies initiated a decades-long, often aggressive political 
and public relations campaigns that ultimately resulted in the eradication of chattel slavery north 
of the Chesapeake and significant, if at times illegally flouted, sanctions on the foreign slave 
trade before Congressional abolition in 1808.11 While this dissertation recognizes that 
northeastern state abolition was an imperfect process, it emphasizes the successes of 
Revolutionary Era and Early National abolitionism. Several recent works, especially books that 
explore race and racial politics in these periods, either implicitly or explicitly ignore that 
northeastern state slavery abolition happened at all.12 This dissertation offers a new history of 
northeastern abolition, one that attempts to explain why it happened, rooting the processes in 
moral and political economies that reflected deep prejudices against chattel slavery and the 
political and economic power of slaveholders. 
The title of this dissertation deserves brief explanation. The usage of “human capital” 
bears a slight relation to labor economists’ use of the term, in that it is meant to evoke 
northeastern abolitionists’ widespread belief that abolishing chattel slavery would promote 
                                                           
South Carolina and Massachusetts (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2014); James J. Gigantino, The 
Ragged Road to Abolition: Slavery and Freedom in New Jersey, 1775-1865 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016). One need not deny white racism and discrimination, however, to argue that 
northeastern state abolition was historically unprecedented, and initiated and completed with historic 
rapidity between 1777 and 1827. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of the 
processes of northeastern state abolition. In any case, antislavery and anti-racism were philosophically 
inseparable. See Herbert Aptheker, Anti-Racism in U.S. History: The First Two Hundred Years (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1992).  
11 For interpretations that emphasize Early National antislavery societies’ elitist conservatism, in 
particular the PAS, see Newman, Transformation of American Abolitionism; Nash and Soderlund, Freedom 
By Degrees. Paul J. Polgar, A Well-Grounded Hope: Abolishing Slavery and Racial Inequality in the Early 
American Republic (University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming), implicitly equates Early National 
abolitionism to modern-day liberalism, emphasizing their commitment to racial egalitarianism. 
12 See, for example, Nicholas Guyatt, Bind Us Apart: How Enlightened Americans Invented Racial Segregation 
(New York: Basic Books, 2016); Robert L. Parkinson, The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the 
American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).  
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“industry” and “economy,” to use diction they constantly invoked in their writings. This usage is 
inspired by Revolutionary Era philosopher and economist Adam Smith’s conception of skills 
acquired by workers as a valuable form of fixed capital, “the acquired and useful abilities of all 
the inhabitants or members of society.”13 When northeastern abolitionists justified chattel slavery 
abolition as a way to promote “industry” and “economy,”  they meant not only the cultural 
attributes of sobriety and industriousness, but also the tangible industries of commodity 
production. Sobriety and industriousness could be promoted in African-Americans, and in 
society as a whole, through abolishing the status of chattel slavery, thus motivating labor and 
encouraging technological experimentation and agricultural improvements. They believed that 
industry and economy could be encouraged by policy in individuals, but more importantly in free 
households, in which parents retained secure, legal right to their children. In these conditions—
communities freed of the deleterious effects of chattel slavery and which encouraged 
industriousness—domestic manufacturing would bloom, securing American economic 
independence and fulfilling the promise of the North American continent’s bounteous natural 
resources. “Human capital,” then, denotes a vision of slavery abolition encouraging labor 
productivity and economic diversification emphasizing unbound labor and the free household 
model. 
In order to buttress the two major arguments of this dissertation, that the northeastern 
abolition of chattel slavery was historically rapid, and secondly that it was rooted in diversified 
agrarian, proto-industrial, and lastly mercantile northeastern capitalist economies in the Early 
Republic, this dissertation is organized into six chapters and conclusion. The first chapter 
provides a survey of the northeastern regional economies through 1775, the purpose of which is 
                                                           
13 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book II, Chapter 1.  
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to establish a broad comparative context for understanding the regional differences between the 
New England and the mid-Atlantic—the Northeast, in the terminology I employ—and the Upper 
and Lower South. The second chapter explores the British-American imperial crisis after 1763, 
focusing on the activities of abolitionists like Anthony Benezet, among others, and the 
efflorescence of abolitionist literature in response to the unfolding crisis. The third chapter shifts 
the analytical lens to the individual state level, re-examining the individual processes of state 
chattel slavery abolition in the Northeast, and the conditions and politicking that made their 
initial success possible. The first three chapters function as an opening tryptic, establishing a 
contextual basis for the conflicts of the political economy of slavery and freedom that grew in the 
Early Republic.  
The fourth chapter picks up the story of northeastern abolitionism after the ratification of 
the Constitution, detailing the activities of abolitionists and abolition societies as they strove to 
uphold chattel slavery abolition and counter northeastern merchants’ participation in the African 
and intercontinental slave trades. The analysis then transitions in the fifth chapter to an 
exploration of the conjunctions between abolitionism and capitalist economic development. It 
develops the concept of antislavery capitalism: visions of economic development rooted in 
agricultural improvements and the promotion of domestic manufacturing. Proponents of this 
political economy were not always abolitionists—that is, they did not necessarily directly 
contribute to abolitionist political and public relations campaigns—but their visions of regional 
and national political economy had distinctly antislavery implications. Moreover, capitalists like 
Moses Brown, whose investment funded the first successful mechanized textile mill in the 
United States, viewed capitalism and abolitionism as related, even consonant. If men like Tench 
Coxe, for example, believed that cotton textiles manufacturing had a significant role to play in 
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promoting American economic security, it would be a mistake to argue that they supported the 
interests of southern slaveholders to the extent that the “slavery capitalism” historians suggest. 
The sixth and final chapter extends this analysis through 1820 and the Missouri Crisis, 
incorporating discussion of western expansion into the Old Northwest. The conclusion gestures 














Ch. 1: Free Household Farms, Manufactures, and Merchants That Traded Slaves: 
Northeastern Economies and Capitalism in the Colonial Period  
  
 Medford, Massachusetts, in Middlesex County a handful of miles north of Boston, had an 
economy typical of New England in the eighteenth century, centered on free household 
agriculture and family-based craft manufactures. While free households predominated in 
Medford, slavery had long existed the New England countryside and local merchants 
participated in the African slave trade on a small scale. Men like Medford merchant Timothy 
Fitch financed, organized, and directed trade in commoditized human beings, like the 1761 
voyage that brought the future poetess Phillis Wheatley to Massachusetts. As the eighteenth 
century progressed, Medford’s agricultural and household manufacturing economies became 
increasingly integrated with Boston. According to a nineteenth century historian of Medford, as 
“Boston became a large town, [Medford’s] farmers were prompt in supplying it with milk… This 
led to raising cows on an extensive scale; while this, in its turn, led to raising grass and hay in 
preference to corn.” The mid-nineteenth century authors of Medford’s town history remarked 
that of industrial plants, “Medford has never had many, in the modern sense of the term. Among 
the towns first settlers, every house was, in one sense, a factory; for almost every one had a 
spinning wheel and loom.” At the same time, the town also harbored a saltpeter manufacturer, a 
small spermaceti candle works, as well as brick makers, distillers, and small ship builders. 
 Gauzy as this 1855 description of Medford’s early free household economies might be, it did 
contain kernels of truth. It described the early stages of Medford’s transition to market 
production, a process that unfolded in the Northeast in the eighteenth century, a step towards the 
development of diversified regional economies that wove together free household agriculture, 
manufactures, and local and external commerce. This account, in other words, described 
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Medford’s transition to capitalism. The authors further elucidated a shift in the town’s social 
structure that portended significant change not just for Medford, but for New England and the 
Northeast as a region. By the late colonial period, Medford’s growth led to a corresponding 
move away from using enslaved labor. In 1754, forty-nine slaves inhabited the town, but ten 
years later, at the beginning of the British-American imperial crisis, the community counted 
forty-nine free blacks in its population.1  
Why did chattel slavery decline in Medford, and why did its town meetings repeatedly 
petition the Massachusetts assembly to proscribe slave importations in the 1760s and 1770s, even 
as locals like Timothy Fitch clearly profited from the slave trade? The foundations of slavery’s 
decline in the Northeast in the Revolutionary Era had roots in the interconnected agricultural, 
household manufacturing, and commercial economic traits that towns like Medford developed by 
the late colonial period. The British North American colonies in the Upper and Lower South did 
not exhibit the same contours of economic development before the American Revolution, 
because their plantation-based economies often generated large profits for slaveholders, but 
resulted in exaggerated wealth inequality within the free population—not to mention the 
dehumanizing violence and psychological torture the enslaved endured daily. While plantation 
slavery did not take root in the Northeast, current scholarly paradigms emphasize the complicity 
of the entire North American continent in the entrenchment of chattel slavery in the Chesapeake, 
Lower South, and Caribbean. It is now a truism among historians to say that New Englanders 
                                                           
1 Charles Brooks and William Henry Whitmore, History of the Town of Medford, Massachusetts, From its First 
Settlement, in 1630, to the Present Time, 1855 (Boston: James M. Usher, 1855), pp. 19, 352-353, 438. New 
England town histories dating from antebellum and post-Civil War periods often omitted or underplayed 
the presence of both enslaved and free blacks. Even accounting for such omissions, the decline of slavery 
in Medford and other towns like it is the salient point for this discussion. For more detail on Wheatley’s 
life, see Vincent Carretta, Phillis Wheatley: A Biography of A Genius in Bondage (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2011).  
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were just as responsible for the inhumane system of American chattel slavery as southern 
mainland and Caribbean planters, because the slave trade contributed mightily to their 
commercial economies, and by the nineteenth century southern cotton developed into an 
important American commodity crop. Scholars that highlight northeastern complicity in southern 
mainland and Caribbean plantation slavery also tend to emphasize the importance of enslaved 
labor in the social structures and internal economies of New England and the mid-Atlantic 
colonies, usually centering their analyses on coastal cities and their commercial economies.2 This 
historiographical trend, however, ignores the structural foundations of New England society and 
economy: the free household agriculture and family-based manufacturing in rural localities. 
Scholarly interpretations of agricultural development in the British North American 
colonies, particularly the Northeast, pivot on the question of “market-dependence,” the extent to 
which free household farmers specialized their output to generate income, or remained self-
sufficient with little need or desire to engage in market participation. The former, a 
“commercialization-staples” model, argues that late colonial period farmers experienced “the 
intensive development of commodity-production and exchange,” meaning that free household 
farmers chose to maximize their output, and therefore potential profits, to invest in land 
purchases and farm improvements. The latter, or “demographic-frontier” model, emphasizes the 
extensive geographic growth of colonial agriculture as a result of the uniquely low North 
                                                           
2 See, for example, the essays in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, discussed in the 
Introduction. Wendy Warren, New England Bound: Slavery and Colonization in Early America (New York: 
Liveright, 2016), a widely praised book that asserts the fundamentality of African and Native American 
slavery to early Massachusetts, but which confuses the existence of slavery in Massachusetts with its 
social and economic significance. Part of the confusion arises from a consistent failure to adequately 
distinguish labor regimes and legal statuses. Thus, for example, Warren claims that “The role of slave 
labor in the West Indies in fueling [the English imperial economy’s] tremendous growth is clear… The 
role of enslaved labor in New England in creating the wealth is, however, largely invisible, because 
enslaved people there did not do different work from their English counterparts; their slave labor was not 
distinguished from free labor.” Ibid., pp. 117-118. See also Jared Ross Hardesty, Unfreedom: Slavery and 
Dependence in Eighteenth-Century Boston (New York: New York University Press, 2016).  
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American ratio of labor-to-land. This model explains agricultural expansion on the western 
frontiers as independent of external market coercion, because colonists had abundant access to 
western land after Native American removal, over which imperial authorities had very little 
power to enforce legal property claims of coastal and metropolitan land speculators.3 By the late 
eighteenth century, it is clear that free household farmers in southern New England, and those in 
proximity to northeastern towns and cities, increasingly produced for external markets. Even so, 
by the late colonial period market production did not dominate the rural agricultural and 
household manufacturing economies of New England and the mid-Atlantic. 
Across the Northeast, agrarian social structures and economic culture discouraged the 
concentration of vast individual landholdings, unlike in the Upper and Lower South colonies. 
While in the late colonial period slave-holding was common in mid-Atlantic agricultural 
operations, especially in the Delaware and Hudson River Valleys and Long Island, intensive 
concentrations of landed wealth and human property did not predominate. Northeastern 
abolitionists made this point repeatedly in the late 1760s and early 1770s, as they denounced the 





                                                           
3 These two models are characterized by Charles Post, The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-
Structure, Economic Development, and Political Conflict, 1620-1877 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), esp. pp. 
73-102, 103-130, 155-194. Quotation p. 160. The two interpretations have long been the subject of scholarly 
debate. Recent work has cast doubt on the view of northern family farmers as technologically backward, 
“slovenly” agriculturalists who were divorced from market relations in the late colonial period. See the 
overview provided by Russell R. Menard, “Colonial America’s Mestizo Agriculture,” in Cathy D. Matson, 
ed., The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 107-122. 
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 For most people living in New England in the eighteenth century, family farming and 
craft manufacturing of textiles, household and leather goods, and foodstuffs defined life and 
labor. While the West Indian and transatlantic trades were robust, as they circulated fish and 
lumber products throughout the Atlantic world and returned sugar and molasses, luxury 
manufactured goods, and most importantly specie, the most recent works on the economy of 
early New England give the distinct impression that external trade was fundamental to sustain 
life in New England.4 The region, moreover, was ironically a significant participant and yet still 
a periphery in the transatlantic currents of commercial life in the British Atlantic world in the 
eighteenth century. The basic fact of colonial New England was that the majority of colonists 
lived outside coastal cities and worked in mixed agricultural-commodity production economies. 
Many New Englanders lived in towns like Medford, close to growing urban clusters, but the 
family farm and small town remained the focus of their laboring lives. While variations among 
towns and micro-regions always obtained, it is possible to sketch a generalized description of the 
mixed farming-commodity production economies of rural New England. 
The free household farm was the primary unit of agricultural production through the late 
colonial period and Revolution. In the decades after the initial Puritan settlement of 
Massachusetts, the New England colonies developed land distribution patterns that emphasized 
the replication of free household units that primarily utilized family and seasonal labor to 
                                                           
4 This is in part due to the fact that merchant houses kept detailed records which are often easily 
consulted by modern historians. In a broader sense, moreover, after three decades of first Atlantic, and 
now global, historical frameworks becoming entrenched, many historians’ instinct is to look for external 
economic connections. One consequence of these developments is that agriculture is sidelined as a crucial 
economic activity, except when agricultural activities were forcibly performed by slaves on plantations in 
the Caribbean and southern mainland North America. This is in stark contrast to the social historians of 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, that wrote detailed micro-histories of towns and rural localities especially in 
New England. The methodologies of social history were applied to the New England “transition to 
capitalism” debates of the 1970s and 1980s, discussed below.   
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produce agricultural products for immediate family and local consumption.5 Authorities in New 
England towns closely regulated local labor markets so that agricultural and craft production 
proceeded on relatively small landholdings, prioritizing free household patriarch and local 
authorities’ control over production regimes. Over several generations New England 
landholdings became increasingly parcellized, as inheritance patterns created smaller family 
farm holdings, leading to social differentiation in New England towns, which some historians 
view as the precondition for capitalist development in the region.6 Still, the New England 
agricultural economy never developed extreme concentrations of land ownership among 
relatively few persons, as did the Upper and Lower South colonies. Unlike the Upper and Lower 
South, New England developed a unique political economy which suppressed the concentration 
of wealth in vast landholdings and ownership of human property.  
New England’s town-based system of economic organization was far more egalitarian 
than the Upper and Lower South, and slavery was relatively rare outside of cities and large 
towns.7 A 1762 English encyclopedia of North America noted these dynamics of property 
ownership, comparing them to Kent county in southeastern England. While many large 
landholders rented land to tenants or hired overseers to administer their estates, “the greater part 
of the people is composed of an independent and substantial yeomanry.” The custom and law of 
inheritance, which encouraged parcellized landholdings, “makes the people the more ready to go 
backward into the uncultivated parts of the country, where land is to be had at easy rates.”  While 
                                                           
5 Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) shows this process in detail in this county of ten 
towns. Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of New England (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1995) argues that a “civic ecology” that emphasized community-based economic relations 
defined New England.  
6 For a review of this literature, see Post, The American Road to Capitalism, esp. Ch. 2.  
7 Barry Levy, Town Born: The Political Economy of New England from Its Founding to the Revolution 
(Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2009). 
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western migration led to the dispersal of family and kinship networks, it also had salutary effects 
on the lived experience of the average New Englander: “In no part of the world are the ordinary 
so independent, or possess so many of the conveniences of life.”8 During the imperial crisis, New 
England abolitionists grounded their arguments against slavery and the slave trade in a desire to 
perpetuate this relatively egalitarian mode of agricultural production, believing that to perpetuate 
slavery would fatally damage their unique political economic organization, one that suppressed 
the concentration of landed wealth and property. 
By the late colonial period, New England family farmers produced a wide range of crops 
for their own subsistence needs, as well as for local trade and barter. Outside observers typically 
noted the poor quality of soil in the New England colonies when describing the region’s free 
household agricultural economies, arguing that New England farmers should pursue 
improvements to wring maximum production out of rocky and resistant soils.9 Southeastern New 
England contained the best soils in the region, consisting of “a black mold on a red loam or 
clay,” but throughout the region the primary subsistence crop mixes included maize, garden 
vegetables, and fruits, in addition to dairy products produced by farm wives and children.10 At all 
                                                           
8 The American Gazetteer. Containing A distinct Account of all the Parts of the New World: Their Situation, 
Climate, Soil, Produce, Former and Present Condition; Commodities, Manufactures, and Commerce. Together with 
An accurate Account of the Cities, Towns, Ports, Bays, Rivers, Lakes, Mountains, Passes, and Fortifications. The 
whole intended to exhibit. The Present State of Things in that Part of the Globe, and the Views and Interests of the 
several Powers who have Possessions in America. Illustrated with proper Maps, 3 Vols. (London: A. Millar, 
1762), I: “England, New” entry. There is no pagination in this three volume encyclopedia. For this and all 
future citations, I will refer to the entry title. The next line would bode ill for the British Empire little more 
than ten years later, at the height of the imperial crisis: “They are raised from infancy to the exercise of 
arms; they have a militia, which, as such, is by no means contemptible.”  
9 See Cathy D. Matson, “A House of Many Mansions,” in Matson, ed., “The Economy of Early America,” 
pp. 29-30, and works cited therein. Daniel Vickers, “Errors Expected: The Culture of Credit in Rural New 
England, 1750-1800,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 63 No. 4 (November 2010), pp. 1032-1057, uses the 
diaries of three rural New England free household farms to uncover the quite diversified nature of rural 
agriculture activity. See also Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, Ch. 5. 
10 An American, American Husbandry: Containing an Account of the Soil, Climate, Production and Agriculture 
of the British Colonies in North American and the West Indies; with Observations on the Advantages and 
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turns, family members provided the overwhelming majority of farm labor in the late colonial 
period, with chattel slavery and indentured servitude rare in rural New England, being largely 
confined to the large towns and cities.  
While New England towns relied heavily on Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey 
for importations of wheat and flour, one traveler noted that farms usually “raised a small quantity 
of common wheat” in addition to barley and oats.11 In general, however, across the region family 
farms raised maize as their primary grain crop. According to another English chronicler of New 
England agriculture, “Indian corn… makes the common food of the lowest sort of people,” 
suggesting that wheat and flour imported into the region was primarily consumed by wealthier 
New Englanders in large towns and cities.12 In general, maize, and in some cases rye, was the 
first crop planted by colonial pioneer farmers, especially in the southern portions of the region. 
New Englanders consumed corn in several ways, as bread and in ears, extracting the syrup as a 
sweetener, as well as using it to brew a beer that “is not despicable,” according to a rather 
haughty English description.13 
Apples were the primary orchard fruit produced in New England, and contemporaries 
noted that “there is no farmer, or even cottager, without a large orchard: some of them of such 
extent, that they make three or four hundred hogsheads of cyder a man.”14 Other observers noted 
that particularly fecund apples trees could produce “six or seven barrels, at the rate of eight or 
nine bushels to the barrel.” In 1767, Middlesex County, Massachusetts alone produced 33,436 
barrels of cider, and Connecticut Rev. Timothy Dwight recorded the cultivation of more than a 
                                                           
Disadvantages of Settling in Them, Compared with Great Britain and Ireland, in Two Volumes (London: J. Bew, 
1775), I: pp. 46-47.  
11 American Husbandry, I: p. 52. 
12 American Gazetteer, I: “England, New” entry.  
13 American Gazetteer, I: “England, New” entry.  
14 American Husbandry, pp. 56-57. 
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dozen apple varieties throughout the region.15  In addition to apples, other fruits native to the 
region and harvested by free household farms included grapes, currants, strawberries, 
raspberries, and “whitehorn-haws, as big as [English] cherries.”16  
While the quality of New England’s soil was generally of inferior quality than that of the 
mid-Atlantic and the Upper and Lower South, in general it allowed for significant pasturage, 
which made farm animals and the foodstuffs and farm products derived from them a significant 
aspect of New England’s agricultural economy. By the mid-eighteenth century, English 
pasturage grasses spread throughout the region, and family farms produced considerable 
quantities of hay, with two to three tons a common yield.17 Free household farms preferred to 
maintain about two acres of their landholdings in pasturage, “as they are thereby enabled to 
support large herds of cattle, and flocks of sheep, which must improve their farms.”18 Indeed, 
family farms devoted significant energy to tending cattle, sheep, and swine, from which they 
derived value in foodstuffs and wool.  
Colonial New England farmers, English travelers sometimes noted, hesitated to adopt 
advanced English farming techniques like the introduction of nitrogen-rich fodder grasses such 
as clover, or the systematic use of manure as fertilizer, but it was also just as likely that they 
remained unaware of these advanced techniques at mid-century. Intensive convertible husbandry, 
pioneered by English agricultural reformer Jethro Tull around the turn of the eighteenth century, 
did not become widespread in the Northeast until after the Revolution, though by the 1770s some 
scientific-minded farmers in southern New England began to experiment with Tull’s 
                                                           
15 Bidwell, Agriculture in the Northern United States, p. 99.  
16 American Gazetteer, I: “England, New” entry. 
17 Bidwell, Agriculture in the Northern United States, pp. 20-21.  
18 American Gazetteer, I: “England, New” entry. American Husbandry, pp. 56-57. 
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techniques.19 Even without advanced techniques, northeastern free household farms typically 
produced more than subsistence. Most importantly, by the Revolution excess crop and dairy 
production in New England began to find important domestic markets linked to nascent urban 
centers and the coastwise trades, as was the case for Medford. The spread of agricultural wage 
labor markets in Massachusetts, moreover, suggests that free household farms increasingly relied 
on temporary wage labor outside the family to meet their production needs when necessary at 
specific points throughout the year, especially harvest. Wage rates for temporary and seasonal 
agricultural laborers remained relatively constant from 1750 until the Revolution, although there 
was a steep spike in per day wages as the war began in 1776.20 
New England free household agriculture centered on local communities. Family farms 
congregated around small and large towns often operated in self-sufficiently, with household-
made manufactures circulating in relatively small trade networks.21 With the important exception 
of lumber products like staves, shingles, and shook-down barrels that found markets in the West 
                                                           
19 Lemon, “Agriculture and Society in Early America,” p. 84. An American, American Husbandry, I: pp. 53-
54, described how farmers in “some parts” of Connecticut and Rhode Island had begun to adopt “the 
English system of making clovers a preparation for corn; they leave the grass upon the land as many 
years as it will yield tolerable crops, and then plough it up, and sow wheat, which is found a much better 
management than the common one.” 
20 Winifred B. Rothenberg, “The Emergence of Labor Markets and the Transformation of the Rural 
Economy: Massachusetts, 1750-1855,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 48 No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 
537-566, esp. Figure 1, p. 541. Rothenberg based her computations on the account books of ninety farmers.  
21 Social historians in the 1970s, 80s, and early 1990s produced detailed works on towns and counties in 
New England which detailed the methods of household agriculture, manufacturing, and trade in colonial 
New England. Some representative examples of these works are Kenneth Lockridge, A New England 
Town: The First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); 
Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990); Winifred B. Rothenberg, From Market-Places to Market Economy: The Transformation 
of Rural Massachusetts, 1750-1850 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). While these and other works 
use different methodological techniques and often disagree about the timing of the “transition to 
capitalism” in New England, they all document local agricultural and household manufacturing 
economies that displayed significant interconnectedness by the late colonial period. A recent work that 
provides a cultural history of change in New England rural agricultural society is J. M. Opal, Beyond the 
Farm: National Ambitions in Rural New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
Opal argues that a “moral economy” tradition that celebrated industriousness predominated in the late 
colonial period, shifting to an emphasis on cultural nationalism in the early 19th century.  
27 
 
Indies, the New England countryside did not produce significant trade commodities primarily 
intended for external markets.22 Typically, the furthest external markets for rural commodities 
were large towns and cities like Boston, Providence, and New Haven, and it was in the cities that 
the countryside free household agriculture and manufacturing and the Atlantic commercial 
economies interacted. In this economic context, the cultural attribute of industriousness and the 
growth of household manufacturing  pushed free households to work to achieve a “competency,” 
a minimum level of household consumption and a respectable standard of living.23 
Contemporaries noted the high productivity of farms in the Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey, usually attributing their fruitfulness to the region’s superior soil quality. One 
observer in the 1770s recorded that “many parts of [New York] yields a larger produce than is 
common in England,” and that the quality of the soil was “in general very good.” The “richness 
and freshness of the soil” yielded 20 to 30 bushels of wheat per acre, “and this with such bad 
husbandry as would not yield the like in England, and much less in Scotland.” He also remarked 
on the extensive cultivation of corn and barley “in all the southern parts of the province,” though 
he considered New York’s of inferior quality to that grown in Europe. Potatoes were also widely 
cultivated in New York, which he attributed to higher quality soil, a “black, loose, fresh 
woodland” that produced “very great crops.” Crucially, the growing urban center of New York 
City provided a “constant and ready market” for locally grown produce, a comment that was 
equally true of the southeastern hinterlands of Pennsylvania which supplied Philadelphia. He 
described “rich pastures” and the cultivation of a wide variety of fruits like peaches and 
                                                           
22 This, of course, distinguished New England from the Upper and Lower South’s slavery-based 
commodity-export economies.  
23 Daniel Vickers, “Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 47 No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 3-29. It of course must be noted that not all households in 
colonial New England achieved “competency,” and that social differentiation was prevalent in rural areas 
(and more so in cities).  
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nectarines, as well as “immense quantities of melons” grown near New York City. The fecundity 
of kitchen gardens also jumped out to this observer, which exhibited the “same superiority [that] 
runs throughout all their fruits…”24 In and around Albany, observers noted significant 
agricultural productivity. In addition to pear, peach, and cherry trees, the predominantly ethnic 
Dutch and German farmers in the region grew maize “in great abundance,” as well as profitably 
producing wheat. A traveler noted of German family farmers lived in large villages, and “sow 
great quantities of wheat, which is brought to Albany; and from thence they send many yachts 
laden with flour to New York.”25 
Grains cultivated by Pennsylvania farmers included maize, barley, and oats, but most 
importantly wheat, “the grand article of the province.” Pennsylvania farmers produced “immense 
quantities” of wheat on farms near Philadelphia and increasingly in the western backcountry, in 
average quantities of “25 to 32 bushels per acre.”26 Like New York, in the early 1770s 
Pennsylvania farmers remained largely unacquainted with Jethro Tull’s innovative techniques, 
though some more modern-minded, and wealthier, farmers began to adopt the latest English 
innovations before the Revolution. Even without the widespread utilization of Tull’s techniques, 
by the late colonial period land distribution policies in Pennsylvania led to the widespread 
ownership of freeholds in rural Pennsylvania, and family farmers who worked the land as tenants 
did so on less onerous terms than earlier in the eighteenth century. These developments largely 
                                                           
24 An American, American Husbandry, I: pp. 95-100. 
25 Pehr Kalm, Travels into North America; containing its natural history, and a circumstantial account of its 
plantations and agriculture in general, With The Civil, Ecclesiastical And Commercial State Of The Country, The 
Manners of the Inhabitants, and several curious and Important Remarks on various Subjects. By Peter Kalm, 
Professor of Oeconomy in the University of Aobo in Swedish Finland, and Member of the Swedish Royal Academy 
of Sciences. Translated into English by John Reinhold Forster, F. A. S. Enriched with a Map, several Cuts for the 
Illustration of Natural History, and some additional Notes… 3 Vols. (Warrington: William Eyres, 1770), II: pp. 
245-246. 
26 An American, American Husbandry, I: p. 158. 
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owed to the Penn family’s sale of proprietary lands at reasonable prices after 1733, and 
Pennsylvania farmers took advantage of widespread freehold property ownership to expand 
production of wheat to supply flour to Philadelphia merchants, who then distributed to coastwise 
markets in North America, and from thence secondarily to the West Indies and southern 
European markets.27 
Common vegetables raised in Pennsylvania included cabbage and turnips, cultivated for 
both human and cattle consumption. Raised to an “immense size, and without any very 
extraordinary culture, though they seldom attempt them without dung,” these vegetables graced 
dining tables and filled cattle troughs throughout the colony.28 Cattle raising was an important 
part of the agricultural economy in the hinterlands near Philadelphia, as farmers kept “great 
flocks of cattle: some of them have forty to sixty horses; and four or five hundred head of horned 
cattle, oxen, cows, bulls, calves, and young cattle…”29 A British traveler to North America 
summed up the fecundity of the mid-Atlantic agricultural economies by way of comparing them 
to his observations of Chesapeake farms and plantations. The Rev. Andrew Burnaby, an 
Anglican minister at Leicester, described southeast Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey as 
being “much better cultivated” than Virginia and Maryland, which he had just visited at length. 
He found the soils of the region to be “extremely strong and fertile,” and concluded that 
“cultivation is carried to a high degree of perfection,” in both quantity and quality of farm 
                                                           
27 Mary Schweitzer, Custom and Contract: Household, Government, and Economy in Colonial Pennsylvania 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).  
28 An American, American Husbandry, p. 164. 
29 Ibid., p. 167. 
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produce. He further contrasted Pennsylvania with the southern colonies, where in the latter he 
found agriculture to be “in a very low state.”30 
The organization of agricultural production in the Northeast generated economies 
relatively independent from the immediate need to produce directly for external markets. More 
so than the commodity-export commercial and agricultural economies of the southern colonies, 
the northeastern colonies supported extensive domestic consumption markets rooted in free 
household agriculture and manufacturing economies by the late colonial period, even as they 
groaned under British imperial manufacturing restrictions. Undoubtedly, external commerce in 
transatlantic trade networks contributed English manufactures, Caribbean sugar products, 
southern mainland tobacco, and dozens of other commodities which helped fuel the development 
of domestic consumption in the Northeast. At the same time, Revolutionary Era abolitionists 
could conceive of the region shorn of direct connections to slavery in the Caribbean and the 
African and intercontinental slave trades because their agricultural and household manufacturing 




The agricultural labor force in the mid-Atlantic consisted primarily of family members, 
but also included a significant population of British and European servants and to a lesser extent 
African slaves. Temporary bound labor was commonplace especially in Pennsylvania, a fact 
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widely acknowledged by contemporary observers and emphasized by historians. The reasons for 
Pennsylvania freeholders’ utilization of bound labor were two-fold: first, and most importantly a 
pressing need for labor on rural farms; and secondarily, because potential British and European 
bound laborers viewed Pennsylvania as an attractive site for emigration, and thus submitted 
themselves and their families to temporary bound labor in the hopes that “the best poor man’s 
country” was not an empty moniker. The irony of Pennsylvania’s colonial reputation as a haven 
for the oppressed, but the reality of its freeholders’ use of bound labor has certainly not escaped 
historians: the key modern work on life and labor in Pennsylvania is entitled “Runaway 
America,” and juxtaposes the lived experience of bound laborers with Benjamin Franklin’s 
homilies promoting working-class industriousness.32  
Foreign travelers to Pennsylvania noted the unique labor regime of Pennsylvania (and the 
broader mid-Atlantic region), but clearly contrasted slavery and servitude—a distinction that 
modern historians sometimes elide in discussions of “unfree” labor in the British Atlantic.33 
“Pennsylvania is not without negroe slaves for cultivation,” an observer noted, “though the 
number bears no proportion to white servants.” As in England, it was common practice for 
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Pennsylvania farmers to hire servants by the year, and in the 1770s wage rates for male farm 
hands hovered between £10-£16 per year, with female “maids” earning from £5-£7 annually. A 
second kind of servitude especially common in Pennsylvania was indentured “redemptioners,” 
typically families that could not (or would not) pay their passage from Europe or Great Britain in 
whole, and thus contracted their labor for a period of years in exchange. British travelers noted 
that Pennsylvania law strictly regulated the master-servant relationship, compelling masters to 
feed and clothe their bound laborers, and indentured servants, redemptioners, and seasonally-
employed wage workers often experienced quite different work regimes and treatment. “These 
distinctions in servitude are met with in our other colonies,” a British visitor noted, referring to 
the northeastern colonies, “but they do not occur so often, because for one newcomer in them, 
there are twenty at Philadelphia.”34  
Recent historiography cuts several different, and often contradictory, ways with regards 
to the significance of slavery and servitude, as well as the economic significance of the slave 
trade, to New England and the mid-Atlantic. A tendency of the “slavery capitalism” historians is 
to assume the importance of chattel slavery and the slave trade to the entire portion of North 
America that would become the United States, though recognizing the obvious distinctions in 
significance between the Northeast and Upper and Lower South.35 Another recent work finds 
significant differences in the political economy and labor markets of New England and 
Pennsylvania, counterpoising the tightly controlled labor markets of New England (where 
slavery and bound servitude were relatively uncommon) with the “free labor markets” of 
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Pennsylvania. In this view, the higher prevalence of temporary bound labor in Pennsylvania 
existed in stark contrast to Massachusetts.36  
A mid-18th century Swedish traveler to the mid-Atlantic, Pehr Kalm described wage and 
temporary bound labor with an air of familiarity, and chattel slavery with a tinge of academic 
dislike. Kalm observed three forms of labor: “quite free” laborers who agreed to work for wages 
and could leave their employer on their own will, indentured servants and redemptioners, and 
chattel slaves. The latter he described as “the purchaser’s servant as long as he lives, unless he 
gives him to another, or makes him free.” Kalm noted that Pennsylvania Quakers had a history of 
moral antislavery—personal qualms about the propriety of slavery rooted in religious beliefs—
but did not let the sect entirely off the hook, noting that “they are no longer so nice, and they 
have as many Negroes as other people.” Immediately after this comment, Kalm pivoted and 
identified a strain of antislavery that extended beyond Pennsylvania Quakers, and thus the views 
of most historians of pre-Revolution antislavery. “However many people cannot conquer the idea 
of [slavery] being contrary to the laws of christianity to keep slaves,” Kalm pointed out, due to 
an aversion against the total alienation and bodily disownment of the chattel principle. He 
proceeded to analyze, at length, all the ways in which the enslaved were held in a state of 
debasement in the mid-Atlantic, North America, and the Caribbean, but the fact that he observed 
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non-Quaker antislavery points to a latent critique of slavery that would be politically unleashed 




Before the American Revolution, most rural northeastern farm families either produced 
their own woolen and flaxen textiles, or obtained them through local trade markets. In the 1760s 
and early 1770s, as British textile manufacturers inaugurated a shift towards industrial 
production, in New England (as well as Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey), most people 
lived outside urban areas, and therefore had intermittent access to British or European made 
textiles. Spinning was an activity typically performed by women and children, and while men 
had traditionally predominated in weaving, historians have discovered that the task was 
increasingly “feminized” by the Revolutionary Era. References to “homespun” clothing abound 
in accounts of New England communities, and the cloths and material objects that New 
Englanders produced in their homes spawned a culture of local consumption and production that 
later generations accustomed to industrial textiles romanticized as “the age of homespun.” As the 
leading historian of the economy and culture of “homespun” notes, the expansion of participation 
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in and production for markets outside local communities, northeasterners consumed “store-
bought” and homemade fabrics in tandem by the end of the eighteenth century.38 
Production statistics for northeastern “homespun” production are noticeably lacking 
before 1790, when the Washington administration attempted to assess the productivity of 
American manufacturing, textile and otherwise, led by Treasury Secretary and Assistant 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton and Tench Coxe.39 By the 1760s, however, household textile 
manufacturing was sufficiently widespread in the Northeast that elite men began to form 
improvement societies that offered rewards for the best specimens of woolen and linen thread 
and woven fabrics. The emergence of improvement societies was inspired by the non-
importation movements to protest British imperial policy in the mid and late 1760s. These non-
importation movements, however, built on a pre-existing base of household textile production, 
and were primarily concerned promoting American production of fine linens and woolens to 
replace luxury English-made goods.40 While households and plantations throughout colonial 
North America produced “homespun” textiles, contemporaries and modern historians primarily 
identify them with New England and mid-Atlantic free farming households.  
Travelers to Pennsylvania noted that “manufactures are very considerable,” providing the 
example of “thread stockings” made at Germantown. By his estimate, the town’s inhabitants 
produced sixty thousand pairs of the stockings the year before, which retailed for one dollar per 
                                                           
38 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, The Age of Homespun: Objects and Stories in the Creation of An American Myth 
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pair. One traveler also noted the productivity of Irish linen weavers in Pennsylvania; of New 
York, he noted that its household manufactures lagged behind those of their southern neighbors. 
Even so, New York households manufactured “a small amount of cloth, some linen, hats, shoes, 
and other articles of apparel.”41 In 1767, on the other hand, Royal Governor of New York Sir 
Henry Moore conducted a tour of the colony, and he noticed “the custom of these course cloths 
in private families throughout the whole Province, and in almost every House a sufficient 
quantity is manufactured for the use of the Family, without the least design of sending any of it 
to market.” In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, authorities reported no textile factories “which 
deserve to be called by that name,” but that household textile manufactures were common and 
widespread.42  
Most importantly for the political and economic developments of Revolutionary Era and 
Early Republic, the “homespun” production of free households in the Northeast formed the 
template on which capitalists with antislavery instincts like Moses Brown grafted industrial 
production methods in the 1780s and 1790s.43 Burgeoning industrialists like Brown, his son in 
law Nicholas Almy, and their English master mechanic Samuel Slater initially employed family 
units at their early machine-spinning plants, and contracted the weaving of their machine-spun 
yarn to farm families.44 This is not to deny that southern plantations and non-slaveholding 
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families in the Upper and Lower South also produced “homespun” textiles, nor that imported 
English and European textiles were unimportant as consumer goods in the late 18th century. 
Rather, the northeastern reliance on “homespun” goods reflected the broader dynamics of the 
free household agriculture and craft manufacturing economies that differentiated New England 
and the mid-Atlantic from the Upper and Lower South. Further, because the Upper and Lower 
South produced very little cotton before the American Revolution, the household textile 
manufacturing processes which late 18th century capitalists drew upon to develop industrial 
capitalism centered on woolens and linens, and not cotton.45 
Advanced manufacturing technology was largely absent in British North America in the 
colonial period, due to imperial restrictions on colonial industry which supported productions of 
the home isles. A pillar of the mercantilist system, imperial suppression of colonial 
manufacturing took many forms, from direct penalties on individuals and communities that 
attempted to implement new production processes, to discriminatory tariffs on raw materials. But 
much to imperial planners’ chagrin, by the 1760s and 1770s colonists in the Northeast 
increasingly desired to make finished consumer goods and industrial materials for themselves, 
ranging from finer grades of textiles to sophisticated iron products and luxury goods like clothing 
accessories and glass. North America’s bounteous natural resources held promise that the 
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colonies could develop extensive manufacturing and extractive industries, and the Empire’s 
mercantilist prevention of manufacturing moved from critique to grounds for rebellious activity 
by the 1770s, especially in New England.46 The 1750 Iron Act, for example, encouraged colonial 
iron production, but only crude pig and bar iron. The Empire restricted the privilege of producing 
more refined and valuable iron products such as wrought iron to ironmongers in the home isles. 
It was telling that in November 1772 the Boston Town Meeting cited imperial restrictions, 
“restraining us from erecting Slitting-Mills for manufacturing our Iron, the natural produce of 
this country,” claiming “an Infringement of that Right which God and Nature have invested us, 
to make use of our skill and industry in procuring the necessaries and conveniences of life.”47  
Imperial manufacturing restrictions handcuffed prospective colonial manufacturers of 
advanced iron products, but by the late colonial period the New England, middle, and Upper 
South colonies had achieved a relatively robust crude iron industry. As early as the 1640s, 
Massachusetts colonists had established rudimentary iron foundries, which Bay Colony 
authorities further promoted after the English Civil War.48 By the mid-18th century, however, the 
middle colonies had overtaken New England as the chief iron producers in the Northeast, and 
Virginia and Maryland had also developed extensive crude iron-making capability, the largest 
among the North American colonies. Between 1763 and 1775, Pennsylvania exported an average 
of 590 tons of pig iron to England, while New York exported an annual average of 725 tons. By 
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comparison, Virginia and Maryland combined to export and average of 1,843 tons of pig iron to 
the mother country in the same years.49  
The majority of pig and bar iron produced in the British North American colonies was 
intended for domestic use, evident in the amount of North American-made bar iron circulated in 
the North American coastal trade.50 The New England colonies imported the majority of bar iron 
produced in the Upper South and mid-Atlantic. Between 1768 and 1772, the New England 
colonies imported an annual average of 17,458 hundredweights of bar iron from other colonies, 
with Massachusetts absorbing the overwhelming majority, primarily for use in the Bay Colony’s 
extensive shipbuilding operations.51 North American-produced pig and bar iron drove a nascent 
refined iron industry in the New England, as skilled ironworkers transformed crude pig and bar 
iron into custom-made components needed for shipbuilding and other applications. Between 
1760 and 1775, the northeastern colonies counted 114 ironworks, 66% of the total across the 
thirteen colonies.52 These ironworks, however, depended on bar iron produced largely in 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, a connection that involved slavery and temporary bound labor.  
The labor regimes of iron mines and foundries in the Chesapeake and mid-Atlantic (the 
source of the majority of American iron) blended enslaved, temporary bound, and free wage 
labor. A thorough study of the Pennsylvania and Virginia iron industry emphasizes the 
importance of enslaved labor in mines and foundries, as aspiring “adventurers” often preferred to 
use slaves and temporary bound laborers in their enterprises because alienated workers could be 
more easily controlled. This was especially important in mines, where the disagreeable and 
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dangerous work often turned off free wage laborers, and thus contributed to labor unrest. 
Through the prism of the iron industry in Pennsylvania, then, the contention is that slavery was 
critical to the emergence of industrial capitalism in Pennsylvania. Iron products did contribute 
significantly to economic development in the Northeast in the late colonial period, especially as 
inputs in New England shipbuilding, and the table below makes clear that New England was the 
primary importer of bar iron produced in the mainland colonies. In this rendering, capitalism did 
not come over on the first Puritan ships to North America, but emerged from the ships built in 
Massachusetts dockyards in the eighteenth century. But while Pennsylvania iron “adventurers” 
relied on enslaved and temporary bound labor before the American Revolution, after 
independence they increasingly shifted towards using free wage laborers, not a coincidental 
development considering the ongoing process of slavery abolition in the Keystone State 
beginning in 1780.53   
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Table I: Bar Iron Imported from Mainland Colonies, 1768-1772 (in hundredweights) 
 
Year North American 
Total 
New England Total New England Percentage 
1772 33,156 22,428 67.6 
1771 28,084 18,539 66.0 
1770 28,338 20,304 71.6 
1769 21,860 13,947 63.8 
1768 16,905 12,070 71.3 
Average 25,669 17,458 68.1 
 
Source: Historical Statistics of the United State, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), Series Z, pp. 360-373.  
  
 
Connected to, and arguably more important than iron production to the Northeast was the 
shipbuilding industry. Tentative estimates suggest that New England shipbuilders produced 
44,173 in ship tonnage between 1769 and 1771, 68% of the British North American total;  
roughly 40% of this tonnage was sold to offshore metropolitan mercantile interests, contributing 
an average of £75,000 in foreign exchange earnings to British North America, of which New 
England accounted for £44,000.54 The development of the shipbuilding industry created 
networks of production and consumption with tentacles that reached across the Northeast. 
Lumber products, locally fabricated iron components, and dozens of other inputs necessary to 
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ship-building, in addition to the employment of thousands of workers in ship-building yards and 
on the wharves, contributed significantly to northeastern regional economic diversification.55 
By the 1770s, vessels manufactured primarily in New England counted as the fifth-most 
valuable colonial export.56 The structure of the Chesapeake and southern colonies’ economies 
were such that capital and labor, in the form land and slaves, heavily concentrated in plantation 
commodity agriculture, therefore leading to the under-development of capital-intensive 
shipbuilding operations. In the Upper and Lower South shipbuilding lagged far behind the 
Northeast, even though the former did not face competitive disadvantages in natural resources. 
From 1769 until 1771, Maryland and Virginia produced 122 vessels ranging from topsails to 
sloops and schooners. In the same years, Massachusetts alone built 411 vessels, evidence of its 
merchant-capitalists ability to invest capital in shipbuilding enterprises, as well as the availability 
of artisans and common laborers. New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut combined to 
contribute an additional 468 topsails, sloops and schooners between 1769 and 1771. 
Pennsylvania and New York produced 143 vessels in the same years.57  
New England had some competitive advantages that helped the region to produce 
shipping more efficiently and cost-effectively, though often of lower quality, but these were 
balanced by some disadvantages. While all the North American regions had access to timber, 
New England’s lumber industry was historically better-developed; and the same time, it lacked 
direct access to iron ore. The development of shipbuilding in New England was an outgrowth of 
the region’s increasingly diversified commercial economy, as the industry became an important 
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component of the “mixed-farming-fishing-timber economy” that developed in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. New English civil authorities and mercantile interests promoted shipbuilding to 
provide an additional commodity base aside from ocean fisheries, because it could not match the 
staple crop production of the southern colonies. The nature of shipbuilding, in particular its 
demand for processed lumber products, ironwork, and skilled and semiskilled labor, generated 
forward and backward linkages that further contributed to the region’s economic 
diversification.58 By the eve of the American Revolution, New England shipyards produced 
vessels far more cheaply than their North American neighbors. While historians have debated the 
exact cost-per-ton shipbuilding prices at various points in the 17th and 18th centuries, it is clear 
that New England routinely produced ships inexpensively compared to its continental neighbors, 
a minimum of £2 per measured ton.59 
Pennsylvania merchant-financiers began investing heavily in shipping and shipbuilding 
in the early 1770s, though as the above table indicates their shipbuilding operations hewed closer 
in scale to the Upper and Lower South than New England. Whereas earlier in the 18th century, 
metropolitan merchants owned the majority of ships registered in Philadelphia, Philadelphians 
owned more than 75% of locally registered ships by 1775. From 1770-1775, Philadelphia 
merchants annually invested an average of £61,652 in their local shipbuilding industry. One 
historian calculates that by the outbreak of the Revolution, Pennsylvanians had invested almost 
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£500,000 in shipbuilding, and that industry directly or indirectly impacted the business activities 
of the majority of Philadelphia merchant-capitalists by 1775.60 
The extraction and manufacture of timber into shipping containers and construction 
materials was a significant economic activity in the northeastern colonies, given the ubiquity of a 
wide variety wooden containers for storing and transporting trade commodities.61 New England 
took the lead in producing shipping containers to supply the West Indian sugar colonies for use 
in storing and transporting their sugar and molasses, significant percentages of which the sugar 
islands exported back to the Northeast. Shingles, house frames, furniture, masts, and pine, 
walnut, and oak boards were also important lumber products produced largely by the 
northeastern colonies for domestic, intercolonial, and external markets. Lumber products and 
processed fish, alongside the carrying trade (to be discussed below) were perhaps New England 
and the mid-Atlantic’s most direct contribution to the transatlantic mercantile economy, and 
therefore their most direct sustained economic connection to the Caribbean sugar colonies. The 
New England-Caribbean trade axis is well-known to historians: New England shipped lumber 
products and processed fish to the Caribbean, which returned molasses and rum, thus sustaining 
the region’s commercial economy.62 By the late colonial period the New England and to a lesser 
extent Middle Colonies annually sent an average of almost £70,000 in wood products to the West 
Indies, the vast majority from New England. Further, pickled and dried fish also contributed to 
the New England-Caribbean trade, as New England merchants annually exported 189,697 
                                                           
60 John J. McCusker, “Sources of Investment Capital in the Colonial Philadelphia Shipping Industry,” The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32 No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 146-157, quotation p. 154. 
61 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, p. 315.  
62 Eric Kimball, “’What Have We To Do With Slavery?’,” in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s 
Capitalism, strains to develop this argument, implying that the West Indian trade was so fundamental to 
New England, and Massachusetts in particular, that its absence would have destroyed the regional 
economies. This argument makes no note of the household agriculture and manufacturing.  
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quintals of dried fish to the West Indies, but also 114,734 to southern Europe and the “wine” 
islands.  
 
Table II: Value of Selected Wood Products Exported by the New England and Middle 
Colonies by Region, 1768-1772 (in pounds sterling) 
 








1772 94,684 3,249 8,915 106,848 88.6 
1771 75,133 4,365 9,318 88,816 84.6 
1770 67,689 4,193 11,558 83,440 81.1 
1769 51,632 3,919 6,795 62,346 82.8 
1768 56,516 6,298 6,505 69,319 81.5 
New England 
Percentage 
73.9 30.7 69.4 
 
Source: Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial 
North America, Appendix IV, Tables 2-5. Note: These figures represent the combined value of pine 
boards, staves, and headings. 
  
 
Numbers like these would seem to support the idea that Caribbean slavery contributed 
directly to the growth of northeastern capitalism, in a manner similar to that described by Eric 
Williams in Capitalism and Slavery. In the American Northeast, however, capitalism emerged in 
the rural agricultural economies which spawned domestic consumption markets for both 
domestic and foreign manufactured consumer goods, not in the transition from mercantile to 
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industrial capital in Great Britain described by Williams for Great Britain.63 Further, it is unclear 
how much New England lumber and fish were consumed by northeasterners themselves, but 
patterns of the regional North American coastal trade suggest that northeasterners consumed as 
much of each as did West Indian slaves. And undoubtedly northeasterners purchased, distilled, 
and consumed large amounts of Caribbean molasses and rum, though the importance of rum to 
North American participation in the African slave trade has been overstated. But contrary to the 
“slavery capitalism” historiographical trend, New England capitalist development did not 
fundamentally depend on the Caribbean trade—the relationship was actually reversed. It was 
because of emergent capitalist development in the New England countryside that trade 
connections with the West Indies were so significant in the late colonial period.  
This discussion is not intended to downplay the importance of external commerce with 
the West Indies, or to any of the slave-based economies of the Atlantic world, to the northeastern 
economies. As David Brion Davis explained several decades ago, many Quaker merchants in the 
American Northeast and Great Britain, including influential members of the Philadelphia-based 
Pemberton family, derived large fortunes in part from the West Indian trade which allowed them 
the leisure and resources to pursue humanitarian causes, including slavery and slave trade 
abolition campaigns. Thus, it would seem that the relationship between abolitionism and 
                                                           
63 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. A common reading of Williams flattens his rather complex 
argument into the assertion that British capitalism depended on Caribbean slavery, because profits from 
Caribbean sugar were the bedrock investments of the textile industry in England. At times Williams 
made this assertion, but his larger point was that the 18th century saw a shift in power from mercantile to 
industrial capitalists, and that the latter had little incentive to support the West Indian interests. What 
Williams did not stress, however, is that the reason textile capitalists did not have a direct interest in the 
West India lobby was because their customers lived in the British Isles and western Europe, and had been 
transformed into consumers by the earlier agricultural capitalist transformation “industrious revolution.” 
This reading of Williams’ argument would seem to suggest that it inspires modern “slavery capitalism” 
historians, but as H. Reuben Neptune suggests, they surprisingly do not seem to read much of Williams. 
Neptune, “Throwin’ Scholarly Shade: Eric Williams in the New Histories of Capitalism and Slavery,” MS 
essay, presented at The Graduate Center, CUNY, 9 March 2018.  
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economic concerns—while never deterministic—ran through merchant capitalism.  But that 
relationship in fact ran three ways, towards eliminating chattel slavery from the agricultural 
countryside, encouraging the growth of industry and the development of an industrious (and 
ideally, easily controllable) manufacturing labor force, as well as through the mercantile 




Shifting focus to broader patterns of trade and commercial finance, it is beyond doubt 
that the northeastern colonies had developed into significant mercantile economies by the late 
colonial period. New England merchants had firmly established reputations as kings of the North 
American “carrying” trade by the 1760s, and colonial trade statistics reveal significant 
differences among the mainland North American regional commercial economies. By the mid-
18th century, the northeastern colonies’ increasingly diverse agricultural and household 
manufacturing economies yielded balances of trade with the British Isles quite different than the 
Upper and Lower South colonies. While the latter’s slave-based plantation-staple economies 
generated higher export totals of raw commodities, they imported comparatively less than their 
northeastern neighbors, which also boasted higher rates of free household consumption. These 
differences in part contributed to the development of divergent attitudes towards the slave trade, 
                                                           
64 Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, pp. 233-249; see also Davis’s further elaboration on 
these themes in his reply to Thomas Bender’s critiques in “Reflections on Abolitionism and Ideological 
Hegemony” in John Ashworth, David Brion Davis, and Thomas L. Haskell, The Antislavery Debate: 
Capitalism and Abolitionism as A Problem in Historical Interpretation, Thomas L. Haskell, ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), pp. 161-179.  
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slavery, and economic development by the late colonial period, which accelerated after the 
Revolution and during the Early Republic. 
The most complete statistics for calculating colonial British North American import and 
exports, overall values, and price series exist for 1768-1772. In 1767, the Townshend Acts 
created the American Board of Customs, empowered to tightly control the implementation and 
collection of trade duties. Historians believe the Board finished tabulating trade records through 
1772 in 1774, not long before the imperial crisis became declared war. Statistics for 1768-1772 
reveal fluctuation and decline by region and commodity as a result of the relative effects of local 
non-exportation agreements.65 The importance of slave-grown staple-crop exports to the Upper 
and Lower South is illustrated in the average values of the five most valuable commodities 
exported from North America in these years. Tobacco, rice, and indigo, all commodities 
produced by the southern slave-based economies, combined for 67.8% of colonial commodity 
exports. Raw commodity export totals, however, mask the dynamism of the northeastern 
agricultural, household manufacturing, and commercial economies, where diverse and 
increasingly creative uses of capital in growing urban clusters like Boston, Philadelphia, and 
New York City supplemented relatively low totals of raw commodity exports.66 
Comparing regional variations in the value of imports from and exports to England adds a 
layer of nuance to commodity export averages. In 1763 the northeastern colonies accounted for 
only 14.9% of the total value of North American colonial exports to England, but 47.8% of the 
value of the thirteen colonies’ imports from England. Statistics for 1763 reflect the aftermath of 
                                                           
65 Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, Appendix IV, pp. 204-5, Table II. These scholars also 
note that the disruption of the American War for Independence likely led to the loss of import/export 
records for 1773 and 1774. 
66 Gary M. Walton and James F. Shepherd, The Economic Rise of Early America (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), Ch. 5, esp. p. 81. 
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the French and Indian War, which disproportionately affected the northeastern frontier regions, 
but the disparity between regional shares of exports and imports reveal significant regional 
difference.67 In 1765, for instance, the northeastern colonies sent 19.6% of North American 
exports to England, but absorbed 61.6% of the total value of English imports to the thirteen 
colonies. By 1770 the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies continued to produce the lion’s 
share of the value of North American exports, 75.8%, but accounted for less than half of 
consumption of British imports, 47.1%. In 1774, the last full year of peace before the outbreak of 
armed conflict, and in which October the non-importation Association agreement was 
announced, the northern colonies accounted for 19.1% of the value of North American exports to 
England but 62.8% of English imports.68 What accounted for the fact that the Upper and Lower 
South consistently exported far more to England and Scotland than they imported? Southern 
plantations tended to be self-sufficient, especially for the needs of the enslaved, which 
suppressed the growth of free household-based local consumption markets unlike the Northeast. 
The trade commodities, destinations, and average annual value of trade exports of the 
British North American colonies of further shows regional distinctions, as well as the 
interconnectedness of Atlantic trade patterns. Between 1768 and 1772, the New England annual 
value commodity exports averaged £439,101, 63.3% of which went to the West Indies in the 
form of dried and salted fish, livestock, wood and whale products, and grains. New England’s 
annual value of exports to Africa those years averaged £17,194, almost entirely rum, while the 
region’s annual value of commodity imports averaged £1,053,800.69 The figures for 
                                                           
67 For an extensive overview of the Seven Years’ War see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ 
War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).  
68 HSUS, II: p. 1176, Series Z 213-226.  




Pennsylvania and New York are proportionally similar, accounting for an average annual value 
of £526,545, 42.6% to the West Indies and only .002% to Africa, while their annual value of 
imports was £1,202,200. 70 
Meanwhile, the Upper South colonies’ annual value of exports from 1768-1772 was 
averaged £1,046,883, more than double the total commodity exports of New England and the 
middle colonies.71 Tobacco accounted for 72.2% of that total, with the British Isles their chief 
market as mandated by the Navigation Acts, absorbing 79% of the Upper South’s exports.72 
Meanwhile, Virginia and Maryland accounted for a combined average annual import value of 
£1,131,800.73 The Carolinas and Georgia exported an annual average value of £551,494, 75.6% 
of which was rice and indigo also bound to the home isles by the Navigation Acts, accounting for 
71.4% of the lower South’s exports.74 Meanwhile the region’s average annual imports amounted 
to £534,200.  
Taken together, these statistics make visible two broad, contrasting trends in the 
northeastern and Upper and Lower South commercial economies. First the northeastern colonies, 
where abolitionism was earliest and most effective, contributed disproportionately to the growth 
of domestic consumption markets, absorbing 57% of commodity imports to North America in 
the late 1760s and early 1770s. Second, northeastern colonial import-export statistics show 
                                                           
70 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Table 9.3, p. 199. Eighty percent of exports 
to the West Indies were grains and grain products, with the remainder mainly consisting of flaxseed, 
wood products, iron, livestock, and potash. This emphasizes the point made above: that northeastern 
trade connections with the West Indies should not be downplayed, but placed contextually alongside the 
region’s agricultural and household manufacturing economies.  
71 HSUS, II: p. 1182, Series Z 287. 
72 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Table 6.1, p. 130. 
73 HSUS, II: 1182, Series Z 287. 
74 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Table 8.2, p.174. 
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significant diversification by the 1770s, compared to the narrower, export-driven, slave property 
regimes and commodity-staple economies of the Upper and Lower South colonies.  
 
 
Table III: Average Annual Value of Exports from and Imports to British North America, 
1768-1772 
(In Thousands of Pounds Sterling) 
 
Region Exports  Percentage of North 
American Total  
Imports Percentage of North 
American Total  
New England 439.1 17.1  1,053.8 26.9 
Middle 
Colonies 
526.5 20.5 1,202.2 30.6 
Upper South 1,046.9 40.8 1,131.8 28.8 
Lower South 551.5 21.5 534.2 13.6 
 
Sources: McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Tables 5.2, 6.1, 8.2, 9.3; HSUS, 
II: pp. 1182-1183, Series Z 287; Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic 
Development of Colonial North America, pp. 91-93. 
 
Other indices of British North American commercial development complement the 
regional differences evident in import-export values. Import-export statistics, because they 
measure “visibles” in the form of trade goods and commodities, do not account for the total 
productivity of the northeastern regional economies. Commercial services and “invisibles,” for 
instance merchants’ growing marine insurance and freighting businesses, made crucial additions 
to the New England commercial economies because they contributed cash credits to colonial 
accounts in the metropole.75 “Invisibles” earnings contributed a critical source of revenue that 
allowed the New England and middle colonies to redress trade deficits with the metropole that 
                                                           
75 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Table 4.1, p. 81. 
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are suggested in the raw import-export statistics. Between 1768 and 1772, the North American 
colonies consistently maintained trade deficits due to trade with the metropole. In 1768, for 
example, the colonial-metropolitan trade deficit totaled £1,408,000, of which the northeastern 
colonies generated £1,202,000. Non-importation movements organized by urban merchants in 
response to the Townshend program drastically reduced colonial-metropolitan trade in 1769, but 
from 1770 through 1772 the colonial trade deficit averaged £2,371,000, reaching a peak of 
£3,480,000 in 1771. New England and the middle colonies’ share of trade deficits with the 
metropole in those years totaled 64.4%, 79.9%, and 78.4%, respectively. The northeastern 
colonies’ trade deficits were far more balanced with the West Indies, their second most important 
regional trading partner after the British Isles.76   
 “Invisibles” earnings contributed significantly to balance northeastern trade accounts 
with the metropole, much more so than the African and intercontinental slave trades so closely 
identified with the region’s commercial economies. In 1768, for example, the combined value of 
shipping earnings and “other invisibles” generated in the Northeast totaled £596,000 (81.5% of 
the North American total), more than six times the total £83,000 value of slaves imported into all 
the North American colonies that year. In 1770, the region’s shipping and “invisible” earnings 
reached £695,000 (82.2%), compared to £108,000 value of slaves imported to North America. In 
1772, northeastern shipping and “invisibles” earnings reached £740,000 (76.8%), while the value 
of slave imports reached a post-1763 high of £392,000.77 “Invisibles” earnings took two primary 
forms. First, and most importantly, were earnings derived from the shipment and distribution of 
export commodities in transatlantic commerce on colonial-owned ships, and second profits 
                                                           
76 Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America, 
Table 7.1, p. 115. 
77 HSUS, II: pp. 1182-1183, Series Z 288-289. The Chesapeake and southern colonies accounted for 98.6% 
of the value of slave importations to North America in the years cited.  
53 
 
derived from colonial shipping insurance underwriters.78 Between 1768 and 1772, North 
Americans earned an average of £601,400 annually from shipping earnings on voyages to all 
regions of the Atlantic world. The New England and middle colonies contributed 
disproportionately to “invisibles” earnings, especially because of trade with the British Isles and 
the Caribbean.  
 
Table IV: British North American Shipping Earnings by Region, 1768- 1772 (in pounds 
sterling) 
 
Region New England Middle Colonies Upper/Lower 
South 
Total 
1768 296,000 165,000 94,000 561,000 
1769 313,000 176,000 110,000 599,000 
1770 323,000 188,000 95,000 606,000 
1771 348,000 174,000 89,000 611,000 
1772 354,000 181,000 95,000 630,000 
Average  326,000 176,800 96,600 601,400 
Percentage 54.2 29.3 16.1 
 
Source: Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of 
Colonial North America, Table 7.6, p. 128. Note: This table omits shipping earnings from the British 
Canadian colonies and those derived from Florida, the Bahamas and Bermuda. Together these regions 
accounted for less than 5% of total North American shipping earnings. 
 
  
 The second major source of “invisibles” earnings, marine insurance services, similarly 
exhibited significant regional variations. Insurance services generated fewer profits compared to 
                                                           
78 See the thorough discussion of “invisibles” earnings in Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, 
and the Economic Development of Colonial North America, pp. 124-136. 
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shipping earnings, and profits to be made from underwriting marine insurance policies varied 
significantly depending on the proposed destinations and routes. Colonial merchants preparing to 
sail for the West Indies and southern European markets tended to purchase policies from local 
providers, with interest rates that varied from two to three percent, while voyages to Africa in 
pursuit of slaves but also commodities like gold, ivory, and pepper usually cost between eight 
and eleven percent. Insurance policies on ships bound for the British Isles bore the least 
expensive interest rates, often no more than 1%.79 When included with port fees and various 
minor ancillary revenue streams, marine insurance earnings constituted a small but important 
contribution to “invisibles” earnings, because ship-owners tended to pay  insurance premiums in 
specie or foreign exchange credits to colonial accounts.  
Critical to the northeastern colonies, “invisibles” earnings allowed colonial merchants to 
address their trade imbalances with metropolitan merchants. When expressed in concert with 
trade commodity export statistics, their significance is even more obvious. The average annual 
value of “invisibles” earnings were second only to the value of tobacco imports, generating 
£610,000 to tobacco’s £766,000, almost double rice and more than five times as valuable as 
indigo exports.80 Though it is common to note that New England, in particular, could not 
produce commodity crops like tobacco, “invisibles” earnings impacted the northeastern 
commercial economies on a similar scale as tobacco and indigo did the Upper and Lower South. 
The dynamics and patterns of the northeastern commercial economies described in brief 
suggest some aspects that bear upon this discussion’s primary focus, the relationship of 
northeastern abolitionism to the region’s emergent capitalist economies in the late colonial 
period. When the American Revolution unleashed political possibilities for northeastern 
                                                           
79 Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and Economic Growth in Colonial North America, p. 135. 
80 Ibid., p. 135.  
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abolitionists to pursue political campaigns, they benefitted from several social and economic 
preconditions. First and most obvious, comparatively few slaves in the Northeast muted the 
political power of slaveholding interests in the region—and yet, as I will discuss in subsequent 
chapters, northeastern state slavery abolition still encountered significant opposition. Second, the 
free household basis of agricultural production, especially in New England, generated patterns of 
property ownership more, but not absolutely, egalitarian than in the Upper and Lower South. The 
prevalence of household manufacturing at the time of the Revolution, moreover, presented 
market opportunities, but also increasingly dependence, and slaveholding was beyond the 
economic competency of the vast majority of northeastern free households.81 Finally, the 
northeastern commercial economies exhibited more diversification than the Upper and Lower 
South, and therefore while northeastern commerce was not the sole source of capitalist 
development, the merchant classes still wielded significant political and economic significance. 




The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database records that merchant-financiers and ship captains 
disembarked 271,950 enslaved Africans on mainland British North American shores from the 
infamous initial sale of nineteen Africans to Virginia colonists in 1619, until the eve of the 
American Revolution. Of these, 124,951 were imported to the Chesapeake colonies, 120,464 to 
                                                           
81 The absence of industrial manufacturing in North America in the 1770s, and therefore the often 
appalling work conditions of industrial emerging simultaneously in England, meant that unlike the latter, 
slaveholding interests in the Northeast could not cudgel abolitionists for ignoring the plight of the white 
working classes. See the discussion of industrial labor discipline in England in David Brion Davis, The 
Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, pp. 458-468. It is noteworthy that northeastern industrial 
capitalism, particularly textiles, emerged after state slavery abolition began, not before.  
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the Carolinas and Georgia, 10,814 to the mid-Atlantic, and 6,455 to the New England colonies.82 
Recent research on the inter-colonial slave trade further estimates that 46,275 slaves were 
exported or transshipped from the British Caribbean to the mainland North American colonies 
from 1651 until 1775.83 Though but a fraction of the more than six million Africans transported 
to the Americas by 1770, slave imports to Britain’s North American colonies provided a 
demographic foundation from which slave populations naturally reproduced by the late colonial 
period, certainly in the Upper and Lower South.84 
 The northeastern colonies never regularly received large-scale slave importations in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a fact typically explained by their distance from Africa 
compared to the Caribbean and southern mainland, their climates and failure to develop 
plantation economies, and therefore their lack of demand for slave labor. New England 
merchants, however, have long been characterized as eager and prolific slave traders as suppliers 
to the southern mainland and Caribbean, and scholars have invested the region’s slave trade 
merchants a significance that is in some ways disproportionate to the slave trade’s overall 
economic impact on the Northeast. But the African and intercontinental slave trades, because 
unique nature of their cargo and the wealth of successful slave trading merchants, attracted much 
attention from contemporaries and historians. Rhode Island merchants and ship captains, in 
                                                           
82 Transatlantic Slave Trade Database [Hereafter TSTD], slavevoyages.org. Statistics compiled 27 June 2018. 
The remaining 9,666 were imported to Florida, the Gulf Coast, and “other North America.” 
83 Gregory E. O’Malley, Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of North America, 1619-1807 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), Tables 4, 8-10, 12, 18, pp. 121, 175-177, 202, 327. The vast 
majority of these were imported by South Carolina, Georgia, and the Chesapeake colonies.  
84 TSTD estimates that 12,521,337 African slaves exported to the Americas. The literature on the Atlantic 
slave trade to the Americas is vast. For overviews, see Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade, 1440-1870 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending 
of the Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave 
Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975); W. E. B. DuBois, 
The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to North America (Boston: Longmans and Green, 1895).  
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particular, were active participants in the slave trade, and the colony’s economy supported 
extensive rum-distilling operations in Newport and Bristol that helped grease the trade for 
African slaves.85 Although New England’s climate and natural resource base precluded the 
establishment of plantation-staple economies like the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies, the 
story is usually framed, New Englanders were deeply complicit in the establishment and growth 
of American slavery through their participation in the transatlantic slave trade. W.E.B DuBois’s 
influential study of the African slave trade to North America asserted that “vessels from 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and, to a lesser extent, New Hampshire, were early 
and largely engaged in the slave trade.”86 While New Englanders did not necessarily desire 
slaves for their own colonies, then, they had no compunction, and indeed profited handsomely, 
from supplying African slaves to the Caribbean and southern mainland colonies.87  
 As early as 1649 Massachusetts ships engaged in the African slave trade, as the Fortune 
set out for “the coast of Ginny, thence to Barbados and so for New England.” As did many 
slaving voyages, the Fortune’s generated acrimony between the ship’s captain and its merchant-
financier, resulting in an arbitration panel to determine damages incurred during the ship’s 
Atlantic passage.88 By the mid-18th century Massachusetts colonists had established a somewhat 
                                                           
85 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Figure 13.1, p. 291, counts 95 rum 
distilleries in New England in 1770, 26 in Rhode Island. See also, John J. McCusker, Rum and the American 
Revolution: The Rum Trade and Balance of Payments of the Thirteen Colonies, 2 Vols. (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1989). It should be noted, however, that North Americans consumed the majority of New 
England-distilled rum.  
86 DuBois, Suppression of the African Slave Trade to North America, pp. 20-25, quotation p. 20.  
87 TSTD calculates that ships registered the “U.S.A” flag, which includes the British North American 
colonies before 1775, brought 6,689 enslaved Africans to the Northeast, 2,281 to the Chesapeake, 3,989 to 
the Lower South, and 36,477 to the Caribbean before the American Revolution. Statistics compiled 27 June 
2018. On Rhode Island slave trading interests, see Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle. See also Lorenzo J. 
Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 47-48; David 
Richardson, “Slavery, Trade, and Economic Growth in Eighteenth-Century New England,” in Barbara L. 
Solow, ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 
237-264; O’Malley, Final Passages, pp. 201-204.  
88 Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative, III: pp. 9-11.  
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regular, if small, presence in the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1746 and 1757, Boston’s Customs 
House recorded six ships entered in from Africa or Barbados with enslaved cargo on board, in all 
cases importing fewer than six men or women. Those handfuls of slaves were mostly skilled 
artisans or children, suggesting that merchants desired them for their specific skill sets or for 
training as domestic servants. The Customs House also recorded fourteen ships cleared out for 
Africa between 1748 and 1757.89  Some New England merchants and slave traders like Medford 
resident Timothy Fitch, who financed and directed the 1761 voyage that included seven-year old 
Phillis Wheatley and resulted in the deaths of twenty-one Africans en route from Senegal, 
invested in the African slave trade as one component of their commercial portfolios.90 
Massachusetts merchants also continued to participate in the African trade as the British-
American imperial crisis escalated, clearing at least twenty-two ships for Africa between 1771 
and 1774.91 In all, through 1775 ships cleared from Massachusetts ports carried 9,852 Africans to 
slavery in the Americas, 6,945 to the Caribbean and 2,663 to the North American mainland, 
before warfare paralyzed New England trade.92 
Rhode Island, the North American colony most closely identified with the Atlantic slave 
trade in the Revolutionary Era, entered the trade much later than its northern neighbor. In 1708 
Gov. William Cranston wrote the Board of Trade that the colony had not received any African 
                                                           
89 Ibid., III: pp. 66-67. Robert E. Desrochers, Jr., “Slave-for-Sale Advertisements and Slavery in 
Massachusetts, 1704-1781,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 59 No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 623-664, counts 1,487 
slave-for-sale advertisements in the Boston News-Letter and Boston Gazette from 1704 to 1781, consisting 
of both newly arrived African slaves, slaves already resident in Massachusetts, and enslaved persons 
brought to Massachusetts from other colonies. The subject of the Massachusetts slave trade has never 
received a dedicated, extensive treatment. Announcements for ship arrivals and departures in the Boston 
Gazette, to take the example of one of the city’s leading newspapers, make clear that at least several ships 
per year made voyages to Africa in these years, so the Customs House figures do not reflect the entire 
commerce to and from Africa. See for example, Boston Gazette, 31 July 1750; 11 June 1751; 21 July 1752; 8 
January 1754. 
90 Carretta, Phillis Wheatley, pp. 4-7. 
91 Donnan, Documents Illustrative, III: p. 76.  
92 TSTD, statistics compiled 28 June 2018.   
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slaves “on account of the Royal African Company, or by any of the separate traders,” for ten 
years. In 1700, the governor reported that three ships co-owned by Rhode Islander Edwin Carter 
and Barbadian merchants Thomas Bruster and John Bates made African slaving voyages. The 
voyages succeeded, as the vessels made “the disposition of their negroes” in Barbados. Cranston 
pointed out that until that time, Rhode Island had never received slaves direct from Africa, “that 
the whole and only supply of negroes to this colony” arrived from Barbados, roughly twenty to 
thirty slaves annually. The Governor noted that Rhode Island “planters” did not desire large-
scale importations of African or West Indian slaves anyway, fearing their supposed “turbulent 
and unruly manners.” Rhode Islanders rather preferred “to employ white servants before 
negroes.”93  
By the middle of the eighteenth century Rhode Island mercantile interests entered the 
Atlantic slave trade on a much larger scale, and they began earning their reputations as North 
America’s premier slave traders. In 1732 the colony’s General Assembly repealed an import duty 
of £3 per each slave imported into the colony, seemingly in response to the British Empire’s 
long-standing policy of discouraging slave importation duties they deemed prohibitive.94 
Relaxing the duty, it was hoped, might encourage local merchants to further invest in Atlantic 
slave trading. The 1733 account book of a Rhode Island slave ship noted that the voyage netted 
119 slaves along the West African coast. In exchange, the captain and supercargo traded barrels 
of rum, tar and sugar, as well as fabric, iron bars, and sundry other trade commodities.95 Between 
November 1747 and February 1755, thirty ships cleared out for Africa from Newport, Rhode 
                                                           
93 Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative, III: pp.109-110.  
94 Ibid., III: pp. 122-123. See p. 123, n. 2 for evidence of the General Assembly’s “ready compliance with 
royal instructions” regarding slave importation duties.  
95 Ibid., III: pp. 123-127. 
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Island’s chief port, while six ships entered from Africa and one from Barbados, presumably 
having disembarked its slave cargo there.96 
 By the 1750s and 1760s Rhode Island merchants had emerged as the most important 
North American players in the African slave trade. Prominent merchants like the Brown, Vernon, 
DeWolf, and Lopez families began to increase their investments in African slaving voyages, in 
the process generating large profits from successful voyages.97 In April 1756, for example, 
Samuel and William Vernon wrote Charleston, South Carolina associate George Austin, that “as 
[we] have several Vessels gone to Africa whom we have ordered to Barbados… be pleasd 
therefore to be particular and frequent with your Advices” on the South Carolina slave market.98 
Newport’s Custom House records for 1763 show that fourteen ships cleared that port for Africa, 
while fifteen ships left the port bound for Africa in 1765. 99 That same year, however, Brown 
family’s Providence mercantile firm organized a disastrous slaving voyage to Africa, as the 
Sally’s crew were forced to put down a slave insurrection which led to the deaths of fifty slaves. 
The voyage led a member of the family firm, Moses Brown, to reevaluate his views on slavery 
and the slave trade and embark on a career as an abolitionist in the 1770s.100 
In 1767 and 1769, after the Sugar and Stamp Act protests and as the Townshend program 
generated increased colonial dissatisfaction with British imperial commercial policy, Newport 
continued to clear out ships for Africa, albeit in smaller numbers, as five ships left the port for 
                                                           
96 Ibid., III: p. 139. Bristol and Providence, Rhode Island also handled a considerable amount of mercantile 
traffic, including the African slave trade, though before and after the Revolution Newport merchants 
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97 Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle, details the activities of these merchant families in detail.  
98 Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative, III: pp.166-167. On the process of slave sales in colonial South 
Carolina, a chief market for Rhode Island slave merchants, see Sean Kelley, “Scrambling For Slaves: 
Captive Sales in Colonial South Carolina,” Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 34 No. 1 (August 2012), pp. 1-21.  
99 Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative, III: pp. 189, 209.  
100 TSTD, Voyage ID 36299. Mack Thompson, Moses Brown, Reluctant Reformer (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1962).  
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Africa in each year.101 Overall, between 1650 and 1775, ships clearing from Rhode Island ports 
delivered 51,371 slaves from Africa to the Americas, 34,549 to the Caribbean and 8,032 to 
mainland North America.102 Rhode Island also received slave importations from the Caribbean 
over that time, and though the exact number is not quite clear, a conservative estimate puts it 
between 1,000 and 1,500.103 As the imperial crisis reached a boiling point by the mid-1770s, 
Rhode Islanders clearly assumed a position as North America’s premier slave traders. Even so, in 
1774 Rhode Island was the first North American colony to attempt to end slave importations by 
statute, as abolitionists led by took advantage of political and economic leverage of the unfolding 
crisis, and increasing popular disdain for the iniquitous trade, to press for anti-slave trade 
legislation.  
 While the bulk of scholarship on North American (and later United States) participation 
in the Atlantic slave trade has focused on New England, New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians also 
supplied their own and other British American colonies with imported slaves. Unlike the New 
England colonies, until the mid-18th century New York and Pennsylvania overwhelmingly 
imported slaves transshipped from the Caribbean, rather than directly from Africa. The middle 
colonies’ trade patterns reflected a growing commerce in grain provisions and lumber products 
sold to the West Indies by mid-century, and slaves in varying-sized lots were included in return 
shipments from the Caribbean.104 By the 1760s, both Pennsylvania and New York merchants 
                                                           
101 Ibid., III: p. 217.  
102 TSTD, statistics compiled 28 June 2018. Rhode Island ships delivered forty slaves to Europe in this time 
period as well. Barbados and Jamaica received the most slaves from Rhode Island ships, 16,651 and 7,634, 
respectively.  
103 O’Malley, “Beyond the Middle Passage,” Table X, p. 163, estimates that 3,870 slaves were brought to 
New England from the West Indies from 1701-1770.  
104 O’Malley, “Beyond the Middle Passage,” p. 159. By the 1770s, the middle and New England colonies 
had developed extensive trade networks with the British West Indian sugar colonies, which is discussed 
in more detail below. 
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began to expand their investments in the African slave trade, though the British-American 
imperial crisis proved an obstacle to their participation in the commerce in human beings. 
After the English takeover of Dutch New Amsterdam in 1664, New Yorkers slowly 
developed an involvement in the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1701 and 1726 the colony 
imported 1,573 slaves from the British West Indian colonies, and at least 822 direct from 
Africa.105 It was not until the 1740s, however, that New York merchant interests began to enter 
the African slave trade on a larger scale. In that decade, twelve ships cleared from New York 
City bound for Africa; from 1750 until 1759, that number increased to twenty-four.106 New 
Yorkers’ investment in the Atlantic slave trade fluctuated between the 1750s and 1770s. At the 
outset of the French and Indian War in 1754, for example, New York merchants and ship 
captains cleared out one hundred and thirty tons of shipping to Africa, accounting for 1.22% of 
the colony’s total cleared tonnage. After the war ended in 1763, tonnage cleared to Africa rose to 
one hundred and forty, but the overall percentage declined to 0.98%. Tonnage cleared to Africa 
reached a pre-revolutionary peak of 290, 1.72% of the absolute total, in 1765-1766. In the same 
years, entrances from Africa reached their highest total: 230 shipping tons, 1.96% of overseas 
tonnage entering New York.107 Overall, between 1650 and 1775 a total of 7,648 slaves were 
delivered to mainland North America and the Caribbean by slaving voyages cleared from New 
York.108 Meanwhile, merchants imported an estimated 4,250 slaves to New York from the 
Caribbean in that span.109 
                                                           
105 Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative, III: p. 444.  
106 Statistics compiled from James G. Lydon, “New York and the Slave Trade, 1700 to 1774,” William and 
Mary Quarterly, Vol. 35 No. 2 (April 1978), Table I, p. 378.  
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cover one full year.  
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to the Caribbean.  
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 As the British–North American imperial crisis intensified in the early and mid-1770s, 
New York merchants continued to seek profits in the Atlantic slave trade by supplying the 
British West Indian and southern mainland colonies with enslaved persons. New York-based 
merchant Levinus Clarkson, for example, served as commercial agent responsible for 
coordinating trade between the West Indies, South Carolina, and New York, in a partnership 
with fellow New Yorker David Van Horne. From 1772 until 1775 Clarkson resided in 
Charleston, South Carolina, acting as the partnership’s agent dealing in a considerable variety of 
trade goods, most importantly slaves, rice, flour, wheat, rum, and processed lumber manufactures 
like pipe staves. In March 1773, Clarkson wrote to Van Horne requesting that he inquire of his 
associates “whether they intend sending to my address the Guinea Men which Mr. Mason 
informed, before my departure from New York.” Clarkson warned that if it was “not a certainty 
of one or more [slaving] vessels being consigned to me,” he would invest the partnership’s funds 
in three hundred barrels of rice destined for markets in southern Europe.110  
 In a letter to Van Horne the next month, April 1773, Clarkson described his travels to 
Georgia to investigate commercial opportunities in the growing colony. Clarkson was 
particularly anxious to learn about opportunities to import slaves to supply Georgia’s expanding 
plantation economy. He unfortunately became sick, perhaps accounting for his surly description 
of Georgia, as a “flourishing Province… [where] considerable Estates might be made for 
Posterity,” and at the same time “a perfect Grave.” Most importantly, Clarkson was irked that he 
had yet to hear from Van Horne in New York about “the Rice cargo, Indigo cargo & Negro 
cargos.” After returning to Charleston, Clarkson resolved to “stay here until I know if I have 
                                                           
110 Levinus Clarkson to David Van Horne, March 4, 1773, Correspondence 1773 Folder, Levinus Clarkson 
Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. 
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anything for sale to the New York Guinea Men or to any from Newport for it is needless for me 
to stay here at a season when little or no business is done…”111  
Clarkson and Van Horne’s commercial activities in New York and South Carolina, 
including slave dealing, continued through 1774 and 1775, though the emergent imperial crisis 
proved an obstacle to the normal flow of business activity. In July 1774 Clarkson wrote to Van 
Horne from Charleston that he was in the process of “disposing of a Cargo of Slaves.” He then 
lamented, “but as the present Contest for Liberty is Such in this Province, as to Indure the worthy 
Carolinias to non Importation as well as a Surmise they will [support non-] Exportation,” short-
term commercial prospects for slave sales there seemed dubious at best. If non-importation and –
exportation continued, Clarkson worried, “in what manner is the merchant to make his 
Remissions to his Guarantor [?]…”112 Clarkson and Van Horne were rightfully concerned that 
the rising tide of antislavery political and moral sentiment in the Northeast might threaten a 
lucrative, but risky and unstable, portion of their business.  
 Pennsylvania’s relationship to slavery, the slave trade, and the emergence of antislavery 
morality is in many ways the most complicated of the northeastern colonies. Scholars of the 
development of abolitionism in North America have for decades, and indeed centuries, tended to 
point to Pennsylvania Quakers as the fathers of American antislavery sentiment and 
organization.113 The demographic origins of the colony, its geographic situation as a neighbor of 
                                                           
111 Levinus Clarkson to David Van Horne, 20 April 1773, Correspondence 1773 Folder, Levinus Clarkson 
Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
112 Levinus Clarkson to David Van Horne, July [?] 1774, Correspondence 1774 Folder, Levinus Clarkson 
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113 Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of 
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colonial slave societies Maryland and Virginia, and its leading role in British North America’s 
eighteenth century commercial economies made Pennsylvania’s role in the Atlantic slave trade 
both unique and significant. 
Founded after Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, in 1681, Pennsylvania’s 
merchants also came to participate in the Atlantic slave trade last among the northeastern 
colonies. In the colony’s first decades, slaves were imported sporadically as the Holy 
Experiment’s burgeoning merchant class slowly developed trade connections with the British 
West Indian colonies, and eschewed participation in trade with the African continent. For more 
than half a century, Philadelphia merchants focused their efforts on importing white indentured 
servants, only gradually shifting to African slaves by the mid-eighteenth century. Early slave 
importations tended to be piecemeal affairs, handfuls of slaves purchased by Philadelphia 
merchants as just one kind of merchandise in mixed trade cargoes in Caribbean trade. Only after 
1730 did Philadelphia merchants begin regularly importing West Indian slaves specifically for 
sale in local markets.  
Over time, slave cargoes from Africa and the West Indies imported to Pennsylvania 
became larger, sometimes reaching two hundred per ship by the early 1760s.114 In the mid-18th 
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century both Quaker and non-Quaker merchants were active in the trade, although Quaker 
merchants’ participation sharply declined under pressure from local, monthly, and annual 
meetings after 1758. Even so, the 1750s and 1760s were the peak of Pennsylvania’s participation 
in the Atlantic slave trade, coinciding with the general emergence of the colony’s mercantile 
class as major North American players in transatlantic trade.115 Between 1759 and 1765, 
merchants imported an estimated 1,243 slaves into Pennsylvania, but unlike earlier importations 
the majority of these came to the Delaware River Valley directly from Africa.116  
Port records that would provide precise accounting of the exact number and origin of 
slaves imported through Philadelphia before 1776 are not extant, but scholars have been able to 
construct some estimates, estimating that 4,200 slaves were imported to Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
and West Jersey between 1675 and 1770.117 Meanwhile, the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database 
records a total of 788 slaves imported to the Americas by ships cleared from Pennsylvania 
between 1700 and 1775, of which 383 were brought to mainland North America, most between 
1760 and 1765. These figures almost certainly under count the total numbers of slaves brought to 
the Americas by Pennsylvanians, and other scholars have uncovered evidence that the total 
approached several thousand between 1720 and 1766.118 Nonetheless, the early and mid-1760s 
were the peak years of slave importations into Pennsylvania, as well as overall Pennsylvanian 
                                                           
115 Darold D. Wax, “Negro Imports Into Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania History, Vol. 32 No. 3 (July 1965), pp. 
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participation in the Atlantic slave trade to the Americas.119 The table below shows that by the 
late 1760s and early 1770s, slave importations to the Middle Colonies fell off sharply after the 
earlier peak. From 1768 to 1772, Pennsylvania imported a total of ten slaves from Africa, the 
West Indies, and other British continental colonies, and while this does not mean that 
Pennsylvania merchants abruptly stopped supplying other British colonies with slaves, it shows 
the colony almost entirely ceased importing slaves to supply its domestic labor markets. 
Pennsylvanian voices, moreover, were among the most vociferous voices that called for slave 
trade abolition in the 1760s and 1770s, their arguments energized by the brewing political-
economic conflict with the British Empire.   
 
Table V: The Slave Trade to North America by Destination and Origin, 1768-1772 
Region Africa West Indies Continental 
Colonies 
Total 
New England 52 52 20 124 
Middle Colonies 97 32 1 130 
Upper South 3,502 2,482 72 6,056 
Lower South 14,159 5,215 954 20,328 
Total 17,810 7,781 1,047 26,638 
 
Source: HSUS, II: p. 1172, Series Z 133-144. Note: For 1768 figures for West Indies include African 
slave imports. West Indian slave imports averaged 41.5% of African slave imports from 1769-
1772. This percentage is used for 1768.The Middle Colonies includes New York and 
Pennsylvania, and the Lower South includes North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. 
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Modern scholarship generally accords the slave trade a significant role in the northeastern 
commercial economy, and suggests that later industrial development in New England accelerated 
because of the “slave(ry) trade,” which included slaves and commerce in goods ancillary to the 
slave trade, most importantly rum.120 Economic historians critique the complicity thesis, noting 
that the African slave trade accounted for only a small percentage of New England rum 
production, the majority being consumed by local domestic markets or exported to other 
mainland colonies.121 David Eltis has determined that the majority of slaves imported to 
mainland North America were not brought by North American ships before the American 
Revolution. The “story of slave arrivals in colonial America,” he points out, “is very much a 
British one,” such that between 1661 and 1775 North American ships never brought more than 
twenty percent of slaves imported to the mainland, and less than seven percent of slaving 
voyages to Africa embarked from British North American ports.122 The lucrative African slave 
trade was a monopoly of the Royal African Company (RAC) until 1698, and over the course of 
the eighteenth century independent British merchants and the RAC fought for market share, 
especially after the empire secured the Spanish Asiento in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht.123 Intense 
competition and the Empire’s direct support for slave trading merchants from the mother country 
dictated that even the most active North American slave trading merchants were reduced to a 
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Even if North American participation in the foreign slave trade did not have a measurable 
economic impact commensurate with its notoriety, it was the latter that mattered to northeastern 
abolitionists as the imperial crisis brewed after 1763. Economic determinism, in other words, 
does not capture the significance of the slave trades on the politics of the 1760s and 1770s, nor in 
the minds of North American colonists at a time when the bases of imperial and colonial 
authority quaked in the tumult of the early stages of the Age of Revolutions. The key point for 
this discussion is to highlight the underlying social and economic conditions that gave rise to the 
first effective abolition campaigns in the Americas—those of northeastern abolitionists that 
powerfully emerged after 1763.  
At the outset of the imperial crisis in 1763, the agricultural, manufacturing, and 
commercial bases of the Northeast and Upper and Lower South colonies developed significant 
different contours. The diversified commercial economies of the northeastern colonies showed 
an increasing maturity which the southern colonial slave societies matched with the powerful 
singularity of their plantation-export economies. While northeastern merchants invested in the 
African and intercontinental slave trades, there is little evidence to suggest that the regional 
economies would have collapsed in the absence of the slave trade. As the imperial crisis 
unfolded and metropolitan policy generated successive waves of colonial protest, abolitionists in 
the Northeast elaborated scathing critiques of the British empire’s colonial plantation economies, 
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grounded both in the ideological terms of the empire’s violation of North Americans’ 
constitutional right to consent as subjects, as well as in political-economic calumniation of 















































In May 1763, Pennsylvania Quaker abolitionist Anthony Benezet wrote to fellow Friend 
Joseph Phipps “on a subject that which has long been a matter of deep concern to many well 
minded People in these Parts.” The subject he wished to broach was the “the Negro Trade, the 
purchasing & bringing of poor Negroes from their native Land, and subjecting them to a State of 
perpetual Bondage, and that often the most cruel and oppressive, in which the English Nation is 
so deeply engaged…” Convinced that abolitionism would not take root in North America 
without political pressure on colonial assemblymen, royal authorities, metropolitan imperial 
planners, Parliament and King George III, Benezet commenced a wide-ranging campaign to turn 
popular opinion against slavery and the slave trade.  
Benezet feared that Britain’s victory over the French in the Seven Years’ War would 
accelerate the expansion of slavery in North America. Slavery, he wrote Phipps, “with additional 
sorrow, we observe to be greatly encreasing in these Northern colonies, by the New Acquisitions 
the English have lately made of the Factories on the great River Senegal” from the French, by the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris signed three months before in February 1763. Benezet pondered how 
slavery had become so entrenched in British North America to begin with, how “an evil of so 
deep a dye; has so long not only passed unnoticed, but has even had the Countenances of 
Government, and been supported by Law…” He concluded that the “gracious Kings, & many 
worthy men in government” who dominated colonial assemblies and imperial politics embraced 
the “corrupt Motives which gives life to slavery,” and had no motive to circumscribe slavery or 
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the slave trade. Abolitionism in North America, then, depended on an upsurge of popular disdain 
for the political and economic inequalities inherent to slave societies.   
Benezet understood the economic magnitude of colonial slavery and the Atlantic slave 
trade, and the considerable political power colonial planter and metropolitan mercantile interests 
wielded as a result. He nevertheless hoped that the fruits of victory in the Seven Years’ War, 
especially England’s acquisition of French North American territory east of the Mississippi 
River, would spur the Empire to limit slavery’s continental expansion and to allow individual 
North American colonies to amend slaves’ legal status to resemble indentured servitude. He 
hoped that western lands would “provide the Government an Advantageous opportunity of 
beneficial employment for the Negroes,” through a “prohibition to the [slave] Trade and [that] a 
Provision be made for… freedom of those now amongst us, after a reasonable time of service.” 
Fortunately, Benezet lived to see Pennsylvania’s Assembly adopt a plan for gradual abolition 
along very similar lines in 1780. He was correct in sensing that post-war years would be decisive 




 The 1764 American Duties Act was one of the first pieces of parliamentary legislation to 
arouse colonial opposition after the Seven Years’ War, most critically in New England. The Act 
halved pre-existing import duties on foreign sugar and molasses, critical to New England’s rum 
distilling operations, and invested imperial admiralty courts with increased authority to enforce 
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the Act’s provisions. It also threatened to undermine commerce in Madeira wine, foreign textile 
imports, and lumber exports, and exacerbate the already depressed post-war colonial economies.2 
Merchants in Massachusetts and Rhode Island immediately protested the Sugar Act, fearing the 
destruction of their commerce and blaming the insidious political influence of West Indian sugar 
interests in Parliament for the its passage. Bostonians argued that the Act constituted an outright 
attack on the carrying trade, fisheries, and commerce of New England, the pillars of the region’s 
mercantile capitalism, and began mobilizing merchant opposition to imperial trade policy. 
Although rum has often been characterized a crucial New England export to Africa in 
exchange for slaves, economic historians estimate that North Americans consumed ninety 
percent of rum distilled or imported into New England. 3 But trade connections between New 
England and the West Indies remained significant, and the former’s merchants foresaw economic 
disaster in the Sugar Act, stressing that it would lead to economic ruin for both the northeastern 
colonies and their West Indian brethren who relied on them for ocean fisheries and lumber 
products. Some New England merchants even predicted that “the duty will in a short time put a 
period to the African trade from this continent,” most notably the (relatively minor) export 
business in distilled spirits to Africa and southern Europe. They warned that a decline in New 
England commerce would harm the sugar colonies, because their commercial ties with New 
England “consequentially tends to increase the number of laborers” in the West Indies and “to 
add to the cheapness of their support, and upon these it’s well known the growth and value of 
                                                           
2 Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
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those colonies must absolutely depend.”4 New England merchants disdained the Sugar Act, in 
other words, because they believed it would harm their trade connections with the British 
Caribbean. But at the same time an emergent colonial protest literature sparked by the Act, most 
notably James Otis’s The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, introduced the 
argument that imperial taxation and restrictive economic regulation constituted the political 
‘enslavement’ of colonial subjects.5  Coupled with the next year’s Stamp Act, protests erupted 
over imperial regulation of the northeastern mercantile economies, protests which abolitionists 
learned to use to their political advantage. 
 The May 1765 Stamp Act, an internal revenue tax designed to provide funds to offset the 
costs of maintaining British troops in North America, the first instance of a standing army in the 
thirteen colonies, was a turning point in the beginning stages of the imperial crisis. The Act’s 
provisions are well known, as are the political protests it generated: petitions from colonial 
assemblies, the meeting of delegates from nine colonies in New York at the Stamp Act Congress, 
and on-the-ground physical resistance to its implementation and collection spurred by local 
chapters of the Sons of Liberty from New England to Charleston, South Carolina. Stamp Act 
protests against Parliament’s authority to levy internal taxes on British colonies, especially from 
New England, began to frame objections to imperial taxation policy as an antislavery argument.6 
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Thus, Rhode Island Governor Stephen Hopkins argued that the Sugar and Stamp Acts were an 
attack on colonists’ liberties as British subjects, “the greatest blessing that men enjoy, and 
slavery the heaviest.” “Those who are governed at the will of another,” wrote Hopkins, “and 
whose property may be taken from them by taxes or otherwise without their own consent and 
against their will, are in the miserable condition of slaves.”7 Actual slaves, of course, were held 
as chattel property by colonial masters and denied not only the privileges of subjecthood, but the 
right to self-ownership.  
The ‘enslavement’ argument developed by British North American protestors in 1764 
and 1765 would lead to charges of moral and political inconsistency, directed especially at 
southern slaveholding patriots.8 Everyone knew that New England merchants controlled the 
North American market share of the Atlantic slave trade, and that Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey had relatively large slave populations. But because the northeastern regional 
economies were more diversified, agrarian property ownership more dispersed, wage labor more 
common, and domestic consumption markets therefore more expansive, the valences of 
northeastern ‘enslavement’ rhetoric registered with less hypocrisy than from southern 
slaveholding political leaders. While slaveholders argued against their supposed ‘enslavement’ 
from the perspective of men whose economic livelihoods were fully enmeshed in the imperial 
plantation-staple complex, northeastern colonial protestors could more plausibly claim that 
imperial ‘enslavement’ hindered their commercial economies, even though some New England 
and mid-Atlantic merchants participated in the West Indian trades that connected them indirectly 
                                                           
7 Stephen Hopkins, Rights of the Colonies Examined (Providence: William Goddard), in PAR, pp. 507-522, 
quotations pp. 507-508; Waldstreicher, Runaway America, pp. 176-180. 
8 This is a central theme of Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundation of British Abolitionism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Samuel Johnson famously expressed this view in 
Taxation No Tyranny (London, 1775) lambasting American slaveholding patriots: “How is it that we hear 
the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?” 
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to plantation slavery. The political economy of northeastern protest and resistance to 
parliamentary sovereignty emphasized dismay over the colonists’ inability to consent to imperial 
regulations through direct representation in Parliament expressed as diatribes against the colonial 
‘enslavement,’ themes readily adopted by abolitionists in the 1760s and 1770s as they wove an 
antislavery argument into revolutionary politics.  
 Parliament’s passage of the Townshend Acts in summer 1767 escalated colonial fears 
that the imperial apparatus aligned contrary to their interests. A series of revised import and 
export duties on commodities like tea, glass, and paper designed to mitigate the metropole’s 
share of colonial maintenance expenses, protests against the program mushroomed into a series 
of local-level non-importation agreements. These became the first instances of productive cross-
colonial cooperation by 1770, albeit haltingly as the merchant classes did not embrace non-
importation evenly, particularly in Philadelphia.9 Into this breach stepped abolitionists, grasping 
an opportunity to expand their audiences by applying the logic of colonial political protest to the 
trade and ownership of commodified human beings. 
 Cambridge, Massachusetts Congregational minister, merchant, and abolitionist Nathaniel 
Appleton published Considerations on Slavery in a Letter to a Friend in 1767, framed as advice 
addressed to a man purported to “have thoughts of being concerned in the African slave-trade.”10 
Appleton opened the pamphlet to his unnamed “Friend,” a man of “example and influence” in 
                                                           
9 T.H. Breen, Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution; n.a., 
“Effects of the ‘Non-Importation’ Agreement in Philadelphia, 1769-1770,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of 
History and Biography, Vol. 14 No. 1 (April 1890), pp. 41-45; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, pp. 
99-103. 
10 Nathaniel Appleton, Considerations on Slavery in a Letter to a Friend (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1767), p. 3. 
Benjamin Edes and John Gill were members of the Sons of Liberty and published the Boston Gazette, a 
critical outlet for New England protests against imperial policy. See Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act 
Crisis, p. 122. At the same time, Boston patriot printers at times declined to print antislavery literature, in 
attempts to separate antislavery from political resistance to imperial policy. See Parkinson, The Common 
Cause; Waldstreicher, Runaway America.  
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Massachusetts, by declaring the bedrock principles of his opposition to slavery and the slave 
trade. “However profitable the trade may be to some readers,” he admitted, “it is contrary to 
humanity, christianity, the interest of the province, and of private families.” He aimed to 
convince his “Friend” to use his influence to “in time, to produce an act of government to 
prevent the further importation of slaves among us; and I flatter myself that the example of this 
province may influence others; but if not, we can be gloriously single.”11Appleton appealed to a 
tradition of British antislavery moral economy which emphasized local sovereignty over the 
regulation of labor markets that had historical roots in New England, noting that the British 
Empire “does not permit a slave on her happy island; but gives to every one freedom, which 
stamps him image of his God.”12 Appleton, writing five years before the famed Somerset case 
where Chief Justice Lord Mansfield ruled that only positive municipal law legalized slavery, 
realized that the appeal of his antislavery argument, and therefore its political possibilities, rested 
on an appeal to a localist understanding of colonial legislative sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
metropole. This logic also fueled colonial protest to imperial economic policy after 1763. 
 Building on Anthony Benezet’s earlier publications which described the horrors visited 
upon the African continent to feed American slave markets, Appleton fulminated that “this trade 
for the lives of men being once established, has set all Africa by the ears.” “All honest industry 
among them is laid aside to the more profitable business of trepanning one another,” he bluntly 
observed.13 He offered lurid descriptions of the overland march to the West African coast and the 
                                                           
11 Ibid., pp. 3-4.  
12 Ibid., p. 4. Levy, Town Born. The classic statement of the British “moral economy” tradition, in which 
communities rallied against economic activities which they deemed unfair is E. P. Thompson, “The Moral 
Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, Vol. 50 (February 1971), pp. 
76-136. This usage of “moral economy” is conceptually different than later American social and economic 
historians’ use of the term, where they utilized it to describe the independence of subsistence farmers 
from market relations in colonial New England.  
13 Appleton, Considerations, p. 6. 
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Middle Passage to establish the physical and psychological terrors of slavery, then pivoted to 
discuss the perverse ways slavery warped the moral and political economy of New England. 
Appleton flatly declared his disgust for the argument that slave-owners and traders were “not 
men-stealers, having bought them with their money.” The African and intercontinental slave 
trades were economically perverse because “by the importation of slaves, we prevent the 
importation of white servants.” Abolitionists like Appleton preferred to encourage the 
importation of laborers bound by the contractual, temporary status of indentured servitude for 
several reasons. Temporarily bound laborers were not ripped from their communities and home 
continent and forced to endure the Middle Passage, so servants, of which “it is well known that 
there are thousands in Europe,” provided labor but were not degraded to the status of chattel 
property. They posed less potential danger to colonial communities, and in any case Appleton 
submitted that servants cost one quarter of the purchase price of African slaves.14 
 Appleton’s antislavery vision for Massachusetts socioeconomic development rested on 
the idea that the existence of slavery promoted internal conflict and prevented the development 
of community cohesiveness. “I take it to be the policy of a state to consult measures to have the 
greatest number of laborers, and those so interested in the welfare of a community, as to be 
always desirous and ready to support and defend it,” he argued.  Slavery led to “the great 
inconvenience” of “our poorer sort of people… who would gladly serve us for a support, but 
then they must be upon a level with negro slaves.” Living among slavery and slaveholders 
caused the servant class, who could expect to gain freedom after their indentures expired, to 
become idle and dissolute, and devolve into vagrancy. Slavery also ruined the moral fabric of 
private families, because the introduction of slaves into households introducing an “amazing 
                                                           
14 Ibid., p. 12 
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distinction” between freedom, and slaves who “as to choice or property, they have none…”15 
Appleton closed the pamphlet with a poem written by a British West Indian, James Grainger, 
which invoked the “tyrannic sway” of slavery, the same formulation black Bostonian Phillis 
Wheatley used five years later in a poem dedicated to Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for 
Colonial Affairs. “Freedom,” the poem closed, was checked by “laws, Oppression’s scourge,” 
which legalized slavery in the colonies.16  
  Anthony Benezet continued his efforts to encourage the development of antislavery 
political and public sentiment through publishing and circulating abolitionist tracts written by 
himself and others. Having published A Caution and A Warning to Great Britain and Her 
Colonies in 1766, in April 1767 he wrote to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) 
to appeal for their aid in promoting the colonial antislavery argument by distributing the 
pamphlet to its members. But, he was dismayed to learn, the Anglican-operated SPG refused to 
do so on the grounds that “they cannot condemn the practice of keeping Slaves as unlawful,” 
both scripturally and by colonial laws.17 Meanwhile Benezet wrote to Friend John Smith of 
Burlington, New Jersey, forwarding one hundred copies of A Caution for local distribution, and 
sent additional copies to Philadelphian David Barclay requesting, “thou wilt be pleased to read 
the Treatise, when I am persuaded thou wilt perceive it to be a Matter which calls for the most 
deep Consideration, of all who are concerned for the civil, as well as religious Welfare of their 
Country.” Benezet noted of his work that “much might have been said” to southern slaveholders, 
“of the continual Danger the southern Colonies are exposed to, from the vast disproportion 
between the Negroes & the whites, but this was thought to be a Subject of too tender a nature to 
                                                           
15 Ibid., p. 14. 
16 Ibid., p. 16. 
17 Anthony Benezet to The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 26 April 1767; The Society’s Reply, 
February 3, 1768, in AINAMAB, pp. 137-139, quotation p. 139. 
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be exposed to view, in places where it might fall into the Hands of the Negroes.”18 Northeastern 
audiences, he was learning, proved far more receptive to the antislavery argument he worked 
tirelessly to promote than southern planters. 
 In 1770 thirteen year-old Connecticut boy John Trumbull added his voice to an energized 
northeastern abolitionism, in a satirical essay proclaiming that “it is strange that any persons 
should be so infatuated, as to deny the right of enslaving the black inhabitants of Africa.” “The 
inestimable privilege” of slave-owning, the future portraitist of the elite founding generation 
wrote, was a “natural, moral, and divine right” of Anglo-Americans.19 Trumbull dedicated most 
of the short essay to mocking proslavery arguments based in scripture, which often invoked the 
Curse of Ham, and defenses of the institution that positively emphasized slaves’ exposure to 
Christianity. He shrewdly satirized the property relation of slavery by claiming that “the whole 
world is the property of the righteous; consequently the Africans, being infidels and heretics, 
may rightly be considered as lawful plunder.” To ward off claims that Africans were fit to be 
enslaved because they lacked natural intelligence, Trumbull mordantly claimed to know at least 
three slaves in Connecticut “who know half the letters in the alphabet, and have made 
considerable advances in the Lord’s prayer and catechism.”20 He closed by proposing that 
slaving expeditions be sent to Rome and Constantinople, “to fetch off the Pope and the Grand 
Signior,” if enslaving infidels was indeed a legitimate act. While Trumbull’s essay is not 
necessarily notable as an extensive political-economic critique of slavery and the slave trade, it is 
nonetheless further evidence of an efflorescent northeastern abolitionism.   
                                                           
18 Anthony Benezet to John Smith, 21 April 1767, in George S. Brookes, ed., Friend Anthony Benezet 
[hereafter FAB] (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), pp. 267-268. Benezet to David 
Barclay, 29 April, 1767 in AINAMAB, pp. 139-141, quotations p. 140. 
19 John Trumbull, “The Correspondent No. 8,” Connecticut Journal and New-Haven Post-Boy, 6 July 1770. 
20 Ibid., p. 144. For an analysis of proslavery thought, see Larry E. Tise, Proslavery: A History of the Defense 






 A series of cases heard at the Court of King’s Bench in the early 1770s, most notably 
Somerset v. Stuart (1772), ruptured the legal bases for slavery within the British Empire, in large 
part due to the efforts of antislavery attorney Granville Sharp. In many ways the culmination of a 
long and vibrant debate over the legitimacy of property-in-man, the Somerset case held special 
significance for abolitionists because it affirmed that slavery—and by extension, the importation 
of slaves into colonies—was a matter of positive, local law. While colonists debated the meaning 
of the Somerset decision and individual interpretations depended on a variety of factors, 
Mansfield’s ruling implied a large degree of local autonomy over slavery’s future in the 
northeastern mainland colonies.21 Colonial newspapers covered the trial breathlessly, as London 
correspondents provided day-by-day reportage of the oral arguments. On May 15, 1772, one day 
after Mansfield decided in favor of Somerset, granting him freedom, a report of the trial pointed 
out the “this Cause seems pregnant with consequences extremely detrimental to those 
Gentlemen, whose estates consist in Slaves: It would be a means of ruining our African Trade if 
it should be decided in favor of the Negroes.” The correspondent further prophesized that should 
the case be decided in favor of Somerset, England would be flooded with “black Gentry,” and 
argued that to prevent racial mixing, the “importation of Negroes” to the home isle should be 
                                                           
21 My interpretation of Somerset and the “long English antislavery argument” follows John N. Blanton, 
“This Species of Property: Slavery and Subjecthood in Anglo-American Law, 1619-1783,” Ph.D. Diss., The 
Graduate Center, CUNY, 2015, Ch. 6. David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to 
Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), pp. 21-56, frames the debates over slavery and imperial law 
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arguments over slavery’s future in the British Empire and mainland North America.  
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prohibited by “some Method.” Racist fears of growing black populations in the home isle aside, 
the Somerset case did suggest political possibilities for northeastern abolitionists.22 
 In August 1772, a few short months after Mansfield issued his ruling, Granville Sharp 
wrote to Benezet to weigh in on his plan to organize an antislavery petition campaign to the King 
and Parliament. Sharp’s advice reflected the larger debates over the political and legal authority 
of Parliament vis-à-vis the colonies, by summer 1772 a question of increasingly heated 
dynamics, as well as the uncertainty over slavery and imperial law in the post-Somerset context. 
He counseled Benezet that the plan to present anti-slave trade petitions to Parliament was 
“certainly very proper,” but that “with respect to the Toleration of Slavery in the Colonies, I 
apprehend that the British Parliament has no right to interfere.” Here Sharp acknowledged the 
Somerset decision’s interpretation of colonial slave law. “Because I think our brethren of the 
Colonies can’t be too much upon their Guard with respect to the dignity & independence of their 
own Assemblies,” Sharp advised Benezet that it would be wise to send petitions praying for the 
abolition of slavery in individual colonies “only to the King, or the King in Counsel,” and not to 
Parliament. “Respect must be had to the rights of the Colonies,” Sharp continued, “and a Petition 
from thence if addressed to the Parliament ought to relate to the Slave trade in general, with its 
bad effects & dangerous consequences in general, and not merely to the importation of Slaves 
into the Colonies, because they have a right themselves to prohibit such importations…” Sharp 
counseled Benezet to limit efforts to secure antislavery legislation to the colonial assemblies 
because he believed it a more successful approach, and “even less than a thousand hands I 
                                                           
22 Boston Post-Boy, July 27, 1772. This correspondence was also reprinted in the Essex [MA] Gazette, July 
28-August 4, 1772. Patricia Bradley, Slavery, Propaganda, and the American Revolution (Oxford, MS: 
University of Mississippi Press, 1998) argues that patriot-aligned Massachusetts newspapers deliberately 
distorted the significance of the Somerset decision, ironically to suppress and increasingly popular 
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appeal.   
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shou’d think it a very considerable point gain’d as it would afford an excellent argument ag:st the 
pretended necessity of holding Slaves in the Colonies, which is always Alleged as the reason of 
the encouragement: given by Parliament to the African trade…”23  
 After 1772 the volume and intensity of northeastern political abolitionism escalated in 
tandem with the broader political conflict of the imperial crisis. That year merchant, financier, 
and recent Scots transplant to Boston James Swan addressed fellow Bay colonists, North 
Americans, and imperial planners in a pamphlet that harangued against the African slave trade. 
Swan followed the format pioneered by Benezet, opening the pamphlet by quoting witnesses to 
the horrors of the slave trade on the African coast and establishing the cruelty of slave usage in 
the Americas. He then pivoted to imbue language from the 1691 Massachusetts charter, a 
product of the constitutional settlement of the Glorious Revolution, with an antislavery 
interpretation. Because the Bay Colony’s charter explicitly protected “all liberties and 
immunities of free and natural subjects within the dominions of us… as if they and every one of 
them were born within our realm of England,” Swan argued that the slave trade, and slavery, 
were illegal “for making slaves of British subjects.” This interpretation led the Scotsman to hope 
that “means will be used by the legislature of most, if not all of the provinces of North-America, 
totally prohibiting the importation of Negroes, and setting at liberty those who are now in 
bondage, which will be an honor to human nature.”24  
 By promoting colonial assembly action to abolish slave importations, Swan built on a 
history of Massachusetts town and assembly statements asking for a cessation of slave 
importations into the Bay Colony. As early as 1700, a committee of Bostonians asked the 
                                                           
23 Granville Sharp to Anthony Benezet, 21 August 1772 in AINAMAB, pp. 197-199. 
24 James Swan, A Dissuasion to Great-Britain and the Colonies, from the Slave-Trade to Africa, Shewing the 
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assembly to lay a forty-shilling tax on each slave imported into the colony, “to discourage the 
bringing of them.” The next year, the Boston Town Meeting petitioned the assembly to promote 
the immigration of white servants and to “put a period to Negroes being slaves.”25 In 1755 Salem 
petitioned the Massachusetts General Court to ban slave importations, and in the years after 1763 
local statements in support of slave trade abolitionism steadily proliferated.26 In 1765, Worcester 
instructed their representative to the colonial assembly to urge the passage of abolition 
legislation, and in 1766 the Boston Town Meeting instructed theirs to push “for the total 
abolishing of slavery among us, [and] that you move for a law to prohibit the importation and the 
purchasing of slaves for the future.”27 On March 13, 1767, the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives passed a bill “to prevent the unwarrantable and unusual Practice or Custom of 
inslaving mankind in this Province, and the importation of slaves into the same.”28 Royal 
Governor Sir Francis Bernard struck down this effort, as were subsequent attempts in 1771, 
1773, and 1774.29 One Massachusetts resident, “very sorry to find that the [1767] Bill… had 
miscarried for the present,” urged the continued publication of abolitionist literature like 
Nathanial Appleton’s recent Considerations on Slavery. “And tho’ the very desirable Act which 
was in Agitation has not been attained,” the writer urged, “yet such Publications will I doubt not 
lessen the future Importation of Negroes…”30  
                                                           
25 Quoted in Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, p. 51. The timing of these petitions was not coincidental, 
as public debate over the morality and economic viability sparked by the publication of Samuel Sewell’s 
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26 George H. Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts (New York: Negro Universities Press, 
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27 Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
28 Ibid., p. 126.  
29 Ibid., pp. 130-133. 
30 Boston Gazette, 30 March 1767. 
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Localized, town-based opposition drove the rise of abolitionism in Massachusetts. In late 
1772, Medford again gave its House of Representative member instructions to officially record 
the town’s hostility to the slave trade. Medford residents had turned decisively against the slave 
trade and merchants involved in it, including Timothy Fitch, the man responsible for importing 
Phillis Wheatley to Massachusetts. As early as the mid-1760s, Medford’s slave population had 
virtually disappeared, and its residents clearly wanted that to remain the case.31 Like other 
localities in Massachusetts, the town had a recent history in support of slave trade abolitionism, 
having instructed its representative in December 1767 to “give his Suffrage… to effect the total 
Abolition of that standing Reproach to the Nations of Christendom- The Slave Trade.”32 At a 
freeholder meeting on December 28, 1772, Medford’s selectmen instructed “the Representative 
of this Town… [to] use his utmost Influence to have a final Period put to that most cruel, 
inhuman, and unchristian Practice, the Slave Trade.”33  
Medford’s freeholders justified their action by citing the Boston Committee of 
Correspondence’s November 1772 statement on colonial rights, written by patriot leader Samuel 
Adams. It opened by declaring that “all men have a right to remain in a state of nature as long as 
they please; and in case of intolerable oppression, civil or religious, to leave the society they 
belong to, and enter into another.” Adams based his defense of the civil and political liberties of 
Massachusetts on a reading of John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, emphasizing the 
antislavery implications of the political philosopher’s concept of the social contract. Adams 
                                                           
31 Charles Brooks, History of the Town of Medford, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, From its First Settlement 
in 1630, Until the Present Time, 1855 (Boston: James M. Usher, 1855), p. 438.   
32 Boston News-Letter, 31 December 1767. The report was primarily concerned with stating the town’s 
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86 
 
argued that “In the state of Nature, Men may, as the Patriarchs did, employ hired servants for the 
defence of their Lives, Liberties and Property; and they should pay them reasonable wages.”34 
Slavery, the personal ownership of human property, was therefore beyond the pale. Implicitly 
linking slaveholding to Parliament’s ongoing political oppression of the North American 
colonies, and Massachusetts in particular, Adams argued that “the Legislative has no Right to 
absolute arbitrary Power over the Lives and Fortunes of the People: nor can Mortals assume a 
Prerogative, not only too high for men, but for Angels…” 35 He recited a lengthy list of 
grievances visited upon Massachusetts, emphasizing the theme of Parliament and the Empire’s 
arbitrary use of power, decrying the colonies’ inability to consent to legislation through direct 
parliamentary representation. The linkage between Medford and other Massachusetts town’s 
previous endorsements abolitionism and the Boston Committee’s declaration of colonial rights 
and liberties, then, is evidence of the intertwined projects of liberty from arbitrary imperial rule 
and the antislavery critique of the absolute power of masters over slaves. 
At the 1774 First Provincial Congress, an extralegal body that conducted business in 
defiance of the Empire’s dissolution of the colonial assembly, delegate and abolitionist Nathaniel 
Appleton received a letter asking the body to countenance abolition in light of the escalating 
crisis. Appleton’s request built on the decades-long emergence of abolitionism in Massachusetts, 
especially town-based opposition to slavery and the slave trade rooted in fears of the economic 
inequality that accompanied the chattel principle. After “some debate,” the Provincial Congress 
                                                           
34 The Votes and Proceedings of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town of Boston, in Town Meeting 
Assembled (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1772), p. 5. Patricia Bradley argues that Sam Adams led the way among 
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formed a committee to debate how Massachusetts patriots could eliminate slavery, clearly 
inspired by the politics of the imperial crisis, and which reflected a long-standing aversion to the 
peculiar institution in much of Massachusetts.36 
 To be sure, not all New Englanders had been fully convinced of the immorality of the 
slave trade, or the propriety of using the politics of the imperial crisis to promote abolitionism. A 
January 1773 contribution to the Boston Post-Boy decried the rising spirit of abolitionism in New 
England. The author, writing as “S.M.,” claimed that the “many Essays have lately appeared in 
the News-Papers” promoting abolitionism relied on woefully inaccurate information on 
conditions in Africa, and therefore made fallacious arguments in favor of emancipating slaves. 
He argued that African slaves were “redeemed by European traders” from “the bloody tyranny” 
of despotic African kingdoms. “S.M.” positively compared the lived experience of colonial 
slaves and “common English laborers,” whose livelihoods depended on the whims of wage-
paying capitalists who were not compelled to provide for their laborers like colonial 
slaveowners. “The negroes of the British colonies are much more happy and easy than the slaves 
to necessity in any part of the world,” including Africa, when compared to the plight of 
impoverished agricultural laborers groaning under the “arbitrary” imperial governments of 
continental Europe. In summation, the author warned that “if therefore the African trade is 
prohibited as an infraction upon the liberty of mankind” then both colonial and imperial 
commerce would face complete and utter destruction. But this sort of anti-abolitionist argument, 
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which often doubled as a critique of North American patriotism, steadily became the minority 




Pennsylvanians William Dillwyn and Benjamin Rush also contributed to the flowering of 
northeastern political abolitionism in a pair of 1773 pamphlets. Dillwyn’s Brief Considerations 
on Slavery, and the Expediency of Abolition opened with an appeal for legislative action to 
abolish the slave trade. Dillwyn explained that the “religious and moral obligations we are under 
in a private capacity, to do our utmost to promote the true interests of mankind, increase with our 
powers and opportunities of action.” The security and happiness of communities rested in 
enlightened legislatures that did not sanction the existence of slavery of the participation of its 
citizens in the slave trade. Abolitionism, to Dillwyn, was the apotheosis of the northeastern 
colonies’ economic destiny, and he criticized a political economy of colonial protest detached 
from abolitionism, declaring that “I hope it may be attributed to the multiplicity of other 
engagements, which have much engrossed the attention of government, that the iniquitous nature 
of this traffick has not been adverted to…”38 He admitted that while the northeaster colonies’ 
commercial economies were not reliant on the African slave trade, there were still no excuses for 
inattention to the abolitionist project. Complacent northerners needed to be convinced to “view it 
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as a matter sufficiently important for the extraordinary interposition of a legislature,” or else 
slavery in the northern colonies would become “a bondage which, in our southern colonies and 
islands, is more cruel and oppressive than the most of us in the northern colonies have had an 
opportunity of forming an idea of.”39  
For Dillwyn, to encourage slavery was to distort the regional political economies of the 
Northeast. Slavery and the slave trade “attended with many inconveniences, [which] has been 
lately set forth by several writers.” The northeastern colonies had to avoid the deleterious effects 
the chattel principle visited upon the southern economies through promoting legislative abolition, 
because “the riches of a free state consists in the number of members, who enjoying its privileges 
and blessings, are thereby interested in its preservation and advancement.” Incapable of 
contributing to a “free state,” slaves posed danger to domestic security, and did not contribute to 
domestic consumption markets.40 To Dillwyn, like Nathanial Appleton, promoting the 
emigration of indentured servants to the northern colonies was the far more preferable solution to 
expanding the northern colonies’ labor supply. The indentured servant, by “setting out with the 
animating hope of acquiring independence in the community… and the protection of the laws, 
heartily unites in promoting the prosperity of his country…”41 On the other hand, slaves were 
understandably internal enemies, and slaveholders had little incentive to promote political and 
economic equality with non-slaveholders.  
Dillwyn’s ultimate goal was the abolition of slavery, but “the first and most important 
step” was “absolutely to prohibit any future importations into these colonies.” Dillwyn expected 
push-back from imperial planners and Parliament, and noted that “if by royal instructions, our 
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governors are prevented the exercise of their own judgements; provincial addresses to the crown, 
would be likely to remove the difficulty” of forwarding abolitionism. In a nod to presumed 
opposition of southern planters abolitionism, he argued that “if we cannot obtain a total 
prohibition of the importation, we shall certainly be indulged in obtaining it for the colonies 
which petition for it.”42 If southerners and their legislatures persisted in their hostility to 
abolitionism, in other words, then so be it. Dillwyn devoted the last pages of his pamphlet to 
sketching out gradual abolition schemes for the northeastern colonies, concluding with an appeal 
for slave emancipation, to “of enemies make them friends and useful members of society, by 
conferring on them such privileges as will interest them in the general welfare.”43 
Benjamin Rush’s An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America, 
Upon Slave-Keeping echoed Dillwyn’s insistence that encouraging slavery and the slave trade 
warped the free labor underpinnings of northeastern capitalist development. Rush devoted much 
attention to elaborating this argument, arguing that “if the plantations in the islands and southern 
colonies were more limited, and free men only employed in working them, the general product 
would be greater, though the profits to individuals would be less…” Agrarian economies 
grounded in free labor principles, while assuredly “diminishing opulence in a few, would 
suppress luxury and vice, and promote the more equal distribution of property, which appears 
best calculated to promote the welfare of society.” Rush connected abolitionism to the promotion 
and growth of domestic consumption markets, a transformation in northeastern capitalism 
underway in the late colonial period. He argued that free laborers consumed four times the 
“quantity of British goods” as did slaves, and added that “slaves multiply in all countries slowly. 
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Free men multiply in proportion as slavery is discouraged.”44 Bewildered how the slavery and 
the slave trade became entrenched throughout the Empire, Rush beckoned to future historians 
“who, when they read accounts of the slave trade (if they do not regard them as fabulous) will be 
at a loss which to condemn most, our folly or guilt, in abetting this direct violation of the laws of 
Nature and Religion.”45 
Like Dillwyn, Rush’s plan for abolition began with the slave trade: “the first step to be 
taken to put a stop to slavery in this country, is to leave off importing slaves.” He urged that the 
mainland colonial assemblies unite in opposition to the slave trade by petitioning the King and 
Parliament to “dissolve the African Company,” the empire’s sanctioned slave trading enterprise. 
Rush denounced the Company as an “incorporated band of robbers.” As for independent 
mainland merchants who participated in the slave trade, he proposed to marshal public opinion to 
shame slave traders out of dealing in human merchandise. They should be “shunned as the 
greatest enemies to our country,” Rush declared, “and let the vessels which bring slaves to us, be 
avoided…”46 For domestic slave populations Rush urged gradual abolition legislation. He was 
particularly concerned that young slaves should benefit from laws “made to limit the time of 
their servitude, and to entitle them to all the privileges of free-born subjects.” However, he 
proposed that elderly slaves should continue in their service, not out of concern for masters’ 
property rights, but because their care should remain the responsibility of those “from whom 
they contracted those vices and infirmities.”47 Rush’s plan anticipated the basic structure of 
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Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition legislation. But in 1773, his and other abolitionists’ focus 
was to leverage the imperial crisis to antislavery ends. 
Meanwhile, Rush and other leading abolitionists worked political back channels in the 
metropole to promote their agenda. In May 1773 Rush opened correspondence with Granville 
Sharp, sending him copies of An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America. 
He proudly pointed out that a decades-long rhetorical and political fight against the slave trade 
reaching back to Quaker antislavery pioneer John Woolman had decisively influenced public 
opinion in Pennsylvania, claiming that “three-fourths of the province as well as [Philadelphia] 
cry out against it.”48 At the same time, Benezet set to work “using the best endeavours in our 
power to draw the notice of the Government upon the grievous iniquity & great danger attendant 
on a farther prosecution of the Slave Trade…” Benezet contemplated plans for abolition that 
included gradual emancipation coupled with the resettlement of black Pennsylvanians “from the 
West side of the Allegany Mountains, to the Missisipy, on a breadth of four or five hundred 
miles…” He opposed to racially segregated rural communities, though, because “the only 
rational, safe, & just expedient both natural and religious would, I think, be that they be mixed 
amongst the whites & by giving them a property amongst us, make them parties & interested in 
welfare & security.” Benezet also worked to convince Benjamin Franklin, at that time the 
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colonies’ agent in London, to pursue an abolitionist agenda, and pressed leaders in colonial 
assemblies to publicly assail the Atlantic slave trade.49  
In February 1773 Benezet, in concert with other Quaker abolitionists, presented a petition 
with two hundred signatures calling for the end of slave importations to Pennsylvania, and the 
abolition of the entire British-American slave trade to the Pennsylvania Assembly. The assembly 
assigned a committee to report a bill providing for prohibitory duties on the importation of 
“Negro and Mulatto Slaves into this Province,” which provided for a duty of £20 as a 
discouragement to the trade.50 According to Benezet, assembly members approved the duty 
because they believed it inexpedient to send a petition requesting immediate abolition to the 
King or Parliament,  better “for the present, to lay a farther duty on all Slaves, to be imported, 
into this Province…” Benezet took the measure of assemblymen and concluded that the newly-
perpetual £20 duty “will amount to a tacit prohibition of the trade… they apprehend that the 
passing or refusal of this law, by the King and Council, will better enable them to judge what 
farther step to take, with respect to making head with the King and Parliament, that the Slave 
Trade may be put an end to, which all orders of people here desire may be done.”51 Benezet 
pushed Benjamin Rush to publish his Address at this exact moment, hoping that the young, well-
educated, and non-Quaker Rush’s influence would bolster abolitionism among Pennsylvania 
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assemblymen.52  The immediate abolition of the slavery and the slave trade by appealing to 
reform-minded assemblymen and imperial officials proved difficult to achieve, even in the face 
of mounting popular abolitionism, the Empire consistently refused to assent to proposed colonial 
abolition legislation.  
Anthony Benezet continued to pump his connection with Granville Sharp to promote the 
abolitionist political agenda in the home isle in 1774. That January, Sharp wrote Benezet that his 
efforts to present North administration officials with abolitionist literature proceeded apace, 
though not as successfully as both men might have wished. Sharp reported that “I have dispersed 
a great many Manuscript Papers relating” to slave trade abolitionism “among all those persons of 
my acquaintance, whose interest I thought of as sufficient consequence to have weight in 
promoting a Reformation,” including copies of the 1773 petition to the Pennsylvania Assembly 
and Virginia’s 1772 anti-slave trade petition to Parliament. Sharp described his repeated attempts 
to convince the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the North American colonies, to 
publicly embrace slave trade abolitionism. “I have given his Lordship a copy of the Pennsylvania 
Petition,” he reported, “and he promises to take particular notice of the Act of Assembly, which 
passed in consequence of it, for a Duty on Negroes, whenever the said Act is transmitted to His 
Majesty; for he don’t recollect that he has yet seen it.”  
Sharp pressed forward in this advocacy of colonial abolition petition campaigns, 
believing that political pressure on the North administration was the most prudent path for 
Benezet and his colleagues to pursue. “Petitions to the King,” Sharp counselled, “subscribed by a 
considerable number of respectible inhabitants of any, or each, of the Provinces (showing the 
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sense of the iniquity and danger of Slavery, like that to the Assembly of Pennsilvania) would 
have considerable weight, but this I mention from myself.”53 In the next several years, however, 
as the political breach between the thirteen colonies and the Empire widened, northeastern 
abolitionists shifted away from seeking imperial action to direct appeals to public opinion to 
support abolitionism in their assemblies. With the partial exception of New York, where 
according to British military officials many of the political and merchant classes remained loyal, 
“the most submissive and obedient to the laws and acts of Parliament of any province on this 
continent,” by late 1774 and 1775 men and women across the northern colonies increasingly lent 
their support to slave trade abolitionism and pressed the abolitionist case to their assemblymen.54 
Benezet also corresponded with Quaker convert and Rhode Island abolitionist Moses 
Brown, brother of notable slave trader John Brown, to promote the abolitionist program. In 1773, 
Moses converted to Quakerism and became an active abolitionist. Born into a prominent Baptist 
family of merchants and spermaceti candle manufacturers, Brown went through inner turmoil 
when his family firm invested in the African slaving voyage of the schooner Sally in 1765.55 
Brown also served in the Rhode Island colonial assembly, and by the early 1770s was financially 
comfortable and seemingly content, until his wife passed away in 1772. After his 1773 
conversion to Quakerism, Brown manumitted slaves that he and his recently-deceased wife had 
inherited, and embarked on public campaigns to press for abolition from his home in Providence, 
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no easy task considering that political and economic power of slave-trading merchants in 
Newport and Bristol.  
In 1774, Benezet reported to Brown on anti-slave trade legislation presented in the 
legislatures of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, noting that “a considerable duty on any 
further importation of Negroes & other slaves” had been passed by the New York General 
Assembly, notwithstanding New York City’s influential Loyalist merchant and landed classes 
that opposed abolitionism. Unfortunately, that effort “was refused by the Governor & Council.”56 
New York’s Assembly had, in fact, passed a prohibitory duty in early 1773, but the additional 
duty proposed in 1774 to “more effectually” suppress slave importations was a step too far for 
the colony’s imperial officials.57 Benezet’s efforts to convince Moses Brown to press the Rhode 
Island assembly to act against the slave trade bore fruit, however, as Brown pressured the 
legislative body to consider abolition legislation. In June 1774, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly contemplated “an Act prohibiting the importation of Negroes into this Colony.” The 
bill provided “that for the future, no negro or mulatto slave shall be imported into this colony; 
and in case any slave shall hereafter be brought in, he or she shall be, and hereby, rendered 
immediately free.” Such persons would be granted “personal freedom, and the enjoyment of 
private property, in the same manner as the Native Indians.”58 
The Act’s provisions reflected the political and legal uncertainties generated by the 
imperial crisis. While it provided protection for the slave property of British subjects who were 
permanent residents of other colonies, the act also required temporary visitors to remove slaves, 
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and children born of them while resident in Rhode Island, upon leaving the colony. It 
acknowledged imperial support for the African and intercontinental slave trades and the legal 
geography of slavery in the Empire, providing that “nothing in this Act shall extend, to any negro 
or mulatto slave brought from the coast of Africa, into the West Indies, on board any vessel 
belonging to this colony, and which negro or mulatto slave could not be disposed of in the West 
Indies, but shall be brought into this colony.” In that instance, the bill provided for a bond of 
£100 per each slave brought to Rhode Island, “that such negro or mulatto slave shall be exported 
out of the colony, within one year of the date of such bond.” Finally, the Act levied a £100 fine 
for Rhode Islanders convicted of “receiving, harboring, or concealing” slaves “clandestinely” 
brought into the colony. 59 The Board of Trade overturned the Rhode Island Act, as it did the 
prohibitive duties in Pennsylvania and New York, but clearly that Rhode Island public opinion 
turned decidedly in favor of abolitionism by the mid-1770s. The abolition of slavery and the 
slave trade would have to wait until the next decade, when Moses Brown’s efforts bore fruit 
when the Rhode Island Assembly abolished chattel slavery in the Ocean State.  
The Providence Town Meeting inspired a 1774 Rhode Island Assembly attempt to 
abolish the slave trade. In May 1774, the Town Meeting offered a statement of abolitionism that 
matched Benezet and others’ deep hostility to slavery and the slave trade, evidence of the appeal 
of abolitionism in the North American colony most closely identified with human trafficking. In 
response to the intestate death of Jacob Schoemaker, who possessed “six negroes, four of whom 
are infants,” the meeting declared “that it is unbecoming the character of freemen to enslave the 
said negroes; and they do hereby give up all claim of right or property in them, the said 
negroes…” While “engaged in the preservation of their rights and liberties” vis-à-vis the Empire, 
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it made political and moral sense to direct the town’s assembly representatives to “use their 
endeavours to obtain an act of the General Assembly, prohibiting the importation of negro slaves 
into this colony; and that all negroes in this colony, should be free, after attaining to a certain 
age.”60 The heady brew of opposition to the imperial apparatus in the mid-1770s made many 
Providence residents reassess their colony’s relationship to slavery and the slave trade; the 
politics of resistance offered leverage for Rhode Islanders like Moses Brown to pursue an 
abolitionist legislative agenda successfully. 
The Rhode Island Assembly later supplemented the 1774 Act in November 1775, a few 
short months before war with the empire resumed and the thirteen colonies declared 
independence. The 1775 Act built on the previous year’s relatively strict focus on preventing 
slave importations, proposing a plan for gradual abolition. It began by reasserting the context of 
the imperial crisis, that “the Inhabitants of America are generally Engaged in the preservation of 
their own Rights and Liberties, among which that of Personal Freedom must be considered the 
greatest…” For that reason, the Assembly concurred that “those who are desirous of Enjoying all 
the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to extend personal Liberty to others.” The 
act reiterated the previous slave importation ban and provided freedom for slaves “clandestinely” 
brought into the colony. Illegally imported slaves were to be “rendered immediately free, so farr 
as respects personal freedom and the Enjoyment of Private property…” The 1775 Act expanded 
on the earlier legislation by providing for the emancipation of slaves born in the colony after the 
act’s passage. It cited the Rhode Island colonial charter and “the declarations of our rights at 
Sundry Times since asserted” to declare that “all Persons born within this colony, are as free to 
all Intents and Purposes as those born within the Realm of England, where the laws expressly 
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Exclude personal slavery,” referring to the recent Somerset decision. The Act furthered provided 
encouragement to slaveholders to voluntarily manumit their slaves by applying for a “Bill of 
Freedom” with their local Town Council, to be issued pending council approval that decreed 
manumittees not become public charges.61 Looming war with the empire put a temporary halt to 
further discussion of the subject in the halls of New England assemblies, but a wave of 
abolitionism in the northern states began to crest, which would unleash forces of political 




 The North administration’s implementation of the Tea Act in May 1773 and the famed 
“Tea Party” protest of Boston patriots fueled abolitionism in the Northeast. Because the act 
extended a monopoly on the North American tea market to the East India Company, radical Bay 
colonists interpreted it as a direct assault on the political and economic liberties of New 
Englanders. Parliament’s response to Boston’s intransigence, the so-called ‘Intolerable’ Acts, 
was the immediate context for the attempts of individual colonies to pass slave trade abolition 
legislation described above. Aimed specifically at Massachusetts but cause for alarm across the 
mainland, the collection of acts closed Boston’s port, curtailed the colony’s town meetings to one 
per year, and altered the Bay Colony’s royal charter to suppress further protests. Coupled with 
the Quebec Act, which fueled fears of a popish plot to suppress the region’s hegemonic 
Protestantism, the Intolerable Acts generated sympathy for Massachusetts across North America 
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and led to a continental non-importation movement that culminated in Continental Congress’s 
Association agreement in October 1774. The most recent historian of the subject has identified 
protests to the Tea and Intolerable Acts as the most important factor in the mobilization of North 
America, because they “encouraged a strident, often hyperbolic language unprecedented in the 
evolution of non-importation.” Non-importation and –consumption, in the context of 1774 and 
1775, did not have directly antislavery implications; on the other hand, the rapid emergence of 
political abolitionism in the decade prior was a genie that patriot  leaders could only partially put 
back in the bottle. 62 
 Black Americans also pressed for slavery abolition during the imperial crisis, most 
forcefully in Massachusetts. Slaves there presented petitions to colony’s General Court and 
House of Representatives requesting abolition legislation in January 1773, a few short months 
before the passage of the Tea Act. The petitioners protested their enslaved status by pointing to 
the obvious: “…We have no property! We have no Wives! No children! We have no city! No 
Country!”63 As the pace of events in 1773 and 1774 drove Massachusetts patriots to unify the 
political economy of colonial resistance to imperial authority, so did the pace of black petitions 
escalate. Free and enslaved blacks collaborated with sympathetic whites to protest the chattel 
principle as incompatible with Massachusetts’ moral and political economy. Black Bostonians 
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requested that antislavery pamphleteer James Swan reprint his Dissuasion to Great Britain and 
the Colonies, so that copies could be distributed amongst the black population of Boston and 
presented, along with other abolitionist materials, to the Massachusetts General Court.  
Inspired to publicly press freedom claims by the imperial crisis, black abolitionist 
petitions increased in 1774 and 1775. Slaves in Connecticut leveraged the politics of colonial 
resistance to press freedom claims as did those in Massachusetts. Signed “Liberty,” an October 
1774 letter to the printer of the Connecticut Gazette written by a sympathetic citizen of property 
and standing described the efforts of enslaved blacks there to claim freedom. “I have now before 
me a ‘humble petition of a number of poor Africans, to the SONS OF LIBERTY in this colony,’” 
the letter began, “humbly praying” for recognition of natural rights for the same reason that 
white patriots were fighting against “the arbitrary designs of those who would subject us to 
slavery…” Their argument “cannot be denied consistent with sound policy, much less from a 
principle of justice.”  After denouncing the horrors of the African slave trade and the 
commoditization of human beings in scriptural terms, “Liberty” directly connected the slaves’ 
cause to the imperial crisis. “Under such a load of guilt,” he challenged Connecticut whites, 
“how can you with any face contend for your own rights?- how can you condemn a North or a 
Bute, or the greatest parricide that that ever disgraced the British court?”  
 In an unpublished 1774 pamphlet entitled Some Thoughts on the Subject of Freeing the 
Negro Slaves in the Colony of Connecticut, Connecticut minister Levi Hart elaborated a political 
and economic critique of slavery and the slave trade that included a detailed plan for state-
sponsored gradual abolition of slavery.64 Hart, a New Divinity Congregationalist, wrote the 
                                                           
64 The pamphlet MS is reprinted with commentary in John Saillant, ed., “Some Thoughts on the Subject of 
Freeing the Negro Slaves in the Colony of Connecticut, Humbly Offered to the Consideration of All 
Friends and Liberty & Justice,” New England Quarterly, Vol. 75 No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 107-128. 
102 
 
pamphlet in response to the Intolerable Acts, crafting an argument that has been described as “an 
amalgamation of republican, enlightened, and New Divinity Calvinistic principles.”65 The 
pamphlet opened by offering scriptural refutations of the legitimacy of slavery, but Hart devoted 
much attention to articulating a secular antislavery argument that was increasingly familiar—and 
attractive—to northeasterners. 
 “I am sensible,” Hart acknowledged, that the plan “will be objected to, by some who are 
not owners of Slaves, as being unreasonable that they who have had no hand in the slave trade 
should be punished together with the guilty persons, by being obliged to bear a part of the 
expence of their freedom.” But Hart summarily rejected this line of argument. Rather, he 
observed that “this trade hath carried on under the patronage of the legislature but is not the 
legislature a representation of the whole body of the people, so that each man is in effect, present 
& hath his voice in the enacting the laws?” He connected abolitionism to patriot protests against 
the denial of consent to imperial legislation, at that point widely accepted throughout the thirteen 
colonies, arguing “& what ground do we have of complaint against taxation by the british 
parliament as less friendly to liberty than if done by our own Legislators[?]” Therefore “each 
individual in the colonies, is as really concerned in the Slave Trade as the owners of Negroes and 
therefore as really obliged to bear his part of the expence in procuring their freedom.”66 
“Procuring” Connecticut slaves’ freedom, though, need not “bring a vast & insupportable 
expense upon the Colony,” because Hart had devised a plan for abolition that minimized the cost 
of reimbursing slave owners in exchange for their human property.  
 Some aspects of Hart’s plan found their way into northeastern state abolition laws after 
the Revolution. “All the Negro Slaves in the colonies, & in a state of Minority,” Hart proposed, 
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“must be supposed to pay for their education by a certain age… it is presumed this time of 
Service could not be equitably lengthened out beyond the age of 24 or 25 years for males & 
something less for females…” He urged that elderly slaves should be maintained by their current 
owners to avoid public expense, and “if they are made free their owners would be entitled to no 
reward as they would sustain no loss” for having engrossed their slaves’ prime working years.67 
Hart presented detailed calculations for gradual abolition legislation with as little expense to the 
state as possible. He designed the plan to provide minimal pecuniary compensation to 
slaveowners while allowing freed slaves to prepare for and enter wage-labor markets as 
efficiently as possible. Hart calculated that Connecticut’s 1,700 slaves could be emancipated via 
a taxpayer-funded purchase program of sixty-eight slaves per year between the ages of twenty-
five and thirty-seven, at a rather high valuation of £60 for males and £40 for females. Slaves 
younger than twenty-five were to be freed at that age, having repaid their masters for their 
“education” with labor in their adolescence and early adulthood. Hart concluded that his plan 
would cost Connecticut’s public coffers £22,984, a considerable but not prohibitive amount. “A 
colony tax of 3 pence on ye pound will raise 26450- a sum more than sufficient to defray the 
expence with a surplus of 2616 pounds which may be applied in a manner hereafter proposed 
when we exhibit a plan for treating the Negros after they are free,” he argued.68 Hart’s plan for 
abolition would not be adopted immediately as imperial restrictions remained and war became an 
increasingly realistic prospect. In October 1774, however, the Connecticut assembly outlawed 
slave importations, and extended the prohibition after the war in 1784, pairing the extension with 
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the gradual emancipation of slaves at the age of twenty-five, as Hart had suggested a decade 
before.69 
 Hart further elaborated concepts of emancipation in a pamphlet published in October 
1774, and not coincidentally, given the Connecticut assembly’s nearly simultaneous ban on slave 
imports. The immediate context was the meeting of the First Continental Congress, which 
convened in Philadelphia that September. Slavery and the slave trade were heinous because they 
violated the Lockean precept of the social contract. Thus, because “society evidently originates 
from mutual compact or agreement, so it is equally evident, that members who compose it, unite 
in one common interest; each individual gives up all the private interest that is not consistent 
with the general good, the interest of the whole body…” Slaveowners did not promote the 
general good by depriving others of self-ownership, and slaves could not be expected to uphold 
the common interest in societies in which their legal status was chattel property. Tellingly for a 
New Englander, Hart compared colonial social and economic development to trading companies, 
because both were “possessed of a common stock, into which every one hath given his 
proportion; the interest of this common stock is now the property of the whole body, and each 
individual is benefited in proportion to the good of the whole…” Slavery violated the common 
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The first opportunity for the northeastern abolitionism to find expression in a unified, 
cross-colonial context was at the First Continental Congress. Among the urgent matters on the 
delegates’ agenda included crafting official petitions and declarations against British imperial 
economic policy, and to construct a legitimately unified non-importation agreement. 
Unfortunately for abolitionists there was little direct discussion of slavery and the future of the 
slave trade to North America as the delegates debated the creation of a non-importation 
association, with unity in opposition to the imperial policy paramount. On September 22, 1774, 
the Congress issued a “Resolution Not To Import,” which urged “Merchants and others in the 
several colonies, not to send to Great Britain, any orders for goods, and to direct the execution of 
all orders already sent, to be delayed or suspended, until the sense of the Congress, on the means 
to be taken for the preservation of the liberties of America, is made public.”71 This laid the 
groundwork for a congressional non-importation agreement, meant as a show of economic force 
against the Empire.  
 In early October, the Congress considered several proposals for a continental 
Association. On October 20, 1774 the delegates voted to ratify the Association agreement, set to 
take force on September, 10, 1775, and prepared it for public distribution. The agreement opened 
with a brief statement of colonial grievances, which recited the familiar themes of colonial hatred 
of imperial economic regulations, Parliament’s unconstitutional use of legislative power, and 
violations of the colonists’ consent to imperial rule. These grievances, “which threaten 
destruction to the lives, liberty, and property of his Majesty’s subjects, in North America” led 
Congress to the “opinion, that a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation 
agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable 
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measure…”72 The opening resolve expressed a general statement of non-importation, set to take 
effect on December 1, 1774, while non-exportation of North American commodities was to 
begin on September 10, 1775. The second resolve declared “we will neither import nor purchase, 
any slave imported,” declaring that “we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither 
be concerned with it ourselves, nor will we hire vessels, nor sells our commodities or 
manufactures to those who are concerned in it.”73 To what end did the Continental Association 
include slave importations, and how was it connected to emergent northeastern abolitionism? 
The inclusion of slave importations made sense in the broader context of what the 
Congress, and especially northeastern delegates, wanted to achieve with the Association: a 
unified program of economic resistance against the Empire in the hope that Parliament could be 
brought to the bargaining table on terms that gave North Americans some political leverage. 
Because the Continental Congress designed the Association agreement to ban both the demand 
and supply of British import prohibiting slave importations made sense, and was cause for 
celebration for abolitionists. Abolitionists’ hopes, to be sure, did not include a widespread belief 
that unified, cross-continental action was possible. In the short-term, any immediate economic 
problems the slave import ban might create would presumably affect northeastern merchants 
who invested in slaving voyages, men well acquainted with the public turn against slavery and 
the slave trade in their communities. 
The northeastern press largely celebrated the Association agreement, and local 
Committees of Correspondence began preparations to enforce its provisions. The Connecticut 
Courant, for instance, lauded the congressmen for “having, in a manner highly honourable to 
themselves and to their Constituents, and serviceable to their Country, finished the important 
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Business on which they were appointed… for a great and increasing nation.” The newspaper 
especially celebrated provisions in the Association agreement that promoted the “increase and 
encouragement of sheep… and to the improvement of manufactures of all kinds.”74 The New 
York Journal reported in November 1774 that the city’s Committee of Correspondence had 
already set to work enforcing the Association agreement’s strictures. Information had circulated 
that a ship was bound to the West Indies with eighteen sheep on board, in violation of the 
agreement. “A number of citizens waited on the Captain,” according to the Journal’s report, 
“and informed him that the exportation of sheep was contrary to the resolution of the continental 
Congress…” The captain promised to abide by the agreement, but then tried to clear out in the 
middle of the night, when he was met by two hundred New Yorkers and led by four members of 
the local chapter of the Committee of Correspondence. The merchant whose goods, including the 
eighteen sheep, protested but under public pressure the sheep were disembarked and the “people 
being satisfied, peaceably dispersed.”75 Eighteen sheep, of course, did not a revolution make. But 
popular opinion in New England and the mid-Atlantic did support the implementation and 
execution of the Association agreement, though oftentimes with difficulty, as the calendar 
flipped to the critical year of 1775.  
The Association agreement completed, the First Continental Congress adjourned in late 
October 1774. At the Second Continental Congress, convened in May 1775, the exigencies of 
brewing war demanded the delegates’ attention. The congress’s records show that slavery and 
the slave trade generated very little discussion as the body continued to meet throughout 1775, 
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simultaneously planning for war and considering ultimately unsuccessful attempts to reconcile 
with the Empire. Letters from delegates to the Congress offer only brief glimpses into the 
reactions of colonial publics to the Association agreement’s slave trade prohibition. After the 
First Congress had adjourned, on December 14, 1774 Rhode Island delegate Samuel Ward wrote 
to Pennsylvanian John Dickinson to report on the Rhode Island General Assembly’s view of the 
Association agreement. “The people are Universally satisfied with the proceeding of the 
congress,” Ward wrote, “and determined to adhere to the Association, even the Merchants who 
suffer most by discontinuing the Slave Trade, Assure Me They shall most punctually conform to 
that Resolve and the Country is general is vastly pleased with it.”76 Other than other glancing 
references, the delegates seem not to have discussed the slave trade any further. From the 
perspective of northeastern abolitionists, the inclusion of the slave trade in the Association 
agreement augured well for the future of their project. Abolitionists continued to promote their 
vision of moral and political economy at the local-level, leading to the creation of the first 
abolition society in the Atlantic world. 
On April 14, 1775, at the Rising Sun Tavern at the intersection of Germantown and York 
Streets in North Philadelphia, ten men, including Thomas Paine, met to discuss the formation of 
an antislavery pressure group. Convened a mere five days before the battles at Lexington and 
Concord, the group later referred to as the Pennsylvania Abolition Society got off to a modest 
start, meeting four times in 1775 before warfare interrupted their activities until 1784. The 
proximate reason for founding the society was to offer protection and legal guidance to 
Pennsylvania blacks illegally claimed as slaves, and to press freedom claims in courts.77 The case 
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of mixed-race woman Dinah Nevil seems to have been the direct impetus for the creation of the 
PAS. Nevil and her four children made their way from New Jersey to Philadelphia in winter 
1773, where she instigated a freedom lawsuit on behalf of herself and her children. Spearheaded 
by Thomas Harrison, a Quaker tailor of modest means, Nevil’s case motivated organized 
antislavery cooperation in Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania.78 The PAS’s earliest historian 
claimed that by 1775 “so numerous” had freedom suits become, “that many benevolent 
individuals whose sense of justice prompted them to interfere, found the labour too onerous to be 
borne.” A growing supply of freedom suits pressed by black Pennsylvanians, it seems, met a 
popular demand for organized antislavery activity in the Keystone state.79 Though the war 
curtailed the PAS’s earliest activities, by the mid-1780s it would re-emerge as a vanguard group 
that pushed slavery abolition and antislavery political programs in the Keystone State, and 
beyond. As 1775 turned to 1776, and independence developed into a legitimate possibility, 
abolitionism was temporarily sidelined as a political movement. Still, abolitionists pressed their 
case in publications designed to keep alight the flame of their cause in the minds of men and 
women increasingly preoccupied with the prospect of war.  
In early 1776, Newport, Rhode Island New Divinity minister Samuel Hopkins published 
A Dialogue Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, the most complete statement of the moral 
and political economy of northeastern abolitionism published before the thirteen colonies’ 
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declaration of independence in July 1776. The events of the escalating imperial crisis in the early 
1770s led Hopkins to become increasingly active in promoting abolitionism from his pulpit in 
Newport, a city whose merchants had long been active participants in the African and 
intercontinental slave trades.80 In January 1775, before writing and publishing A Dialogue, 
Hopkins corresponded with Levi Hart to offer his comments on the unpublished manuscript 
Some Thoughts on the Subject of Freeing the Negro Slaves in the Colony of Connecticut. 
Hopkins was buoyed by Some Thoughts, especially the detailed arithmetic of Hart’s plan for 
abolition in Connecticut. Hopkins thought “the plan you propose is practicable, if the public 
attention could be gained, & people could be earnest about it.” Hopkins’s critiques concerned 
Hart’s treatment of slaveholders’ rights to their property. He wished Hart had argued “that all 
owners of slaves are under indispensable obligations to free them, whether the public will 
compensate them, or not…” Hopkins suggested that Hart’s calculations could be tweaked to 
assuage slave holders that they would receive fair compensation for their loss of property. “It 
will be said the master is not compensated,” he offered, “tho’ he should receive the sum he gave 
for his slave… A compensation can be nothing of the real worth of the slave to his master. And if 
it is unjust to take [a slave] away without some compensation, it is unjust to deprive the master 
of his service without a full compensation.” Not usually the most positive personality, Hopkins 
thought Hart’s work a good, but still preliminary first step. Many New Englanders despised the 
slave trade and disliked the powerful merchants that invested in it, he wrote, but because many 
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“who have not attended to the injustice of keeping these slaves, who have been made so by this 
trade, in perpetual slavery, perhaps something more particular ought to be said, on this head…”81 
Hopkins accepted his own challenge with the publication of A Dialogue in early 1776. He 
prefaced the publication with an address to the delegates of the Second Continental Congress, 
convened in May 1775, saluting the delegates’ efforts to “[obtain] the approbation and applause 
of your constituents… in the important, noble struggle for LIBERTY…” Strongly supportive of 
the ban on the slave trade in the October 1774 Association agreement, Hopkins wrote in behalf 
of the growing number of abolitionists, who “have particular encouragement thus to apply to 
you, since you have had the honour and happiness of leading these Colonies to resolve to stop 
the slave trade; and to buy no more slaves imported from Africa.” He denounced the 
inconsistency of arguing against the political ‘enslavement’ of imperial policies towards the 
thirteen colonies without taking further, united action against chattel slavery in North America. 
He urged Congress “that your wisdom and the great influence you have in these colonies, will be 
so properly and effectually exerted, as to bring about a total abolition of slavery, in such a 
manner as shall greatly promote the happiness of those oppressed strangers, and the best interest 
of the public.”82 
Hopkins structured A Dialogue as a series of exchanges between two New Englanders, 
one an abolitionist, the other a skeptic of abolitionism for a number of social, political, and 
economic reasons. The pamphlet opened with the skeptic acknowledging the efflorescence of 
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abolitionism, yet maintaining that “this is not a proper time to attend to it, while we are in such a 
state of war and distress, and affairs of much greater importance demand all our attention…” 
Hopkins’s abolitionist countered this argument against the expediency of abolition by decrying 
slavery as a “public sin.” Even though “there are but few of these slaves, indeed in New-
England, compared with the vast numbers in the islands and the southern colonies,” New 
Englanders could not be excused for failing to take action against slavery and the slave trade. 
Slave trade abolitionism having received the endorsement of the Association agreement, he 
believed, was a necessary but not sufficient development. A conviction against the slave trade, 
Hopkins wrote, “has been so spread of late, that it is has reached almost all men on the continent, 
except some who are too deeply interested in it, to admit the light which condemns it.” The 
Association agreement signaled approbation of the slave trade, but that did not mean that anti-
slave trade sentiment was shared equally across the North American colonies, and the local law 
of slavery remained undisturbed.83 
 Much of the abolitionist’s argument in A Dialogue concentrated on proving that slavery 
and the slave trade were moral and political evils that threatened the foundations of the North 
American commercial and agricultural economies. Thus, the abolitionist argued that “if African 
slaves had never been introduced, or this slavery were now abolished; and every man had his 
farm or plantation, no more than he could cultivate to his best advantage, by the help of his 
children, and perhaps a few hired men; this would introduce industry, temperance, and 
economy.” Had plantation slavery not taken root in the Upper and Lower South colonies, by this 
logic, their economies would have mimicked those of the Northeast. Slavery led to political and 
economic inequality, as the power of masters over slaves mimicked the arbitrary power of 
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tyrannical monarchies over their subjects—the fear of every republican-minded North American 
patriot.84 By connecting antislavery political economy to patriotic republicanism, Hopkins forged 
links between the politics of the imperial crisis and the abolitionist argument.  
 Abolition, Hopkins argued, would stimulate the expansion of free labor markets in the 
northeastern colonies. Local governments needed to direct this process so that potential freedmen 
and women were put in a position to positively contribute to their communities. Thus Hopkins’ 
abolitionist countered concerns that free blacks would become pauperized and drain public 
coffers, by arguing that they should “be subject to the same restraints and laws as other freemen; 
and have the same care taken of them by the public.” New England town meetings historically 
controlled the allocation of labor in local markets and provided social welfare, and Hopkins saw 
no reason why black New Englanders should be ostracized from the public weal. “If not put 
under peculiar disadvantages, as freed negroes commonly are,” he wrote, and if they were given 
“reasonable wages for their labour,” there could be no doubt that blacks would be fit subjects for 
full inclusion in New England society and economy.85 Hopkins continually emphasized the 
linkages between the abolitionist argument and the politics of non-importation and consumption, 
arguing that while the Association agreement’s ban on slave importations, as well as attempts by 
colonial assemblies to block slave importations were positive steps, still “holding these blacks in 
a state of slavery, is a practical justification of the slave-trade…” “By keeping these slaves,” he 
continued, “and buying and selling them, they actually encourage the slave trade… For so long 
as slaves are bought and possessed, and in demand, so long the African trade will be supported 
and encouraged.” If slavery were to be abolished throughout the thirteen colonies, putting a stop 
to foreign slave importations was a significant, but preliminary step. “For if it be wrong to import 
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and buy them now, it was always wrong… and we have made them our slaves without the least 
right, and ought to retract it, and repair the injury done to them, so far as it is in our power, by 
setting them free and compensating them otherwise, so far as we are able.” 86  
 The New England skeptic accused Hopkins’s abolitionist of promoting measures that 
would lead to widespread loss of property, and even worse, possibly servile insurrection. “Many 
make such a clamour about holding our Negroes in bondage,” the skeptic argued, “and have so 
inveighed against the African slave-trade, and even keeping our blacks in slavery, that many 
negroes are become very uneasy, and are much more engaged to obtain their liberty than they 
used to be.” Therefore questions surrounding slavery’s future in the thirteen colonies should be 
segregated from the political questions of the imperial crisis, kept “in private.” Public 
consideration of the revolutionary antislavery argument, especially by members of the clergy like 
Hopkins, was dangerous “lest the blacks should take it fully into their heads that they are treated 
hardly, and never be easy till they are set at liberty.” 87  
 Hopkins’s abolitionist retorted that “the present state of our public affairs” demanded that 
abolitionism be taken seriously, because of political and moral inconsistency: “while the poor 
Negroes look on, and hear what an aversion we have to slavery… necessarily leads them to 
attend to their own wretched situation.” Thus, “they see themselves deprived of all liberty and 
property,” he wrote, and “they see the slavery the Americans dread as worse than death, [as] 
lighter than a feather, compared to their heavy doom.”88 The only morally sound plan of action 
was to marshal public opinion, and therefore political power, to fight slavery. Abolitionism 
“ought doubtless to be attended to by the General Assemblies, and Continental and Provincial 
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Congresses; and if they were as much united and engaged in devising ways and means to set at 
liberty these injured slaves, as they are to defend themselves from tyranny, it would soon be 
effected.”89 Slavery and the slave trade negatively impacted everyone in North America; 
therefore, abolition was a proper subject for colonial legislators to entertain.90   
 Hopkins wrote “An Address to the Owners of Negro Slaves, in the American Colonies” 
as a concluding salvo to A Dialogue. He challenged slaveowners to defend the peculiar 
institution without resorting to appeals to property rights in chattel slaves, which he and other 
abolitionists believed illegitimate, or on grounds of political inexpediency. He acknowledged 
that “the several legislatures of these colonies, the magistrates, and the body of the people have 
doubtless” been complicit in the allowing the dehumanizing chattel property regime of slavery to 
persist. But he pivoted to warn slaveowners that the political economy of imperial crisis had had 
a deafening impact on the minds of non-slaveholders: “And is it not worthy of your 
consideration, that they who are not interested in this practice, and have no slaves, are generally, 
if not every one, fully convinced it is wrong?” While doubtless an exaggeration, certainly if 
applied to the Upper and Lower South, Hopkins did have a point. He only had to look outside his 
own window for evidence that this assertion was sustainable at the local level. He referred to 
Rhode Island’s 1774 and 1775 overturned slave trade abolition laws as proof that the yawning 
inconsistency between patriot cries of political ‘enslavement’ by the Empire and American 
chattel slavery was not an insoluble paradox. “Men love not to be inconsistent with themselves,” 
Hopkins noted acerbically, and the Rhode Island General Assembly had proven that it was 
possible for New England patriots to elude inconsistency.91 The contours of northeastern 
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agrarian, mercantile, and infant manufacturing capitalism through the 1770s, in contrast to the 
Upper and Lower South, made the inconsistencies of Revolutionary rhetoric and American 





Preparations for war with the British Empire consumed the attention of the Second 
Continental Congress in late winter and spring 1776. Complex negotiations over financing the 
Continental Army, coordinating troop requisitions, preparing defensive strategies, and working 
to massage public opinion in favor of supporting the monumental undertaking of a war for 
independence were critical tasks if the shoots of the “seedtime of revolution,” to borrow Thomas 
Paine’s suggestive metaphor, were to bloom. By June 1776 congressional support for a 
declaration of independence, an explanation of colonial grievances against the Empire, and a 
plea for international diplomatic recognition of the patriot project, reached a critical mass.  
 Congress reiterated the October 1774 Association agreement’s ban on slave importations 
in April 1776, as the delegates edged closer to declaring independence after the previous July’s 
Olive Branch petition was denied by King George III and Parliament.92 On April 6, 1776, the 
Congress declared in a series of non-imported and exportation resolves, “That no slaves be 
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imported into any of the thirteen United Colonies.” The Congress further recommended to the 
state legislatures that they appoint agents responsible for “observing the regulations made by the 
Congress, or assemblies, or conventions, concerning trade, and for securing the observation of 
such parts of the association as are not inconsistent therewith.”93  
 As in September and October 1774 when the First Continental Congress debated the 
Association agreement, there was very little direct mention of slavery or the slave trade as the 
delegates moved towards approving the creation of a committee to draft a declaration of 
independence. In April 1776, the delegates to the Congress worked to untangle a confusing 
patchwork of legalities of individual colonial assemblies, only three of which—Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut—were legally operational vis-à-vis the Empire. During the same 
month, John Adams wrote to fellow Bay Stater Joseph Warren that New England and four slave 
societies on the southern mainland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, stood 
firmly in support of a declaration of independence, while in Pennsylvania, New York, New 
Jersey, and Delaware support for independence among the political and mercantile classes 
wavered.94 By early June 1776, however, the Congress agreed to appoint a committee to draft a 
declaration, with Thomas Jefferson chosen to perform the bulk of the writing under the 
supervision of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman.  
The story of the drafting process of the Declaration of Independence is as celebrated a 
chain of events as exists in American history and popular memory, as is Thomas Jefferson’s role 
as the primary author of the document. As David Armitage has made clear, the document was 
primarily an appeal for international diplomatic recognition clothed in natural rights talk par 
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excellence.95 The Declaration was also a statement of revolutionary principles that exposed deep 
underlying contradictions about American slavery and American independence. At the heart of 
these contradictions lay Jefferson’s condemnatory, and ultimately excised clause which accused 
King George III—the “Christian King of Great Britain”—and his predecessors for perpetuating 
the “piratical Warfare” of the African slave trade, for “waging cruel War against human Nature 
itself.” The Declaration’s slave trade clause contained language that scholars have noted was the 
most inflammatory in the entire document, both in substance and in tone.96  
In haranguing the King and his predecessors for having forced the slave trade upon North 
Americans for well over a century, Jefferson needed only to point to repeated colonial assembly 
attempts to proscribe slave importations into their communities. Jefferson claimed George III 
“prostituted his Negative for Suppressing every legislative Attempt to prohibit or to restrain an 
execrable Commerce, determined to keep open a Markett where Men are bought and sold.” 
Jefferson infamously lambasted the King for “exciting those very People to rise in Arms among 
us, and to purchase their Liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people who 
also obtruded them…”97 These remarkable assertions shocked many of his colleagues, prompting 
John Adams to describe Jefferson’s handiwork as a “vehement philippic against Negro slavery.” 
98 Delegates from South Carolina and Georgia did not take kindly to Jefferson’s inflammatory 
language, or the precedent it would have enshrined had it been included in the finished product. 
Deep southerners’ misgivings about including the “vehement philippic” in the Declaration 
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motivated them to push for the excision of the clause in the debates of July 1-3, before Congress 
formally approved the document and released it to the American public.  
Jefferson implied in his personal notes of the proceedings that South Carolinians, led by 
Edward Rutledge, disapproved of a resolution to convene the Committee of the Whole to vote on 
the declaration, because they wanted the clause excised. He later wrote that the clause 
“reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South 
Carolina & Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on 
the contrary still wished to continue it.” He also noted that some of “our Northern brethren I 
believe felt a little tender” about the implications of the clause, most likely Rhode Islanders who 
were directly or indirectly interested in African and intercontinental slave trading.99 This sort of 
tenderness, though, had as much to do with the public turn against slavery and the slave trade in 
the Northeast as it was direct evidence of widespread support for the slave trade as a central 
pillar of the mercantile and agrarian economy of the region.  
Jefferson’s political motivations for crafting this passage, how they related to the 
emphatic statement of natural rights elsewhere in the Declaration of Independence, and what it 
tells us about his and other slaveholding patriots’ deep ambivalence about the politics of slavery 
and revolution are not the central concern of this analysis.100 If considered as an outcome of 
                                                           
99 Jefferson’s notes of the debates cryptically record that on July 1 Rutledge and his fellow South 
Carolinians were initially against a resolution to debate the Declaration: JCC, VI: p. 1092.  
100 David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution, p. 46, isolates the paradox of Jefferson and other patriot 
slaveowners’ “need to spin the spiraling politics of slavery” at a momentous occasion of imperial 
emancipation in two probing questions: “Could British guilt and American innocence be confirmed 
without advancing the cause of abolition? Did Jefferson even want to?” Richard Beeman notes that 
American historical memory which designates sole responsibility of the Declaration’s drafting and the 
meaning of its contents oversimplifies the workings of the committee designated to produce the 
document, and that many details concerning who edited the document, when they did, and the substance 
of their edits are not evidentially clear. Beeman, Our Lives, Our Fortunes, and Our Sacred Honor, p. 393. 
Waldstreicher elsewhere argues persuasively that while “the language was pure Jefferson and the 
passion particularly Virginian… yet the casting of African slavery as further proof of British villainy is 
120 
 
congressional politicking, the excision of Jefferson’s striking condemnation of British imperial 
complicity in perpetuating the slave trade and slavery is understandable. South Carolinians, 
Georgians, and a few New Englanders did not want it in the Declaration, and unity carried the 
day. If considered as part of the tangled, and indeed insoluble views of Jefferson on slavery and 
his evolving sense of American political economic development, the episode is the textbook 
definition of a paradox. At bottom, the excised clause was a failed political ploy to engender 
sympathy for the insurgent American patriots in the international diplomatic community while 
tarring the British imperial apparatus with the slimy stigma of political ‘enslavement.’ The 
Articles of Confederation, the new nation’s first governing charter, created a decentralized 
structure of governance on which New England states and Pennsylvania capitalized to unleash 
abolition to promote the accumulation of free labor human capital, by breaking the property 
relationship of slavery.  
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Ch. 3: Abolition Unleashed: The Revolution and Northeastern State Abolition, 1776-1788 
 
Political abolitionism percolated in the mid-Atlantic and New England states after the 
Revolutionary War escalated in spring 1776, and spread rapidly across the region as British 
military strategy shifted to the South beginning in 1778. Abolition in the Northeast advanced 
unevenly and in response to tumultuous local contexts, but by the mid-1780s six states had 
initiated he abolition of chattel slavery. In March 1780 the Pennsylvania state assembly made 
history, passing the first abolition law in the Anglo-Atlantic world. The Quok Walker cases and 
their resolution in the 1783 Commonwealth v. Jennison decision cemented slavery’s abolition in 
Massachusetts, though successful freedom suits and socioeconomic aversion to slavery paved the 
way for judicial abolition for over a decade. Connecticut’s legislature provided for gradual 
abolition in 1784, while Rhode Island’s assembly instituted gradual emancipation the same year 
in a politically fraught process. In 1785, New York’s assembly came close to passing abolition 
legislation, only to be overturned by the Council of Revision because of concerns that the 
proposed law did not guarantee freed-persons’ political and civil rights. Slaveholding politicians 
and their constituents across the Northeast objected strenuously to abolition, but with the 
temporary exceptions of New York and New Jersey, they fought a losing battle in the 1780s.  By 
1788, all of New England and Pennsylvania had abolished slavery, slave importations, and made 
their citizens’ participation in the slave trade illegal. While New York and New Jersey did not 
pass abolition legislation until 1799 and 1804, respectively, abolition swept forcefully and with 
remarkable rapidity between 1780 and 1788.1  
                                                           
1 Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation The Abolition of Slavery in the North (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967) is still the touchstone for subsequent scholarship so that northeastern state abolition 
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Before the Revolution escalated in the spring and summer of 1776, slavery in the 
Northeast underwent a series of political, rhetorical, and legislative attacks. The disruption of 
war also unleashed a variety of opportunities for the enslaved to stake claims to liberation from 
their status as chattel property. Since North American transatlantic commerce was paralyzed 
during the war, so too were the African and intercontinental slave trades. The challenge of war to 
the legal and social structures of slavery in the thirteen states varied in response to local law, 
customs, and the relative intensity of antislavery political agitation activated by the imperial 
crisis. The impact of destructive military campaigns was also borne unevenly, striking the New 
England and the mid-Atlantic first before the Empire’s shift in military strategy to focus on 
crushing the American rebellion from the Chesapeake southward. By 1783, the war and creation 
and implementation of the Articles of Confederation together combined to obliterate political 
obstacles to the adoption of abolitionist programs in New England and Pennsylvania. 
During the war the free and enslaved blacks powerfully asserted claims to freedom, as 
activists like Prince Hall and Paul Cuffee organized petition campaigns that reflected their deep 
understanding of the emancipatory principles embedded in the Declaration of Independence.2 
Recently emancipated, Phillis Wheatley continued to wield her pen, eloquently protesting the 
                                                           
is most often referred to as the first emancipation. My formulation of “abolition unleashed” offers a core 
interpretive departure Zilversmit’s earlier, and still very useful, work in that it emphasizes the strength of 
political abolitionism and historically unprecedented rapidity with which state legislatures and courts 
enacted abolition. Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp, 115-145 also emphasizes the swiftness of northern state abolition, 
in the long durée Euro-Atlantic world context. Recent interpretations of northern abolition, echoing 
elements of Zilversmit’s work, have tended to emphasize the halting and incomplete mature of northern 
abolition, particularly in states that legislated abolition, because the laws did not immediately free all 
slaves and did not result in strict racial equality.  
2 See, for example, “Petition of Prince Hall and Other Blacks, January 13, 1777”; “Petition of New 
Hampshire Slaves, November 12, 1779,”; “Petition of Paul Cuffee and Other Blacks, February 10, 1780,” 
all in Roger Bruns, ed., Am I Not A Man And A Brother: The Antislavery Crusade of Revolutionary America, 
1688-1788 [Hereafter AINAMAB] (New York: Chelsea House, 1977), pp. 428-429; 452-454; 454-455. 
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iniquity of slavery in letters and poems. Enslaved New England men seized opportunities to 
serve the American war effort in exchange for freedom and- potentially- political inclusion. 
Escalating since the 1760s, enslaved New Englanders continued to press freedom suits, legal 
claims to mitigate their status as chattel. 3 The British Army’s occupation of New York City 
effectively foreclosed black New Yorkers’ legal avenues to freedom, but the city was 
increasingly filled with enslaved and freed Afro-Britons who were swept to the city along with 
Loyalists from across North America.4 
The most direct external challenge to slavery during the war—British military 
emancipation—was not applied to the mid-Atlantic and New England. Virginia Governor Lord 
Dunmore’s famed proclamation of November 7, 1775 applied only to that state, and while the 
June 1779 Phillipsburg Proclamation expanded the policy to the enslaved of all American 
patriots, it could only be effectively enforced in the Upper and Lower South, where the majority 
of British military resources were concentrated by 1780. Thousands of Afro-Britons escaped 
slavery in the Chesapeake and Carolinas, and Thomas Jefferson’s “faulty math” led him to 
estimate that 80,000-100,000 southern slaves reached freedom, though modern assessments 
suggest a lower figure of 25,000-30,000. New England military emancipation, offers of freedom 
in exchange for service, freed upwards of one thousand men, mostly in Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts. 5 The war’s impact on slavery in the Northeast was indirect, as 
                                                           
3 Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s Cause: A History of Abolition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 66-76; 
Lorenzo J. Greene, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1961); Alan Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).  
4 On the travails of Loyalists and the experiences of black New Yorkers during the Revolution and after, 
see Graham Russell Gao Hodges, Root and Branch: African-Americans in New York and East Jersey, 1613-1863 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Judith Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and 
Loyalists in Revolutionary New York (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).  
5 Cassandra Pybus, “Jefferson’s Faulty Math: The Question of Slave Defections During the American 
Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 62 No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 243-264; Pybus, Epic Journeys of 
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it led states to re-organize their governmental structures, thereby opening political breaches that 
abolitionists worked to exploit. At the same time, the war spurred the creation of free black 




The delegates to the Continental Congress began to debate the structure of the Articles of 
Confederation in summer 1776, as war rapidly escalated. While several issues concerning 
slavery generated heated debate, the delegates broadly agreed that the Articles’ basic structure 
should be grounded in what one historian has called “extreme federalism.” The states, in other 
words, remained sovereign vis-à-vis the national government. In the context of the imperial 
crisis, this broad consensus made sense. The delegates clearly wanted to avoid creating a national 
government that could potentially mimic the centralization of the British Empire. “Extreme 
federalism” was also accepted, in part, because the states wanted as much control as possible 
over the law of slavery. For the slave societies from the Chesapeake southward, this was both an 
acceptance and repudiation of the principles elucidated by Lord Mansfield in the 1772 Somerset 
decision, where declared slavery a municipal institution upheld only by positive local law. The 
Congress did not intend the Articles of Confederation to threaten slavery’s legality in the states. 
For southern slaveholders, however, the consequences of the Somerset decision’s adoption of the 
“freedom principle” and its potential transmission national law had worrisome future 
                                                           
Freedom: Runaways of the American Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 
pp. 3-74; Gerald Horne, The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of 
America (New York: New York University Press, 2014), pp. 234-252; Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: 
Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), pp. 13-54.  
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consequences. The law of slavery, southern slaveholders agreed, must be jealously guarded as a 
state prerogative.   
 Recent scholarship on the relationship between municipal slavery and the Articles of 
Confederation emphasizes how the framework’s structure protected southern slavery from an 
interventionist national government. The Articles of Confederation, in other words, shielded 
slavery where it already existed, leading historians to claim it was a ‘victory’ for slaveholders. 
Some scholars go further, to arguing, that the Articles not only protected slavery where it existed, 
but set the stage for the institution’s later southwestern expansion. Thus the debates over slavery 
between northerners and southerners at the Continental Congress constituted “dramatic evidence 
of the power of the slave states, as well as of the major political weight of slavery as an element 
in structuring the revolutionary government.”6 
 Scholars that emphasize protections for slavery that were embedded in the Articles of 
Confederation have several good reasons for doing so. The Articles, they point out, embraced the 
principle of “confederal law” with reference to slave property. Among other things this meant 
that slaves held as chattel under southern state laws could not be confiscated in states where the 
legality of slavery faced a dubious future. The Articles’ Privileges and Immunities clause 
guaranteed slaveholders the right to recover fugitive slaves, and to sojourn with their enslaved 
                                                           
6 George Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American 
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 45-57, quotation p. 157. See also Paul 
Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000), pp. 20-69; Finkelman, “Slavery and the Founders: Little Ventured, Little Gained,” Yale 
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Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), shows the powerfully 
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property throughout Confederation states and territories. Slaveholders also received protections 
against the confiscation of slave property in the event that individual states passed legislation 
banning slave importations, which individual colonies had attempted to implement 
unsuccessfully in the tumult of the imperial crisis.  Critical to slaveholding interests, southern 
politicians demanded these protections as the asking price for confederation.7  
The most contentious debates in Congress over provisions relating to slavery in the 
Articles concerned taxation. The central question was whether slave property should be included 
in taxation quotas. Southern slaveholders voiced near unanimous opposition to the inclusion of 
slave property in tax quotas, arguing that this would unfairly burden the slaveholding states. 
Maryland’s Samuel Chase declared including slave property inappropriate because no such 
proposal to tax the cattle and horses of the northern states was on the table. Led by South 
Carolinians, congressional slaveholders threatened defection should slave property be included 
in tax quotas. Because the distribution of tax burdens was such a critical issue, regional 
divergences in property regimes threatened to derail the Confederation from the beginning. 
Proposals to include all property, excluding “household goods,” as the basis for taxation went 
nowhere. Debates over slavery and taxation ended in late 1777, as the Congress ultimately 
decided to include land and buildings as the bases for determining tax quotas, removing 
population from the tax formula. The exclusion of slave property has been interpreted as a 
victory for slaveholding interests. In any case, scholars are in unanimous agreement that the tax 
                                                           
7 Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union, pp. 51-55; For a detailed discussion of slavery and taxation debates in 
the revolutionary era, see Robin L. Einhorn, American Slavery, American Taxation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 110-138. Einhorn notes, correctly in my view, that debates over property and 
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structure crafted by the Congress resulted in a deeply flawed and unworkable system that 
doomed the Articles government to failure.8 
 While the Articles insulated southern slavery from external legal assaults, allowed 
slaveholders right to their enslaved property under the Articles’ “confederal” regime, and 
ultimately excluded slave property from tax quotas, the nation’s first governing charter should 
not be interpreted as an unmitigated victory for southern planters, regardless of their national 
political influence. Because of the Articles’ “extreme federalism,” from the perspective of 
antislavery northeasterners, the Confederation offered unprecedented opportunities to abolish 
slavery within their states. Scholars who emphasize the Articles’ protections for slavery 
implicitly acknowledge this understanding. But because abolitionism is so often characterized as 
weak and halting, their interpretations gravitate towards an emphasis on protections for southern 
slavery, leaving several questions unanswered. If northern delegates at the Continental Congress 
agreed that the Confederation government could not force an individual state to abolish slavery 
or deny slaveholders the right to their property—and there is not one suggestion in the Journals 
of the Continental Congress that these positions were ever on the table—why are “confederal” 
protections for slave property held up as an unqualified victory for slaveholders? Why did 
slaveholders fret, and threaten disunion, over counting slaves as property for tax quotas if 
northern abolitionism was weak and isolated? What were southern slaveholders worried about? 
These questions do not deny that the Articles provided protections to southern slaveholders, but 
rather that their decentralized structure summarily obliterated all political obstacles to state 
                                                           
8 Journals of the Continental Congress [hereafter JCC], ed. Washington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C., 
1904-1937), IX: 785,-788, 793-797, 800-801. The Articles left the states broad discretion to elect delegates to 
serve in congress, only mandating that each state should have no less than two or more than seven 
delegates. Each state was given complete responsibility for maintaining their delegates to Congress, and 
each state received one vote in Congress. Therefore, conflicts over slavery and representation, which later 
proved so divisive at the Constitutional Convention, were avoided under the Articles. AoC, Art. V, §2-3. 
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abolition in the Northeast. Abolitionists in New England and Pennsylvania capitalized on 
national political decentralization to force through legislative and judicial abolition, against often 
strident opposition, the first instances of slavery abolition in the Americas. 
The Articles did not extend the possibility of forced abolition on the southern states, but 
at the same time, they did not prevent northeastern abolition. The Articles’ decentralization with 
regard to trade, moreover, meant that the states retained authority to regulate the importation and 
exportation of goods into their jurisdictions. This allowed state legislatures absolute authority to 
allow, or ban, slave importations.9 Therefore conflicts over whether to sanction slave 
importations, or whether to circumscribe slaveowners’ right to sell slaves out-of-state, were 
exclusively fought within state legislatures and not at the national level. As we will see below, 
mercantile and slaveholding interests in New England and the mid-Atlantic fought against the 
abolition of slave importations and participation in the slave trade, ironically leading their states 
prevent the sale of slaves out-of-state and gradually abolish slavery before outlawing their 
citizens’ participation in the slave trade. The locus of the politics of slavery from 1776-1788 was 
the state, not the weak and ineffectual national government.  
Northeastern abolitionists still petitioned the Confederation Congress to symbolically 
gesture against the immorality of slavery, and to recommend that state legislatures restrain the 
slave trade. After the Treaty of Paris took effect in September 1783, Pennsylvania Quakers 
resumed their petition campaigns. In October, they sent a petition containing over five hundred 
signatures on the subject of the slave trade. Severely limited by the Confederation Congress’s 
                                                           
9 AoC, Art. 9, §1: “… no treaty of commerce should be made, whereby the legislative power of the 
respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own 
people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or 
commodities whatsoever.” Emphasis mine.  
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inability to act independently of the states, the petition solicited Congress’s “Christian 
interposition to discourage prevent so obvious an evil, in such a manner as under the influence of 
Divine Wisdom you shall all meet.” They grounded the petition’s requests in the familiar 
language of natural rights, buttressed by the “solemn declarations often repeated in favor of 
universal liberty” that the Revolution had wrought.10 Aware that Congressional paralysis and the 
extreme federalism of the Articles made their request largely symbolic, the petitioners relied on 
antislavery New Jersey delegate David Howell to keep them abreast of developments in 
Congress.11 The petition was received and submitted to a committee of three for consideration 
which included Howell.12  
In January 1784, the committee submitted a report to the whole, which resolved that the 
Congress consider the Quaker petition “as a testimony of their sincere concern for the essential 
good of their country …” The Congress’s Journal indicates that “that essential good of their 
country” was struck through and replaced with “the rights of mankind,” which spoke volumes 
about southern opposition to even a faint suggestion of Congressional interest in anti-slave trade 
rhetoric. The committee also resolved to encourage state legislatures to take measures to restrain 
the slave trade, “to compass the object” of the First Continental Congress’s October 1774 
Association agreement, which prohibited slave importations as part of a broader non-importation 
                                                           
10 “To The United States Congress Assembled, The Address of the People Called Quakers,” MS 
reproduced in AINAMAB, pp. 493-501. 
11 David Howell to Moses Brown, 22 August 1783, Papers of the American Slave Trade, Jay Coughtry, ed. 
[hereafter PAST], Moses Brown Papers [hereafter MBP], Correspondence, Reel 4. Howell noted not even 
seven states could agree on a site to relocate the seat of Congress, an indication of Congress’s inability to 
conduct routine business.  
12 JCC, XV: pp. 654; 660.  
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program. Not officially approved by Congress, the failed petition revealed the limitations of 
national antislavery political action under the Articles.13  
In September 1784, Philadelphia Quaker James Pemberton reported to Moses Brown that 
David Howell’s efforts to reignite congressional discussion of Quaker anti-slave trade petitions 
proceeded slowly. Howell tried to “embrace the first opportunity to bring on” discussion of anti-
slave trade petitions, but was “met with obstruction from the southern slave holders.” Pemberton 
assured Brown that the Philadelphia Meeting for Sufferings remained busy planning petition 
campaigns, as well as assisting Afro-Pennsylvanian freedom claims. The Pennsylvania Abolition 
Society had recently been reorganized, and the society shouldered the burden of enforcing 
Pennsylvania’s 1780 abolition law quickly. While Pemberton rued that the Articles constrained 
that northeastern abolitionists, he noted with approval that abolitionist sentiment was ascendant 
in Great Britain, largely the work of abolitionists Granville Sharp and Thomas Clarkson. 
Pemberton noted sanguinely that “it would be a desirable point gained, could a total prohibition 
to the trade in every government be brought about.” By 1787, Pemberton would be partially 
fulfilled in his hopes. But at the national level, the only antislavery policy that had any chance of 
fulfillment under the Articles was the prohibition of slavery in United States territories.14 
 Crafting policies to promote orderly western expansion was the most pressing task for the 
Confederation Congress. Faced with untangling overlapping state land claims in territories west 
                                                           
13 JCC, XVI, pp. 13-14.  
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of the original states, the Congress encountered questions over slavery and western expansion.15 
A congressional committee consisting of Thomas Jefferson, Jeremiah Townley Chase, and 
abolitionist champion David Howell issued a report in March 1784 that recommended a process 
of state land cessions and broad surveying procedures, and to abolish slavery north of the Ohio 
River by 1800. It is unclear if this proposal was inspired by northeastern gradual abolition laws, 
which had been secured in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island by March 1784. There 
has been much scholarly debate about Jefferson’s personal motives for promoting abolition 
provisions in the Northwest Territory, and how they relate to his vision of yeoman political 
economy.16 Ultimately the slavery provision was dropped from the final text of the 1784 Land 
Ordinance Act. Delegates from New England and the Mid-Atlantic States voted unanimously to 
strike out this provision, for reasons that are not entirely clear. Presumably delegates with proven 
antislavery credentials like David Howell desired an immediate prohibition in the territories, well 
within the Congress’s authority to enact.17 Nevertheless, proposals to reserve the Northwest 
Territory for non-slaveholding New England settlers returned in 1785.  
 That year, the Confederation Congress once again addressed the problem of providing for 
orderly western settlement. The previous year’s Land Ordinance Act created the Northwest 
Territory as a national domain, but it remained for Congress to provide more specific instructions 
for distributing western land and organizing territorial governance. In March 1785, antislavery 
                                                           
15 On the confusing entanglement of land claims in the west, see James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 
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delegate Rufus King of Massachusetts successfully entered a resolution that proposed to ban 
slavery in the Northwest immediately, a proposal supported by all of the New England states, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York.18  Virginia delegate William Grayson noted that King 
decided to wait until discussion of an expanded Ordinance bill resumed in April 1785 to further 
push for a slavery ban. Grayson believed that seven states “may be found liberal enough” to 
support the ban on slavery.19 But Congress did not extensively address the slavery question in the 
1785 debates. Most of the debate centered on resolving technical questions of land surveying, the 
disposition of government moneys derived from land sales, and provisions to set aside public 
lands for schools.20 Congress did extend the “confederal” legal regime of the Articles to the 
Northwest Territory, securing slaveholders’ right to recapture fugitives in the territory.21 
Consideration of the slavery ban was not taken up again after King’s March resolution. The 1785 
Land Ordinance Bill, passed May 20, 1785, provided for detailed surveying and land distribution 
procedures, but the question of slavery in the Northwest returned once again in spring 1787. 
 The events leading to the passage of the Northwest Ordinance on July 13, 1787, are 
shrouded in ambiguity. The Confederation Congress debated versions of the bill for more than 
two years. They debated a draft bill twice in April and May 1787, and again when Congress 
reconvened in New York that July.22 By that time, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
was deep in the midst of debating slavery and congressional representation. Just before Congress 
took up the bill for final consideration, Massachusetts delegate Nathan Dane proposed the 
inclusion of Article VI, which banned slavery and involuntary servitude north of the Ohio River, 
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19 William Grayson to James Madison, May 1, 1785, JMP, FOLC.  
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while recognizing southern slaveholders’ right to reclaim fugitive slaves in the territory.23 There 
was no recorded discussion of Article VI by the whole, and on July 13 the Confederation 
Congress’s most important piece of legislation passed by unanimous vote. 
 Historians have puzzled over why the Ordinance was passed so quickly, and with so 
little discussion of the momentous decision to use congressional authority to ban slavery from an 
entire section of the national domain. Most importantly, they ask why southern delegates 
acquiesced so easily to Article VI. A confluence of motivations influenced these decisions. First, 
southerners likely accepted Article VI as quid pro quo for allowing slavery’s legalization in the 
territories south of the Ohio River, where slaveholding pioneers were already settling the future 
slave states of Kentucky and Tennessee.24 Second, there is tantalizing evidence that Congress 
rushed the Northwest Ordinance into passage at the instigation of Manassah Cutler, who 
represented the New England-based Ohio Land Company. The Company wanted to purchase 
five million acres of north of the Ohio River, and the national treasury desperately needed an 
infusion of funds to pay down domestic debt. According to some sources Cutler harbored 
antislavery views, and while some scholars doubt their sincerity, it is nonetheless clear that the 
company’s potential customers were New Englanders who would not move to the territory if 
forced to compete with slaveholders. Regardless, Article VI generated no direct opposition in 
Congress.25 While the Ordinance did not immediately and completely abolish slavery in the 
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Northwest Territory and the five states carved out of it, as masters sojourning from southern 
states retained property rights, Article VI remained in effect and the Northwest developed into an 




Pennsylvania followed an ironic path to slavery abolition.26 On the one hand, as the 
Revolution dawned it had the largest and best organized cadre of antislavery activists in the 
Anglo-Atlantic world, largely the work of Anthony Benezet and the Quaker “Antislavery 
International” which he spearheaded. But with war came problems for Quakers, as their pacifism 
made them suspect and open to accusations of Toryism.27 The state ratified a radical new 
Constitution in September 1776, the first clause declaring that “all men are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the 
enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” The new Constitution was the work of a coalition 
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of Philadelphia radicals led by Thomas Paine and Scots-Irish Presbyterians headed by George 
Bryan. Coupled with the war, the coalition effectively displaced Quakers from power in the state 
government, which also reflected a popular backlash against the political and economic power of 
wealthy Philadelphia merchant class, which included many Quakers. Amidst these 
transformations in state politics, revolutionary abolitionism still found a voice in Assembly 
politics and in the court of public opinion.28 
In fall 1778, newly-appointed Executive Council President George Bryan asked the 
unicameral State Assembly to consider antislavery legislation. Bryan’s message exhorted the 
assemblymen to gradually abolish slavery, “so disgraceful to any people, and more especially to 
those who have been contending in the great cause of liberty themselves..." Maintaining 
consistency with Declaration principles, the message framed gradual abolition as Pennsylvania’s 
opportunity to make history by becoming the first government to declare slavery illegal and 
“establish the rights of human nature.” The Council offered to produce a draft bill for Assembly 
consideration within a week, which spurred the Assembly to debate and craft its own bill. After 
some back-and-forth between the Assembly and Executive Council about which body had the 
authority to officially propose the bill, by March 1779 an Assembly committee on abolition 
reported a bill to the whole. Abolition legislation did not leave the Assembly’s agenda for the 
next year.29 
                                                           
28 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); 
Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, pp. 124-125; Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 107-143; Robin Blackburn, The American Crucible: Slavery, 
Emancipation, and Human Rights (London: Verso Books, 2011), pp. 160-162; Constitution of Pennsylvania, 
I. 
29 “In a message from the President and Supreme Council of Pennsylvania, of the 5th Instant, to the 
Representatives of that State in Assembly met…” Reprinted in New Jersey Gazette, 17 February 1779. 
Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, pp. 126-127. 
136 
 
The draft preamble applied the logic of patriot radicalism to the problem of slavery. The 
familiar revolutionary abolitionist call to avoid the hypocrisy of claiming political enslavement 
while holding slaves “in a state of thralldom” was the central argument. With the shift in British 
military strategy to the South, the preamble closed by rejoicing in “our own happy deliverance 
from that state of unconditional submission to which we were doomed” as colonies.30 A draft bill 
released for public consideration in early March 1779 proposed the emancipation of children 
born to enslaved mothers at eighteen and at twenty-one for males. Other provisions included 
slave registration procedures, holding masters responsible for freed people who became 
“chargeables,” and another that maintained a pre-existing prohibition on white-black 
intermarriage. Crucially the draft bill proposed dismantling the legal property relation of slavery 
amending slaves’ status to resemble indentured servitude, specifically applying the law of 
servitude to Afro-Pennsylvanians, and by extending legal protection to slaves accused of crimes 
on the same grounds as free inhabitants (albeit preventing slave testimony against freemen in 
court). The draft bill finally proposed that “no man or woman of any nation or color… shall be 
deemed, adjudged or holden, as slaves or servants alike,” though it made no direct mention of 
preventing Pennsylvania freemen from participating in the foreign slave trade. As would be the 
case in Rhode Island and Connecticut several years later, the legislative process of abolition in 
Pennsylvania unfolded from internal to external, from gradual abolition within the state by 
amending slaves’ legal status, to restraining its’ citizens participation in the slave trade.31 
 There does not appear to have been much public commentary on the proposed bill in the 
spring and summer of 1779, and the Assembly scheduled it for consideration after a newly-
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elected legislature convened that fall. Accordingly, legislators began discussion of the bill in 
December 1779. After some debate, the proposed ages of emancipation were lengthened to 
twenty-eight for both sexes. Otherwise, its provisions were similar to the March 1779 draft bill. 
The assembly printed the new bill for public consideration, and to promote its passage supporters 
took to the press. According to a series of public letters attributed to George Bryan, by winter 
1779 a member of the Assembly, the debate was of mild tenor.32 “An inconsiderable number of 
persons, residing in the western parts” of Pennsylvania, a reference to Westmoreland County, 
soon to be annexed from Virginia, opposed the bill. Bryan was irked to find that the “few 
opposers” of the bill included fellow Presbyterians, but was otherwise confident that public 
opinion overwhelmingly titled in favor of gradual abolition. “The longer this benign proposal has 
been contemplated” by the public, he wrote, “and the oftener it is brought up to view, the higher 
advances it makes in public approbation.”33  
Elsewhere, Bryan justified the bill by countering arguments that emancipated slave 
children could not become responsible freed people, retorting that because “the vilifying effects 
of slavery … without doubt, destroy industry,” emancipated children raised “with the certainty of 
freedom, would be characters of a different cast.” The deleterious effects of slavery were not just 
limited to the enslaved, as “slaves ever perjorate the citizens of any country” by dishonoring 
labor, inducing laziness in masters and mistresses, and suppressing technological advancement. 
Pennsylvanians ought to know, Bryan warned, that “a journey in into the Southern States would 
illustrate this beyond any description. A citizen of Pennsylvania or New England, going into that 
country, is shocked at the train of mischiefs, moral and political, which are caused by servitude.” 
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in states that claimed to be free, as Pennsylvania did in its 1776 Constitution, permitting slavery 
was to encourage “bad subjects” and the presence of “internal enemies.” Abolishing slavery 
would surely increase Pennsylvania’s economic and political power vis-à-vis slaveholding 
neighboring states, because if Pennsylvania were to be “disembarrassed” of slavery, it would 
acquire comparative economic strength over Virginia. While Virginian slaveholders worried 
over controlling their slave populations and could not diversify economic activity without 
difficulty, a free Pennsylvania filled with “hardy, diligent, and enlightened citizens” would 
develop industry “which cannot be expected, where slavery prevails.”34 
The first months of 1780 were hopeful for antislavery Pennsylvanians, Quaker or 
otherwise, as public support for gradual abolition seemed widespread. The Assembly received 
five petitions in favor of the bill, and two in opposition from Presbyterian Scots-Irish in 
backcountry western counties, to which George Bryan applied his persuasion. In eastern 
Pennsylvania, and especially in Philadelphia, popular opinion was decidedly in favor of gradual 
abolition.35 In the Assembly, Bryan and a newly-appointed clerk with antislavery principles, 
revolutionary radical Thomas Paine, shepherded the bill through the legislative process. The 
essay “African Slavery in America,” possibly an early Paine article, was published in March 
1775 weeks before the founding of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, of which Paine was a 
founding member. The essay assailed slave trading merchants and systematically skewered the 
philosophical and practical justifications for slavery, and proposed the outlines of a plan for 
gradual abolition. Young able-bodied slaves, it argued, should “with the assistance of 
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legislatures, determine what is practicable for masters, and best for them.” 36  Almost exactly five 
years later, Paine was in a position to actualize a plan for abolition in Pennsylvania.  
The draft bill taken up by the Assembly in late February 1780, and passed shortly 
thereafter, was quite similar to the draft made public in November the previous year. The 
preamble declared that “we rejoice, that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to 
others, which has been extended to us; and a release from the state of thralldom, to which we 
ourselves were tyrannically doomed, and from which we have now every prospect of being 
delivered.” The bill broke the property relationship of slavery by abolishing lifetime slavery or 
servitude, and freed children born of enslaved mothers after its passage. One critical difference 
from the earlier draft pertained to the age of full emancipation for children born after its passage, 
twenty-eight for both males and females, a concession to slaveholders opposed to the bill. Freed 
children would not be held to service as chattel property, as the bill provided that their status 
would convert to “the manner on the conditions whereon servants bound for indenture for four 
years.” It further compelled masters of this newly-created class of Afro-Pennsylvanian servants 
to register them with county clerks by November 1, 1780, to regulate the process of gradual 
abolition.37 On March 1, 1780, the Assembly voted thirty-four to twenty-one in favor of passage. 
In its final form, the 1780 act was something close to revolutionary in terms of the 
thoroughness with which it dismantled the legal structures of colonial slavery in Pennsylvania.38 
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The act’s provisions systematically contravened decades of Pennsylvania slave codes, 
specifically transferring Afro-Pennsylvanians’ legal status to match that of white free persons 
and indentured servants. It provided specific protections for Afro-Pennsylvanian families, for 
example, its provisions designed to prevent the “unnatural separation and sale of husband and 
wife from each other and their children.”39 The act’s architects clearly intended the law a 
through-going repudiated of chattel slavery, evidenced through the repeated usage of language 
that plainly declared slavery illegal and removed race as a justification for enslavement. Section 
10, a clause designed to allow visiting delegates and ministers to temporarily bring enslaved 
persons into Pennsylvania, declared “that no man or woman of any nation or colour [except 
registered Pennsylvania slaves and servants and those brought by outside officials] shall at any 
time hereafter be deemed, adjudged, or holden within the territories of this commonwealth as 
slaves or servants for life, but as free men and women.”40 But the complete repudiation of 
slavery contained in the first piece of abolition legislation in human history, of course, did not 
come to fruition uncontested. 
The twenty-one Assemblymen that voted against the bill collectively released a statement 
justifying their opposition, and their argument centered on how gradual abolition in Pennsylvania 
affected the continental confederation. They believed the Assembly undermined Pennsylvania’s 
relations with states to the South, especially Maryland and Virginia, “in adopting a measure, to 
which some of them cannot in their present invaded condition (with its attendant calamities) 
conform…” In an ironic twist, they argued against abolition precisely because as the British 
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military shifted southward, they feared that abolition in Pennsylvania would lead southern slaves 
to act upon “the sound of freedom… to a demand of an immediate and intire freedom.” The 
opposition also appealed to white racism and fears that racial violence would be stoked by the 
potential elevation of Afro-Pennsylvanians to full citizenship. They argued that “we think they 
would have been well satisfied, and the Legislature would have sufficiently answered their 
humane purposes, had these unhappy people been enabled to enjoy the fruits of their labor, and 
been protected in their lives and property” as were white Pennsylvanians, but that 
enfranchisement and the possibility of blacks serving in office and intermarrying with whites 
were a step too far. In other words, the opposition did not fully condemn gradual abolition in 
principle, just the potentiality of black citizenship.41 
 A Pennsylvanian writing as “Liberal” responded to concerns raised by the Assembly 
opposition, reminding them that the gradual abolition bill should have come as no surprise, given 
that public discussion of the proposed legislation had been ongoing for over one year. Thus, 
southern delegates to the Confederation Congress meeting in Philadelphia had plenty of time to 
acquaint themselves with the draft bill and register objections, though the Congress could not 
prevent Pennsylvania’s Assembly from passing the law. “Liberal” flatly rejected opposition 
concerns that Pennsylvania’s law would undermine slavery in neighboring states, criticizing their 
“imagined dangers for the rice, indigo, and tobacco planters.” Furthermore, “Liberal” viewed 
opposition to an individual state abolition law as unfounded because of “strange reasoning, that 
when the British Generals everywhere proclaim liberty for slaves, any relaxation of their 
bondage, on our part, should provoke the negroes against the Americans.” He reminded the 
opposition that South Carolinian Henry Laurens, president of Congress and a planter with 
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antislavery sympathies, was in the midst of proposing a regiment of South Carolina slaves in 
exchange for their freedom. The “gradual freedom” extended to Pennsylvania’s relatively small 
enslaved population, therefore, “must be drowned and lost in the magnitude of the worthy 
[Laurens’] proposition.” Concerns over miscegenation and potential intermarriage were 
overblown, he argued, and fears that blacks were not competent to give evidence in trial 
assuaged by noting how Massachusetts blacks had long enjoyed that right “without 
inconvenience.” “Liberal” concluded by reminding the opposition that the preamble of the 1776 
state constitution compelled them to extend freedom to Afro-Pennsylvanians, to honor 
revolutionary freedom principles.42   
Historians of abolition in Pennsylvania have characterized the bill as a half-measure, 
instead focusing on its silences and limitations. The Act did not provide for a state apparatus to 
directly monitor masters’ compliance with the slave registration procedures, nor did it provide 
punishments for masters who sought to sell slaves out of the state in order to evade relinquishing 
their slaves without remuneration. Initially, moreover, slaves not registered by their owners 
under the act’s provisions did not qualify for gradual emancipation. The process of  abolition, to 
be sure, was agonizingly long for many enslaved Afro-Pennsylvanians, who could only expect to 
obtain their “freedom by degrees” and often faced evasive and unscrupulous masters.43 
Pennsylvania masters used devious methods of binding enslaved minorities to longer terms of 
service than provided for in the 1780 act, which abolitionists criticized as fraudulent, while many 
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in the western counties claimed ignorance of the law’s registration provisions. In November 
1781, the state assembly initially rejected a motion to give relief to such masters by a vote of 
thirty to twenty, though the next month the assembly extended the registration window in 
deference to requests by masters in Westmoreland and Washington counties, the former recently 
annexed from Virginia.44 While Afro-Pennsylvanians heavily felt the liminal period between 
enslavement as chattel property and attainment of total freedom, and the 1780 law was by no 
means a perfect piece of legislation, it is misleading to characterize gradual abolition in 
Pennsylvania as halting or tentative. While Pennsylvania masters could and did retain rights to 
the labor of their slaves, the 1780 act’s chief achievement was to insert state authority to 
regulate, and extinguish, the chattel principle.  
 After the 1780 act’s passage, when proslavery assemblymen immediately fought back 
against the act claiming that it unfairly burdened masters in the western counties, abolitionists 
worried that the law might not withstand legal or political challenges. After 1782, however, 
organized opposition to the act in the assembly died down, though individual masters continued 
to petition the legislature for redress from the act’s provisions.45 Pennsylvania courts tended to 
uphold the act’s provisions. A male slave named Alexis was brought into the state by a French 
subject and sold to a Spaniard after the act’s passage, for example, and eventually declared free 
by Pennsylvania courts.46 After 1784, the reformation of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was 
a critical development in upholding the law’s provisions as the PAS acted as an adjunct to the 
state government, its members taking on pro bono freedom suits and otherwise using the state’s 
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legal apparatus to enforce the law as best they could to prevent illegal enslavement and slave of 
slaves out-of-state.47 In 1785 prominent abolitionist Dr. Benjamin Rush, writing to British friend 
of America Dr. Richard Price, noted that gradual abolition had salutary effects on the Afro-
Pennsylvanian population. “We perceive already the good effects of the abolition of Negro 
slavery,” Rush wrote Price, and “the slaves among us are in general more industrious and orderly 
than the lowest class of white people.” He noted that a Quaker school for freed children, largely 
the work of recently deceased abolitionist Anthony Benezet, continued to educate the first 
generation of freed children as well as adults seeking self-improvement through education.48 But 
as Rush and other abolitionists realized, though slave importations had been made illegal in 
1780, individual participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades remained legal, and 
thus turned their efforts to preventing Pennsylvanians from participating in the slave trades 
entirely. 
In a letter to John Coakley Lettsom dated May 14, 1787, Benjamin Rush noted that the 
PAS and its president Benjamin Franklin turned their attention to persuading the Constitutional 
Convention to act against the slave trade. The Convention having just convened, abolitionists 
from Pennsylvania and elsewhere viewed its meeting in Philadelphia as an opportunity to 
impress anti-slave trade principles upon the men who would craft the federal Constitution.49 In 
the Pennsylvania state assembly, abolitionists led by the PAS pressed legislators to pass a law 
closing loopholes in the 1780 act, and forbid Pennsylvanians’ participation in the slave trade. In 
Philadelphia newspapers, commentators noted the incongruence of disallowing slave 
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importations but not entirely cutting off Pennsylvanians from the foreign slave trade. “Though 
the law for the gradual abolition of slavery forbids the importation of slaves,” one correspondent 
wrote, “yet it does not restrain your inhabitants from prosecuting the slave trade.” The solution 
was simple: “It is high time… that the legislature should again interpose their authority, and put 
an end to, at least in Pennsylvania, to this horrid business altogether.”50  
Pennsylvanian attention to the horrors of the slave trade, while having been energized 
from at least 1763 forward, intensified during public outrage over the enslavement of 
Pennsylvania sailors working aboard the Dolphin by Barbary pirates.51 As vessels continued to 
fit out for Africa, public opinion in and around Philadelphia coalesced against the slave trade and 
merchants who profited from it.52 In early 1788, months after Pennsylvania’s convention ratified 
the Constitution, Quaker abolitionists began a petition drive to ask the state assembly to outlaw 
participation in the slave trade and revise the abolition act. They collected two thousand 
signatures, prompting the assembly to assign a committee to report proposed revisions to the 
1780 law. The PAS appointed a committee to lobby state legislators for a revised abolition law 
that fully severed Pennsylvania and its inhabitants from the foreign slave trade, and printed one 
hundred copies of the anti-slave trade petition for distribution among lawmakers.53 Persuaded by 
the petition and the intensification of anti-slave trade public opinion, an assembly committee 
tasked to consider revisions of the 1780 law released a report in early March 1788 that identified 
four particular weaknesses in the law, all related to the sale of slaves out-of-state and continued 
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participation in the slave trade by Pennsylvania merchants and sailors. The assembly then 
resolved to report and debate a revised bill.54  
Work on the revised bill moved rapidly, and by March 25 the assembly discussed a 
revised bill twice and released it for public consideration.55 Passed on March 29, 1788, the 
revised law included all of the recommendations of the assembly committee. It made the sale of 
slaves out of the state without their consent illegal under penalty of fine, immediately freed 
slaves imported into Pennsylvania from abroad, and declared that vessels engaged in the slave 
trade were liable to forfeiture. Additionally, the 1788 revision provided penalties for 
Pennsylvanians convicted of outfitting vessels intended for the slave trade. The revised law 
effectively closed the most significant loopholes in the 1780 act, and the PAS’s earliest historian 
called it an “efficient supplement.”56 The act did not prevent some unscrupulous merchants and 
seamen from illegally engaging in the quite profitable trade in commoditized bodies, nor did it 
accelerate the previously mandated process of gradual abolition. Yet, by 1790 Pennsylvania’s 
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Rhode Island was the first New England state to pass legislation designed to regulate the 
chattel principle and proscribe masters’ property rights in slaves during the Revolutionary War, 
in preparation for a more thoroughgoing gradual abolition. An October 1779 act passed by the 
General Assembly banned masters’ ability to sell slaves out of the state without their consent, a 
containment policy that would eventually be adopted elsewhere in the Northeast in the 1780s and 
1790s.58 Not coincidentally, the law passed simultaneous to the British army’ voluntary 
withdrawal from Newport, effectively ending Rhode Island’s direct involvement in the war.  
The 1779 act’s passage was in part due to the continued efforts of abolitionist Moses 
Brown to marshal public opinion and political power in favor of antislavery legislation. Rhode 
Island abolitionists’ public campaigns against slavery began to revitalize as the war in New 
England drew to a close. Political supporters of the 1779 bill clearly intended to lay the 
groundwork for gradual abolition, and the General Assembly justified the law by arguing that 
allowing the sale of Rhode Island slaves out-of-state “is against the Rights of human Nature, and 
tends to greatly aggravate the Condition of Slavery, which this General Assembly is disposed 
rather to alleviate, till some favorable Occasion may offer for its total abolition.” Masters found 
to have carried off slaves by land or water would forfeit their property and labor rights in those 
persons, who were to receive “Certificate[s] of his or her total Emancipation” approved by two 
local Justices of Peace. The act empowered Justices of the Peace to recover payment for the 
value of each slave illegally, but successfully, sold out-of-state, one moiety payable to the state 
treasury and one to the informer. The 1779 act had clear limitations: it did not provide for full-
scale gradual abolition, and none of its provisions directly affected Rhode Island merchants’ 
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future participation in the transatlantic slave trade. As with amelioration and abolition legislation 
in Pennsylvania, the act provided little in the way of direct enforcement mechanisms, and did not 
authorize a dedicated state agency empowered to prosecute violations. Emphasizing the act’s 
limitations as an instrument for immediate and total abolition, however, can obscure its 
significance as the first piece of antislavery reform legislation passed in the United States after 
the Declaration of Independence.59  
Moses Brown and the antislavery network he cultivated felt optimistic about the 
prospects of gradual abolition laws in Rhode Island and throughout the Northeast. Privately, 
Brown pressured merchant firms which he learned considered investing in the slaving voyages. 
In August 1783, as he ramped up a public campaign in preparation for introducing abolition 
legislation to the General Assembly, Brown wrote to William Clark and Joseph Nightengale, a 
prominent Providence mercantile partnership reputed to have designs to finance a slaving voyage 
to Africa. Brown recounted how his family firm’s 1764 Sally voyage to Africa pricked his 
conscience, eventually leading him to convert to Quakerism and embrace abolitionism. He sadly 
recalled that he did not speak out against slave trading at that time, because he was not yet 
familiar with the antislavery publications of Anthony Benezet and others. “I have many times 
since thought,” he wrote, “that if I had known the sentiments of others, or had their concurring 
Testimonies to those Scruples, I then had, I should have been preserved from an Evil …” He 
urged Clarke and Nightengale that “for your preservation from so great an evil as I have found 
that Trade to be… with a view to dissuade and discourage your pursuing the Voyage, that you 
may avoid the unhappy reflections I have had…”60 Brown drew on his two decades of business 
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experience in an attempt to discourage them from trafficking in human beings, but did not 
succeed in convincing Clark and Nightengale, as the partnership later dabbled in the African 
slave trade in 1790.61 Brown’s application of direct and personal intervention in this instance was 
but one strategy abolitionists used to pursue their agenda.62 
 Rhode Island abolitionists’ preferred organ for disseminating their antislavery views was 
John Carter’s Providence Gazette, joined in 1784 by Bennett Wheeler’s United States Chronicle. 
Through these Brown and others published a stream of antislavery commentary in the early 
1780s, including nearly every issue of the Gazette in 1783.63 In the fall and winter of 1783-4 
both newspapers printed ringing denunciations of slavery and the slave trade, and also 
disseminated draft versions of a gradual abolition law Brown personally drafted for public 
consideration. The Providence Gazette printed an early version of an abolition law in September 
1783, chiefly concerned with ending Rhode Islanders’ participation in the slave trade. The early 
draft’s provisions provided for stiff penalties, requiring £1000 bonds posted to the state for any 
vessel bound to Africa. Any master attempting to evade this provision by clearing out for another 
destination before traveling to Africa would also be subject to a £1000 fine. In a radical flourish, 
the draft also proposed to temporarily ban any Rhode Islander convicted of violating the 
proposed law from “enjoying[ing] the rights of a free subject, which he has been depriving his 
fellow men of, in violation of the laws of the State and humanity” until payment of the £1000 
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fine.64 The State Assembly dropped the disenfranchisement provision from the final draft bill, 
perhaps in response to negative public opinion, but it signaled the aggressive tenor of Brown’s 
vision for the process of abolition. 
Brown worked political back channels that he mastered during service in the colonial 
assembly in the 1760s and early 1770s, By late 1783 he and his antislavery network seemed 
tantalizingly close in their efforts to turn public opinion and the Assembly in favor of a gradual 
abolition statute. Written by Brown but signed by the New England Meeting for Sufferings, a 
December 1783 petition asked the General Assembly to consider abolition legislation. Citing the 
“unalienable rights of man,” the petition acknowledged that “we are sensible [that] the Slavery of 
the Negros is not an evil which has taken its life in the present day,” but argued that the “late 
publick calamities & afflictions have served to open the Eyes of the People” against slavery. The 
war ignited popular abolitionism, they argued, and popular opinion demanded that the foul stain 
of chattel slavery be dissolved. The petition accordingly asked for laws “most conducive to the 
Entire Abolition of Slavery,”  emphasizing the principle of “Personal Liberty,” which 
undergirded colonial protest during the imperial crisis and equally motivated the growing public 
conviction that slavery.65  
Under public pressure from abolitionists and amidst growing popular antislavery 
sentiment, the General Assembly debated Brown’s abolition bill in late February 1784. Brown 
worked the bill into the Assembly through the Providence Town Meeting, which he and other 
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leading abolitionists had lobbied for several months.66 In drafting the act, he drew inspiration not 
just from the earlier 1774, 1775, and 1779 laws. He seems to have borrowed the general 
framework of the draft bill from a May 1652 act passed by Rhode Island General Court, 
apparently at the instigation of Rhode Island founder Roger Williams.67 The 1652 law 
emancipated enslaved minors at age twenty-four and limited terms of bound service to ten years, 
for the protection of “black mankinde” and “white beings.” The act proscribed the sale of slaves 
and servants outside the colony under penalty of £40, anticipating Rhode Island’s 1779 law by 
over a century. Though long-forgotten, and virtually ignored by modern scholarship, the 1652 
act’s provisions anticipated the northeastern gradual abolition and anti-slave trade laws of the 
1780s.68  
 Brown’s draft bill, debated by the Assembly’s lower house on February 25 and 26, 
proposed an aggressive program of emancipation, providing that all children born to slave 
mothers after March 1, 1784 would be free and that “Servitude for Life or Slavery of Children in 
Consequence of the Slavery of their Mothers, shall be and hereby is Utterly taken away, 
Extinguished and forever Abolished.” 69 The draft act further liberalized private manumissions, 
                                                           
66 Thompson, Moses Brown, pp. 179-180. 
67 Welcome Arnold Greene, The Providence Plantations for Two Hundred and Fifty Years… (Providence: J.A 
and R.A. Reid, 1886), p. 37.  
68 MS Copy, PAST, MBP, “Antislavery Folder,” Reel 12. Brown’s copy of the 1652 statute is situated in his 
papers among several drafts of his bill in various stages of completion dating from the late months of 
1783. The copy was forwarded to Brown by acquaintance Stephen Gould, who obtained it from a Charles 
Gyles, who copied the act while engaged in transcribing Rhode Island State Records. The act is reprinted 
without comment in John Codman Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States (Boston: 
Brown and Little, 1858), I: p. 275.  One exception in modern scholarship that recognizes the 1652’s 
significance is John C. Donoghue, Fire Under the Ashes: An Atlantic History of the English Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), pp. 266-267. Donoghue acknowledges that the act was the 
first of its kind in the Anglo-Atlantic world, and a direct precursor to northern gradual abolition laws of 
the 1780s and 1790s, though I take issue with the characterization that it “anticipated the Emancipation 
Proclamation.” 
69 PAST, MBP, “Antislavery” Folder, Reel 12. The cleanest and most complete draft, at slides 542-545, is 
quoted here. This draft is not dated, but apparently was composed in the late months of 1783. This is 
suggested by its proposal to free children born of slave mothers on or after January 1, 1784. Because the 
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granted freed persons the rights and liberties of “those born to free parents,” and provided that 
masters support the children born free of enslaved mothers until age twenty-four for males and 
twenty-one for females. It further prevented masters from manumitting slaves over the age of 
forty-five, judged incapable of supporting themselves by Town Councils. Brown urged access to 
education for freed persons, and to accomplish this goal he provided that it “be Lawfull for the 
Respective Town Councils, and they are hereby required, upon application of those who may 
hold the mothers of such may be freed by this Act” to bind out children and adolescents for a 
period not to exceed four years after their term of service to compensate masters for education 
and instruction. Finally, Brown’s bill proposed to enact strict regulations on merchants 
participating in the slave trade, citing the October 1774 Association agreement’s ban on slave 
trading and importations, retaining the prohibitive mast bond of £1000 on all ships clearing 
Rhode Island for Africa as a deterrent to the slave trade. 
After submitting the draft bill to the Assembly, Brown and others published declarations 
of support for the proposed legislation. Signed “A Friend to every honorable Branch of 
Commerce,” one opinion piece hoped Assemblymen “will find but very few, if any, of their 
Constituents disapprove of a Work so well begun.” The writer, likely Brown, pointed to the 
success of abolitionism in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, and what seemed to be providential 
signs of progress in New Jersey and Delaware, as proof that Rhode Island’s proposed move 
towards abolition reflected the broader emancipatory spirit of the Revolutionary Era. He also 
reminded readers of Rhode Island’s overturned 1774 and 1775 slave importation bans, that “this 
State, while under British government, was the first which ventured to pass and Act discouraging 
                                                           
General Assembly did not take up the bill until late February, I use March 1, 1784 for this discussion. The 
draft bill was printed for public consideration, as were earlier drafts discussed above. See the United 
States Chronicle, 15 January 1784.  
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the Importation of Slaves: It is to be wished she may still keep the lead, rather than fall behind 
any of her Sister States.” 70 With public opinion duly massaged in favor of abolition, the 
Assembly commenced the consideration of the bill.  
As Brown predicted, it was met with stiff opposition from Newport Assemblymen, who 
represented Rhode Island’s premier slave trading port and objected to the harsh provisions 
against participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. But the most strident 
opponent of the bill was Moses’ elder brother John, a noted Providence merchant, businessman, 
and unabashed profiteer, later the slave trade’s staunchest defender in the United States Senate in 
the 1790s.71 Moses attended the Assembly sessions of February 25 and 26, where he recorded 
brief notes on the debate.72 John Brown, ignoring instructions from the Providence Town 
Council to support the draft bill, first objected to its slave trade provisions based on “just-war” 
doctrine, because African “Slaves in their own Country were to be Destroyed if not Sold it was a 
piece of humanity to bring them away and make Slaves of them.” This was a well-worn 
argument typically deployed to downplay the violent process of enslavement, and justify the 
slave trade. John called as witness a slave ship captain named Benson to support this claim, and 
continued his assault on the bill by proclaiming his brother’s invocation of the 1774 Continental 
Congress slave trade ban inappropriate because it was promulgated before the Declaration of 
Independence. Thus, according to John, the state Assembly should apply to the Confederation 
Congress for guidance on the matter, confident it would provide no resolution. John speciously 
claimed that allowing Rhode Island participation in the slave trade “would pay the Interest of 
                                                           
70 A Friend to every honorable Branch of Commerce, “To the United States Chronicle,” United States Chronicle, 
29 January 1784. See also United States Chronicle, 19 February 1784. 
71 Thompson, Moses Brown, pp. 180-181. Thompson characterizes John Brown as primarily motivated by 
profit, with few scruples, throughout his life and career.  
72 “The Arguments made Use of Against the prohibition of the Slave Trade to the Coast of Africa from 
This State,” MS, PAST, MBP, “Antislavery” Folder, Reel 12.  
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whole debt of the Country,” because the slave trade generated rum sales and therefore impost 
taxes.73 Moses’s biographer concludes that his brother’s opposition to his handiwork was “much 
to [his] embarrassment and chagrin, but not to his surprise,” and John’s opposition proved 
effective as the Assembly rejected the draft bill by a two-to-one vote.74 
For Moses Brown the final version of the bill, passed February 27, 1784, proved 
somewhat of a disappointment.75 Fortunately it retained much of the original preamble’s 
emancipatory language, which grounded the law in the declaration principles. The bill 
emancipated children born of slave mothers after March 1, 1784, in fact lowering the ages of 
emancipation to twenty-one for males and eighteen for females. It also included Moses’s 
language expressing his conviction that freed persons needed access to education, but it provided 
no specific legislative framework providing for state support of educational initiatives. Most 
significantly, two provisions diverged from the vision Moses Brown laid out in the draft bill. 
First, the burden of support and maintenance of freed persons shifted to town councils, whereas 
Brown intended that former masters should support freed persons if necessary. This shift was 
crucial, as fears that freed persons would become public charges underlay opposition to gradual 
abolition at the local level. Second, due to John Brown and Assembly opposition, the final bill 
entirely omitted regulation of the transatlantic slave trade.76 Focusing on the bill’s limitations, 
which are understandable given the intense opposition to its slave trade measures, again obscures 
the achievement of gradual abolition. While the bill had loopholes, as did Pennsylvania’s 1780 
act, it began the process of dismantling the chattel principle in Rhode Island.  
                                                           
73 Ibid. The significance of Rhode Island rum exports to Africa have been over-exaggerated, as 90% of its 
production was sold and consumed domestically.  
74 Thompson, Moses Brown, p. 181.  
75 The final text is in Bartlett, ed., The Records of Rhode Island, X: pp. 7-8.  
76 Ibid.  
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In April 1784, two months after the Assembly approved the pared-down law, Newport 
Congregational minister Samuel Hopkins wrote to Moses Brown to express gloomy sentiments 
about the future prospects for gradual abolition. The pessimistic Hopkins worried that Newport’s 
merchant class would continue their participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades 
to supply the slave societies of the southern mainland and Caribbean. Hopkins’s public 
endorsement of abolitionism dating back to the mid-1770s still rankled Newport’s merchants a 
decade later, leading him to conclude that “this town, I greatly fear, will be the last in the State to 
do what they ought to do, and be foremost in it, respecting that most abominable traffic, and the 
consequent slavery that is among us.” Even worse, he feared the new gradual abolition law 
would be repealed or heavily amended at that fall’s General Assembly. Hopkins worried about 
the political impact of a new slate of Newport assemblymen, because “though some of them are, 
in many respects, worthy men, I believe not one of them will vote for any law to discourage the 
slave trade, or the slavery of the Africans.” Hopkins’s pessimism was not necessarily unfounded. 
From after the revival of the transatlantic slave trade in the mid-1780s until national abolition in 
1808, Rhode Island merchants purchased and sold more enslaved persons than any other New 
England state. Hopkins’ worst fears about the prospects of gradual abolition in Rhode Island, 
however, would ultimately prove misplaced.77 
The one provision of the 1784 act that aroused some indignation in the Ocean State 
outside the merchant class was that which made town councils responsible for supporting 
indigent freed persons. Opposition to the clause was significant enough that in October 1785 the 
state assembly considered an amendment to the abolition law. Passed that same month, the 
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amendment declared that “subjecting towns to the support and education of such children is 
extremely burthensome, and is incompatible with the principles upon which” the 1784 act was 
based. The amendment was an altruistic measure intended to unequivocally support freed 
persons, for while it removed the burden of support from the towns, it did not compel former 
masters to support freed adults. In effect, the amendment placed the burden of support on freed 
persons themselves after they reached twenty-eight years of age, or on the parents of freed 
juveniles. While the revision placed the burden for support for children born to enslaved mothers 
on their masters, upon the manumission of enslaved mothers the former masters were discharged 
from providing future support. For abolitionists like Moses Brown, this alteration to the 1784 act 
felt bittersweet. But after 1784, their attention focused on a more pressing issue, to prevent 
Rhode Island merchants and sailors from participating in the slave trade.78 
Rhode Islanders’ reputation as North America’s premier slave traders is well known, and 
historians have made significant efforts to chart Ocean State participation in the Atlantic slave 
trades.79 As American transatlantic commerce resumed after the Treaty of Paris took effect in 
May 1783, North American merchants resumed participation in the African slave trade. Of sixty-
eight documented slaving voyages to Africa under the American flag between 1783 and 1788, at 
least forty were carried out by ships registered in or departing from Rhode Island, the majority in 
Newport but also a handful from Providence. Collectively these voyages disembarked 3,683 
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enslaved Africans, primarily to markets in the Caribbean and South Carolina.80 The resumption 
of the slave trade sparked Moses Brown and other abolitionists to spearhead public campaigns to 
press the state assembly action against Rhode Island participation in the slave trades. Brown and 
Samuel Hopkins corresponded frequently on the subject, attempting to build a cross-
denominational coalition, and on several occasions Hopkins sent Brown copies of anonymous 
anti-slave trade articles he wished Brown to submit for publication in Providence newspapers, 
notably the Gazette and United States Chronicle. Hopkins, residing in the slave trading center of 
Newport, worried that his identity would be revealed if he published in Newport newspapers.81 
Meanwhile, Hopkins corresponded with abolitionists across Connecticut, trading pamphlets with 
Congregational minister Levi Hart of Connecticut, desiring Hart to distribute them in the hopes 
of spreading “a conviction of the evil of the slave trade and slavery.” Brown himself hatched a 
plan to sponsor an essay contest based on the following query: “Would it not be worthwhile to 
attempt to get the Convention of clergy in Boston, the General Association in Connecticut, and 
the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, to remonstrate against the [slave trade] to Congress, or 
[in] some other way bear their testimony against it?”82  
Ever the pessimist, Samuel Hopkins remained unconvinced that the Rhode Island 
assembly would act against the slave trade. In May 1787 he wrote Brown that “I do not think it is 
likely that the Assembly will take the matter up, so as to the slave trade, at the next session.” He 
                                                           
80 TSTD, statistics accessed 6 December 2016. The total number of slaves disembarked by American-
owned ships numbered 7,181. Thus Rhode Island slavers ferried cargoes that were slightly smaller than 
average for American ships. The average Rhode Island disembarked cargo numbered 92; on other 
American ships, the average was 124. Massachusetts ships made seven voyages; one New York ship 
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81 Samuel Hopkins to Moses Brown, 17 November 1784, in WSH, I: p. 120.  
82 Samuel Hopkins to Levi Hart, 10 February 1786 in WSH., p. 121. Brown seems to have borrowed the 
idea for an essay contest from Cambridge University, which sponsored one in 1785. Thomas Clarkson 
won the contest which sparked his career as an abolitionist. For more on Clarkson and British 
abolitionists, see Brown, Moral Capital.  
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further pleaded with Brown to submit anti-slave trade essays for publication, as the slave trade 
lobby in Newport, “that wicked set of men,” shuttered the city’s presses to his writings.83 Brown 
and the Rhode Island Quaker Yearly Meeting pressed on with plans to present a petition to the 
assembly asking lawmakers to pass legislation banning the slave trade in the fall 1787 session, 
undoubtedly expecting intense opposition to the proposed legislation based on assembly hostility 
to the failed slave trade provisions in the 1784 gradual abolition law. Remarkably there seems to 
have been very little opposition. Perhaps Newport and Providence merchants bowed in the face 
of public disapprobation of the African slave trade, or maybe they expected that a proposed law 
would have sharp teeth but little bite. Either way, the assembly took up the proposed legislation 
in early November 1787.84  
An act to prevent the slave trade passed on November 3, 1787, in a near-unanimous vote, 
with only four members of the House of Representatives and none in the upper house in dissent. 
The act prevented Rhode Island citizens and residents, either as “Master, Factor, or Owner” from 
importing or transporting slaves from Africa. The act provided for £100 fines for each slave so 
transported, and £1000 for each ship engaged in the trade. The act contained one obvious 
loophole: it applied only to slaves purchased in Africa, but not to slaves purchased and sold in 
the American intercontinental trades. In the following years prominent slave traders like John 
Brown and the D’Wolf and Vernon families devised strategies for illegally participating in the 
African slave trades.85 Still, Brown and other abolitionists could look back at the years since 
1779 and feel that their project largely succeeded. Shortly after the act’s passage, Brown said as 
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85 “An Act to Prevent the Slave Trade and to Encourage the Abolition of Slavery,” reprinted in Providence 
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much to Levi Hart. “Is it not extraordinary, that this State,” Brown wrote, “which has exceeded 
the rest of the States in carrying on this Trade, should be the first Legislature on this globe which 




Vermont seized the honor of being the first state to abolish slavery in the Anglo-Atlantic 
world in its July 1777 state constitution. Vermont’s constitutional abolition was unique among 
the uneven processes of northeastern abolition after 1776. Previously an eastern district of New 
York, Vermont’s abolition reflected the insignificance of chattel slavery in the thinly populated 
state where free household agriculture dominated the state’s political economy. Scholarly 
assessment of Vermont’s abolition agrees that constitutional abolition was a direct and explicit 
method ridding the state of the chattel principle.87 There seems to have been no legislative debate 
or public opposition to abolition, a policy elaborated in a clause entitled “A Declaration of the 
Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont,” which affirmed that “all men are born equally 
free and independent…” The clause declared that no person “born in this country, or brought in 
from over sea, ought to be holden by law, to serve any person, as a servant, slave or apprentice,” 
freeing males at twenty-one and females at eighteen.88 Elsewhere, the Granite State’s 
Constitution extended the franchise to all free men regardless of race.89 Vermont’s constitutional 
                                                           
86 Moses Brown to Levi Hart, 27 November 1787, in WSH, I: pp. 122-123.  
87 See Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, p. 116.  
88 The relevant sections are reprinted in AINAMAB, pp. 429-432.  
89 Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, II: pp. 36-37.  
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abolition was the most straightforward and unambiguous in the Northeast, and by the first 
Federal Census in 1790 its slave population had dwindled to sixteen.90 
In New Hampshire, Vermont’s neighbor to the west, slavery abolition occurred as a 
product of murkier circumstances. As the war progressed, the enslaved in New Hampshire 
petitioned the state legislature to ameliorate their condition, as did their compatriots in 
Massachusetts. A November 1779 petition signed by nineteen enslaved men, for the sake of 
“justice, humanity and the rights of mankind,” asked the legislature to amend their status 
“whereby we may regain our liberty and be ranked in the class of free agents…” The legislature 
rejected their petition in June 1780, with a  brief comment that the “House is not ripe for a 
determination in the matter.”91 Abolition in New Hampshire was eventually secured not through 
legislation, but through freedom principles embedded in the state’s constitution, as in Vermont. 
New Hampshire selected delegates to create a new constitution in 1783, and the new document’s 
Bill of Rights declared that “all men are born equally free and independent,” and extended 
“natural, essential, and inherent rights” of property ownership to all inhabitants in the state, 
implying that this rights extended self-ownership to slaves.92 Slavery was not explicitly 
abolished in the New Hampshire constitution, but by 1790 the institution had withered away as 
the first national census recorded just one-hundred and fifty-eight slaves in the state.93 It was not 
until 1857 that New Hampshire’s legislature finally passed abolition legislation, though slavery 
had died out decades before.  
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Abolitionism in Massachusetts was a potent force before 1776.94 African-Americans in 
the Bay Colony took advantage of the tumult of the imperial crisis to press freedom suits in local 
and state courts beginning in the early 1760s, and Massachusetts jurists expressed sympathy for 
the plight of enslaved people, particularly against the physical dominion that masters could 
exercise over slaves. In 1766 the Massachusetts State Supreme Court decided Slew v. Whipple in 
favor of mixed-race woman Jenny Whipple, granting her freedom and damages. Other freedom 
suits in the late 1760s and early 1770s combined to cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of 
holding chattel property in slaves in Massachusetts. Massachusetts courts recognized the 
enslaved as legal persons, a recognition that slaves in the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies 
never enjoyed. These cases collectively undermined the legal basis for slavery, spearheaded by 
persistent free and enslaved black activism.95 Freedom petitions and suits increasingly filled 
Massachusetts courts and legislatures by 1776, sending slavery in the Bay State on the path to 
final extinction. While some jurists remained willing to uphold limited property rights in the 
enslaved, and the particular circumstances of individual cases did not always lead to unequivocal 
declarations of freedom, the future of slavery seemed tenuous at best. Black activism was 
undergirded by a new state constitution which offered an emphatic statement of freedom 
principles, the product of growing popular disapproval of the chattel principle in Massachusetts. 
                                                           
94 The following account of freedom suits from the 1760s until 1783 is drawn primarily from Blanton, 
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95 This is the central theme of Sinha, The Slave’s Cause, esp. pp. 66-76. 
162 
 
The first attempt to create a Massachusetts state constitution began in summer 1778. 
Created by a convention drawn from the ranks of state legislators, it made no direct mention of 
slavery, and Massachusetts towns rejected the proposed constitution on a variety of grounds. 
Some opposed to the draft because it was crafted by a convention drawn from sitting members of 
the legislature produced it, and not a convention of delegates elected specifically for the purpose. 
Moreover, the draft constitution was not initially offered for public debate.96 It is equally clear, 
however, that town councils also disapproved of the 1778 draft because its failed to apply the 
freedom principle to abolish slavery, contained no provision abolishing the slave trade to 
Massachusetts, and because it explicitly excluded “negroes, Indians, and mulattoes” from 
citizenship rights 97 According to opponents of the latter clause, withholding citizenship rights to 
these groups perverted the very reasoning behind the movement for independence. “By holding 
up this clause in our constitution,” spoke John Bacon in the convention, “we sap the foundation 
of that liberty which we are now defending at the expense of all that blood and treasure which we 
so liberally part with in the prosecution of the present war with Great Britain.” To counter 
supporters of disenfranchisement who claimed that lower taxes on non-whites compensated for 
excluding them from citizenship, Bacon, exasperated, argued that “if this is not to establish 
slavery by a constitution, the foundations of which, it is pretended, are laid in the most extensive 
principles of liberty, I confess, Sir, I am utterly ignorant of what the terms liberty and slavery 
mean.”98 
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Largely the work of John Adams, a man not known for strident antislavery beliefs or 
actions, the 1780 Massachusetts State Constitution laid the philosophical basis for slavery 
abolition. Over the course of his career as a lawyer, Adams participated in several freedom suits, 
at times representing masters seeking to recover the property in the labor of servants. Adams 
knew well the public turn against slavery in the Bay State which intensified after 1763. He 
drafted the constitution quickly, as citizens from western Massachusetts clamored for a duly 
constituted state government that reflected revolutionary principles. Most importantly, the 
constitution needed to address widespread opposition to disenfranchisement and the de facto 
recognition of slavery’s legality implicit in the failed 1778 draft. The first article cleared up these 
issues, echoing Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution in declaring that “all men are born equally free 
and independent, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights…” In adopting 
sweeping revolutionary language, the constitution brought Massachusetts in line with the 
freedom principles that suffused the antislavery arguments of the imperial crisis. It also reflected 
a long-standing aversion to slavery in Massachusetts evident in rural towns, whose freeholders 
had asked Massachusetts legislatures to abolish the institution and proscribe slave importations 
into the Bay State repeatedly in the previous decades. 
While early nineteenth century Massachusetts jurists interpreted the 1780 constitution to 
have “virtually abolished” slavery, later generations questioned the immediate impact of Article 
I’s language on the enslaved.99  As early as 1866, historians of slavery in Massachusetts doubted 
whether the 1780 constitution in fact abolished slavery, or was merely a statement of principles 
that did not effectively free all slaves from bondage immediately. More recent historians  argue 
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that the 1780 constitution, while it included rhetorical denunciations of slavery typical of the 
revolutionary moment, was not a product of widespread public antipathy to slavery in 
Massachusetts, nor did it immediately end slavery.100 While the Massachusetts constitution did 
not directly and explicitly abolish slavery, it oriented the new state government towards 
antislavery legal principles, which within a short three years led to judicial abolition in 
Massachusetts.  
A series of decisions culminating in 1783 known as the Quok Walker are viewed as the 
impetus behind judicial abolition. Even before the final decisions in the Walker cases, however, 
state courts interpreted the state constitution to have banned slavery in Massachusetts. 
Massachusetts courts approved the freedom suit of Elizabeth Freeman in 1781 on the basis of 
Article I, before Jennison v. Caldwell emancipated Quok Walker, who claimed was falsely held 
to service as a slave to Nathaniel Jennison. The 1783 decision directly repudiated the chattel 
principle in Massachusetts, cementing a developing body of legal precedents that extended the 
right of self-ownership to the blacks in Massachusetts. Judge Levi Lincoln flatly declared that 
the 1780 constitution could not be construed to legitimize either chattel property claims of master 
like Jennison, or to deny Massachusetts blacks the protections of state law. Lincoln argued that 
“when one subject is restrained of his liberty, it is an attack on every subject…”101 Slavery in 
Massachusetts was effectively made illegal through the combination of legal precedent and the 
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freedom principles of Article I. What remained legal, however, was Massachusetts citizens’ 
ability to participate in the slave trade. By 1788, the final nail in the coffin of the slavery 
complex in Massachusetts would be definitively hammered home. 
As elsewhere in New England and in Pennsylvania, proscription of the slave trade in 
Massachusetts occurred after state slavery abolition. The impetus behind the drive to abolish the 
slave trade was the 1787 kidnapping of three free blacks, who were then sold into slavery in 
Martinique. Several years before, in 1785, the state legislature began to consider legislative 
methods to restrain Massachusetts citizens’ participation in the slave trade. Consideration of 
slave trade legislation moved slowly in 1786 and 1787, but the kidnapping episode spurred state 
lawmakers to act more quickly, and Governor John Hancock personally intervened to support a 
slave trade ban.102 The episode aroused widespread public indignation, with one commenter 
railing against the kidnapping as a “wicked and abominable insult upon this government,” and 
urging “every person of the least humanity, [to] execrate the authors of this villainy…”103  
The Rev. Dr. Jeremy Belknap took the lead in whipping up a petition campaign to goad 
the legislature into action, as did black activist Prince Hall, who simultaneously attempted to 
convince the legislature to grant him trading privileges along the African coast with the intention 
of resettling some Massachusetts blacks across the Atlantic.104 In early spring 1788, these efforts 
paid off, as the Massachusetts legislature began to debate and draft a slave trade bill. Passed on 
March 25, 1788, the act banned Massachusetts citizens and residents from participating in the 
African slave trade. To prevent the kidnapping of free blacks, the law further provided an 
explicit legal framework whereby the friends and family of kidnapped persons could bring action 
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to recover their kin and press for damages.105 The law was not perfect, and in the following 
decades some unscrupulous merchants and ship captains illegally participated in the foreign 
slave trade, especially to the Lower South and Caribbean. But by the time Massachusetts’ 
ratification convention approved the Federal Constitution in 1788, both chattel slavery and the 
slave trade had been firmly abolished in the Bay State. 
In Connecticut, slavery abolition took a circuitous path. Unlike in Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Pennsylvania, for all their peculiarities, there is little surviving evidence of the 
political processes behind abolition in Connecticut. Along with Rhode Island, Connecticut first 
outlawed slave importations in 1774, at the same time the state laid the groundwork for gradual 
abolition. Enacted in the heated atmosphere of the imperial crisis, the slave trade law went 
unnoticed during the war. Unique among the thirteen original states, Connecticut’s state 
government was not reconstituted in the years after 1776, and the state retained the colonial 
structure of government: governor, council, and elected assembly. In effect, Connecticut’s 1662 
colonial charter became the state’s constitution with no alterations other than a declaration of 
Connecticut’s sovereignty.106 Political abolitionists in Connecticut, then, could not appeal to 
revolutionary freedom principles embedded in a new state constitution, as in Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania. While Connecticut could lay claim to leadership among the northeastern states in 
taking action against slavery and the slave trade, the legislative history of abolition in 
                                                           
105 Reprinted in Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, II: pp. 29-30.  
106 Connecticut did not create a state constitution until 1818. For a brief history of slavery in Connecticut, 
see George L. Clark, A History of Connecticut: Its People and Institutions (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 
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Connecticut after 1776 was more distinctly political, largely a story of maneuvering in the state 
assembly.107 
The Connecticut legislature entertained the prospect of gradual abolition in 1776 and 
1777, in both years failing to enact legislation, though the assembly did pass a bill in October 
1777 that eased the liability requirements masters faced when desiring to manumit individual 
slaves.108 Gradual abolition came before the assembly yet again in late November and December 
1779, when a draft bill entered the legislature’s agenda. While no copy of the proposed bill is 
extant, it appears to have proposed the emancipation of children born to enslaved mothers at 
twenty-eight, and according to scattered newspaper items, there was significant assembly support 
for the proposed bill. Only six assemblymen expressed outright opposition to gradual abolition, 
while two members opposed it because “they thought the age of twenty-eight years, for the entire 
freedom of the young blacks, hereafter born, was unreasonably long.”109 For reasons that are not 
entirely clear the bill did not pass, and another attempt the next year made it through the state 
legislative council, only to be aside by the state House of Representatives for later consideration 
and not taken up again.110  
Obstacles to the advancement of gradual abolition legislation in the state assembly 
prompted Connecticut abolitionists to consider alternative ways of securing an abolition law. 
Spearheaded by Roger Sherman and Richard Law, antislavery assemblymen discovered an 
                                                           
107 The most recent account of abolition in Connecticut is David Menschel, “Abolition Without 
Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slavery, 1784-1848,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111 No. 1 (October 
2001), pp. 183-222. While acknowledging the significance of legislative action to gradually abolish 
slavery, Menschel focuses most of his attention on loopholes and limitations of the laws, to be discussed 
below.  
108 Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, II: p. 41.  
109 Connecticut Journal, 8 December 1779.  
110 Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, p. 123. 
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opportunity to do so in early 1784 when the legislature undertook to revise and update state laws, 
and chose Sherman and Law to supervise the project.111 Among the revised laws was “An Act 
Concerning Indian, Molatto, and Negro Servants and Slaves.” Upon first glance, its provisions 
seem a rather straightforward series of regulations on bound laborers’ behavior and physical 
mobility—in other words, a slave code. Similar to the local law of servitude throughout the 
colonial and revolutionary eras, it punished infractions harshly, and was clearly designed to 
apply only to non-whites. Perhaps because of its racialized provisions, the law did not clearly 
differentiate between the legal statuses of non-white servants and slaves, providing the same 
punishments for each. Buried within the revised law, however, were two provisions long desired 
by antislavery assemblymen, and many ordinary Connecticut citizens.112 
 The first was a brief provision prohibiting the importation of slaves into Connecticut, 
which simply declared that “no Indian, Negro, or Mulatto slave, shall at any Time hereafter, be 
brought or imported into this State, by Sea or Land, from any Place or Places whatsoever, to be 
disposed of, left or sold in this State.” Unlike other northeastern state abolition laws, 
Connecticut’s law provided for fines of $334 per each slave illegally imported, sold, or 
purchased.113 Second was the law’s final provision, far more significant in scope. “Whereas 
sound policy requires that the Abolition of Slavery should be effected,” the provision began, 
after March 1, 1784 children born to enslaved mothers would be freed at twenty-five. The 
clause’s brevity and its situation as the final provision of an otherwise non-emancipatory law has 
led to speculation that it was a backdoor method of achieving abolition, shrewdly calculated by 
                                                           
111 Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, II: p. 41; Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, 
pp. 123-124.  
112 Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, in America (Hartford: Elisha Babcock, 1786), pp. 233-235.  
113 Ibid., 234.  
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Sherman and Law.114 Unlike gradual abolition laws in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the 
Connecticut law did not include detailed provisions. Scholars have noted that it did not provide 
for an explicit state enforcement mechanism. According to this interpretation, the law did not 
immediately emancipate all Connecticut slaves, and further, Law and Sherman intended the law 
to prevent the growth of a free black population in the Nutmeg State.115 Given New England’s 
economic development through the Revolution, however, it is equally clear that legislators 
intended the law to rid Connecticut of the chattel principle and promote the growth of 
agricultural and urban wage labor markets stocked with unbound laborers. In any case, slavery 
steadily declined in Connecticut. By 1790 only 2,764 of 237,946 total inhabitants retained the 
status of slave, and that number dwindled over the next decade. Gradual abolition may well have 
taken a circuitous route towards implementation in Connecticut, but by the turn of the century 
slavery in Connecticut had effectively been abolished. 
While the 1784 abolition law was intended to prevent the importation of slaves to 
Connecticut, by 1787 abolitionists believed additional legislation necessary to flesh out the law’s 
provisions in further detail. While Connecticut merchants never were large-scale participants in 
the slave trades, abolitionists led by Levi Hart joined in the wave of slave trade abolitionism that 
reverberated throughout the Anglo-Atlantic world in 1787 and 1788.116 With encouragement 
from Quaker Meetings in New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, the state’s House of 
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Representatives passed an additional act in October 1788.117 The new law actually lowered the 
fines per slave illegally imported from $334 to $167, but added an additional $1667 fine per ship 
involved in the slave trade. It declared insurance policies taken out on ships proven to have 
ferried slaves to the Americas void, and fined masters $334 for each slave sold out of 
Connecticut, but did allow masters who intended to move out of the state to legally take their 
slaves with them. The law’s final clause provided for slave registration procedures to ensure that 
gradual abolition proceeded as the 1784 act intended, ordering masters to register slaves freed at 
age twenty-five within six months, at a penalty of $7 per slave for each month after the grace 
period. A brief piece of legislation that clarified legal procedures to recover slave registration 
fines passed in 1789. By the dawn of the Early Republic Connecticut’s path to the total abolition 
of slavery was clearly marked, and the Connecticut merchants banned from participating in the 




                                                           
117 A Quaker correspondent to the Pennsylvania Abolition Society noted that the Connecticut public and 
members of the State House of Representatives overwhelmingly favored the bill, which he attributed to a 
gathering of Quaker delegates from New England and the mid-Atlantic in Hartford designed to promote 
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object to the general Principles of the Bill. The Members of both Houses with the generality of the 
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an Evil.” Extract of a Letter from New York dated 19th 10 mo. 1788, Pennsylvania Abolition Society Papers 
(hereafter PASP), Series II, Incoming Correspondence: 1784-1795.  
118 “An Act to Prevent the Slave Trade,” Acts and Laws in the State of Connecticut in America (Hartford: 
Hudson and Goodwin, 1805), pp. 399-400. “An Act in Addition to an Act, entitled an Act to Prevent the 
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The fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 at the 
Constitutional Convention encountered thorny questions about slavery as they debated a new 
governing charter to replace the Articles of Confederation. The heated debate concerning slavery 
at the Convention is well-known to historians, and thus require but brief mention here.119 
Debates over slavery, congressional representation, and the future of the slave trade were the 
most divisive. Lower South delegates like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina 
bridled at suggestions from New England and mid-Atlantic delegates that the new national 
government ought to regulate and proscribe the slave trade, seeing it as an attack on the 
municipal law of slavery in the states. In response, antislavery delegates like Pennsylvania’s 
James Wilson countered that sanctioning the slave trade would stain the moral fabric of the new 
Republic, and ran counter to the revolutionary freedom principles enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Debates over whether to count slaves for the purpose of determining 
representation—debates not had during the creation of the Articles—were also highly 
contentious. Lower South slaveholders, in particular, desired that slaves count the same as free 
persons. Many New Englanders and Pennsylvanians fought back against these suggestions, as 
their states had already begun the process of gradual abolition.  
                                                           
119 The literature on slavery debates and the resultant clauses concerning slavery in the Constitution is 
vast. One vein of scholarship, adopting views first expounded by abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, 
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 While the Convention scrapped the Articles of Confederation entirely, it retained the 
“confederal” regime of municipal state slave law. The Convention’s Journals record no 
suggestion that the reconstituted national government could interfere with slavery where it was 
already legal. At the same time no one suggested that the national government could force the 
New England states and Pennsylvania to overturn slavery abolition, thereby creating a “federal 
consensus.”120 This consensus was not created by the Constitutional Convention, but an 
inheritance from the “extreme federalism” of the Articles. The passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance by the Confederation Congress, simultaneous to the Convention’s meeting, created 
one precedent about national authority over slavery in the territories, but it was clear that slavery 
would remain legal in territories south of the Ohio River. Debates over slavery and expansion, so 
divisive in the antebellum decades, caused little tension at the Constitutional Convention. The 
municipal law of slavery, and of abolition, was not disturbed by the Constitution.  
 The Constitution’s slavery clauses famously did not mention the word, in deference to 
northeastern delegates who did not wish to see the new governing charter sullied by its inclusion. 
The three-fifths clause granted slaveholders congressional representation disproportionate to 
their numbers, a political advantage that had the most impact between 1790 and 1820.121 The 
fugitive slave clause, guaranteeing slaveowners’ right to recapture fugitives throughout the states 
and territories, was a holdover from the “confederal” understandings of slavery under the 
Articles of Confederation.  
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The Convention did break new ground in the Article I, Section 9, the slave trade clause, 
which denied Congress the ability to abolish slave importations for twenty years. There was a 
range of opinion across New England and the mid-Atlantic about the twenty-year moratorium. 
At state ratification conventions in 1788, delegates debated whether the slave trade clause 
contained antislavery implications, or was a concession to Lower South slaveholders that 
signaled acquiescence to continued American participation in the slave trades. Thus in the 
Massachusetts convention, one delegate opposed the slave trade clause because of “the idea, that 
the slave trade was allowed to be continued for twenty years,” which obliged him “to bear 
witness against any thing that should favor making merchandize of the bodies of men.” In 
response, a fellow delegate suggested that the clause was a “step taken… towards the abolition of 
slavery” because Congress could “totally annihilate” the slave trade as soon as 1808.122 One 
Pennsylvania commentator remarked that because the Constitution invested the national 
government with authority to regulate commerce, it was “disgraceful to the last degree, that we 
should except [the slave trade] from the exercise of power” for twenty years. He opposed the 
Constitution on this ground, and believed the slave trade should be “expressly abolished” and 
that the general government authority to “make such regulations as should be thought the most 
advantageous for the gradual abolition of slavery, and the emancipation of slaves which are 
already in the states.”123 This was wishful thinking because southern slaveholders bitterly 
opposed abolition in their state legislatures in the 1780s and 1790s, beating back tentative efforts 
to introduce slavery amelioration legislation in Virginia and Maryland.124 Even so, by the end of 
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28 February 1788.  
123 Pennsylvania Packet, 1 February 1788.  
124 Eva Sheppard Wolf, Race and Liberty in the New Nation: Emancipation in Virginia From the Revolution to 
Nat Turner’s Rebellion (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), pp. 39-84.  
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1788, as we have seen, the New England and mid-Atlantic states abolished slave importations 
and their citizens’ participation in the trade, as had Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas.125  
The ratification of the Constitution marked the end of the revolutionary period with 
regards to slavery and abolition. By 1788, abolition had been unleashed across New England and 
the mid-Atlantic, only narrowly overturned in New York and New Jersey. Northeastern abolition 
was a revolutionary achievement, collectively the first instances dismantling the property regime 
of slavery in the Americas. Though political and legal processes of abolition unfolded unevenly 
in response to varied local contexts, it remade the legal, political, and economic geography of 
slavery and freedom in the American Northeast. The years of the Early Republic were host to the 
emergence of new theaters of conflict over the future of slavery in the United States.
                                                           
125 For a chronological survey of these laws, see W.E.B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to 
the United States of America, 1638-1870 (New York: Longman, Green, & Co., 1904), Appendix A.  
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Ch. 4: The Fruits of Northeastern State Abolition, I: The Politics of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Abolitionist Activity in the Early Republic, 1787-1808 
 
By 1788, optimistic sentiments permeated the writings and correspondence of 
northeastern abolitionists. Even the notoriously pessimistic and cantankerous Rev. Samuel 
Hopkins of Newport, Rhode Island believed that Ocean State public opinion had firmly turned 
against chattel slavery and the slave trade. For close to two decades, Hopkins occupied the pulpit 
of the First Congregational Church in Newport, the central node of American merchants’ 
participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. “For near twenty years, I have 
openly opposed both by preaching and by writing the Slave Trade and the Slavery of the 
Africans,” Hopkins wrote Pennsylvania Abolition Society member Rev. George Rogers, “and I 
have had the Satisfaction of seeing the conviction of the moral and political evil of this abuse of 
our fellow men increasing…” Well aware that the political and economic power of Newport and 
other New England merchants who dabbled in the slave trade remained significant, Hopkins 
proceeded to list the legislative and moral victories abolitionists chalked up in the Revolutionary 
Era. He celebrated the series of northeastern state slavery abolition statutes passed between 1780 
and 1787, as well as state laws that prohibited, “on Severe penalties,” participation in the African 
slave trade. Hopkins further noted that black activism played a crucial role in these 
developments, including petition campaigns and Paul Cuffee’s ambitious plan to resettle black 
New Englanders in Africa. Though optimism did not often enter Hopkins’ outlook, he had reason 
to believe that northeastern abolitionism was a potent force.1 
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Others shared Hopkins’ belief in the rising tide of public sentiment against the slave 
trade, and implicitly the powerful merchants that financed and operated slavers from 
northeastern ports. Also writing to Rev. William Rogers, Hopkins’ fellow Newport resident Eli 
Hitchcock described his “pleasure to observe an emerging disapprobation of the African Slave 
Trade.” “In this age of freedom,” Hitchcock commented, “the public is revolting from the horrid 
practice- & in america there are none so inconsistent as to defend it except the few who have 
made it their interest that it should be right.” In a note appended to the Hitchcock’s letter, Rogers 
recorded that his correspondent put his beliefs into action. Hitchcock recently purchased the 
freedom of two black children aged eleven and twelve, due to be sold illegally into slavery in the 
Lower South. While these children were not born free as per the post-nati provisions of Rhode 
Island’s 1784 gradual abolition law, a subsequent Ocean State statute made the sale of slaves out 
of state illegal. Hitchcock apparently did not attempt to press the children’s claim in Rhode 
Island courts, but the conditions of his purchase transferred their status to indentures and 
provided for their freedom at age twenty-five. This episode showed that even if public opinion 
tilted decidedly in favor of antislavery measures throughout much of New England, the processes 
of gradual abolition and preventing illegal human trafficking did not unfold smoothly, nor 
without contestation.2  
Anti-slave trade petition campaigns were the most politically significant activities 
pursued by the abolitionists. The abolition societies and closely-related regional Quaker 
Meetings peppered legislative bodies with requests to step as far as they could to restrain the 
importation of foreign slaves, and American participation in the Atlantic slave trade complex. 
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The petition drives of the late 1780s built on a tradition of anti-slave trade activism that reached 
back to the early stages of the imperial crisis in the 1760s, which escalated simultaneously with 
northeastern slavery abolition campaigns after 1780. The abolition societies and Quaker 
Meetings sent dozens of petitions to state legislatures, and until 1787 the Confederation 
Congress, which couched their requests in both moral and political terms.3 A June 1787 petition 
to the Rhode Island State Assembly submitted by the New England Yearly Meeting appealed to 
both the egalitarian implications of republicanism and the Golden Rule. These, the petition 
argued, justified exercising the “authority entrusted to [the Assembly], [to] contribute your 
endeavours to prevent the sufferings of multitudes” of African slaves forced to endure the 
Middle Passage and chattel slavery in the Caribbean and southern mainland by self-interested, 
profit-seeking Ocean State merchants.4 
Later that same year, the New England Meeting petitioned the Senate and House of 
Representatives of Massachusetts to act against the slave trade. Composed and signed by 
abolitionist and soon-to-be textile manufacturing capitalist Moses Brown, the petition evinced 
specific knowledge of the politics of public opinion in the Bay State. While recognizing that 
“notwithstanding the length of time the inhabitants of [Massachusetts] has been unhapily [sic] in 
the Slave Trade,” the Meeting’s research showed that the vast majority of lawmakers represented 
constituencies hostile to the trade. Previously that year, the state legislature approved a law that 
provided for heavy penalties against the participation of Bay Staters in the Atlantic slave trade. 
The Meeting pointedly noted that only four of forty-eight members of the State House opposed 
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the bill, “all of which were concerned in the trade or Distilling [rum] for it,” and that the Senate 
voted unanimously in favor of the bill. The petition simply asked that the bill’s provisions be 
firmly enforced. Careful to note that they did not petition with strictly “Commercial Views,” 
Brown emphasized the Meeting’s humanitarianism, a nod to the fact that powerful merchants 
commanded disproportionate political power. Yet this and dozens of other legislative petitions 
made clear that public opinion had turned decidedly against northeastern participation in 
commerce in human beings.5 
Such was the volume of anti-slave trade petitioning intended to capitalize on public 
hostility to the trade that anonymous authors satirized the Quaker Meetings and abolition 
societies in the press. In June 1787, the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer published a short, 
comedic piece that lampooned the widely-discussed politics of slavery and the slave trade. 
Created by a Pennsylvanian who styled himself “An Enemy to the Society for the Abolition of 
Slavery,” the author deliberately fudged whether or not they supported abolitionism. “I observe 
an advertisement… of a plantation to be sold in Maryland for ‘negroes, merchandize, or cash,’” 
it began, and “from this appears that NEGROES are to be introduced in that State instead of 
Paper-Money…” The writer proposed a system of currency based on bodies and body parts, a 
clear reference to the decades-long agitation of abolitionists against the commodification of 
human beings. Valuing healthy middle-aged men and women at three hundred dollars and 
younger adolescents and children proportionately lower amounts, the schema reached grotesque 
levels with its proposals for “change.” A head was valued at twenty dollars, a right arm sixteen 
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and left arm twelve, legs eight each, hands and feet four, and little fingers and toes one-third of a 
dollar. “To prevent any inconveniences form the smell of this species of change when it is first 
emitted,” the “Enemy” suggested, “it is proposed to harden it by exposing it to salt and smoke, 
before it is taken from the mint.” Whether intended as an oblique attack on the PAS and other 
abolition societies, or as a pure satire of antislavery and proslavery argumentation, the piece 
certainly suggests how deeply these debates penetrated the public consciousness by the late 
1780s.6 
The abolition societies crafted public addresses designed to capitalize on growing 
northeastern public hostility to chattel slavery and the slave trade in the late 1780s. A November 
1789 PAS public address expressed many of the moral, political, and economic critiques of 
slavery that bloomed in the Revolutionary Era. The address combined enlightened republican 
principles and hostility to chattel slavery and slave importations on the grounds of 
humanitarianism and public safety. It opened by gesturing to the ongoing success of northeastern 
state slavery abolition campaigns, and continued with language familiar to readers of abolitionist 
literature across the northeast. “Slavery is such an atrocious debasement of human nature,” the 
society declared, “that its very extirpation, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes 
open a source of serious evils.” The experiences of the Middle Passage and chattel slavery so 
debauched the enslaved that “freedom may often prove a misfortune to himself, and prejudicial 
to society.” Enlightened leadership from the abolition societies and legislators was essential in 
order to direct safely enact gradual emancipation and channel public opinion into the proper 
channels. While paternalistic and overly optimistic in their confidence of success in achieving 
abolition in the southern states, such addresses evinced a potent strand of northeastern public 
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opinion towards chattel slavery and the slave trade. The twinned institutions not only flagrant 
debased the natural rights of humanity, but also threatened the social and economic prosperity 
even of those states, like Pennsylvania, where their final extinction was but a matter of time.7 
In 1789 and 1790, Quaker Meetings and abolition societies in Pennsylvania, New York, 
New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland submitted several petitions to the First Congress that 
requested the legislature to make use of its newly created constitutional authority to restrain 
American participation in supplying foreign places with slaves. In October 1789, the Quaker 
Yearly Meeting of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and western Virginia and Maryland petitioned 
Congress to exercise its authority to encourage the “Suppression of Vice, Infidelity and 
Irreligion, and every Species of Oppression on the Persons and Consciences of Men, so that 
Righteousness and Peace, which truly exalt a Nation, may prevail throughout the Land…”8 Thus 
began a renewed campaign in which Quaker Meetings and the abolition societies attempted to 
utilize pressure politics to sway the First Congress into considering anti-slave trade measures, 
within the bounds of the freshly-ratified Constitution.9 
The two petitions that generated the most division in the First Congress were those 
submitted by the mid-Atlantic Quaker Yearly Meeting’s Warner Mifflin, and by the PAS in 
February 1790.10 The PAS’s February 3, 1790 petition to Congress, signed by an elderly 
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Benjamin Franklin, asked legislators to regulate the slave trade to the fullest extent allowed in 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, and to countenance measures to promote the ultimate 
extinction of chattel slavery.11 Franklin’s views on slavery and the prospect of abolition were 
fraught with complications and ambiguities over the course of his long life, not least because at 
various times he owned household slaves, and made the pages of his Pennsylvania Gazette host 
to hundreds of runaway slave and servant advertisements beginning in the 1720s. During the 
British-American imperial crisis, moreover, Franklin found himself in the awkward position of 
simultaneously representing the interests of Pennsylvania and Georgia, where public opinion 
concerning chattel slavery differed considerably before and after the Revolution. While 
Franklin’s motivations for attaching his name to the PAS petition shortly before his death have 
been subject to considerable scholarly debate, the content of the petition clearly demonstrated 
stringent antislavery principles.12  
 The language and requests of the February 1790 petition aligned with those of previous 
Quaker Meeting petitions to the state legislatures and the Confederation Congress in the 1780s. 
The PAS opened the petition by referring to its members’ own success in pressuring the 
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Pennsylvania state assembly to pass gradual abolition legislation in March 1780, and its 
continuous efforts to uphold the law’s provisions and persuade the Pennsylvania Assembly to 
pass supplementary legislation in 1788. The PAS appealed to Congress to exercise the newly-
created “Salutary Powers… invested in you for Promoting the Welfare & securing the blessings 
of liberty to the people of the United States.” These blessings “ought rightfully be administered, 
without distinctions of Colour, to all descriptions of people…” Members rooted the petition’s 
language firmly in Declaration principles, repeatedly referring to natural rights, liberties, and 
“blessings,” the fruits of American independence from the British Empire. The PAS argued 
against the blatant “Inconsistency” of perpetuating chattel slavery in the Chesapeake and Lower 
South (not to mention New York and New Jersey), in direct contradiction to the “General 
enjoyment of the blessings of Liberty.”  In closing, the society moved away from florid language 
and made the petition’s one specific request of Congress: to “Step to the very verge of the 
Powers vested in you for discouraging every Species of Traffick in the Persons of our fellow 
Man.”13 In other words, the PAS did not ask for an outright prohibition of the foreign slave trade 
to the United States, but that Congress prohibit American citizens from supplying foreign nations 
and colonies with slaves, and further to prevent foreign ships from outfitting slaving voyages in 
the United States.  
The mid-Atlantic Quaker Yearly Meetings’ petition used significantly more stringent 
language in lambasting the national government’s acquiescence to American participation in the 
slave trade. Signed by Meeting Clerk Nicholas Waln and submitted by Warmer Mifflin, the 
petition to President Washington and Congress railed against “the enormities abhorrent to 
                                                           
13 “Memorial of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery…” 3 February 1790, MS, 
LOCO: https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/franklin. Accessed 21 November 2017.  
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common humanity [in] this abominable commerce.” It argued for widespread public antipathy to 
the slave trade. As evidence, it pointed out that “divers of the legislative bodies of the different 
states on this continent, have since manifested their sense of the public detestation due to the 
licentious wickedness of the African trade for slaves, and the inhuman tyranny and blood 
guiltiness inseparable from it…” In conclusion, the Meeting appealed to legislators’ sense of 
“Justice and mercy,” undoubtedly aware that those sentiments did not prick the consciences of 
many in the Upper and Lower South and some members of the New England merchant 
community.14   
Together, the PAS and Quaker Meeting petitions touched off the first sustained and often 
vituperative debates in Congress, as legislators hashed out exactly what authority the body could 
exercise over slavery and the slave trade in a Declaration of Powers. Intense invective 
characterized the proceedings after a committee report was entered for debate. Reporting to his 
brother James from New York City, the nation’s temporary capitol, John Pemberton’s 
description of the debates captured the divisive tenor of national discussions of slavery and the 
slave trade. In a pattern that would repeat throughout the Early Republic and antebellum periods, 
South Carolinians took the lead as the most animated proslavery avatars. Speaking for almost 
half an hour, Aedanus Burke heaped scorn upon abolitionists. “I could not hear much what he 
said,” Pemberton wrote his brother, “but I understand it was principally abuse & in his Close 
presented us as Satan Flying like a Coromoranth.” This comment elicited laughter from other 
Lower South members before the Speaker restored order. Fellow South Carolinian William 
Smith then rose and spoke with “Billingsgate Language” so outrageous that apparently a brief 
                                                           
14 Martin P. Claussen, ed., The Journal of the House of Representatives: George Washington Administration 
1789–1797, 9 vols. (Wilmington, Del., 1977), II: p. 33.  
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moment of levity broke the tension. New Englanders, however, often framed as ardent defenders 
of American right to participate in the slave trade, were “Galled” by the South Carolinian’s 
rhetoric and behavior.15  
Such discordant exchanges characterized subsequent debates, because men on all sides of 
the equation knew that their outcome would set a significant precedent for the United States 
government’s relations to slavery and the slave trade.16 Lower South congressional 
representatives continued to excoriate Quaker abolitionists and their allies for proposing what 
they believed to be unwarranted intrusions in the private property relations of chattel slavery, by 
attacking American participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. William Smith 
once again warned northeasterners that “those who are not interested” in slavery “ought not to 
interfere.” The slave trade debates immediately followed those of Alexander Hamilton’s Report 
on the Public Credit, and they too had ramifications for government revenue collections. Smith 
and other South Carolinians, of course, had no desire to allow the ten-dollar per-slave imported 
tax allowed for in the Slave Trade Clause to become law. Thus, they opted for an offensive 
strategy, assailing abolitionists at every turn, hoping to prevent both slave trade regulation as a 
precedent, and paying taxes on slaves they might wish to import in the future.17 
Fearful of allowing acrimony to fester and eager to address other business, particularly 
Alexander Hamilton’s government finance plans, James Madison stepped in to broker a 
compromise. Based on Madison’s compromise proposals, the debates resolved when Congress 
                                                           
15 James Pemberton to John Pemberton, 8 March 1790, PASP, Series II, Loose Correspondence, Incoming: 
1784-1795.  
16 The relationship to the national government to slavery and its adjuncts is masterfully charted by Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States’ Government’s Relations to Slavery, 
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agreed to a formal Declaration of Powers on March 5, 1790. The Declaration of Powers restated 
what was already common knowledge to legislators regardless of their particular interests, 
reiterating that Congress could not “interfere in the internal regulations of particular states,” 
meaning it could not force slavery abolition on states against their wishes. But the Declaration 
also stated that Congress “are equally constrained, from interfering in the emancipation of slaves 
who already are, or who may be… imported into or born within any of the said States.” In other 
words, the committee declared that Congress could neither force abolition on a state, nor 
override state abolition statutes, a restatement of the “federal consensus” agreed to by delegates 
the the Constitutional Convention three years before. The Declaration of Powers also reasserted 
that Congress could not abolish the foreign slave trade before 1808, a fact stated clearly in the 
Constitution and not up for serious legal or political challenge. Importantly for the abolition 
societies, it acknowledged congressional authority to prohibit foreign slaving ships from 
outfitting in American ports and American citizens from aiding and abetting the African and 
intercontinental slave trades. 18 
While Congress intended the Declaration of Powers to subsume conflicts over slavery 
and the slave trade, the vim and vigor of the debates that produced it laid bare the fundamental, 
and to many frightening, regional differences. Writing to David Stuart in late March 1790, 
George Washington expressed dismay over the “jealousies” exposed by the congressional 
debates. Worried that abolitionist petition campaigns succeeded in “poisoning the minds of the 
Southern people,” the president asked rhetorically, “was it not always believed that there are 
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some points which peculiarly interest the Eastern States?” Desperate that the Union not fracture 
over the slavery question, Washington acknowledged that regional distinctions could not be 
papered over. But he argued that diversity of opinion defined the new nation, even pointing out 
significant conflicts between upcountry and coastal Virginians and Carolinians on a variety of 
issues. This was undoubtedly true of many political, economic, and social problems, but slavery 
and the slave trade were different. Washington feared an emergent antislavery front in New 
England and the mid-Atlantic, potentially a threat to southern slavery. “And I will ask another 
question (of the highest magnitude in my mind),” Washington wrote, “and that is, if the Eastern 
& Northern States are dangerous in Union, will they be less so in seperation [sic]?” He feared 
that slavery might split the nation, and that in the event, “independent of other considerations 
what would Virginia (and such other States as might be inclined to join her) gain by a seperation 




In December 1790, Rhode Island abolitionist Thomas Arnold wrote to PAS President 
James Pemberton, in response to a circular letter requesting information on the present state of 
the slave trade in the northeastern states. As a member of the Providence Society for Abolishing 
the Slave-Trade, Arnold knew well the powerful Rhode Island merchants that invested in the 
risky business of human trafficking seeking substantial profits.20 While the recently founded 
                                                           
19 George Washington to David Stuart, 28 March 1790, Founders Online, National Archives, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0183. 
20 Constitution of a Society For Abolishing the Slave-Trade with Several Acts of the Legislatures of the States of 
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Providence Society worked to establish its organizational apparatus, Arnold noted that in Boston 
politically powerful merchants thwarted a similar effort in the Massachusetts legislature, which 
contradicted the wishes of most Massachusetts residents. “I am in hopes that business is so far 
finished as to leave the members of Massachusetts Now at Liberty to Act their own Constituents 
sentiment with a brimming spirit of freedom.” Arnold commented, “it is hard to conceive how 
any, who acknowledge the Enormity of the Evil, and the Powers of Congress… can yet appear to 
act with indifference.”21 On the other hand, both Rhode Island senators had joined the 
Providence Society, and they offered assurance to Arnold they would use their position to act 
against the slave trade. Lower South members of Congress were the most intransigent, but he 
hoped even they could be “softened.” South Carolinians need not fear an interruption to the slave 
importations, he ironically commented, because even their own state legislature temporarily 
halted made them illegal due to market saturation and economic depression. “The more northern 
states have been larger partakers in the Traffick arising from the trade,” especially Rhode Island, 
“but the Interest or Influence of those who still allow themselves to pursue it… is comparatively 
too little and Inconsiderable to attract the notice of this Legislature [U.S. Congress].” While New 
England merchants continued to participate in the slave trade, paradoxically the trade was 
insignificant enough in the context of other trade-related business that Congress temporarily set 
aside the issue.22 
                                                           
Providence Society was founded after the state prohibited residents from participating in the slave trade. 
This prohibition was chiefly effective at preventing slave importations and the sale of slaves out of state. 
The Society was founded, in large part, to generate negative attention towards merchants who supplied 
the West Indies and Lower South with African slaves. Like the PAS, the Providence Society was 
frustrated at the lack of a state enforcement apparatus, and functioned unofficially in that role.  
21 Thomas Arnold to James Pemberton, 11 December 1790, PASP, Series II, Loose Correspondence, 
Incoming: 1784-1795.  
22 Ibid. In the six years from 1785-1790, 73 slaving voyages departed from Rhode Island to Africa, and 
disembarked 5,234 slaves, 2,711 to the Caribbean and 1,248 to mainland North America. Transatlantic 
Slave Trade Database (TSTD): salvevoyages.org. Accessed 12 September 2017.  
188 
 
And yet in spring 1792 Pemberton complained to Moses Brown that proslavery 
legislators, alongside northeastern merchant allies like Moses’ brother John, “remain deaf to all 
entreaties… to the exercise of that authority which the house of Representatives of Congress has 
acknowledged themselves to possess.” Because of “political considerations” between “Southern 
and Eastern Members,” congressional action to prevent foreign ships from using American men 
and resources to fit out for the slave trade stalled until that point.23 In the face of opposition to 
slave trade regulation, abolitionists across the Northeast developed plans to convene a meeting of 
delegates from state and local societies to coordinate national antislavery political campaigns. By 
early 1793, correspondence between northeastern abolitionists and their constituent societies 
began to converge on plans to organize an umbrella society to promote more effective regional 
and national coordination.  
Spearheaded by the PAS, the American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of 
Slavery, and Improving the African Race, first met in Philadelphia on New Year’s Day 1794. 
The N-YMS, Providence Society, and societies from New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, 
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Wilmington (DE), Maryland, Chestertown (MD), and Virginia elected delegates to attend the 
inaugural meeting held at Philadelphia City Hall. The first American Convention prioritized the 
crafting of an anti-slave trade petition that would reflect a unified abolitionist stance, as well as 
what they believed to be popular opinion throughout the mid-Atlantic and New England. The 
Convention’s very first resolution was to present a memorial to Congress “praying that body to 
prohibit, by law, the citizens of the United States, from carrying on a commerce, in slaves, for 
the supply of foreign nations.” This perfectly constitutional request, Convention delegates 
believed, was a significant preliminary step to begin severing the United States from the Atlantic 
slave trading complex. It was consonant with the 1790 Declaration of Powers, since it recognized 
that the Constitution prevented Congress from instituting an outright national prohibition of slave 
importations before 1808. The Convention quickly drafted a congressional petition based on the 
resolution which it dispatched to Congress, meeting at nearby Congress Hall, on January 7, 
1794.24 
Abolitionist allies in Congress quickly drafted a bill with the legal guidance of PAS 
counsel in January and February 1794, and shepherded the legislation through the legislative 
process with remarkable efficiency. The law passed on March 22, 1794 with surprisingly little 
formal opposition, though a few Congressmen from the Lower South wailed against what they 
believed to be unwarranted legislative intrusion into private property relations. The provisions 
almost exactly reflected the American Convention’s wishes, banning foreign slavers from 
outfitting in American ports and American citizens from participating in foreign slaving 
expeditions in any way. The law provided for fines of up to two hundred dollars for each 
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violation, and incentivized informants by offering them one moiety of any penalties levied on 
violators. From the perspective of abolitionists, the sole disappointments in the 1794 act were 
that it did not provide for potential imprisonment, nor did it create a government agency 
specifically to prosecute accused violators.25 The individual states, moreover, remained free to 
permit slave importations if they chose, though only Georgia allowed them in the mid-1790s. 
The act’s enforcement limitations allowed some unscrupulous American merchants and ship 
captains to profit by illegally supplying West Indian colonies with African slaves. The fact that 
the national legislature overwhelmingly passed an act that restricted American participation in 
supplying the slave markets of the Caribbean and South America, however, was a significant 
legislative victory for northeastern abolitionists.26  
While the abolition societies and Quaker Meetings considered the 1794 Act a victory, 
deceitful merchants, ship-owners, and captains quickly developed methods to evade prosecution. 
A committee designated to create the Convention’s annual agenda described several deceptive 
strategies at the 1797 American Convention delegate meeting. First, American captains routinely 
and “clandestinely” used the Danish flag when transporting slaves to the West Indies, because 
Denmark allowed its subjects free participation in the Atlantic slave trade. The committee urged 
the Convention to draft an official address to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, requesting 
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that he commence negotiations with the Danish court “for the prevention of the use of their flag 
and registers.”27 
Another impediment to the enforcement of the 1794 act lay in the initial identification of 
ships suspected of fitting out for slaving voyages. To identify a vessel fitted out specifically for 
the slave trade was relatively easy; the tackle and appurtenances needed to carry out devoted 
slaving voyages obviously suggested its purpose. In response the to the Act’s passage, men 
seeking to evade prosecution shifted to transporting fewer numbers of slaves on vessels “not 
specially fitted out for that purpose, the act being thereby evaded,” according to the Convention 
committee. They proposed petitioning Congress to amend the act, suggesting that it require ship-
owners to swear “on oath or affirmation” that they would not receive on board any slaves bound 
for sale in foreign markets. The committee further urged Congress to require ship-owners to post 
significant bonds liable to forfeiture “in case a sale of any slave so put on board should take 
place.”28 In an additional step to rectify the obstacles to the enforcement of the 1794 Act, the 
Convention consulted legal counsel which assured them that the sale of slaves in foreign markets 
by Americans in vessels not specifically fitted out for that purpose “are equally a breach of law 
with those made on board of vessels originally destined for this traffic.” The Convention 
complained that enforcement of the law was often lax, particularly because certain customs 
collectors interpreted the law only to apply to dedicated slaving vessels. The Convention pointed 
to the “difficulty of bringing to justice those who are concerned in evading the provisions of the 
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law in question,” which “renders it necessary that great care should be taken to remove every 
possible pretext for acting in opposition to the [1794 act].”29 
The American Convention attempted to persuade the southern state legislatures to 
constrain the slave trade, albeit with little success. Given the strictures of the federal system, 
northeastern abolitionists could only petition southern state governments to voluntarily 
circumscribe the African and intercontinental slave trades. Aware that southern state authorities 
could not be counted upon to effectively enforce the 1794 act, not to mention their own laws that 
supposedly banned slave importations, the American Convention crafted entreaties that 
emphasized the dangers of freshly-imported African slaves to community safety. In 1795, for 
example, the Convention petitioned the South Carolina state legislature to remind them of “the 
dangers to which the citizens of the United States are exposed, while a numerous class of men 
exist among them, deprived of their natural rights, and forcibly held in bondage…” The “first 
and principle object” of the memorial was to convince Palmetto State legislators to ban both 
slave importations and exportations. The Convention hoped that South Carolina slaveholders 
would also consider methods to ameliorate slavery and promote “the diffusion of knowledge 
among them,” but believed that “nothing can be effectual while the number of slaves may be 
daily increased by importation…” Northeastern abolitionists had some reason to believe that 
Lower South slaveholders might be receptive to these requests, given that the Haitian Revolution 
continued to escalate near the southern mainland.30 
As the Haitian Revolution intensified over the course of the 1790s, southern slaveholders 
increasingly feared that black Jacobinism would infect the enslaved and free African-American 
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populations. Refugee white Haitian planters fled to the United States, particularly Charleston and 
Philadelphia, where they spun horrifying tales of an apocalyptic race war.31 In this context, 
politicians from the Upper and Lower South were willing to accept additional legislation that 
would upgrade the penalties provided for in the 1794 slave trade act. Given the limitations of the 
1794 act, particularly that it lacked direct enforcement mechanism, it was not significantly 
challenged by southern congressmen after its passage. In an ironic alliance of slaveholders who 
feared revolutionary Haitians in their midst and antislavery northeasterners who desired more 
stringent penalties for Americans violating the 1794 act, in early 1800 Congress began 
consideration of an updated slave trade act.  
Passed in May 1800, the supplementary slave trade act broadened the earlier law’s 
provisions by applying it to non-citizen residents as well as American citizens. Thus, no person 
residing in the United States could participate in ferrying slaves to foreign places, which 
legislators hoped would prevent the importation of dangerous persons into the country. The 1800 
law contained two new additions to the 1794 act. First, it provided that owners of ships used 
illegally in the foreign slave trade had to forfeit the ship, tackle, and “goods and effects, other 
than slaves.” Furthermore, it provided that “all persons interested in such vessel shall be 
employed at the time of such capture, shall be precluded from all right or claim to the slaves 
found on board such vessel…” An antislavery reading of this clause suggested that ship owners 
convicted of violating the act faced forfeiting their property rights to persons legally enslaved 
aboard the vessel, in addition to slaves illegally purchased for sale in foreign markets. The 
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second new feature of the 1800 law was an explicit declaration that Congress in no way meant to 
contradict or counteract state laws prohibiting participation in the slave trade, slave importations, 
and the sale of slaves and servants out-of-state.32  
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, legislators in the two remaining states north of 
the Chesapeake where chattel slavery remained legal again turned their attention to the subject. 
In New York, which had the largest enslaved population in the Northeast, a gradual abolition law 
was overturned narrowly by the state Council of Revisions in 1785. The debate over slavery 
abolition in New York was intensely contested in the public sphere, and Empire State 
slaveholders concentrated in the Hudson Valley and Long Island wielded considerable political 
power compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the region. Founded just before gradual 
abolition initially failed in 1785, the New-York Manumission Society (N-YMS) worked 
assiduously to encourage private manumissions and abolition legislation. The N-YMS’s 
members also made moral and economic uplift particular priorities, and in 1787 the society 
founded the African Free School to further those goals. By 1799, because of the N-YMS’s 
lobbying efforts and a drift in public opinion towards gradual abolition, the State Assembly once 
again considered abolition legislation, which it enacted on the felicitous date of July 4. The path 
to slavery abolition in New York was rocky, and the 1799 gradual abolition law was by no 
means inevitable. Moreover, it was not until 1827 that black New Yorkers were no longer held as 
chattel property. Nevertheless, when viewed from the lens of northeastern regional economic 
development and the unfolding of state abolition elsewhere in the mid-Atlantic and New 
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England, it would have been surprising if the New York State Assembly had not instituted 




After 1788 fighting the slave trades—both the importation into and exportation of slaves 
from the states—was a battle waged at the state and local levels. State slavery abolition, 
antislavery societies recognized, would be rendered ineffective if the formerly enslaved did not 
have legal control of their persons and enforcement apparatuses to prevent illegal kidnapping and 
sale down South. At its inaugural meeting, the American Convention’s second resolution 
prodded state legislatures to “grant to such of them as have been, or may be emancipated, such a 
participation of civil privileges,” and to strengthen enforcement of state gradual abolition laws 
already in existence. As “subjects of property,” slaves were too often “carried off, by force, and 
transferred to places, where even the severity of their former bondage is encreased.” The 
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delegates knew that state legislatures across the northeast had already banned slave importations 
and the sale of slaves out-of-state. But in the absence of “a radical abolition of slavery itself, by 
exploding the general opinion, that the colour of a man is evidence of his deprivation of the 
rights of man,” respectful petitions to state legislatures was the farthest national political step 
abolitionists could take. The abolition societies could and did, however, function as enforcement 
agencies that worked tirelessly to prevent slavery from entering or escaping their communities. 
Preventing slave importations and the sale of slaves scheduled to be emancipated ranked among 
the most important tasks of the abolition societies.34 
In the states that had already passed laws to ban slave importations and their residents’ 
participation in the trade, abolitionists could do more than respectfully petition. In Pennsylvania 
and the coastal New England states, abolitionists pressed lawsuits against merchants and ship 
captains that flouted anti-slave trade legislation. The PAS devoted significant time, energy, and 
resources to tracking down and prosecuting accused slave traders and their accomplices. PAS 
members, most importantly Quaker tailor Isaac Hopper and Thomas Harrison, acted on 
information they received from a variety of sources about possible illegal slave trading. If they 
deemed such information sufficient they initiated lawsuits in Pennsylvania state courts, and after 
March 1794 the United States Eastern District Court in Philadelphia. 
In 1788, the PAS formed the Committee on the African Slave Trade to construct a 
political and legal agenda to suppress American participation in the foreign slave trade. The 
committee drafted petitions that demanded more stringent enforcement of Pennsylvania’s 1788 
state slave trade prohibition, on which they gathered more than two thousand signatures and 
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forwarded to state legislatures throughout the Northeast. The committee also opened 
correspondence with the Providence Society to coordinate their respective anti-slave trade 
activities, aware of Rhode Island merchants’ continued participation and expertise in the Atlantic 
slave trade. The PAS and its correspondents urged each other always to “persevere in application 
to governments” to fight the slave trade, a political solution workable within the constitutional 
strictures of the United States’ federal system of government.35 
The 1794 act incited the Committee on the African Slave Trade actively to seek out and 
prosecute violators, as would the subsequent 1800 supplementary act. On the ground, the 
society’s efforts to enforce the regulation of slave trade law took a similar form as its better-
documented legal work in adjudicating freedom claims.36 It collected information about ships 
cleared for Africa and their owners and operators, and developed legal strategies to prosecute 
them. For example, in autumn 1795 the Committee prepared and circulated a memorandum 
describing ships they suspected of operating as slaving vessels in violation of state and federal 
law. The memorandum listed the Hannah, Sally, Eliza, Ascension, Betsey, Ann, and Mary, ships 
that hailed from ports throughout the Northeast. If possible, they provided their last known 
locations, identified their captains and owners identified, and inquiries made into the 
whereabouts of their crews to obtain depositions. A similar list exists for 1799.37 By collecting 
and disseminating information about suspected slaving vessels and their operators, the PAS 
provided opportunities for abolition societies throughout the Northeast to bring anti-slave trade 
suits in state and federal courts.  
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In summer and autumn 1800, the PAS became embroiled in the United States Navy’s 
capture of the Phoebe and Prudent, vessels captured by the brig Ganges in US waters laden with 
slaves for sale in the West Indies in violation of the 1794 and 1800 regulatory acts. The Ganges 
brought the ships to Philadelphia, and the PAS engaged to help determine the fate of the 
recaptured men, women, and children. The society created a Committee of Guardians to secure 
the emancipation of the captives taken from the vessels. Registered to Newport, Rhode Island 
merchants Benjamin Fairbanks and James Weeden, the Ganges intercepted the Prudent while 
bound to Havana. Ganges Captain James Maloney discovered sixteen enslaved Africans 
onboard. The Committee of Guardians took the captives—those “such as are to be found free”—
and “bound them by Indenture to suitable persons, residing chiefly in the country,” adults for 
four years, and male minors until twenty-one and females until eighteen.38  
The PAS simultaneously commenced a libel case against the owners of the Charleston-
registered Phoebe, John and Alexander Anderson.39 Led by Thomas Harrison, the society 
devoted significant time and expense to ensuring the recaptured men, women, and children 
received apprenticeships to responsible Pennsylvania masters and instruction in various trades, 
some in Philadelphia and others in nearby rural counties. Handled by the U.S. Eastern District 
Court, the sheer number of indentures in the Phoebe case led the PAS to contract for the printing 
of indenture contract templates, listing Harrison as the citizen responsible for their execution. 
Unlike the Prudent case, the indenture lengths varied considerably depending on the assumed 
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age of each individual. While many of the freed captives were apprenticed as “labourers” and 
domestic servants, like the Prudent case, the society placed more than two dozen in 
apprenticeships that promised training in trades like hat-making and tailoring. Not 
coincidentally, Isaac T. Hopper, along with Harrison the most active member of the Committee 
of Guardians and Committee on the African Slave Trade, was a tailor by trade.40 Several years 
later a traveling English Quaker encountered one of the survivors of the Phoebe case, a boy 
named Sado, then a servant in the home of fellow Quakers, the Painter family. He recorded that 
Mrs. Painter told him the “Society instituted for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” placed Sado 
with her family.41  
The extant records of PAS anti-slave trade suits are most complete for the period 
immediately before national abolition, from 1805 to 1807. By late 1805, the PAS juggled at least 
sixteen lawsuits brought by individual members of the Committee on the African Slave Trade in 
the Pennsylvania U.S. Eastern District Court under the 1794 and 1800 federal laws. Often court 
actions initiated by PAS members took the form of libel suits, because the 1794 law provided the 
incentive of a one-thousand-dollar reward to the informer should an accused slave trader be 
found guilty. In Thomas Harrison v. Brig Tryphenia, the Committee entered into its record a 
short deposition by a seaman named John Nick, who served on the vessel Minerva. Nick testified 
that while in “the Havanna,” he witnessed the Tryphenia with “12 to 18 negroes on board which 
he understood were slaves.” He believed that a man named Louis Crousillat offered them for 
sale, because no one went to “the Havanna without horses or slaves, [and he] saw no horses on 
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board.” In addition, Nick testified that he and his Minerva crewmates warned their counterparts 
on the Tryphenia “something of the consequences of navigating a vessel carrying slaves.” Other 
seamen corroborated Nick’s testimony, claiming that the Tryphenia sailed from Philadelphia 
bound for St. Thomas in July 1805, where the master proceeded to purchase fifteen slaves before 
heading to Havana to sell them- a clear violation of both Pennsylvania and United States law. 42  
At the same time, under the leadership of Quaker tailor Isaac T. Hopper the PAS brought 
libel suits against the brig Eliza and its owner Pierce Maher and Captain Edward McDermott. As 
with the Tryphenia cases, the committee recorded depositions from several crewmembers, and 
the evidence was filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Pennsylvania U.S. Eastern District Court. 
Hopper also shepherded several suits brought against the schooner Sally, another ship owned by 
Pierce Maher. According to evidence provided by crewmember Stephen Murray, the Sally sailed 
from Philadelphia to Barbados, Tobago, Trinidad, St. Thomas, and then proceeded to the “River 
Gambia,” where the supercargo purchased two-hundred and fifty slaves and sold them at La 
Guira and Havana—a clear violation of the 1794 law. Apparently, some of the slaves were then 
resold in South Carolina- which had resumed slave importations in 1803 but which was not a 
violation of US law. However, it was a violation of Pennsylvania state law for crewmembers 
who were citizens of that state.43 Although there are no extant verdicts for the cases of the Eliza 
or the Sally, these episodes illustrate both the PAS’s anti-slave trade legal strategies, and the 
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tangled web of state and federal law that complicated the society’s efforts to remake the Atlantic 
Ocean into the eastern boundary of the antislavery cordon of freedom.44 
Committee on the African Slave Trade member Isaac Sherman shepherded libel suits 
brought against the owners and operators of the brigs Good Intent, Hannah, and Arctic and the 
sloop Experiment. In the case of the Experiment, the Committee recorded long depositions from 
testimony by James Johnson and his wife Sarah, who had previously been married to Experiment 
crew member William Robins. Her testimony traced the ship’s route from Philadelphia to St. 
Bartholomew, then to the Senegal and the Cape Verde Islands and back to the Caribbean, as PAS 
counsel attempted to prove that its captain illegally supplied foreign colonies with slaves. One 
PAS memorandum forwarded to US District Court Judge Richard Peters described depositions 
that proved that the Good Intent had been “employed and made use of in carrying slaves from 
one foreign country to another,” in direct violation of the 1794 Act. In the case of the Arctic, 
Sherman petitioned the South Carolina US District Court, which could hardly be expected to 
hand down an anti-slave trade ruling, to prosecute the ship’s owners and operators, accused of 
selling slaves in Montevideo, Uruguay purchased in Zanzibar. Although the South Carolina court 
had jurisdiction because the Arctic was registered at Charleston, and though South Carolina 
reopened its borders to slave importations in 1803, Sherman hoped the court might enforce the 
1794 and 1800 laws. At the very least, in all cases Sherman and the PAS made clear that it 
monitored the enforcement of anti-slave trade regulatory law as closely as possible.45 
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In April 1807, one month after Congress’ passage of the bill to abolish the foreign slave 
trade scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1808, the PAS’ Committee on the African Slave 
Trade continued apace with its efforts to fight the trade. It persisted in collecting and arranging 
evidence against suspected illegal slave trading and funneling it into the appropriate legal 
channels. That same month, a Committee on the African Slave Trade memoranda frankly 
assessed the successes and failures of its anti-slave trade litigation. The Committee pondered 
whether to appeal the aforementioned case of the Tryphenia to the United States Supreme Court, 
thus forcing the nation’s highest tribunal to pass judgment on the efficacy of slave trade 
legislation. The memoranda glumly noted that Chief Justice Bushrod Washington’s court 
previously interpreted the 1794 Act narrowly by not allowing legal action “unless a vessel shall 
go to the coast of Africa and make an excurtion into the country and seize the natives who may 
be at liberty, contrary to what has ever been the practice of those who engage in this detestable 
trade.” Washington’s ruling suggested that American citizens could legally buy enslaved 
Africans, and that the 1794 Act only applied to the delivery, but not the purchase of enslaved 
persons. Nonetheless the committee pressed on with its work because even though several cases 
had been unsuccessful, further litigation would “have a good effect in discouraging [this] 
iniquitous traffic in human flesh.”46 
Like the PAS, abolition societies and individuals with abolitionist sympathies elsewhere 
worked assiduously to prosecute accused violators. For much of 1792 and early 1793, for 
example, Saybrook, Connecticut Rev. Elias Mather engaged in prosecuting the mercantile 
partnership of White, Pratt, and Newell. These merchants’ families, especially the Pratts, were 
prominent in Saybrook. According to Mather’s ministerial colleague Jonathan Edwards, by 
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March 1793 expectations were that the lawsuit would receive a favorable hearing in Connecticut 
state courts.47 Though prosecuting illegal slave trading was a lengthy and expensive undertaking, 
it is clear that northeastern abolitionists were intent on upholding state laws that forbid their 
residents’ participation in the nefarious commerce in human beings.    
Over the course of autumn 1792, abolitionist Moses Brown conducted a lengthy 
correspondence with fellow abolitionist Samuel Eliot, concerning the cases of the illegal slave 
trading owners of the ship Abeona registered in Boston, Massachusetts. Ship captain and store 
keeper Steven Cleveland pursued the cases, attending to the often-considerable difficulties in 
prosecuting illegal slave traders through state court systems. In September 1792, Cleveland spent 
a significant amount of time and (Moses Brown’s) money in legal fees to engage Massachusetts 
Court of Common Pleas Judge Sullivan, who on several occasions claimed not to remember the 
specifics of the Abeona case. Sullivan’s duties, moreover, often meant that he was travelling to 
circuit courts when Cleveland most wanted to consult with him about the case. Eliot volunteered 
to visit Sullivan, for example, and reported that “I again waited upon him… or rather attempted 
to as I found that he had just set out for Worcester Court.” Eliot happily reported that Sullivan 
“had however left a Letter, the purpose of which was, to say, that he had been applied to in the 
case of Cleaveland” in the September 1792 court at Salem.48 
 All of this was demanding activity, certainly for Cleveland, who pursued the case only 
for expenses pending its outcome, which held the promise of a significant payment because 
Massachusetts’ 1788 anti-slave trade law offered one moiety of fines to the informer. As 
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Cleveland told Eliot, the case was an important test of Massachusetts abolitionists’ ability to 
uphold anti-slave trade legislation, and that he would do so “with Energy being determined to 
exert himself in doing all he could for the Establishment of the Freedom of the whole Human 
Race.” But attempting to prosecute accused slave traders came at a price for Cleveland. The 
Providence Society, Eliot wrote Brown, had to “enter with Spirit” in to the case because “it is 
enough, & more than enough, for Mr. Cleveland to bear the personal insults & abuse he 
suffered” in retaliation for pursuing the case. Eliot offered to pay “any Assesment, or do 
anything that may be reasonably expected” to pursue the case to a successful conclusion. He 
further urged Brown to discuss the matter with other members of the Providence Society, and 
warned him not to let it “be disgraced, by the want of timely Effort and Exertion—If we do not 
support Mr. Cleaveland, as far as appears to me, it would be better if the Society were extinct.”49 
The combined efforts of Cleveland, Eliot, and Brown continued in September 1792, as 
attorney Edward Pulling certified that he brought suit on behalf of Cleveland against Abeona 
owners Joseph Waters and John Sinclair in the Salem Court of Common Pleas.50 By November, 
the case continued to drag on, and Samuel Eliot continued to press Moses Brown to assist 
Stephen Cleveland as he attempted to prosecute the Taunton slave dealers. Eliot continued to 
hope that the Abeona case would be brought to successful conclusion. “The earliest [opportunity] 
shall be improved in making the Enquiry of Judge Paine, Dawes or Sullivan,” he wrote Brown, 
“& if it may be done, I will forward the 20 dollars to Cleaveland…” Eliot again warned Brown 
that the Providence Society had to take action quickly to support Cleveland, as any delay might 
lead to a missed opportunity to prosecute Waters and Sinclair. “Delay is… seldom or ever 
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unattended by Danger,” he wrote, and “in such a Cause as this, it too clearly will infer Disgrace.” 
Such were the small windows of opportunity in which abolitionists had to capitalize to 
successfully achieve their antislavery agendas.51 
 In 1793, the Massachusetts State Supreme Court decided Stephen Cleveland’s suit 
against the Joseph Waters and John Sinclair, owners of the Abeona on appeal. Under the 
provisions of the Bay State’s 1788 anti-slave trade law, the court assessed the two men a fine of 
£4700, declaring Waters, the ship captain, and the merchant Sinclair guilty of purchasing ninety 
slaves in Africa and transporting and selling them in West Indies. Cleveland’s work, it turned 
out, promised to pay handsomely. Under the state’s 1788 law, the Court levied fines of £50 for 
each slave and £200 for the Abeona’s usage in the slave trade, of which Cleveland claimed 
£2750. But Waters and Sinclair, unfortunately, could not pay the fine, and Cleveland filed an 
additional suit seeking £5000 in damages. Ultimately, John Sinclair was jailed in the Salem Gaol 
for non-payment of the fines, and while it turned out that Cleveland did not see the pecuniary 
rewards that he hoped would be the fruits of his labor to prosecute the Abeona case, he brought 
the slave traders to heel. The case highlighted many of the difficulties that ambitious men who 
wanted the slave trade to end encountered, not least the tangled legal processes of bringing 
accused slave traders to trial. And yet, the case also showed the effectiveness of Early National 
abolitionists and their societies in the quest to end American participation in the slave trade.52 
While New York merchants did not have as large a presence in the African and 
intercontinental slave trades as their compatriots in New England, the New-York Manumission 
Society did its part to help track down and bring illegal slave traders to justice. In 1800, the 
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society filed a lawsuit Captain John Read of the William and Margaret, a schooner registered in 
New York City to one Thomas Dennis, which had set sail for Africa from Rhode Island and 
disembarked enslaved cargo in the Swedish Caribbean colony St. Barthèlemy. Apparently, the 
William and Margaret experienced inclement weather, and only thirty-five of an initial one 
hundred and five slaves disembarked in the Caribbean. Perhaps the ship struggled into New York 
harbor, where N-YMS became aware of its travels. As of early 1801, society president Willet 
Seaman notified the American Convention that the case remained pending in the U.S. District 
Court. The N-YMS felt “confident, that justice in this case shall be had; and they cannot but 
hope, that the punishment of a few such offenders, will put an end, in our country, to the unjust 
and cruel trade in question.”53  
The illegal sale of slaves out of the northeastern states that instituted abolition was a 
significant worry for members of the abolition societies. Both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals 
participated in illegal human trafficking, although it is difficult to quantify exactly how many 
men, women, and children illegal traffickers smuggled to southern slavery. The American 
Convention’s member societies invested significant time and resources to combatting this trade, 
seeking to uphold  “containment” of slavery and servitude to their states, thereby allowing the 
process of gradual abolition to proceed.54 The PAS and N-YMS most actively pursued cases 
against illegal sale of servants and free persons out-of-state. The New York Assembly forbade 
the sale of slaves out-of-state before legislating gradual abolition in 1799, and Empire State 
slaveholders frequently attempted to illegally cash out their slave holdings in anticipation of 
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gradual abolition. This practice escalated after the turn of the century, as the N-YMS reported to 
the American Convention that “suits were initiated… against certain foreigners, for a traffic in 
black people from this to the southern states.”55  
The efforts of northeastern abolition societies to restrain the slave trades met with some 
measure of success. New England merchants and ship captains still attempted to import slaves 
into the northeastern states, albeit in very small numbers, and abolitionists vehemently contested 
such illegal importations. They met with less success preventing northeastern merchants from 
illegally supplying foreign places with slaves, though as we have seen it was not for lack of 
effort. Most galling to abolitionists was the South Carolina legislature’s decision to open the 
Palmetto State’s borders to fresh importations in 1803. In the five years between 1803 and 1807, 
merchants imported 59,938 slave to the United States, the overwhelming majority to South 
Carolina and a smattering to Georgia, the last major period of slave importations in American 
history. More than half of the ships that undertook slaving voyages and sold their victims in the 
United States either registered in or embarked from South Carolina.56 There is significant 
evidence to suggest that New England merchants began to register ships outside their home 
states to evade potential prosecution, because northeastern abolitionists had hounded their slave-
trading neighbors for years to the best of their ability.57  
 
********** 
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In addition to battling the slave trades, abolition societies expended tremendous effort to 
prevent the illegal re-enslavement of men, women, and children on the path to freedom as per 
state abolition legislation, as well as promoting private manumissions. As Richard Newman has 
persuasively detailed, PAS members labored assiduously to protect Afro-Pennsylvanians from 
being claimed as chattel property contrary to the Keystone State’s 1780 abolition law.58 To that 
end, the society diligently recorded manumissions and indentures of Pennsylvania blacks, as well 
as illegally imported Africans like those in the cases of the Prudent and Phoebe. The PAS also 
kept detailed records of free black Americans in neighboring slave states Virginia, Maryland, 
and Delaware, often at the request of the kin and acquaintances of free blacks who wanted 
assurance that freedom documentation was accessible if necessary. This sphere of activity, more 
than any other, endeared the PAS to black communities across the mid-Atlantic and New 
England. The society’s records are, in many ways, defined by the ledgers of manumissions and 
indentures several waves of society members maintained in the decades after its re-formation in 
1784. The PAS Indenture Books served a practical purpose, as a back-up to the potential loss of 
state government-stored manumission and indenture agreements. To PAS members and free 
black communities, the ledgers signified more than quotidian records; they were an archive of 
freedom, a bulwark against methods of fraudulent re-enslavement masters unscrupulously 
practiced.  
To peruse the PAS manumission and indenture ledgers is to see the process of gradual 
abolition unfold chronologically. The indenture arrangements that typically accompanied private 
manumissions varied widely; while Pennsylvania’s 1780 abolition law clearly proscribed that 
children born to enslaved mothers were to be freed at twenty-eight, it was vaguer about the 
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procedures for slaves born before the law passed. In addition, the law did not prevent the 
manumission of children born to enslaved mothers before age twenty-eight, and PAS members 
promoted the manumission of indentured adolescents and young adults whenever possible. The 
volume of indentures increased as the 1780s and 1790s progressed. In page after page of eight, 
six-column entries, the PAS recorded waves of freedom that attained by Afro-Pennsylvanians in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century.59 
PAS Indenture Book C, for example, records 166 indenture and manumission 
agreements, and they reveal a wide variety of arrangements. The lengths of indenture before 
manumission typically ranged from two to twelve years. Generally speaking, the indenture 
lengths for adults aligned with the customary terms of European indentures, from four to seven 
years. The term lengths typically corresponded to an individual’s age; thus, terms longer than ten 
years usually applied to children and adolescents. Adults rarely served indenture terms longer 
than seven years before full manumission.60 In some cases, where financially possible, PAS 
members themselves served as masters to enslaved individuals transitioning from slavery to 
servitude, and eventually freedom. This was especially true of Thomas Harrison, a man of 
somewhat limited personal financial means who nonetheless served as guarantor for dozens of 
manumissions, often using PAS funds raised for the purpose. Abolitionist attorney and PAS 
Counsel William Lewis attended to much of the legal work, filing manumission and indenture 
agreements regularly throughout in the 1780s and early 1790s. Lewis refused to be compensated 
for his work, and as the PAS’s first historian noted in 1845, he even had to be convinced to 
accept a gift of a “three-pint silver can.”  Anxious not to be viewed as profiting from his legal 
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assistance, Lewis reluctantly accepted the gift “as a mark of respect from the society, but not as 
gratuity for services rendered, for which he determined never to receive a pecuniary award.”61 
In New York, the N-YMS also operated as a clearinghouse of manumission and indenture 
records, a singularly important task given that the ownership of slaves as chattel property was not 
abolished in the Empire State until 1799. Before then, the N-YMS saw its efforts to protect free 
and indentured blacks from illegal enslavement as perhaps the most critical aspect of its 
activities. The society’s Standing Committee minutes invariably began with reports of pending 
freedom cases. The November 1797 minutes, for example, opened by noting that of eighteen 
open complaints made by black New Yorkers, “three have been settled and the persons are now 
at liberty.” In another case, the Standing Committee member’s direct “interference” led to 
another person gaining freedom. The other fifteen cases remained “undecided,” and the 
Committee added that ten additional cases brought the Society’s freedom adjudication docket up 
to twenty-four.62 
The passage of New York’s 1799 gradual abolition act stimulated unscrupulous masters 
to illegally attempt to sell slaves and servants “down South” to the rapidly expanding plantation 
economies of South Carolina and Georgia. In May 1800, less than a year after the act passed, the 
N-YMS noted ruefully that in order for the act to have full effect, a policy of containment must 
be pursued. The society’s Standing Committee reported that “a practice has become pretty 
generall—to ship Negroes from this to the Southern states & that from thence they are reshipped 
to the West Indies and then sold.” The Committee had been informed that foreign nationals 
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especially operated this illegal business in New York City. Their intelligence indicated that 
“certain Frenchmen have employed an office for some time” to conduct the nefarious and illegal 
business. The Committee promised to make significant efforts to “detect and punish the authors 
but they have hitherto eluded them.”63 
At mid-decade, the N-YMS continued to grapple with freedom cases. In July 1806, the 
Standing Committee noted that sixteen new cases reached the society’s attention over the course 
of that summer. A worrying number of new cases emerged from New Jersey, where gradual 
abolition legislation finally passed the state assembly in 1804. The cases consisted “mostly of 
persons, illegally disposed of from the State of New Jersey into this, some of which being so 
important we think it necessary to detail.” In yet another instance, a Frenchman apparently made 
a business of illegal human trafficking. Under cover of night, the man, Augustus Massot, 
attempted to transport four persons to slavery in Savannah, Georgia. One of the four, an 
unnamed woman, managed to escape “as she was brought from the Prison door & so sent on 
board,” after which she managed to alert N-YMS members. Several of the Standing Committee, 
“with 2 or 3 others from our Society,” discovered that the brig Hope was set to sail the next 
morning and immediately “took out a suit” against the ship’s captain and engaged a Deputy 
Thomas to remove the illegally enslaved persons from the vessel. Two of the three recaptured 
persons were immediately set free. One of these was a man who had been free for several years, 
residing in New York City with his wife and children. Massot apparently convinced the man to 
drink until he was in a “perfect state of intoxication” and then hustled him aboard the Hope, a 
method of kidnapping that would be echoed decades later in the better known, unfortunate 
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experience of Solomon Northrup detailed in Twelve Years A Slave.  A doctor claimed the third 
recaptured person, “a Lad of about sixteen years of age,” charging that boy had been kidnapped. 
Aided by the brave woman who escaped Massot’s clutches, the N-YMS members arrived just in 
time.64  
The Massot case took an interesting turn the following morning, as several members of 
the Standing Committee visited New York City Mayor DeWitt Clinton. They inquired whether 
Clinton had granted a permit to the Frenchman to export any slaves; in a somewhat dismaying 
reply, Clinton affirmed “he had granted [Massot] a permit for seven, including the names of 
those that were found on board the vessel.” But the Committee members informed Clinton that 
Massot had lied in the affidavit presented to the mayor in applying for permission to export his 
“slaves.” While Massot claimed that they had been his property for more than one year, the 
society could in fact prove that “two of the seven were free people and the remaining five, if 
legally his property could only have been so for two or three weeks.” Apparently upset that 
Massot had lied to him, Clinton immediately issued a writ for the Frenchman. Suspecting his 
ruse had failed, he fled New York City to avoid prosecution— potentially both significant fines 
and jail time—for having committed “this act of atrocity.”65 
Unfortunately for the N-YMS, but more importantly for the men, women, and children 
who suffered such kidnappings, abolition societies were not always successful in preventing 
illegal kidnappings, as in the case of Augustus Massot. Although the Frenchman made his escape 
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from New York City just in time and did not face the harsh sword of justice, the six of the seven 
persons he claimed as slaves regained their personal liberty. But other men, as devious as 
Massot, tried to circumvent gradual abolition and anti-kidnapping laws, and they did sometimes 
succeed. However, while this theme has been developed by some modern scholars to argue for 
the ineffectiveness of northeastern state abolition, and implicitly that northeastern whites 
uniformly did not have humanitarian sympathies for black Americans, other, more preponderant, 
evidence suggests that gradual abolition was in fact far more thoroughgoing and ultimately 
successful.   
The N-YMS records show that the rate of slave manumissions began to rise sharply after 
1805, which correlated with the ongoing process of emancipation the state assembly initiated in 
1799.  As the first decade of the nineteenth century came to a close, a large and growing number 
of black New Yorkers transitioned from the legal status of chattel property, into a form of 
indentured servitude. The state assembly’s acceleration of the emancipation process as part of the 
re-drafting of the state constitution in 1819 also led to a spike in indentures preparatory to 
abolition. This ongoing process, in the words of a recent historian, created an “antislavery 
generation” of children born free to parents held to service as slaves or servants. Between May 
and June 1819, for example, masters in New York City alone privately manumitted more than 
one hundred slaves, including three owned by Samuel L. Mitchill, a botanist, university 
professor, and outspoken proponent of antislavery political economy.66  
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In a closely related sphere of activity, the abolition societies expended significant 
resources representing free blacks illegally claimed as fugitive slaves, most often from the 
Chesapeake slave states. The PAS and N-YMS encountered such cases frequently, especially the 
former given its shared borders with Virginia and Maryland. A string of PAS secretaries 
maintained correspondence with free blacks and their abolitionist allies in Virginia, Maryland, 
and Delaware in the Early Republic. PAS members like Thomas Harrison and longtime society 
President James Pemberton remained ready to forward certified copies of freedom papers kept 
on file in their records, or to lend legal assistance to blacks claimed as fugitives if needed. 
Though the problems of fugitive slaves, illegal kidnapping, and protecting the personal liberty of 
blacks in the Free states are more often identified with the antebellum decades and the coming of 
the Civil War, they were equally important to abolitionism in the Early Republic.  
Alongside the abolition societies, individual abolitionists also participated in offering 
protection to free blacks’ personal liberty, as well as assisting African-Americans in a variety of 
legal and quasi-legal capacities. Rhode Island abolitionist Moses Brown spent his entire life 
assisting free blacks in many ways, and developed close relationships with a network of black 
Rhode Islanders, including several individuals and their families owned by him and his wife who 
he manumitted in 1773 after his conversion to Quakerism. Brown employed free and servant 
black men at this family’s spermaceti works beginning in the 1760s, as laborers on compulsory 
civic maintenance projects in Providence, and at the textile spinning firm he founded with son-
in-law William Almy and English expert mechanic Samuel Slater in 1789.67 Brown also offered 
assistance in a number of formal and informal ways, from serving as a character witness, to 
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securing loans, to functioning as a private savings bank for freed blacks with whom he was 
personally acquainted.   
In late 1794, for example, Brown’s attention was drawn to the troubles of Caesar, a man 
he previously employed at the spermaceti works, who had run into trouble trying to protect his 
father’s deed to land against confiscation for debts in Dudley, Georgia. Three years prior, Brown 
had apparently written to one Edward Davis on the matter, though a foggy memory prevented the 
almost sixty year old from recalling exactly. Brown went to the length of perusing letter copies 
from the previous four years, in an attempt to determine if he had written on Caesar’s behalf. In 
any case, Brown’s understanding was that Caesar had been unfairly deprived of the land by a 
man named Colgrove, and he noted that “it is possable [sic] some person may have written in my 
name as I have had some such things done…” Brown asked Davis, “please to compare the hand 
writing of the Letter in thy hand with this and if it is the same please to send it… with thy order 
and the mony [sic] shall be paid thee if I therein promised…” Brown wanted to ensure that 
Caesar was properly protected from being deceived by Colgrove, who “had professed to be his 
friend and seemed to have confidence in him…” Here Brown offered to serve not only as a 
guarantor, but as a concerned friend worried that a free black acquaintance would be unfairly 
deceived.68 
Another example of abolitionist service is the efforts of wealthy Quaker capitalist Elisha 
Tyson, born in Pennsylvania and who spent his adult life in Maryland, amassing a fortune in the 
grain milling business and real estate. For decades Tyson served as an active member of the 
Maryland Society for the Abolition of Slavery, and devoted his energies to assisting fugitive 
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slaves and protecting blacks falsely claimed as fugitives. Typically, Tyson first personally 
approached masters accused of illegally claiming persons as slaves. If personal persuasion failed, 
Tyson then “proceeded to employ counsel” to file freedom petitions in local courts, “the case 
prosecuted to final determination. In an adoring biography of Tyson published after his death, his 
son John claimed that Elisha’s lawyers very rarely lost freedom cases, especially in the 
Baltimore County Court. The longtime “president” of that Court, Judge Joseph Hopper 
Nicholson, though a slaveholder from the Eastern Shore, had apparently been persuaded to act 
with humanity by Tyson in deciding freedom cases.69  
 Although Tyson usually preferred to use personal persuasion and local courts to provide 
help to free persons claimed as slaves, he also used political means. In May 1811, Tyson wrote to 
members of Congress with whom he made acquaintance and promised to provide information on 
the cases of kidnapped free and servant blacks. In the case of Abraham Long, Tyson attested that 
“this boy was born on the Eastern Shore [Maryland] & was bound out by his mother.” 
Kidnapped and taken to New Orleans, Long was brought to Baltimore by a Dr. Blackburn, who 
used him as a “waiting man.” Luckily, Long “made his case known” in Baltimore, and with the 
help of the Maryland Society a freedom petition was filed and he received his freedom. “Negro 
Phebe,” from Staten Island, New York, “was manumitted to be free at the expiration of a term of 
years which had nearly expired,” but tragically was “privately sold” with the purpose of sending 
her to New Orleans. “By accident” her case came to the attention of Baltimore citizens (where 
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she was imprisoned before shipment to New Orleans), one of whom filed a writ of habeus 
corpus on her behalf, whereupon Phebe gained her freedom.70 
The experiences of Fairfield, Connecticut resident Isaac Hillard perhaps best illustrates 
the actions northeasterners with abolitionist sympathies undertook to uphold state abolition, and 
also the intransigence of former masters and kidnappers eager to profit from illegal human 
trafficking. Hillard’s story also shows that public antipathy to chattel slavery and human 
trafficking was at times widespread, but not absolute, in the Northeast. In 1789, Hillard traveled 
to Virginia and was shocked to find two young girls that he recognized, born free in Derby, 
Connecticut, kidnapped and sold into slavery. He was so moved that he resolved to prosecute the 
two kidnappers under the provisions of Connecticut’s 1788 anti-slave trade law, designed in 
Hillard’s words “to punish all those who were wicked enough to steal, or kidnap free negroes, 
and carry them off to into other states, and sell them for slaves.” While public opinion across the 
Northeast generally disliked against human trafficking, in Fairfield the accused kidnappers and 
their allies had enough sway to make Hillard’s prosecution “very unpopular.” In particular, they 
accused him of initiating the suits in order to profit from potential fines, tarring him as the self-
interested profiteer. This triggered a seven-year legal battle in which Hillard expended 
significant time and money combatting illegal human trafficking.71  
In a fourteen-page pamphlet printed at his own expense, Hillard detailed the legal travails 
of the case. First, in 1790, the Fairfield County court abated Hillard’s writs, without explanation. 
He then appealed repeatedly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which delayed considering the 
suit because of several technical errors in its preparation. “Under these heavy discouragements,” 
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Hillard decided to petition the Connecticut Assembly directly, basing his case on the fact he had 
only tried to help enforce an Assembly law. He asked the Assembly to grant him an 
appropriation equal to the potential fine so that he could continue to finance the case, which the 
Assembly approved. Finally, in June 1797, the state Supreme Court of Errors decided in 
Hillard’s—and the now adolescents’—favor and forced the two kidnappers to pay fines and 
travel to Virginia to purchase the girls and bring them back to Connecticut. Buoyed by this hard-
earned success, Hillard decided to continue prosecuting other cases of illegal kidnapping, 
including several cases of illegal kidnapping of Connecticut free blacks and their sale in New 
York.72 
Understandably, Hillard was extremely frustrated by the public reaction to his 
prosecution of the case, and his address to the public reads with more than a hint of martyrdom. 
He repeatedly referred to “wicked” and “unprincipled, impudent men,” and claimed that “it is 
hard to find one man in Connecticut, but who professes to disapprove of, and openly bears 
testimony against kidnapping, and sending those called slaves out of state; but to my surprise… 
are willing to have free children sold.”73 Surely many in Connecticut felt hostility towards 
Hillard’s actions, but just as surely many genuinely disliked illegal human trafficking. After all, 
according to Hillard, the 1788 state law was passed by an elected Assembly, and he defended his 
actions by asking, “have I not done, what the legislature meant to have done?”  
Northeastern abolition societies, their members, and individuals with antislavery 
convictions viewed the prevention of slave importations and the sale of slaves out of state, as 
well as illegal kidnappings, as critical in containing chattel slavery within their boundaries, 
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thereby isolating the institution and preventing its expansion. Combined with fighting the slave 
trades, abolitionists’ assiduous work recording indentures and promoting manumissions, and 
laboring to protect against violations of personal liberty and illegal kidnappings, helped rid the 
mid-Atlantic and New England of chattel slavery within a few decades. While it has become 
common in modern scholarship to make William Lloyd Garrison and his “immediatist” followers 
the litmus test of true abolitionism, and to downgrade the radical nature of Early National 
abolitionist activities, Garrison could not have operated the way he later would without the 
template set by the ‘first-wave’ of abolitionism. Members of the N-YMS, PAS, the Providence 
Society, and others were directly responsible for freeing far more enslaved persons than 




Through 1808, neither antislavery nor proslavery partisans could plausibly claim to have 
secured the upper hand in the national Congress. Continuous tension defined the politics of 
slavery, the slave trade, and abolitionism, and yawning questions remained unanswered. Most 
importantly, the politically explosive conflicts over slavery and western expansion that would 
absorb later generations had yet to be addressed directly. Yet it also seemed clear that support for 
heavily regulating the slave trade, within constitutional bounds, was significant in Congress, the 
state legislatures, and northeastern popular opinion. By 1808, all of the states on the eastern 
seaboard prohibited slave importations, with the exception of South Carolina reopening her 
borders to slave importations in 1803, though the proximate reasons for doing so varied. In the 
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Northeast, sustained anti-slave trade organizing overtook merchant opposition to slave trade 
prohibitions. In the Upper South, slave market saturation led Virginia and Maryland to become 
exporters of enslaved people to the Lower South. In the latter states, legislatures passed 
prohibitory laws to curb the introduction of dangerous slaves fresh from Africa, as well as 
potentially revolutionary West Indian slaves. In 1798, Congress even prohibited slave 
importations to the Mississippi Territory, and in 1803 to the Louisiana Territory, though the 
prohibitions were only temporary.74  
Debates in Congress over the future of foreign slave importations in the Early Republic 
effectively ended in March 1807. The final phase of slave trade debate before national abolition 
began at the 9th Congress, in December 1805, when Representative James Sloan of New Jersey 
proposed to levy the ten-dollar tax on slave importations allowed for in the Constitution’s slave 
trade clause. Debate recommenced after the holiday break the following January, and Lower 
South representatives again voiced their vehement disapproval of federal government 
intervention in slavery-related issues. Congressmen like Robert Marion of South Carolina, while 
admitting that the proposed tax was technically constitutional, claimed the measure unfairly 
burdened slave importing states. Henry Southard of New Jersey agreed—the proposed tax was 
constitutional—his “only regret was, that it was not in the power of Congress to lay a more 
effectual tax.”75  
The debate continued along lines familiar to legislators and political observers since 
1790. Should Sloan’s resolution be reworded to replace the word ‘persons’ to ‘slaves’ for 
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purposes of the tax, Connecticut’s Samuel Dana wondered? That would be closer to the truth of 
the matter.76 Sloan’s suggestion elicited full throated responses in the negative from southerners 
like Willis Alston of South Carolina, who attempted to stall the discussion by asking what good 
the ten dollar tax would do when Congress could potentially abolish the foreign trade in two 
short years. Such a tax, Pennsylvania’s John Smilie responded pithily, would accomplish a 
“higher object” than merely raising revenue: it would signal Congress’s “disapprobation of this 
traffic” and “manifest to the world that, as the Representatives of a free people, we will, as far as 
we can, express our opinion of it.”77 The resolution was then postponed. But antislavery 
congressmen insisted on using Congress’s constitutional power to its utmost extent through the 
slave trade clause and past congressional legislative precedent, while southerners worked to 
stone-wall those efforts. 
Debate over the proposed tax continued to smolder throughout the remainder of the 
session. In February 1806, Massachusetts Representative Silas Bidwell gave a lengthy speech in 
which he summarized the recent legislative and constitutional history of the foreign slave trade. 
While respecting the institution of slavery in states where it existed, he about a “new doctrine” 
recently developed by several of his southern colleagues. Proponents of the “new doctrine” 
argued that Article 1, Section 9 was a “mere negative provision,” not containing “positive words 
of grant,” and which did not “consequently give Congress a power to lay such a prohibition” 
even after 1808. This Bidwell argued, was not true. Why, then, would the Constitutional 
Convention have specifically restrained Congress from exercising a granted power until a certain 
date if that power did not exist?78 If the “new doctrine” was logically and constitutionally 
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correct, how could one explain the acts of 1794, 1800, and the later supplementary act in 1803? 
The truth was that slaves were merchandise like any other goods for sale. “The very principle of 
slavery is that the slave is the property of his master, subject to transfer by bargain and sale,” he 
sighed, and everyone knew that Congress most certainly had the power to tax commercial 
merchandise.79 Bidwell then proposed a slave trade abolition statute that would take effect on 
January 1, 1808. Southerners quickly squashed the proposal, but they could not hold out 
indefinitely.  
Debate over the proposed ten-dollar tax subsided as the session wore on into spring. In 
early February, days after Bidwell’s proposed abolition bill, the American Convention presented 
a petition in support of a January 1, 1808 date for slave trade abolition to Congress, not a subtle 
reminder of their stand on the issue. At the same time, the future of slavery in the new territories 
of the Louisiana Purchase, and petitions by slaveholders in the Indiana Territory to make slavery 
legal in portions of the Northwest Territory, complicated matters.80 These interrelated problems 
created a divisive atmosphere surrounding the issue of slave importations. In the end, the 
questions raised by the debates over the proposed importation tax, and whether Congress could 
set a legislative timetable for the abolition of the slave trade had to wait until the next session of 
the 9th Congress, convened in December 1806.  
A recent detailed examination of the 9th Congress’s discussion of the foreign slave trade 
from December 1806 until March 1807 concludes that, though the debate was lengthy, the 
shocking attempts of Aaron Burr and his associates to foment rebellion in the southwestern 
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territories “overshadowed” the slave trade debates.81 Though they revealed sectional discord 
concerning slavery, according to this interpretation, ultimately the passage of the Atlantic slave 
trade abolition act was a sideshow to other more salacious events, and implicitly a fait accompli. 
In the context of the discussion of previous constitutional parameters and the permissibility of 
foreign slave trade regulation, however, these debates read more as the culmination of long-
developing conflict. Moreover, the 9th Congress’s second session would devote more time to 
debating and discussing the foreign slave trade than had any previous Congress.  
The debate commenced early in the session. On December 2, 1806, President Thomas 
Jefferson sent a message to both houses of Congress asking them to consider a bill to abolish the 
foreign slave trade, and Senator Stephen Bradley of Vermont proposed a bill, to take effect on 
January 1, 1808. The initial draft the bill contained six sections that abolished slave importations 
into the states and territories of the Union, incorporating provisions concerning the outfitting and 
operation of slave ships taken almost verbatim from various sections of the 1794, 1800, and 1803 
acts.82 The most divisive subject that the 9th Congress’s second session considered apropos the 
proposed legislation was the status of slaves recovered aboard alleged slave vessels. Should 
violators forfeit property rights in recaptured slaves, like the vessels used to transport them into 
the United States?83 New Jersey’s James Sloan quickly attempted to insert an amendment that 
would make all such persons immediately free, to which members from the Lower South 
immediately objected. 
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In response, Massachusetts’ Bidwell argued that “the United States [should] not take 
property themselves, or pass it over to any other person,” and thus that “the property shall 
entirely terminate.”84 Southern congressmen immediately, and predictably, objected to such a 
proposal. They argued the provision would make the law unenforceable, as the several states 
“interested” in slavery would never do submit to such as policy. Georgia’s Peter Early argued 
that such a provision “would be, to turn loose, in the bosom of the country, firebrands that would 
consume” slaveholders.85 The issue arose in almost every debate on the subject through February 
1807, in part because past congressional discussion of slave trade regulation had never seriously 
confronted the issue, as earlier debates centered on the constitutional limits and possibilities of 
federal regulation and their implications. And as evidenced by the acts of 1794, 1800, and 1803, 
all made constitutionally possible by the ambiguity of the slave trade clause, no serious argument 
could be made that Congress did not have the right to legislate on the subject. By early 1807 it 
seemed clear that an abolition bill of some kind was in the offing.  
 Passed on March 2, 1807, the ten-section piece of legislation was significantly longer and 
more complex than previous congressional legislation on American participation in the foreign 
slave trade. The act opened by declaring it “unlawful to import or bring into the United States or 
the territories thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person 
of color, as a slave, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose” such person “as a slave, or to be held to 
service or labor.”86 It also reiterated, almost verbatim, the prohibition against outfitting vessels 
for the slave trade under penalty of forfeiture contained in the 1800 federal law. The owners of 
such ships, in addition to the forfeiture of their property, also faced a fine of $20,000, and a five 
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thousand dollar fine awaited any “citizen, citizens, or any person resident within the jurisdiction” 
of the United States for transporting captives to the United States with the intent to sell or hold 
them as slaves.87 Any citizen convicted of having actually sold slave captives in the United 
States, in addition to fines, faced no less than five and no more than ten years in prison. Those 
convicted of having purchased a slave imported from any foreign country, place, or kingdom, or 
from the dominions of any “foreign state, immediately adjoining to the United States,” knowing 
that the slave or slaves were imported for the purpose, faced fines of eight hundred dollars per 
each slave purchased.   
 The act also prohibited slave ships outfitted for the trade from docking in the any of the 
territorial waters of the United States, and authorized the president to dispatch United States 
Navy ships to prevent such actions. Also prohibited was the coastwise use of ships weighing less 
than forty tons in the domestic slave trade, a provision that ran counter to southern interests, as 
ships weighing less than forty tons were regularly used to transport slaves between United States 
ports.88 Finally, it required that slave vessels weighing forty tons or more provide detailed ship 
manifests to prove conclusively that their slave cargoes had not been purchased and loaded for 
transport after January 1, 1808, and provided detailed instructions on the procedures to ensure 
compliance with the law. 
 The main sticking point in the 9th Congress’s debates, the fate of captives forfeited from 
slaving vessels, produced the provision that historians generally agree was the largest loophole in 
the bill. As written, the act declared that individuals caught illegally importing slaves 
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immediately forfeited any “right or title whatsoever” to the captives. Such persons were to 
remain subject to “any regulation, not contravening the provisions of this act, which the 
legislatures of the several states or territories at any time hereafter may make, for disposing of 
any such negro, mulatto, or person of color.”89 The federal government could not possess 
captured slaves and dispose of them, and the states retained full control of the fate of such 
persons. In the hands of southern state legislatures, this meant that potential to skirt the 1807 act 
existed. But, the ambiguity of that single provision should not obscure the larger significance of 
the act. For the first time, and at the first constitutionally permissible moment, the United States 
Congress acted to abolish an adjunct of slavery in the United States.  
 In March 1806, shortly before national abolition of the slave trade and as abolition 
proceeded rapidly in the northeastern states, a concerned citizen wrote to Vice President James 
Madison on the future of slavery in the United States. Writing as “A Western Virginian,” he 
argued that “There exists an awful & Growing evile in our hapy country, viz, Slavery. This is a 
curs which British policy entailed on us, and in my humble oppenion as honist & wise men it is 
incumbant on Every American to use every practicable means to extricate ourselves hastily from 
this evile.” As Americans who lived through the Revolution well knew, slaves could be 
dangerous internal enemies at all times, and especially in times of war. While the man was 
critical of the political powers slaveholders wielded in Virginia, which they used to stave off 
gradual emancipation in the 1780s, he still hoped that southern legislatures would see the 
wisdom of imposing abolition as had happened in the Northeast. Warning that “St. domingo is a 
solomn lesson to the most partial advocate of Slavery,” the western Virginian urged Madison and 
by implication all southern slaveholders “to View the Farms of Pennsylvania & the northern 
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States & Compare them with those of the South & see the drary Effects of that pernitious 
practice even in time of Peace!” The West Virginian urged Madison to use his power to promote 
black resettlement projects designed to encourage gradual, voluntary abolition, but his central 
message was unambiguous: slavery was a moral and “political sin.” By the end of presidential 
Jefferson’s administration and the beginning of Madison’s, it is fair to say that most 
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Ch. 5: The Fruits of Northeastern State Abolition, II: Visions of Northeastern Economic 
Development in the Early Republic, 1787-1800 
 
In October 1787, Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS) member Robert Wood, Jr. wrote 
to fellow PAS member John Parrish on the subject of Samson. Samson was enslaved in Africa in 
adolescence, sold first in Barbados and then taken to Philadelphia, where he was freed around 
age thirty before settling with his family in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. “I had a few 
minutes with him,” wrote Wood, “& enquired about his imigration [sic], freedom, and purchase 
of his wife and children.” Samson purchased the freedom of his wife and two children shortly 
after he earned his own in 1770, and thereafter had six more children, including a pair of twins. 
Wood particularly wanted to describe Samson and his family’s quality-of-life in rural 
Cumberland County. He noted that the Samson and his wife “brought up their children 
reputably,” and carved out a comfortable life. Samson possessed “seven or eight acres of pretty 
good land, has built a comfortable House on it. I suppose the land cost him one hundred fifty 
pounds.” Samson also informed Wood that he was “clear of debt & has a Horse, Cattles, & 
farming utensils & all necessary household furniture- he has been free seventeen years or 
thereabouts.” Samson’s life story encompassed the whole of the Atlantic slaving complex. He 
survived enslavement in Africa, harsh slavery in the Caribbean, and a milder variant of bondage 
in Pennsylvania. Unlike the millions of enslaved Africans who perished on the Middle Passage 
or in bondage in Americas, however, Samson once again tasted freedom. Though Samson gained 
freedom before Pennsylvania’s famed 1780 abolition law was passed, his ability to attain 
competency for himself and his free household was indicative of northeastern abolitionists’ 
desire to replace chattel slavery with human capital—freedmen, women, and children operating 
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in household-based economic units as free, unbound agents.1 Samson and his family most 
certainly encountered racism and discrimination, and perhaps that was why they relocated to 
rural Cumberland County. But they possessed physical mobility and economic opportunity.   
That members of the PAS took an interest in Samson and his family was unsurprising. 
Formed in 1775 and re-organized in 1784, the PAS’s members undertook a wide variety of 
activities related to slavery and slave trade abolition, including visitations to inquire after freed 
persons like Wood’s visit to Samson. Abolitionists in the PAS and other northeastern state and 
local antislavery societies like the New-York Manumission Society and the Providence Society 
for Abolishing the Slave-Trade operated in a rapidly changing economic context. In the mid-
Atlantic and New England states, where slavery abolition was initiated or would be shortly after 
1788, a transition to capitalism in the countryside, towns, and cities unfolded simultaneously.2 
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States of America (New London, CT: 1797). For a perceptive analysis of Smith’s experience with slavery, 
freedom, and capitalism, see David Waldstreicher, “The Vexed Story of Human Commodification Told 
By Benjamin Franklin and Venture Smith,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 24 No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 
268-278. 
2 Through the 1990s, historians vigorously debated the timing and dynamics of the northeastern capitalist 
transformation. Though this debate has faded, at the very least it can be asserted that a transition within 
northeastern agrarian social and economic structures, defined by market dependence and the spread of 
wage labor relations and a shift away from subsistence farming, was accelerating in the 1790s. For 
overviews of the transition debates, see Allan Kulikoff, “The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 120-144; Christopher Clark, “Rural 
American and the Transition to Capitalism,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 16 No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 
223-236; Charles Post, The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development, and 
Political Conflict, 1620-1877 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), esp. pp. 155-194; Naomi Lamoureux, 
“Rethinking the Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast,” Journal of American History, 
Vol. 90 No. 2 (September 2003), pp. 437-461, argues that fundamental differences in the economic 
worldview and interests of farmers, merchants, and manufacturers were overdrawn by “moral-economy” 
historians like James Henretta, who argued that northeastern farm families successfully resisted market 
dependence well into the nineteenth century. Clark’s 1991 book, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western 
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As subsistence farming transitioned into family agricultural economies partially dependent on 
waged work, and as household manufacturing slowly shifted towards proto-industrial production, 
the abolition of chattel slavery was both a cause and a consequence of the ongoing northeastern 
capitalist transformation. After the Revolution, the northeastern regional economies, freed from 
British imperial policy that retarded American manufacturing, underwent a transformation rooted 
in agricultural improvement and the expansion of consumption markets, with depth and intensity 
lacking in the Upper and Lower South.3 While men and women of all ranks in the Northeast did 
not always verbalize the relationship between slavery abolition and capitalist development, the 
two processes operated in a dialectic. As the northeastern regional economies increasingly 
                                                           
Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) attempted to split the difference, arguing 
that free household farmers produced for markets when advantageous, but preferred to remain 
independent of external markets. Allan Kulikoff, From British Peasants to Colonial Farmers (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), Ch. 5, argues that by the late 18th century the agrarian 
economies of the Northeast were “composite,” a mixture of subsistence and market dependence, but 
rapidly accelerating towards commercial production, a view I endorse. More recent scholarship has 
called into question whether a search for the origins of the northern capitalist transformation, or even 
whether an accepted definition of “capitalism,” are strictly necessary. For an overview of these positions, 
see Seth Rockman, “What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic, 
Vol. 34 No. 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 439-466. The most recent work on Early American economic development 
tends to focus on finance, international trade, and the formal and informal economies of domestic 
commodity distribution and consumption. See the essays collected in Brian P. Luskey and Wendy A. 
Woloson, Capitalism By Gaslight: Illuminating the Economy of Nineteenth-Century America (Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2015). Ellen Hartigan-O’Connor, “Gender’s Value to the History of 
Capitalism,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 36 No. 4 (Winter 2016), pp. 613-635, is a recent essay that 
situates women at the center of Early American production and consumption economies, particularly in 
Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.  
3 This definition of capitalist transformation, which locates its origins in the transformation of agricultural 
economies in the countryside, draws inspiration from the work of Robert Brenner and Jan de Vries, who 
explore the capitalist transformations of England and Northern Europe in the Early Modern period. See 
Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,” Past & Present, 
Vol. 70 (February 1976), pp. 30-74; Brenner, “The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,” Past & Present, 
Vol. 97 (November 1982), pp. 16-113. For a collection of Brenner’s essays on this subject and critiques of 
the “Brenner Thesis,” see The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
Industrial Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Brenner’s essays were an extension of 
an earlier debate prompted by Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London: G. 
Routledge, 1947). Jan de Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 
1650 to the Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). This work’s emphasis on household 




oriented towards more sophisticated methods of domestic production, state abolition of chattel 
slavery contributed to the spread of capitalist labor relations, which encouraged the further 
development of free household economic units with members that worked for wages outside the 
home. 
The fruits of northeastern state abolition ripened unevenly and always encountered 
resistance from southern slaveholding politicians and their political allies, a wealthy sector of 
urban mercantile interests. The causes and consequences of northeastern state abolition, and the 
shift in political economy it wrought, were apparent several ways. First, as we have seen, state 
abolition led to the rapid emergence of organized antislavery in the 1780s and early 1790s. 
Local, state, and eventually national societies in the mid-Atlantic and New England agitated to 
uphold state slavery abolition, and also devoted significant time and resources to petitioning the 
Confederation and Federal Congresses to circumscribe the slave trades at the local, state, and 
national levels, though political opposition from slaveholders and their allies and the limitations 
of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution often thwarted their efforts. The fruits of 
northeastern state abolition were also evident in the proliferation of a culture of improvement in 
agriculture and manufacturing across the Northeast. Improvement enthusiasts with antislavery 
sentiments of varying intensity, from outright abolitionists like Moses Brown to the more 
circumspect antislavery beliefs of Tench Coxe and Alexander Hamilton, to name but a few, 
developed visions of economic development premised on the absence of chattel slavery. The 
types of agricultural improvements they promoted, their motivations in promoting domestic 
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manufacturing, and the political and economic structures they envisioned would abet their goals 




The 1780s were depression years for the new nation. After war with Britain ended in 
winter 1781, the American regional economies suffered from the collapse of the export trades to 
the Americas and Europe. Before independence, British imperial policy discouraged North 
American industrial-scale manufacturing of dozens of goods, and in the 1780s most Americans 
lived in small towns or the countryside and still produced many of their own articles of 
consumption, or purchased them in local markets. In large towns and cities, foreign textiles and 
manufactures were more common, and by the mid-1780s urban northeastern markets flooded 
with cheap imported goods offered to enterprising merchants by British and European firms 
eager to regain access to American consumers. Fearful that political independence from Britain 
would result in economic dependence, some influential Americans began to promote the 
production and consumption of household and proto-industrial domestic manufactures. 
Promotion of northeastern domestic manufacturing was inspired by very real concerns that cheap 
                                                           
4 David Brion Davis has described the worldview of capitalist entrepreneurs with antislavery convictions 
in paradoxical terms. Focusing most intently on Quaker antislavery capitalists, Davis argues that disdain 
for chattel slavery on moral and economic grounds was leavened by deep concerns to discipline and 
control labor. Quaker manufacturing capitalists in the late 18th century also felt no compunction against—
and indeed celebrated—child labor in their establishments. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution, esp. pp. 250-254. The central point for this discussion is not to deny that antislavery capitalists 
were driven by profit motives, nor is it to argue that capitalist labor regimes presented unqualified 
positive benefits for laborers. Rather, it is to argue that antislavery capitalists disdained the utter control 
that slaveholders legally exercised over the lives and bodies of the enslaved, and believed slavery an 
immoral and wasteful economic system.  
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foreign manufactures, and the wealthy merchants that profited from them, would push the United 
States into a pseudo-colonial economic position. Thus New Jersey Gov. William Livingston 
wondered “by what strange fatality… has our homespun gone out of fashion... why is this 
practice so generally discontinued at present? Must we necessarily determine upon a domestic, 
because we have acquired a political revolution?”5 Livingston’s concern was that cheap foreign 
manufactures undermined American economic independence and prevented domestic 
manufacturing development. Livingston and other northeastern leaders like Tench Coxe believed 
that to achieve a balance between free household agriculture and domestic manufacturing and 
consumption was to secure national, or at least northeastern regional prosperity.   
On August 9, 1787, as the Constitutional Convention prepared to conclude its 
deliberations, Tench Coxe presented a speech to the Pennsylvania Society for the 
Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts. The Pennsylvania Society, which 
anticipated the formation of the better-known Society for the Encouragement of Useful 
Manufactures in 1791, pledged to further American economic independence by replacing 
foreign-made goods with domestic manufactures.6 A former merchant, land speculator, and 
                                                           
5 “Homespun,” American Museum, X: p. 17. Quoted in Rolla Milton Tryon, Household Manufactures in the 
United States, 1640-1860 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966 [1917]), pp. 128-129. That the 1780s was a 
period of economic depression is now widely accepted among economic historians. Peter H. Lindert and 
Jeffrey G. Williamson, Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality Since 1700 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016), Ch. 4, presents persuasive quantitative evidence that the Revolution led to sharp 
declines in American incomes, and that the Upper and Lower South suffered the largest declines.  
6 The Plan of the Pennsylvania Society For the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts 
(Philadelphia: Aitken & Son, 1787). Coxe wrote the plan, and he was responsible for much of the 
organizational impetus behind the Society’s founding. The most thorough biography of Coxe is Jacob E. 
Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978). On the 
foundation of the Pennsylvania Society, see Ibid., p. 102. Martin Öhman, “Perfecting Independence: 
Tench Coxe and the Political Economy of Western Development,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 31 No. 
3 (Fall 2011), pp. 397-433, emphasizes Coxe’s optimistic visions of economic development in the trans-
Mississippi west. Öhman explores the often uneasy balance between Coxe’s promotion of proto-
industrial development and the interests of southern planters in the Republican coalition after 1800, to 
whom Coxe swore allegiance after supporting Hamiltonian Federalism through 1795.   
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developing theorist of early republican political economy, Coxe used the society’s invitation to 
describe how private and public support for manufacturing would solidify the young nation’s 
economic independence. He gestured to the United States’ overwhelming bounty of natural 
resources—as well as the overwhelmingly agricultural orientation of the American regional 
economies—to drum up enthusiasm for manufacturing initiatives. He reminded his audience that 
in their previous condition as British colonies, imperial policy prevented manufacturing 
development. Having secured independence, the nation’s future economic prosperity was best 
assured by promoting manufacturing, and he was careful to note that “in taking measures to 
promote the object” of domestic manufactures, “nothing should be attempted, which may injure 
our agricultural interests, they being undoubtedly the most important.”  
Rather than posing a fundamental conflict between manufacturing and agriculture, Coxe 
developed a vision of national and regional economic development in which the manufacturing 
and agriculture sectors mutually reinforced each other, while commerce played a secondary role 
as a supplier of goods that could not be made using North American resources. “We may venture 
to assert,” Coxe announced to fellow members of the Pennsylvania Society, “that more profit to 
the individual and riches to the nation will be derived from some manufactures, which promote 
agriculture, than from any species of cultivation whatever.”7 Coxe saw the development of 
                                                           
7 Tench Coxe, An Address to An Assembly of the Friends of American Manufacturers (Philadelphia: Aitken & 
Son, 1787), p. 7. Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp. 189-195. For a recent overview of early American manufacturing 
promotion, in particular the ideological justifications that men like Coxe offered in its support, see 
Lawrence Peskin, Manufacturing Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). David R. Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, 1790-1860 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Peskin explores the intellectual history of 
manufacturing promotion, and describes this worldview as “neomercantilist,” while Meyer adopts a 
“materialist” view that describes domestic manufacturing as an outgrowth of agricultural improvement. 
Jonathan Prude, “Capitalism, Industrialization, and the Factory in Post-revolutionary America,” in Paul 
A. Gilje, ed., Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison: Madison House, 
1997), pp. 81-100 emphasizes the diversity of production facilities in the Early Republic, in addition to 
proto-industrial undertakings.  
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American manufacturing capability as a boon to agriculture, not an attack on its primacy. But 
even as Coxe viewed agriculture as indispensable to economic growth, he did not view 
necessarily chattel slaves as the nation’s primary agricultural labor force.  
 Coxe articulated his faith in the promise of manufacturing as an engine of economic 
growth by countering objections to government support for the useful arts that emphasized 
factory work regimes’ supposed ill effects for workers. While some feared that the unhealthful 
work conditions in British textile mills could not be avoided, Coxe argued that was not 
necessarily true. Advances in spinning and carding technology by the 1780s changed the 
conditions of work for many British textile employees, as these “formerly manual and sedentary 
operations” completed in the home increasingly shifted to factory sites with quickened paces of 
work. Proto-industrial manufacturing work regimes, however, were not inherently negative for 
Coxe. To begin with, textiles were not the only branch of manufacturing that he and 
northeasterners wanted to develop, and agricultural labor included plenty of dangerous tasks. For 
Coxe, moreover, the harsh working conditions in British textile mills were not inherent to cloth-
making, nor more harmful than other occupations. He pointed out that draining and clearing 
swamps and marshes, tasks associated with slave labor from the Chesapeake southward, were 
“even more fatal” than working conditions in textile mills.8  
Coxe’s expansive vision of the promise of American manufacturing of all varieties, from 
textiles to potash to beer and liquor to furniture and agricultural implements, rested on the idea 
that manufacturing employment was an effective way to attack poverty and idleness. Whereas 
opponents argued that the factory unnecessarily drew agricultural laborers away from the farm 
                                                           
8 Coxe, An Address, p. 12. 
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and closer to the temptations of vice in more densely settled regions, Coxe believed “the 
employment of our poor in manufactures, who cannot find other honest means of subsistence” 
vital to the national interest.9 Manufacturing could be used inculcate the precepts of 
republicanism in workers, and result in the “POLITICAL SALVATION” of the United States, 
because promoting domestic production lessened American dependence on imported 
manufactures. Coxe’s vision of an American economy based on the twin pillars of agriculture 
and manufacturing had distinctly antislavery overtones. 
 For while Coxe viewed economic diversification and integration as harmonious and 
desirable, during the Early Republic he did not envision the institution of slavery as essential to 
American economic development. The labor requirements of Coxe’s vision of domestic 
manufacturing development prioritized free, unbound laborers and not chattel slavery, because 
the latter stifled laborers’ motivation, presented obstacles to technological advancement, and 
suppressed domestic consumption markets. Throughout much of his life and career, Coxe found 
himself at odds with the economic prerogatives of southern planters and their allies in the 
northeastern merchant class, both of whom consistently opposed government aid to domestic 
manufacturing and favored low tariffs to ensure access to cheap foreign manufactures.10 Slave 
labor, in short, was not fundamental to the policy proposals of economic nationalists like Coxe 
and Alexander Hamilton, his superior in the Treasury Department, in the 1780s and 1790s.11 
                                                           
9 Coxe, An Address, p. 23.  
10 Coxe, An Address, p. 30.  
11 At most it can be said that Coxe tolerated slavery because it was so deeply entrenched from the 
Chesapeake southward, and because he viewed cotton as an important American staple crop which could 
be profitably produced by enslaved laborers. It should be noted, however, that he did not assume that 
cotton must be grown by slaves, and there is no direct support for chattel slavery in his published 
writings. From 1787 until 1789, he served as secretary of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. Coxe’s most 
recent and thorough biographer concludes that he, “more than any other individual deserved credit for 
the accomplishments of the group” in those years. On the other hand, Coxe was forced on a few occasions 
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Slaveholding politicians from the Lower South were quite aware of the divergent regional 
political economies in the Early Republic, not least because of the processes of northeastern state 
abolition that began during the Revolution. Delivering the opening speech to the South Carolina 
state ratification convention at Charleston in summer 1788, Charles Pinckney these openly 
discussed these differences. Pinckney, who spearheaded the inclusion of the fugitive slave clause 
at the Constitutional Convention, favored ratification. He argued that “the first knowledge 
necessary for us to acquire, was a knowledge of the people for whom this system [the 
Constitution] was to be formed: For unless we were acquainted with their situation, their habits, 
opinions, and resources, it would be impossible to form a government upon adequate or 
practicable principles.” Pinckney proceeded to lay out the differences between the Lower South 
and the Northeast, to acquaint colleagues’ ignorant of their social and economic conditions. He 
flatly denied that social distinctions in Europe existed under the republican system laid out in the 
Constitution, but that wealth constituted the only significant possible social distinction in the 
United States. Paradoxically, Pinckney then launched into a harangue against primogeniture, 
                                                           
to comply with legal property rights in slaves owned by business associates. On one occasion, in 1779, 
Coxe acted as the intermediary for the sale of slaves to close associate William Hemsley of Maryland. 
Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp. 92-94. Coxe was publicly attacked because of a 1787 episode in which his soon-to-
be-shuttered mercantile firm, Coxe & Frazier, allegedly received the proceeds from the sale of two 
women slaves owned by a Jamaican planter, to satisfy a £90 debt. As late as 1799 Coxe publicly 
maintained that, “I had neither contributed, in the smallest degree, to make the women slaves, nor to 
keep them in slavery, that I had neither bought them nor in any way owned them…” Coxe, “To the 
Citizens of the United States,” Philadelphia Aurora, 21 May 1799. Coxe was a magnet for political and 
financial controversy throughout his public and private careers, and was often accused of economic and 
political unscrupulousness. He infamously accompanied the British army’s occupation of Philadelphia in 
1778, and two decades later switched his political allegiance from the Federalists to Democratic-




lambasting the system of property inheritance as “a practice no wise state will ever encouraged 
or tolerate.”12 
 At this point, Pinckney isolated the key socioeconomic differences between the Lower 
South and Northeast. In the latter, he pointed out, primogeniture had long been abolished. What 
separated the region was more egalitarian patterns of property ownership. “In the Eastern and 
Northern states,” Pinckney understood, “the landed property is nearly equally divided. Very few 
of them have large bodies, and there are few of them that have not small tracts…” Thus 
subsistence farming, “handicrafts,” and commerce, in that order, dominated the northeastern 
regional economies. Egalitarian property ownership patterns suppressed wealth inequality in the 
Northeast, which was not the case in the Lower South, where large slaveholders dominated the 
regional economy and political life. The mass of ordinary northeasterners were modest in their 
appearances and consumption habits, and even among the largest landowners, “it may be truly 
said there are few of them that are rich, or few of them very poor; nor while the states are 
capable of supporting more inhabitants than they contain at present…” Pinckney devoted the rest 
of his speech to a comparative analysis of the various state governments, noting similarities and 
differences between their respective legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The 
fundamental point he made to his primarily slaveholding colleagues was clear: the northeastern 
regional economies were very differently than their own, which the rapid state-level demise of 
slavery only accentuated.13  
 
                                                           
12 “Hon. Mr. C. Pinckney’s speech, delivered upon opening the discussion of the federal constitution in 
the convention,” Charleston City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 14 May 1788.  





Pinckney’s observations about the stark differences between the Lower South and 
Greater Northeastern regional economies only partially applied to the Upper South.  As in the 
Lower South, in Virginia and Maryland large slaveholders dominated politics and society. Yet 
Thomas Jefferson promoted patterns of American economic development predicated on free 
household (yeoman) agriculture, the antithesis of massive landholdings common among 
slaveholders in the Upper and Lower South. To this end, Jefferson successfully fought to abolish 
entail and primogeniture in Virginia in the 1780s, and over the course of the 1790s his and other 
Republicans’ initial hostility to proto-industrial manufacturing steadily waned.14 While historians 
have discarded the notion that slavery was in decline in the Revolutionary Era, in the longest-
settled regions of the Virginia tidewater and Maryland the deleterious effects of tobacco 
monoculture led leaders like Jefferson to seek new ways of promoting economic development 
closer in design to northeastern emphases on domestic manufacturing and agricultural 
improvement. Yet the failure of gradual abolition in Chesapeake, in addition to the end of short-
lived liberalized manumission policies by the late 1790s, provided clear points of contrast with 
the Northeast. Slaveholders still retained significant power to shape the political economy of the 
                                                           
14 See, for example, Jefferson’s 1792 plan in which he proposed government support and private 
subscriptions to fund “labour-saving” machinery and production facilities for textiles, iron products, in 
addition to other manufacturing pursuits like glass making and tanning. “A Plan for a Manufacturing 
establishment in the U.S.,” Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Online: 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib006737. See also Lawrence Peskin, “How the Republicans Learned 
to Love Manufacturing: The First Parties and the ‘New Economy,’” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22 
No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 235-262. On Jeffersonian political economy in general, see Drew R. McCoy, The 




Upper South, and in this sense the Upper South was far more similar to the Lower South than the 
Northeast.  
Charles Pinckney’s observations to the South Carolina ratification convention were soon 
confirmed at the First Congress in New York in spring 1789, when economic policy debates 
dominated much of the proceedings.15 The federal government’s new authority to regulate 
external and interstate commerce, coupled with a desperate need for revenues, led to stringent 
debates over import duties as well as the propriety of government support for promoting 
domestic manufacturing. The battle lines emerged early in the proceedings. As Congress 
undertook the arduous task of debating import duties on a multitude of goods and commodities, 
economic divisions between the Upper and Lower South and the northeastern states became 
clear. Pennsylvania Federalist Thomas Fitzsimons argued that “some states were, from local 
circumstances, better situated to carry on manufacture than others…” Pennsylvania, of course, 
was one center of pro-manufacturing rhetoric, and Fitzsimons himself was also a founding 
director of the Bank of North America, a precursor to the Bank of the United States. To counter 
slaveholders’ concerns that high import duties would fall unfairly on the southern states, 
Fitzsimons further argued that “for his part, he could never conceive that the consumption of 
[imported goods] by the negroes of South Carolina would contribute to the revenue as much as 
that of the white inhabitants of the Eastern States.”16 Fitzsimons restated a point that northeastern 
abolitionists made repeatedly since the 1760s, that the abolition of chattel slavery and the 
restoration of self-dominion to the enslaved would spur the further development of domestic 
consumption, and in tandem domestic manufacturing pursuits. 
                                                           
15 The longest continuous string of debates on economic policy occurred in April and May 1789. Annals of 
Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., pp. 123-232. 
16 Annals of Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., pp. 148-149.  
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Southern slaveholding congressmen consistently complained that federal promotion for 
domestic manufacturing would unfairly benefit the northeastern states, where the “local 
circumstances” Thomas Fitzsimons referred to meant the ongoing processes of state-level 
slavery abolition. Southern politicians sought to make common cause with sectors of the 
northeastern merchant classes whose businesses depended on access to low-duty manufactured 
goods, just as slaveholders depended on access to foreign goods they could not (or would not) 
make on their plantations. Thus in the debates over duties on imported nails, Virginia 
Representative Theodorick Bland wailed that prohibitive duties on foreign nails were “an 
unequal tax, burdening the Southern States, but not felt by the Northern, who made only enough 
for their own consumption.” In reply, Massachusetts’ Fisher Ames argued that small New 
England manufacturers “take the iron rod of the merchant, and return him nails; in consequence 
of this easy mode of barter, the manufacture is prodigiously great.” Ames believed nail 
production on this basis could take root in other states, much as it had in New England and New 
York and Pennsylvania. Echoing abolitionists’ criticisms of the political economy of American 
slavery as wasteful, however, Ames slyly noted that nail production was best suited where “the 
business can be prosecuted in a similar manner in every State exerting equal industry” to 
Massachusetts artisans.17  
The debates pivoted on complex negotiations about the merits of imposing duties on a 
vast array of goods, and the ways in which such duties favored northeastern, southern, and 
western constituencies. Despite their complexity, however, they fundamentally pitted slave-
owning versus non-slaveholding interests. That made sense, given the divergent regional 
developmental trajectories clearly evident in 1789. When southern congressmen attempted to 
                                                           
17 Annals of Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., pp. 156-157.  
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make common cause with northerners, it was typically in appeals to northeastern merchants. 
Thus Virginia’s Theodorick Bland argued that “the interest of the landholder is undoubtedly 
blended with the commercial interest; if the latter receive an injury, the former will have to 
sustain a portion of it.”18 New York’s John Lawrence needled southern slaveholders because 
“gentlemen from the Southern States mentioned… that the planters had begun to turn their 
attention to other productions than those they were accustomed to… [cultivate]…” Lawrence 
knew that southern planters had no wish to re-orient their production processes to promote 
domestic manufacturing for external markets. Even if planters could afford to do so—and most 
could not, as they held little liquid wealth—chattel slavery, the subjugation of the labor force to 
the status of property, was too ingrained in their culture. And besides, slaveholding politicians 
had little incentive to change, because they benefitted most from the extreme inequalities of 
southern slave economies.  
The plantation economies of the Upper and Lower South were profitable for some, but 
left slaveholders unable to quickly shift labor and production patterns in favor of manufacturing 
for domestic markets, even as plantations were self-sufficient operations. These and many other 
examples suggest the outlines of fundamental economic conflict between the South and 
Northeast. The debates resolved with the July 1789 passage of the Tariff Act, which created the 
first schedule of national tariffs in the young nation’s history. The tariffs varied, and while some 
were clearly designed to promote specific domestic manufactures, in general the schedule 
provided for five percent ad valorem duties on foreign goods. Not satisfied, northeastern 
                                                           
18 Annals of Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., p. 175.  
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manufacturing promoters pressed forward with plans to use government authority to promote 
domestic production.  
Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures” was hailed by contemporaries, and 
since recognized by historians, as the most complete statement of American manufacturing 
capability in the Early Republic.19 Tench Coxe’s research on Greater Northeastern 
manufacturing enterprises formed the basis of the report’s information, supplemented by the 
Treasury Secretary’s queries to manufacturers, manufacturing promoters, and civil authorities 
across the nation.20 In the report, Hamilton bluntly argued that the nation’s economic future lay 
in manufacturing, particularly in the Northeast. Hamilton and Coxe viewed federal and state 
government support for domestic manufacturing as a means of “enlarging the sphere of our 
domestic commerce” and “increasing [the] surplus of our Agricultural produce.”21 The report’s 
recommendations matched the vision of American manufacturing prowess that Coxe had 
promoted for several years by the time the report was submitted to Congress in December 1791. 
Coxe previously wrote that government failure to promote domestic manufactures, opposition to 
which was concentrated among slaveholding interests, “would have been highly criminal.”22 The 
most well-known result of the report’s recommendations was a public-private venture, the 
Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures (SEUM), founded to promote proto-industrial 
production at the Passaic River Valley in New Jersey. Although the society’s efforts failed, 
                                                           
19 There has been some debate among historians about the extent to which Hamilton stressed domestic 
manufactures versus international commerce, especially with Great Britain, the world’s leading 
manufacturer in the late 18th century. William Appleman Williams, for example, contended that Hamilton 
retained mercantilist views as Secretary of the Treasury. As a starting point, see Williams, “The Age of 
Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 1763-1828,” William & Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 15 No. 4 (October 1958), pp. 419-438. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that 
Coxe was deeply invested in promoting domestic manufacturing.  
20 Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp. 189-200; Peskin, Manufacturing Revolution, pp. 139-162.  
21 “Report on Manufactures,” American State Papers, Finance: I, p. 128.  
22 Coxe, A View of the United States of America, p. 98.  
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particularly because of the spectacular bankruptcy of New York financier and SEUM director 
William Duer, its vision fit neatly into a northeastern commitment to encouraging domestic 
manufacturing. It was not a coincidence that manufacturing promoters in the first years of the 
Early Republic operated in political and economic spaces simultaneous to abolitionists’ 





The northeastern agricultural economies transformed in the Early Republic, supporting 
the emergence of proto-industrial capitalism. A culture of improvement that inspired capitalist 
abolitionists like Moses Brown to invest in modern production techniques and promote the 
abolition of chattel slavery, found a parallel in northeastern agricultural societies that encouraged 
agricultural innovation. In and around northeastern towns and urban clusters, free household 
farms responded to opportunities to supply growing domestic consumption markets by investing 
capital in dairy sheds and developing truck farming in fresh vegetables and other perishable 
produce. Just as importantly free household producers also consumed in greater volume, creating 
thick webs of production and consumption patterns that generated regional economic growth. In 
the 1790s, the northeastern countryside experienced a pattern of development that expanded in 
ring-like fashion from large towns and cities outward. As the population of towns and cities 
expanded, so did related agricultural activities to supply their needs. In addition to dairy and 
vegetable truck farming, free-household agriculturalists farther outside urban areas supplied 
245 
 
grains that fed urban wage workers, and forest products that fueled the construction of housing, 
manufacturing establishments, and shipbuilding.23 But agricultural investment on the scale of 
constructing modern dairy sheds and transportation infrastructure, depended on the ability of 
family farm proprietors to develop capital reserves available to invest in such improvements, and 
agricultural improvement societies made the ability of free households to produce more 
efficiently and profitably their priority. 
Like manufacturing societies, northeastern agricultural societies offered cash bounties to 
farmers that successfully developed methods to make farming more efficient. In 1788, the 
members of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture offered premiums for a wide 
array of queries designed to promote agricultural innovation and efficiency. The most 
perspicacious rewarded farmers for “the best experiment made of a course of crops, either large 
or small, agreeable to the principles of the English mode of farming,” by which they meant the 
use of molded plows and clover in crop rotations. Others bounties included improvements in 
cattle folding, methods to prevent frost from ruining wheat fields, methods to prevent insect 
                                                           
23 Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, esp. Ch.2-3. Meyer adopts the model of urban-
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spoilage, for the discovery of new kinds of vegetable matter for cows to produce more and purer 
milk. Another premium, “for the best method of recovering worn-out fields to a more hearty 
state, within the power of common farmers, without dear or far-fetched manures; but, by 
judicious culture, and the application of materials common to the generality of farmers,” 
encapsulated the society’s larger goal, to promote improvements that would directly benefit free 
household farming families with small landholdings and limited financial resources.24 
The following year, Philadelphia physician Enoch Edwards addressed the Philadelphia 
Society, enumerating several reasons why northeastern regional economic development 
depended on agricultural and domestic manufacturing societies. At a time of precipitous trade 
decline and devastated national finances, the aims of agricultural and manufacturing societies 
heralded a secure, diversified national economy. Edwards declared that relying on imported 
manufactured goods was bad policy because of the “distressing and visible truth that most 
foreign articles rise in their prices, while all the productions of our farms bring less at market 
than formerly…” Edwards repeatedly referred to a “spirit of activity and vigor” that the 
Philadelphia society sought to repicate in Pennsylvania. The promotion and dissemination of 
information concerning agricultural improvements would touch all areas of economic activity, 
leading to the advancement of communication networks, generating increased standards of living 
in the countryside, towns, and cities. “By this association” proclaimed Edwards, “we shall not 
only possess the combined knowledge of, but have the advantage of owning a property, as it 
were, in the practice and superior skill of every individual, whereby the habits of activity, 
                                                           
24 Laws of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture… with Premiums Proposed, February 5, 1788, to 
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industry, oeconomy and public spirit, would be generally inculcated and greatly promoted.” 
Promoting agricultural improvements, “useful manufactures,” and therefore “industry and 
frugality,” Edwards argued, would lead to the tighter integration of the rural, town-based, and 
urban economies.25 “Such is the ardour of improvement at Philadelphia,” wrote another 
commentator, “that the city and whole province are now diligently employed in stretching roads 
through the country… [and] a spirit of agriculture seems to be disseminated through all the 
states.” Soon “manufactures for internal consumption” would spread across the northeast.26 
These visions of collective economic improvement had no real counterpart in the Lower South, 
though prominent Upper South statesmen like Thomas Jefferson hoped, vainly as it turned out, to 
reorient their regional economy similarly, around manufacturing and agricultural improvements 
for consumption in domestic markets.   
In Massachusetts, prominent men formed the Massachusetts Society for Promoting 
Agriculture (MSPA) with similar aims. The MSPA solicited new information on farming 
techniques and crop management to make the famously-stony soil of the Bay State more 
productive. Founded in 1792 with Revolutionary ringleader Samuel Adams serving as an 
organizing force, like other agricultural societies it organized contests to promote innovations 
that could be replicated by free household farms, to spur agricultural productivity. At the Board 
of Trustee’s first meeting of the society’s Board of Trustees, it defined the society’s role as a 
clearinghouse for information collected from similar societies across the New England and the 
mid-Atlantic. “There is no country in the world in which there is a greater field for 
improvement,” the trustees suggestively stated, “than America, and Massachusetts and several 
                                                           
25 “An Address (Read the second of February, 1789), to the Philadelphia County Society & c.,” 
Pennsylvania Mercury, 26 March 1789.  
26 Federal Gazette (Philadelphia), 8 December 1788.  
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other States in the Union have adopted similar sentiments respecting their great object” of 
agricultural innovation.27 
Like their brethren in other northeastern agricultural societies, the MSPA developed 
contests and bounty programs to develop new methods for making free household farms more 
productive. One of the society’s first actions was to designate a committee of members hailing 
from across the state to disseminate information from their local communities about ongoing 
agricultural improvement projects. MSPA leaders believed this was the society’s most important 
function. “It is generally to be desired,” the board declared, “that the Community at Large, and 
especially the Members of the Society would engage in Earnest in this Business; would aid its 
friends, and make communications of any discoveries they may deem usefull with Freedom…” 
To this end, MSPA members solicited information widely throughout the Bay State, in order to 
keep abreast of the activities of improvement enthusiasts in neighboring states. Thus, member 
Cotton Tufts shared a letter from one Justin Ely, resident of West Springfield, who had recently 
experimented with “the method of raising Hemp, as practiced by many farmers in the State of 
New York.” 28  
In the MSPA’s early years, its Board of Trustees built a fund to promote agricultural 
innovations of all varieties through personal subscriptions. In November 1792 the Board raised 
significant funds in a variety of legal tender. Board President Thomas Russell contributed “three 
hundred pounds in four percent stock of the United States,” while Christopher Gore donated 
“two Shares in the Bank of the United States, the dividends therein to be appropriated” as a 
reward for agricultural innovations selected in consultation with Gore. James Bowdoin made the 
                                                           
27 Massachusetts Society for Promoting Agriculture (MSPA) Board of Trustees, 3 August 1792, MSPA 
Records, Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS), Box 33, Folder 1, Vol. 1..  
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single largest donation, contributing “four hundred pounds for five years at six percent.” Others 
contributed smaller gifts of fifty and twenty-five dollars, while Jeremiah Allen, Esq. supported 
agricultural innovation with a ten dollar gift.29 The society dedicated a small portion of these 
funds to creating a society seal, necessary after the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the 
MSPA in autumn 1792. The Board of Trustees voted that the seal’s imagery should include a 
plough connected by chain to a pair of oxen, in addition to “a stone wall and a quick fence with a 
gate- the field beyond the fence with sheep and cattle,” while a contended head of a free family 
steered a plough in the foreground. The MSPA’s motto encapsulated the culture of improvement 
created by northeastern societies, declaring agriculture the “Source of Wealth.”30 
In a circular letter created by the MSPA in 1793, with information intended to be 
distributed by local ministers, the society described its aims for sharing information on farm 
improvements within the means of middling free household farms. “In a country, where 
Agriculture is the pursuit of the largest proportion of its inhabitants, every species of information 
that tends to its improvement, is of serious importance,” the letter began, and he society served 
as a conduit for information on farming techniques and experiments. The members believed the 
“success of its exertions will depend as much on the free communications of friends, as on the 
labors of those who are induced to make experiments, by the premiums offered.” The society 
aimed to cultivate a “spirit of improvement” that would encompass farmers across the state and 
beyond. To that end, they asked local ministers to preach a message of improvement and to 
encourage the “practical farmer” to relay the results of their practical experiments to the society. 
A pamphlet distributed with the circular contained “extracts from foreign publications, 
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particularly respecting Butter and Cheese,” foodstuffs made for millennia and in northeastern 
family economies the responsibility of women and children. This suggests the antislavery 
remises of the moral and political economy of northeastern agricultural societies like the MSPA. 
Had the society been interested in perpetuating chattel slavery, or had the northeastern regional 
production economies and consumption markets demanded it, members might have sought to 
publicize innovations for clearing and planting cotton fields or methods for tending tobacco. The 
society rather wanted to “promote the happiness of mankind in this world, as well as in the 
next.”31  
The New York Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Arts, and Manufactures also 
organized elaborate contests to promote agricultural improvement. In a letter to members and 
“supporters of rural economy,” the society proclaimed their “intention, is, to supply the wants 
and to relieve the necessities of mankind, and thereby render human life more comfortable,” in 
order to “to multiply the productions of the land, to shorten or facilitate the toils of the labourer, 
and to excite a spirit of honest industry, whereby riches may become more abundant.”32 To 
further those ends, it offered premiums organized around a series of eleven queries each 
composed of multiple questions. A query on manure, for example, goaded experimental 
agriculturalists to develop methods of producing manure from vegetable matter and minerals. 
Other queries included more efficient ways of raising stock animals to make them more 
productive, methods of improving fruit and forest trees, and experimenting with the viability of 
different grains in New England and mid-Atlantic climates. The eleventh and final query 
concerned manufactures, because promoters of manufacturing and agricultural improvements 
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viewed them as deeply intertwined. The New York society posed these questions with the 
capabilities of free household farmers and mechanics’ workshops in mind, asking participants to 
consider improved methods for making paper, steel, leather and hides, potash, oils from various 
seeds, and whether they knew of coal deposits. Only one question had an indirect connection to 
chattel slavery: “What can be done toward the manufacture of cotton,” the same question 
pondered by antislavery capitalists like Moses Brown.33 
In a January 1792 address to the New York society, Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill offered 
an explicitly antislavery argument reflecting the northeastern culture of improvement in domestic 
manufacturing and agriculture. Mitchill was a botanist and chemist, a member of the New-York 
Manumission Society, a sometime correspondent with Moses Brown concerning antislavery 
organization, and later congressman and strident opponent of slavery and the slave trade. In 
gratefully acknowledging the society’s invitation, Mitchill begged members to “bear with me 
then, while I express my meaning in my own way…” His “way” was a series of arguments that 
may be appropriately called antislavery capitalism, arguing that “by the wise policy of our 
Legislature, the shackles of feudal bondage have been knocked off, and our citizens, who feel 
nothing of vassalage or servitude, act with the spirit of Freemen.” Mitchill made this statement 
fully aware that only seven years prior, the New York Council of Revision had narrowly 
overturned a gradual abolition bill. The abolition of entail and primogeniture, however, was a 
crucial step towards loosening oppressive bonds, because they secured “the natural right of every 
man to a certain part of the earth’s surface…” Mitchill believed slavery abolition would come to 
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the Empire State soon, which would transform property ownership and spur agricultural 
experimentation and productivity, furthering local manufacturing.34 
Mitchill continued drawing a stark contrast between slave and free labor. Agricultural 
improvement, he noted, often required more labor than a family could supply, and the farmer had 
two options: “hired free-men and slaves.” Outside of the southern plantation zones, where slave 
labor was most efficiently deployed on massive landholdings to produce a limited number of 
commodity-export crops, “the labor of free-men is preferred as most consistent with good 
oeconomy: accordingly, in the northern States, slavery is entirely abolished.” He noted that in 
New York, a rise in private manumissions strongly suggested that in the near future chattel 
slavery would have no place in the state’s economic and social structures. Mitchill surveyed 
slaveholding acquaintances, and came away convinced that chattel slavery was only profitable 
for “men of considerable hereditary estates in land, or of a handsome capital acquired by 
marriage or bequest,” a small slice of the American population. “But I cannot name an instance,” 
he proclaimed, “of a man of small property, ever getting rich upon the profits of slave labor.” 
Slaveholding was a wasteful extravagance for northeastern free household farms, and “it is to a 
conviction of the impolicy of expensiveness” of slavery, Mitchill concluded, “rather than to any 
moral or religious considerations on the subject, that the decline of slavery is principally to be 
attributed.”35 Mitchill offered an explicitly antislavery understanding of northeastern capitalism, 
concluding his oration by discussing several agricultural activities which would encourage an 
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antislavery political economy, most importantly the manufacture of maple sugar as a 
replacement for imported West Indian sugar products.  
Extracting and refining maple sap into sugar was an initiative within the means of free 
household farms that had, by definition, local, national, and global antislavery justifications. In 
the late 1780s and 1790s, promoters of maple sugar manufacturing explained the project as a 
means of ending reliance on West Indian sugar cane products, a way to undermine the economic 
foundations of the Caribbean slave societies. Tench Coxe believed maple sugar production was 
an acknowledgment of “the great and increasing dislike to negro slavery, and to the African trade 
among the people” of Pennsylvania. Best produced in February and March, Coxe argued that it 
could develop into an important ancillary source, maple sugar manufacturing neatly fit into the 
seasonal production schedules of free household farms. Coxe believed maple sugar 
manufacturing would become an important source of income for free households, and by 1788 it 
was already “more generally known to the Pennsylvanians, that their brethren in the northern and 
eastern parts of the Union, had long made considerable quantities, with their family utensils, and 
without the expense of hiring assistance…”36  
Coxe’s plan for maple sugar manufacturing reveal a political economy of domestic 
production rooted in the free farming household as the primary unit of production. He calculated 
that the entire United States consumption of Caribbean sugar, from his well-informed estimation 
26,000,000 weight pounds per annum of imported brown and loaf sugar and molasses, could be 
replaced by the free household farm typical of the Northeast. Using math admittedly of the back-
of-the-envelope variety, Coxe determined that family farms with one hundred acres of “sugar 
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maple land, in a state of ordinary American improvement (that is, one third covered with 
judicious reserves of wood and timber, and two thirds cleared for the culture of grass and grain) 
can make one thousand pounds weight of sugar with only his necessary farming and kitchen 
utensils…” By Coxe’s calculations, this would only require the labor of a husband, wife, and one 
child ten years of age. Therefore 26,000 families of three could replace the entire United States 
importation of West Indian slave-grown sugar cane products.  “The operation,” Coxe argued, “in 
a family is as easy, as to make household soap or cheese, or to brew ale or beer, and… there is in 
this country much more than twice the above quantity of sugar maple lands, in situations not too 
southern.” With direct federal government intervention to impose prohibitive duties imported 
sugar cane products, the United States could become economically independent from West 
Indian slavery for its sugar consumption. Coxe’s calculations were optimistic at best, but his 
vision of the social relations of production typified northeastern antislavery capitalist instincts in 
the 1790s.37 
 Prominent Otsego County, New York proprietor William Cooper devoted significant 
time and resources to producing maple sugar on his massive landholdings. Cooper argued it 
would engender economic independence from the Caribbean, and promote the global antislavery 
cause. With the development of American-made maple sugar, the “importation of sugar from the 
West-India islands can be dispensed with,” Cooper wrote, and “if such advantages as I have 
pointed out will result from the manufactory advised, what may we not look forward to a time 
when the minds of men will become so liberal as to view liberty in its true light—when slavery 
shall be done away.”38 Quaker supporters of maple sugar production framed the substitution of 
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slave-made articles as “the best means of abolishing both the slavery of Africans, and the 
transportation of them to the West India islands.” Maple sugar promised to “become a valuable 
oeconomical manufacture” for free-household farm families in the rural northeast.39 In 1793, 
Cooper and several associates urged Philadelphia manufacturing promoters Coxe, Benjamin 
Rush, and Henry Drinker to promote maple sugar production in the Keystone State.40 Maple 
sugar production in the 1780s and 1790s never did supplant Caribbean sugar products in 
American kitchens and pantries, but in promoting its manufacture supporters appealed to a moral 
and political economy in which capitalist manufacturing pursuits could be harnessed to 
specifically antislavery ends, at a time when northeastern state abolition of slavery proceeded 
rapidly.41 
Northeastern promoters of agricultural innovation were not always stridently antislavery 
like Samuel L. Mitchill, or indirectly so like Tench Coxe, but on the whole they supported an 
equilibrium between agriculture and manufacturing initiatives like the production of maple 
sugar. They framed the questions they asked in terms of promoting the interests of free 
household farmers. The language they used to support agricultural improvement dovetailed with 
the visions of northeastern textile manufacturing proponents, who imagined production 
economies premised on the absence, not centrality, of chattel slavery. Slave labor in the Upper 
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and Lower South was closely identified, in both practice and rhetoric, primarily with menial 
agricultural labor in the Early Republic. Slaveholders and their political representatives knew 
that free household-based agricultural improvements and domestic manufacturing flourished best 
in conditions that suppressed chattel slavery, and extreme wealth inequality. The culture and 
spirit of improvement that permeated northeastern agriculture rested on the availability of human 
capital. Antislavery capitalists offered visions of economic development predicated on the free 
household model, where nuclear and extended family units operated as free agents in an 




While recent scholarship has grounded American manufacturing and later industrial 
capitalism in the cotton plantations and finance networks of southern chattel slavery, cotton was 
not the first fiber that fueled the growth of textile manufacturing in the United States. These were 
woolens and linens, both produced domestically in large quantities by free household units 
across the Northeast in the late eighteenth century. In and around Providence, Rhode Island, “in 
the Factories & private Families,” free household families and wage workers produced thirty 
thousand yards of woolen cloths in 1790.42 In nearby Hartford, Connecticut, though the recently 
capitalized Hartford Woolen Factory labored under “Embarrassments… from the scarcity of 
Wool, and the subsequent high price of that article,” the establishment produced 12,528 yards of 
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various woolen cloths between 1788 and 1790.43 Woolen factories like the Hartford 
establishment also suffered from merchant opposition and shortages of skilled workers, as did 
the firm Moses Brown capitalized in Providence in 1789, Brown and Almy. According to 
another Connecticut reporter, investors in new production facilities encountered obstacles from 
the “clashing Interests, or antient prejudices” of urban merchants, as well as “the scarcity of 
Materials and workmen.”44 The Hartford proprietors bluntly complained about the “Ignorance, 
the Knavery, or the fickleness of our workmen,” in addition to “the interested views and Jealousy 
of the British factors and agents in this Country.”45 Aspiring manufacturing capitalists faced 
opposition from merchants and slaveholders, and while cotton would become king in the South, 
in the Northeast woolens and linens wore the crown during the Early Republic.  
Strict focus on the significance of southern cotton to northeastern manufacturing obscures 
both the variety and social relations of production in the rural Northeast. Throughout the region, 
woolens and linens comprised a significant proportion of domestic textile production. At 
Farmington, Connecticut, small local establishments produced “checks, both Cotton & Linen, of 
Bedticks, and of Fustian and Jeenes,” while Hartford Woolen Factory operatives worked 20,000 
pounds of wool into various goods totaling 12,528 yards of finished cloths.46 In a survey of the 
American regional economies written in the late 1780s and early 1790s, Tench Coxe promoted 
mechanized textile manufacturing as a means of engendering economic harmony, pointing to 
cotton, flax, hemp, and wool as the most important raw materials. While cotton was increasingly 
the province of the southern planter, the introduction of flax, hemp, and wool mills was equally 
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if not more beneficial to the Northeast, because the raw materials could be grown and made into 
consumer goods by free household  farm families.47  
 Hartford, Connecticut observers saw these textile production dynamics clearly. In fall 
1791 Alexander King, a Yale College graduate, physician, and former Connecticut Assembly 
member, noted that in regards to cotton, “no great Quantities are manufactured in this place,” but 
that “about 20 Thousand Wt. of Flax is Annually manufactured in this Town which is Another 
important article Manufactures and is done like the Wool in the Domytic [sic] way.”48 William 
Williams of Lebanon, Connecticut reported to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton that 
“there are manufactures of Linnen [sic] Cloths carried on in very many Families in this Town & 
County, & large quantities are made, many private Looms for weaving in Families besides what 
is wove by those whose stated business it is…”49  
Writing in mid-1788, Coxe noted that textile manufactures “have increased exceedingly 
in a few years” in Pennsylvania, which he attributed to the expansion of family and household 
manufactures after the destruction of the American Revolution. He publicized water mills for 
flax, woolen, and cotton spinning that had begun to dot the Pennsylvania countryside, and goods 
produced in the Keystone state including “thread, cotton, worsted, and yarn hosiery… [and] flax, 
hemp, wool, wool and cotton cards.”50 Coxe went out of his way to attribute Pennsylvania’s 
emerging manufacturing base to state laws that encouraged European immigration to the best 
poor man’s country. “We lay no difficulty in the way of any person,” he wrote, “ who desires to 
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become a free and equal citizen” because “on the day of his landing, he may buy a farm, a house, 
or raw materials” to set their household on the path to independent production.51 Coxe 
undoubtedly downplayed the particular social and economic obstacles that freed Afro-
Pennsylvanians encountered vis-à-vis free European immigrants, but the substance of his 
comment correctly pinpointed the fundamental differences in the systems of production between 
the Upper and Lower South and the Northeast. 
Even as mechanized spinning began to emerge in the late 1780s and 1790s, both 
qualitative and quantitative evidence reveals that the vast majority of New England residents 
were clothed in woolen and linens made by their families or in their communities. Reporting to 
Alexander Hamilton, prominent Massachusetts merchant and politician Nathaniel Gorham noted 
that “the People in their own Families & for their own use manufacture double what they did 20 
years ago,” before the Revolution when British imperial policy suppressed American 
manufacturing. “It is now worth the observation of the curious traveler through N[ew] England,” 
Gorham continued, “to observe (more especially out of the great Roads) the cloathing of the 
Country Family & he will find common cloaths made almost wholly by themselves.”52 Across 
Connecticut, observers noted that farm families almost uniformly clothed themselves. “The 
manufactures of Wool are of various kinds of Cloth for Servants and the ordinary wear of the 
whole Class of our Farmers,” wrote manufacturer Peter Colt, farmers and mechanics “appear 
dressed on Sundays and holydays in the manufactures of their Wives and Daughters.”53  
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A correspondent from Danbury, Connecticut recorded that “the spirit of manufacturing 
has not much prevailed, except in the domestic way; that however in aggregate is very 
considerable, as their families are principally clothed in their own manufactures…”54 In the 
“Report on Manufactures,” Hamilton concluded that across the mid-Atlantic and New England 
states, “two-thirds, three-fourths, and even four-fifths, of all the clothing of the inhabitants, are 
made by themselves.”55 Considerable quantities of household-made linen and woolen textiles 
sold in regional markets across New England. In 1789, for example, British consul at 
Philadelphia Phineas Bond noted that roughly 40,000 yards of “coarse New England linen” sold 
in that city alone. In 1791, in Providence free household families wove 25, 262 yards of linen, 
5,858 of cotton, and 3,165 of woolen cloths, many using yarns produced in increasing volume at 
the mechanized spinning plant capitalized by Moses Brown, with the technical expertise of 
Englishman Samuel Slater, Brown and Almy.56 
The chorus of pro-manufacturing rhetoric and promotion of agricultural improvements in 
the mid-Atlantic and New England peaked in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Slaveholders and 
their political allies among wealthy northeastern merchants, who clamored for low tariffs and 
government support for foreign imports, consistently opposed federal and state support for 
domestic manufacturing. For northeastern supporters of manufacturing, the promise of a national 
government with authority to promote manufacturing pursuits after the constitutional settlement 
resulted in mixed blessings. A group of New York City manufacturers, for example, lamented 
Americans’ reliance on imported foreign goods, which they termed a “growing evil.” They asked 
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Congress to “extend a protecting hand to the interests of commerce and the arts,” and not 
continue to encourage foreign imports.57 In June 1789 petitioners from Boston urged Congress to 
address “the great decrease of American manufactures, and almost total stagnation of American 
ship-building.” The Boston petitioners made a crucial point that emphasized the American 
regional economic disparities. “Your petitioners need not inform Congress,” they wrote, “that, on 
the revival of our mechanical arts and manufactures depend the wealth and prosperity of the 
Northern States… unless these important branches are supported, we humbly conceive that our 
agriculture must greatly decline…”58 Throughout the 1790s, northeastern manufacturing 
promoters hoped in vain for direct national government support for domestic manufactures, but 
northeastern merchants and southern slaveholding interests notwithstanding, at the turn of the 
century the first slabs of a proto-industrial foundation in the Greater Northeast were in place.  
While craft production of woolens and linens for local markets was common across 
North America in the late colonial period, plans to develop machine-powered textile 
manufacturing enterprises did not meaningfully emerge until after the constitutional settlement. 
Through the 1780s, centuries old spinning and weaving technologies predominated in the mid-
Atlantic and New England, and household production for the immediate use of the family and 
sale in local markets dominated in the rural communities. In 1800, the vast majority of American 
farm families either produced their own textiles and other craft manufactures or purchased them 
from local producers.59 Household manufacturing was not limited to yarns and textiles, as 
women and children invested significant amounts of time and energy in dairy production, garden 
                                                           
57 “Manufactures,”18 April 1789, American State Papers 09, Finance, I: p. 9.  
58 “Ship-Building and Manufactures,” 5 June 1789, American State Papers 09, Finance, I: pp. 10-11. These 
petitioners represented sixteen occupations, evidence of the dense web of economic connections that 
manufacturing promoters desired to expand. The occupations ranged from ship wrights to brass 
founders to wool card makers.   
59 Tryon, Household Manufactures, pp. 123-163.  
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agriculture and food processing, while men produced rudimentary leather goods in addition to 
grain farming. The mixed agricultural-household manufacturing economies which characterized 
the northeast slowly transitioned to external market production in the late eighteenth century, and 
outside of urban areas most Americans were not entirely dependent on wage work for their 
survival. Though the exact timing of transition to capitalism has been hotly debated, the regional 
agricultural and manufacturing economies of the northeast developed diversified domestic 
production and consumption patterns unlike the Upper and Lower South states by the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
In the eighteenth century, the “putting-out” system characterized the relations of textile 
production near northeastern towns and urban clusters. In this system, family units took in raw 
material, mainly wool, and spun yarn on the rudimentary spinning wheel. Capitalist 
entrepreneurs collected the yarn, and paid the male head of household for his family’s labor and 
then distributed the yarn to weavers, dyers, and finishers.  This system of production was labor 
intensive, even more so for making flax into linen yarn and cloth. The “putting-out” system, 
already entrenched in Great Britain, first emerged in North America just before the Revolution. 
By the 1780s, it formed the basis for the earliest attempts by northeastern capitalists, many of 
whom disliked slavery on both moral and practical economic grounds, to integrate perpetual 
spinning machinery into American textile production. For men like Moses Brown, technological 
advancement went hand-in-hand with the transformation in northeastern labor markets wrought 
by state abolition of chattel slavery. The expansion of the “putting-out” system and mechanized 
spinning showed that the northeastern regional economics exhibited diversified capitalist 
relations of production, dependent on domestic consumption markets composed of free 
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households unbound from external authority and with the legal right to their families.60 These 
characteristics, combined with slavery abolition, were absent in the Upper and Lower South.  
Early republican northeastern capitalists sought ways to incorporate time saving 
machinery to produce yarn suitable for weaving quality cloths more efficiently and in greater 
quantities. The arrival of English weaver Samuel Slater to the United States in 1790 is often 
characterized as American manufacturing’s eureka moment, though machine-spinning initiatives 
had previously been attempted in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York. Slater did, 
however, first bring direct knowledge of Richard Arkwright’s power loom, and quickly set about 
offering his services to enterprising capitalists. Finding the rudimentary spinning and carding 
machines of an aspiring New York manufacturer “not worth using,” Slater wrote to Moses 
Brown to offer his services.61 In his reply, Brown noted the early frustrations he and son-in-law 
Nicholas Almy encountered in establishing machine spinning in Providence. Brown & Almy, 
“destitute of a person acquainted with water-frame spinning,” had failed to make a recently-
purchased jenny frame operational and desperately needed someone with Slater’s expertise. 
Moses offered Slater employment and a share in potential profits, and in January 1790 the 
                                                           
60 While some northeastern state abolition laws, like Rhode Island’s 1784 act, simultaneously abolished 
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critical for understanding the systems American manufacturing capitalists like Moses Brown adopted in 
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61  Samuel Slater to Moses Brown, 2 December 1789, in White, ed., Memoir of Samuel Slater, p. 72.  
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Englishman relocated to Providence to begin assembling the first functional water-powered 
spinning frame on American soil.62 
Slater and his patrons encountered several critical problems in the quest to construct a 
machine-spinning plant. The partnership lacked human capital, in the form of workers with 
highly specialized weaving technology skills, lesser-skilled manufactory operatives, and 
mechanics capable of fabricating machine components. Luckily for Slater, his first (Brown-
recommended) landlord was Oziel Wilkinson, a highly-skilled mechanic who operated a shop in 
Providence that soon after supplied many of the firm’s fabricated parts. Wilkinson’s family also 
directly provided labor to the mill, as sons Smith and David worked variously for Slater in 1790 
and 1791 as cotton carders, breakers, and spinners. The Wilkinson family also offered another 
benefit to Slater: his future wife, Hannah, was Oziel Wilkinson’s youngest daughter.  By early 
spring 1791, after pains taking effort and many stops and starts, Slater was successful in bringing 
the first American water-powered loom into operation.63 Cotton-linen thread and cloths produced 
by Almy and Brown at this early stage included corduroys, royal rib denim, cottonettes, janes, 
and fustians, 4,556 yards of which were produced by the firm from mid-1789 through the end of 
1790.64  
Almy and Brown’s early reliance on Oziel Wilkinson and his family is manifest in the 
firm’s earliest records, as it purchased a wide variety of both manufactured goods and raw 
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materials from Wilkinson. Fabricated iron and steel machine parts proved especially critical to 
Slater’s attempts to build spindle frames, including rollers, nails, jenny spindles, carding machine 
parts, and various kinds of purpose-made nails, screws, and nuts. Sylvanus Brown was another 
Providence artisan that proved critical to the earliest stages of mill construction. A millwright, in 
spring 1790 Sylvanus (no relation to Moses) provided the firm with dozens of wood products 
that made the literal backbone of Slater’s spinning frame. These included several hundred feet of 
plank boarding, ranging from maple to oak to pine, and Sylvanus Brown also crafted the wooden 
spindles for Slater’s machines. By late 1790, the relationship between Slater and Brown had 
soured, but his and Oziel Wilkinson’s critical contributions to Brown and Almy’s attempts to 
erect a machine spinning plant sheds some light on the web of local economic connections 
generated by the firm’s operations.65  
Writing in April 1791 to the proprietors of the Beverley (MA) Factory, Moses Brown 
noted with pride that Slater’s water loom had begun producing cotton yarn, and putting it out to 
local families to weave into cotton-linen and woolen whole cloths. The congressional debates of 
1789 prompted Brown to consider joining the growing chorus of manufacturing promoters led by 
Tench Coxe and Alexander Hamilton, petitioning “for some encouragement to the cotton 
manufactory, by an additional duty on the cotton goods imported, and the applying such duty as 
a bounty, partly on the raising and saving of cotton in the southern states, and partly as a bounty 
on cotton goods… manufactured in the United States.”66 Here the prerogatives of Brown the 
slavery abolitionist and Brown the burgeoning manufacturing capitalist committed to economic 
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nationalism collided uncomfortably. While Brown recognized that an adequate supply of quality 
raw cotton was necessary for his and others’ machine spinning operations, nowhere did he 
actively promote mechanized cotton spinning as a means of abetting the expansion of plantation 
slavery in the Lower South.  
 Indeed, the availability of quality raw cotton supplies often impeded Brown & Almy’s 
early efforts. Before the introduction of the cotton gin, textile capitalists and skilled weavers and 
machinists often criticized southern cotton for its poor quality, and preferred to import cotton 
supplies from the Caribbean, India, or Egypt, though they cost significantly more. Writing in 
response to Secretary of Treasury Hamilton’s request for information on American 
manufacturing in summer 1791, Brown noted that southern cotton “is as Imperfect, and more so, 
than the manufacturing when raised,” a nod to the fact that Slater was continuing to perfect 
mechanized spinning. Southern cotton was poorly cleaned and wrought havoc on Slater’s 
delicate machinery, which “obliges the Manufacturer to have his supply from the Westindies 
under the Discouragement of the Impost.” According to Brown, having to rely of slave-grown 
British Caribbean cotton was “Mortifying to those who from Motives of Promoting the Produce 
and Manufactures of Our Own Country…”67 Having to choose between slave-grown cotton in 
the United States and slave-grown cotton in the West Indies was a choice that the abolitionist 
Brown undoubtedly would rather have not made. Still, it would be a mistake to interpret Almy 
and Brown’s attempts to develop cotton textile manufacturing as a means to promote the 
expansion of slavery in the Lower South.  
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After Almy and Brown established the Slater Mill in Pawtucket in 1790, the newly 
named Almy, Brown, and Slater’s manufacturing capabilities expanded significantly, as did its 
workforce and economic connections to the local community. In 1793, as Slater feverishly 
worked to get the mill operating smoothly, the firm’s accounts detail dozens of transactions with 
local vendors for items like pine boards, nails, candles, and sundry other supplies, and for 
services rendered. In February 1793 alone, for example, Slater purchased 4,010 feet of pine and 
maple boarding from local vendors. The next month, Slater purchased an additional 552 feet of 
pine board and planks, as well as one grindstone and eleven pounds of “old brass.” The mill’s 
accounts detail dozens of similar transactions in the subsequent years, and the funds spent by the 
firm to establish Slater Mill must have contributed significantly to the local economy. What is 
conspicuous early purchasing records for the Slater Mill is how little cotton it purchased from the 
Lower South.  The first entry for mainland cotton was dated June 25, 1794, for 348 pounds of 
“Georgia cotton” priced at £23 8s. Cotton purchases did increase in subsequent years, for 
example a February 1795 purchase of two bags of “Cotton Wool” weighing 612 pounds. The 
firm’s cotton purchases increased over the course of the 1790s and first decade of the nineteenth 
century, but at no point did Almy, Brown, and Slater envision their activities as a prop to the 
expansion of southern slavery. 68   
The Slater Mill’s account books also detail dozens of payments to local artisans and 
laborers, a window into the mill’s labor requirements and as well as Slater’s vision of workforce 
organization. While in later decades Slater and other northeastern mill operators were known for 
imposing strict work discipline and morality with the implementation of “mill town” production 
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facilities and living spaces, in the earliest years of operation Almy and Brown’s mills operated in 
a much more fluid labor market.69 The firm’s early payroll records show that free-households 
(either entirely or in part) were an important labor source, in addition to tradesmen with highly 
specialized skills like Samuel Slater and his father-in-law, expert mechanic Oziel Wilkinson. In 
winter 1790-1791, for example, the firm employed the Arnold family as carders and spinners, 
including head of household Torpen and children Charles, Eunise, and Ann at various times. 
Slater also employed his brothers-in-law Smith and David Wilkinson as machinists, breakers, 
and spinners in 1790-1791, including ten-year-old Smith beginning in 1791. In addition, Almy & 
Brown frequently hired free black laborers, many of whom Moses Brown had personal 
connections with, as laborers. This system, later named the Rhode Island system, relied on free 
family households to provide the vast majority of the textile plants’ labor needs, most often on a 
part-time basis, supplemented by hiring highly-skilled artisans to full-time positions in 
supervisory roles. This system, because it utilized local free household family members as textile 
operatives, it offered the advantage of flexibility, as most families did not derive their entire 
subsistence from mill employment. On the other hand, because these workers maintained 
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autonomous existences separate from the factory space, employers like Slater often complained 
of worker absences and labor shortages. 70 
Almy and Brown payments to workers usually did not specify the exact work performed, 
and the firm recorded labor in number of days worked, revealing the impermanent nature of early 
mill employment. For example, in July 1793 Samuel Slater paid out £4 8s. and £4 5s. 9p. to 
Uriah Hopkins and David Chilson for twenty-two and twenty-one days’ “labour,” respectively. 
In January 1795 the mill paid James Packham £4 14s. 4p. for twenty-one days’ “work” 
performed the previous July. Two frequent payees were the Jenckes brothers, John and David, 
who labored intermittently for the Slater Mill from 1793-1795. The firm paid David Jenckes £58 
8s. for several months of carpentry work in March 1793, as well as an additional nineteen pounds 
“for lodging Washburn and the Masons” for seventy-eight days in his home.71 Both Jenckes 
shared a surname with Peter Brunius Jenckes, a freed slave who manually powered Slater’s first 
power loom in 1790 before it was harnessed to waterpower.72 The fluid patterns of labor at Almy 
and Brown mills that characterized early textile mill production reveal the contours of the 
ongoing transformation within northeastern capitalism in agriculture and manufacturing, and the 
fluid relationship between employer and labor that was a consequence of northeastern state 
slavery abolition.  
 
********** 
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In 1793, famed lexicographer and Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom 
member Noah Webster published a pamphlet entitled The Effects of Slavery on Morals and 
Industry. Webster’s pamphlet encapsulated the political economy of northeastern abolitionism in 
the republic’s first decade. Webster opened Effects with an extended comparative analysis of 
world slavery to support his core argument that “to labor solely for the benefit of other men, is 
repugnant to every principle of the human heart. Men will not be industrious… without a well 
founded expectation of enjoying the fruits of their labor.”73 He then pivoted and applied this 
argument to regional slavery in the United States. Well aware that Pennsylvania and the New 
England states had already forbidden chattel status and gradual emancipation was underway, 
Webster believed that a “general and complete abolition” of slavery in the Upper and Lower 
South would result in chaos. His solution was to “raise the slaves, by gradual means, to the 
condition of free tenants,” precisely what the northeastern states were doing.74 Of course, the 
South’s dependence on slavery was much greater than in the Greater Northeast on after the 
Revolution, but Webster’s proposed solution to the problem of slavery is significant in its 
emphasis on the elimination of chattel status as a spur to increased labor productivity.  
According to Webster, if a handful of humanitarian-minded southern planters would 
provide their slaves “farms on a moderate rent, and their liberty, on the condition of being good 
tenants,” they would find that black Americans were as capable of productively contributing to 
society as whites. “Once inspire them with a love of property,” he urged, “let them go to the 
market for themselves, accustom them to make bargains… and their want continually 
                                                           
73 Noah Webster, The Effects of Slavery on Morals and Industry (Hartford: Hudson and Goodwin, 1793), p. 
22.  
74 Ibid., pp. 34; 37.  
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multiplying will beget habits of industry and economy.” To prove this, he presented the example 
of a similar experiment conducted by Polish Count Andrezj Zamoyski, who in 1760 eliminated 
the status of serf on his estates. Webster gleefully noted that within the first seventeen years of 
the former serfs’ freedom, their birth rates almost doubled, and their incomes almost tripled.75 
This, he believed, was possible throughout the United States if gradual abolition could be 
instituted, as it had been in most of the Northeast, and the evidence was all around him. Unlike 
Webster’s home region, however, in the Upper and Lower South entrenched chattel slavery 
rendered “the great portion of the actual capital of a state unproductive… their property, instead 
of forming an actual capital in trade or manufactures, is converted into real estate or funded 
stock…” This was “a most serious calamity, as it strikes at the very root of national industry, and 
consequently national wealth and power.” 76 
The American Revolution resulted in independence, but it also resulted in serious 
economic calamity. The devastation of the war affected all regions of the United States, though 
its impact was borne unevenly. Recent research suggests that the export economies of the 
Chesapeake and Lower South were destroyed by the economic and political transformations that 
accompanied American independence. Commodity exports from the slave societies of the 
Chesapeake southward tumbled by 39.1% between 1772 and 1790, most importantly because of 
the loss of trade with Great Britain and its Caribbean colonies. Meanwhile, over the same period 
New England and mid-Atlantic exports grew by 1.2% and 9.9%, respectively. The Chesapeake 
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and Lower South’s significant declines in exports exacerbated what were already significant 
regional economic divergences from the mid-Atlantic and New England. While the American 
regional economies regained some of the losses in exports in the 1790s through 1808, it is clear 
that the American Revolution devastated the southern regional economies much more than the 
more diversified agricultural, manufacturing, and export economies of the states from 
Pennsylvania northward- not coincidentally, the states that undertook the processes of slavery 
abolition during and after the revolution.77 
 Framed in terms of real income per capita, the uneven effects of the American Revolution 
are further emphasized. While all regions of the United States saw declines in real income 
between 1774 and 1800, New England and the mid-Atlantic were spared the worst. In those 
years, the northeastern states experienced small annual average decline in real income, while the 
Chesapeake and Lower South’s comparable declines were three times larger. Estimated regional 
incomes are yet another metric that makes regional economic disparities clear. Framed in terms 
of free labor income, the slave societies of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, the Carolinas, and 
Georgia generated $87.77 million in 1800, while Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and the 
New England states generated a combined $157.85 million.78 While economic historians have 
debated the exact contours of economic change wrought by the American Revolution with 
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varying interpretations of differing datasets, the 1780s and 1790s were decades of devastation, 
depression, and recovery that accentuated pre-existing structural divergences. In many respects, 
northeastern promoters of manufacturing responded to shifting regional and national political 
economies in a manner that southern slaveholders could not or would not, given that much of 
their available capital was invested in the bodies of the enslaved and the lands they forcibly 
toiled.  
The northeastern drift towards domestic manufacturing, especially proto-industrial textile 
production, should not obscure the fact that in 1800 the United States remained overwhelmingly 
agricultural. While transatlantic trade rebounded by the end of the century, and American 
merchants began to develop new trade connections with China and southeast Asia, agriculture 
and related commodity production remained the bedrock of the American regional economies. 
Almost three-quarters of the American labor force (both free and enslaved) were agriculturalists 
broadly defined, about 1.4 million people. In the increasingly diversified Greater Northeastern 
regional economies, however, sixty-eight percent of the labor force was agricultural, while the 
figure was eighty-two percent in the Upper and Lower South. The nascent cotton spinning 
industry was still in its infant stages, as only one thousand workers were employed at machine 
spinning mills like those of Almy, Brown, and Slater in Providence and Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island.79  
Meanwhile, the intensification of partisan political battles between Federalists and 
Democratic-Republicans dominated the attention of policy makers and the press in the late 
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1790s. Growing partisanship complicated neat political divisions between the slave societies of 
the Upper and Lower South and the Northeast, as both factions attracted supporters across the 
nation. But the fruits of state slavery abolition had a profound impact on the political economy of 
the Northeast in the Early Republic, spurring the further spread of free household agriculture and 
domestic consumption markets, as antislavery capitalists like Moses Brown and Tench Coxe 
developed a culture of improvement to promote the economic modernization of the mid-Atlantic 
and New England. The example of Samson, the formerly enslaved man ensconced on his free 
household farm in rural Cumberland County, Pennsylvania by1787, encapsulated the 







Ch. 6: Slavery, Antislavery, and Capitalism: Production, Politics, and the Fraying Fabric of 
Union, 1800-1820 
 
When Thomas Paine sat down to write to President Thomas Jefferson in January 1805, he 
did so as one of the most famed—and controversial—political philosophers and participants in 
the convulsions of the Age of Revolutions. Much of Paine’s story is familiar, from his 
spectacular emergence as a revolutionary propagandist with the publication of Common Sense 
almost thirty years earlier, to his participation in the French Revolution and authorship of the 
Rights of Man, to his disownment by much of the American Revolutionary generation in the late 
1790s. Paine conducted a lengthy, and often one-sided, correspondence with Jefferson during the 
presidency of the “Sage of Monticello,” hoping to secure government patronage in recognition 
for his efforts to propagate the American Revolution, but his voice was increasingly ignored by 
an American public that once devoured his writings.  
The year before, 1804, Paine used what little political capital he had left to oppose the 
resumption of slave importations into the Louisiana Territory, which had been temporarily 
banned by Congress in 1803, as the territory transitioned to American control. French Louisiana 
planters protested the ban on slave importations, and Paine responded publicly with a ringing 
critique of slavery and the slave trade, in which he accused them, “you are arriving at freedom by 
the easiest means that any people ever enjoyed it; without contest, without expense, and even 
without any contrivance of your own.” The larger political and philosophical problem, according 
to Paine, was that the planters “already so far mistake principles, that under the name of rights 
you ask for powers; power to import and enslave Africans; and to govern a territory that we have 
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purchased.”1 Writing to Jefferson the next year, Paine further laid out why encouraging the 
further growth of slavery in the Louisiana Territory was an economic, as well as political and 
social, evil. 
Paine’s antislavery political economy centered on the deleterious effects of chattel 
slavery on the labor productivity, as well as the ways in which slavery prevented the 
development of diversified economies founded on free-household agriculture, manufactures, and 
robust consumption markets. At the most basic level, Paine criticized congressional sanction for 
slavery in Louisiana because “bringing poor Negroes to work the lands in a state of slavery and 
wretchedness, is, besides the immorality of it, the certain way of preventing population and 
consequently of revenue.” It was much better to promote the immigration of free or indentured 
European servants, as typified labor markets in Pennsylvania, because of their industry—both the 
cultural attribute of industriousness, but also as a spur to domestic manufactures, which 
encouraged both local production and consumption. Paine was not above using stereotypes to 
prove his point: Germans were the most desirable farmers, while “the Scotch turn their attention 
to traffic [and] the English to manufactures,” while “the Irish in general are generous and 
dissolute.”2 But as a matter of desirable contours of political economy, according to Paine, slave 
importations should be made illegal and slavery outlawed in the new national domain. 
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importations into the Territory. “Application to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into the Territory of 
Louisiana,” American State Papers, No. 172, I: p. 386. A memorial signed by French planter Pierre 
Derbigny, A Memorial Presented by the Inhabitants of Louisiana to the Congress of the United States, in Senate 
and House of Representatives Convened (Washington, 1804) asked Congress to allow slave importations and 
self-government to Louisiana planters. Paine’s response was “To the Inhabitants of French Louisiana,” in 
Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 2 Vols. [hereafter WTP] (New York: The Citadel 
Press, 1945), II: pp. 963-968, quotation pp. 964-965. 
2 Thomas Paine to Thomas Jefferson, 25 January 1805, WTP, II: pp. 1457-1458.  
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Why did antislavery northeasterners, and revolutionary cosmopolitans like Paine, so often 
frame their critiques of slavery in economic, in addition to the more familiar moral terms? The 
key lies in another of Paine’s comments to Jefferson, in which he asserted that ten slaves could 
not match the consumption of goods of one white citizen, that “ in the articles of dress and of the 
table it is almost impossible to make a comparison.”3 Visions of economic development in the 
early nineteenth century emphasized the importance of developing a domestic manufacturing 
base premised on the absence of chattel slavery in the Northeast, in part because slavery 
suppressed the growth of domestic consumption markets.  
Plantations, contemporaries knew, were self-sufficient units, as the enslaved forcibly 
produced most of what they needed to survive. Planters and their families, of course, consumed 
manufactured goods, but they most often purchased these luxury items from merchants with 
British and European connections. Too often in modern scholarship, domestic northeastern 
manufacturing, and later industrialization, are identified with cotton textiles, and thus directly 
with chattel slavery. But this only tells a small part of the story, as slaveholding politicians and 
their northeastern merchant allies consistently opposed American manufacturing in the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century, in part because they sensed that conditions from which it 
emerged presumed the absence of chattel slavery. In the American Northeast, capitalist relations 
sprang from antislavery political economy, if not thunderous moral declamations against slavery 
most historians now identify as true abolitionism. The spread of capitalist social relations in the 
countryside and wage labor in domestic manufacturing in the American Northeast helped to 
solidify the social and economic hegemony of a rising capitalist class, which believed antislavery 
                                                           
3 Thomas Paine to Thomas Jefferson, 25 January 1805, WTP, p. 1458.  
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After Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency in 1801, congressional debates over the 
promotion of northeastern manufacturing intensified. Streams of memorials from manufacturers 
and promotion societies asked that Congress raise tariffs on dozens of imported goods, including 
but not limited to textiles, so that domestic manufacturers could capitalize on the rapidly 
expanding home market, especially in New England and the mid-Atlantic. An 1804 report 
submitted to Congress by New York’s antislavery Rep. Samuel Latham Mitchill on 
“encouragement to manufactures” noted that the previous several years had seen a rise in 
petitions from producers of numerous goods. In 1802, Congress received petitions and 
memorials from “manufacturers of gunpowder, of hats, of printing types, of brushes, and of stone 
ware.” The next year, manufacturers of starch, paper, and umbrellas petitioned Congress, as did 
textile capitalists and shoemakers. Mitchill’s Democratic-Republican politics, as well his 
antislavery beliefs, made him sympathetic to producerist arguments, that small-scale artisans and 
domestic manufacturers should receive some level of government protection.5 While the national 
government could not “encourage manufactures by imposing duties on certain domestic raw 
                                                           
4 This is a key theme in the works of David Brion Davis. See, for example, Davis, “Abolitionism and 
Ideological Hegemony,” in The Antislavery Debate, pp. 161-179.  
5 Andrew Shankman, “’A New Thing on Earth’: Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, 
and the Democratization of American Political Economy,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 23 No. 3 
(Autumn 2003), pp. 323-352, argues that the logic of Democratic-Republican producerism dovetailed with 
promotion of domestic manufacturing, especially among mid-Atlantic Jeffersonians.  
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materials, if exported,” it could act to protect specific domestic manufactures. Whether or not 
Congress would do so was a political question that partially hinged on conflicts over chattel 
slavery and the way to best orient a national economy composed of regions that differed quite 
significantly.6 
The report also stated what political economists like Tench Coxe, Mathew Carey, and 
others had been saying since the 1780s: that agriculture and domestic manufacturing went hand-
in-hand to encourage American prosperity, and that external commerce should play an important 
but ultimately secondary role. “Political economists will instantly see,” the report reiterated, 
“that the good of the revenue, and the happiness of the people, are best promoted by offering part 
of our unwrought materials, and of our surplus provisions, to domestic manufacturers,” while 
exporting what “we can spare” in exchange for foreign-made goods. In a nation rooted in 
agriculture, but especially the free-household patterns of the Northeast, “the cluster of arts and 
trades which minister to its wants spring up of course, almost from necessity.” To Mitchill, who 
had publicly supported endeavors like maple sugar production as an antislavery family 
manufacture, and other northeasterners, this vision of political economy sprang from antislavery 
conditions, states where chattel slavery had been abolished and bound servitude was on the 
decline. It is telling that, outside elite liberal Virginians like Thomas Jefferson and George 
Washington Parke Custis, few slaveholders promoted government policy designed to encourage 
domestic manufactures.7 
                                                           
6 “Encouragement to Manufactures,” American State Papers, 010, Finance, II: pp. 80-81.  
7 In a November 1804 address to Congress, for example, Jefferson asked legislators “whether the great 
interests of agriculture, manufactures, commerce and navigation, can, within the pale of your 
constitutional powers be aided in any of their relations?” Thomas Jefferson to United States Congress, 8 
November 1804, Founders Online, National Archives. George Washington Parke Custis, An Address to the 
People of the United States, on the Importance of Encouraging Agriculture and Domestic Manufactures… 
(Alexandria, VA: S. Snowden, 1808).  
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As was the case in the 1780s and 1790s, during Jefferson’s presidency, northeasterners 
made the strongest arguments in favor of domestic manufacturing, especially Pennsylvanians. 
The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufacturing, founded in 1787, continued 
to lobby for manufacturing protections, maintaining they would “greatly [promote] Union, trade, 
and intercourse among the States, and between the several grand divisions of our country.” 
Unfortunately, by 1804 the Society reeled under the effects of several disastrous circumstances, 
the worst being a fire that destroyed much of its capital stock and “some of the most valuable 
cotton spinning machinery.” Under the leadership of President Tench Coxe and Board of 
Managers that included Mathew Carey, the Society continued to promote the expansion of 
mechanized cotton spinning, as they believed the fiber “is a production the best of all adapted to 
labour-saving machinery, and fit for goods for American use, and for the most diversified and 
extensive exportation.”8  
While this support for American cotton production signaled some acquiescence to the 
interests of southern planters, the Society went on to explain that its vision for American 
manufacturing growth was not limited to cotton textiles alone. It had invested resources in 
developing cotton-spinning technology, but also “machinery for coining or stamping metals, 
leather, &c.,” as well as “for reducing old woolen cloths or rags to the state of wool, [and] for 
boring cannon which have been solidly cast.” Other initiatives included developing machinery 
for flax spinning, combing hemp and wool, staining and printing cloths, constructing steam 
engines, and “various other machinery, facilitating or perfecting manufactures, and saving 
labour, time, risk, or expense.”9 Important as cotton textiles were to manufacturing promoters 
                                                           
8 Communication from the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts 
(Philadelphia: Samuel Akerman, 1804), pp. 4, 21.  
9 Ibid., p. 23.  
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like the Pennsylvania Society, they were not the only pillar in the foundation of American 
industrialization’s northeastern core, which encompassed the manufacture of dozens of products. 
It was not a surprise, for example, that in 1805 Thomas Jefferson had to cancel his Monticello 
nailery manager’s order for iron nail rods from a firm seventy miles away in Richmond, “as it’s 
high price… would take away all the profit from the manufacture.” He bought the rods more 
cheaply from a firm in Philadelphia, two-hundred and fifty miles away.10 
Aside from the manufacturing societies, whose members tended towards the social and 
economic elite, smaller manufacturers and artisans made the case for protection of northeastern 
manufacturing interests. In 1803 members of the Franklin Association, a northeastern artisan 
group that included journeyman printers, as well as men from trades ranging from cork-cutting to 
umbrella manufacturers, petitioned Congress to repeal import duties on raw materials not 
obtainable from the United States, and to impose prohibitive duties on foreign manufactures. The 
Congress Committee of Commerce and Manufactures expressed some sympathy to the 
journeyman artisans, but declined to press the matter in the sitting Congress, recommending the 
matter for the succeeding Congress to address.11 
In Philadelphia, a memorial of the city’s artisans and manufacturers asked for tariff 
protections for domestic goods against foreign competition, and went further by offering 
refutations to the arguments typically made by opponent of tariffs—most often southern planters 
and allies in the northeastern merchant class. First was the contention that “the country is too 
young to begin the manufactory of cloathing for the citizens,” and therefore agriculture should be 
the primary focus of economic policy and manufactures should be imported. This argument 
                                                           
10 Thomas Jefferson to George Jefferson, 14 November 1805, Founders Online, National Archives.  
11 Report of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, of the Several Memorials and Petitions of the 
“Franklin Association…” 21 February 1803, 7 Cong., 2 Sess.  
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discriminated against the northeastern states in particular, because they stood to gain the most 
from manufacturing promotion. “It will be bad policy indeed,” they wrote, “when the United 
States shall retard the prosperity of the most ancient and best peopled states, for no other reason, 
than that the new States are not equally forward in point of population agriculture, &c.” A 
second argument the artisans and manufacturers addressed also concerned the newer western 
states and territories, since opponents of domestic manufacturing argued that the growth of 
industry would be prevent the peopling of the West. This the manufacturers flatly disagreed with, 
replying, “as if the prosperity of the citizens, in old established situations, were to be sacrificed 
to new projects and land speculators.”12 Two objections to protection stemmed from 
misinformation about the effects of manufacturing on the health and morals of factory 
operatives. The supposedly “sedentary” nature of factory work, compared to agricultural labor, 
was an overblown concern: the only truly sedentary workers in factories, they argued, were 
clerks, and merchants were more sedentary than factory workers for that matter. And the “vices” 
and social ills which opponents believed infected European industrial zones, they asserted, did 
not actually exist, at least to the degree some claimed. “A considerable number of your 
memorialists have seen the manufacturing towns of Europe,” they countered, “and are 
convinced, that the greatest portion of virtue is to be found there.”13 
The weightiest argument against national government protections for domestic 
manufacturing was also the most political: the national government should not treat domestic 
manufacturing as a special privilege, thereby discriminating against the other branches of the 
national economy, agriculture and commerce. Coming from the mouths of slaveholders, 
                                                           
12 Memorial of the Artists and Manufacturers of Philadelphia (Philadelphia: n.p., 1804), pp. iv-v.  
13 Memorial of the Artists and Manufacturers of Philadelphia (Philadelphia: n.p., 1804), pp. v-vi.  
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however, the argument against special privilege was also the most easily attacked, and in 1804 
Tench Coxe took up his pen in An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest with this goal in mind. 
The controversial Coxe, by Jefferson’s first administration frustrated and isolated within the 
Jeffersonian coalition, opened the pamphlet spewing fire against manufacturing’s opponents. “To 
excite the citizens to industry, without deviating into slavery or oppression on the one hand,” he 
proclaimed to legislators, “is the standard by which the great Statesman ought to be estimated.” 
His reference to industry encompassed two meanings—the tangible industry of manufactured 
goods, as well as cultural attribute of industriousness. He made clear that the rhetorical opposite 
of industry was slavery: “that man is the greatest Statesman, who, at the same time that he 
banishes tyranny, oppression, slavery, and idleness from the land, encourages and protects 
industry, and prevents it from being disgraced by poverty and contempt.” If not an explicit, 
outright attack on slavery and slaveowners, at the least Coxe imbued his pro-manufacturing 
argument with antislavery overtones.14  
Coxe, to be sure, respected the role of agriculture as the foundation of the American 
economy, and while he often butted heads with merchant elites, he believed that commerce had a 
role to play in securing American prosperity. But, “although these three great branches of 
National industry depend reciprocally on each other,” he wrote, “neither of them ought to be held 
in higher estimation than the other, by the legislature of an extensive country…”15 He used 
several interrelated arguments to convince opponents of domestic manufacturing. Coxe urged 
southern planters to consider investing in cotton mills as a way to increase the productivity of 
their plantations, that “there is not an individual among them that would think his destiny far 
                                                           
14 Tench Coxe, An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest (Philadelphia: Graves, 1804), p. 5.  
15 Coxe, An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest, p. 6.  
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happier than it is,” if they erect cotton mills with a number of spindles proportional to their 
acreage. Implementing spinning at the source of cotton production, Coxe believed, would 
support economic development because it would help attract immigrants and provide 
employment to non-slaveholding, landless white southerners. In other words, Coxe encouraged 
southern planters to pursue a developmental program that resembled the northeastern states.16 
But was that what southern planters really wanted? Surely Coxe knew enough about the 
thinking of southern slaveholders to suspect that it was not. Coxe’s political economy has not 
usually been seen by historians as containing meaningful antislavery implications, in part 
because of his emphasis on cotton textiles as an engine for economic development. Thus, it is 
typically argued, Coxe must have supported southern slavery, at least implicitly.17 That 
interpretation is difficult to square with the language he deployed in An Essay. Having laid out 
the outlines of his case for protection of domestic manufacturing, he directly addressed what he 
believed to be the weaknesses of the slave-based economies of the Chesapeake, Lower South, 
and southwestern territories. The economic, not to mention social and political, inequality of 
plantation economies were their fatal weakness, especially the unequal distribution of property 
ownership that accompanied slavery. “The mere cultivator,” he wrote, “who has no tenure in 
lands, must be a slave or a vagabond.” Therefore, “the landholders of the Southern States, and all 
the advocates of slavery,” found themselves between a rock and a hard place— “placed betwixt 
                                                           
16 Coxe, An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest, pp. 10-11.  
17 While Andrew Shankman does not explicitly assert that Coxe, associate Mathew Carey, and other 
Republican political economists were proslavery, it is implied in “Capitalism, Slavery, and the New 
Epoch: Mathew Carey’s 1819,” in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, pp. 243-261. Carey, 
however, is shown to have harbored racist sentiments, a belief he held in common with many 
Republican-leaning white men in the 1810s. Shankman writes that Carey’s political economy in the late 
1810s was “impossible to conceive without slavery.” Ibid., p. 249. See also Martin Öhman, “Perfecting 
Independence: Tench Coxe and the Political Economy of Western Development,” Journal of the Early 
Republic, Vol. 31 No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 397-433.  
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Scylla and Charybes without a pilot.” The political economy of the slave states and territories 
had been designed to emphasize large freeholds in the hands of a relative few, so that large 
numbers of landless whites lived “vagabond lives… denied the privilege of manufacturing.”18 
Surely, Coxe did not denounce chattel slavery in the scathing language of immorality some of his 
contemporaries used, or later moral suasionists employed. But just as surely, his critique of the 
political economy of plantation slavery rang with stringent tones of calumniation.   
Nor was Coxe alone in laying out a vision of national political economy that had a place 
for, but was not dominated by chattel slavery. In May 1809, Philadelphian Adam Seybert 
delivered a lecture to Philadelphia Manufacturers and Mechanics which emphasized these 
themes. Seybert, a scientist and candidate for U.S. Representative, offered something of a pitch 
to the assembled artisans and manufacturing capitalists, repeatedly extolling domestic 
manufactures as the bedrock of American prosperity. Seybert did not discuss slavery in the 
speech, certainly not in direct reference to southern slavery, but his outline of support for 
northeastern manufactures assumed the absence of chattel slavery. Northeastern manufacturer’s 
point of comparison was Great Britain, and ironically at a time of escalating tension with the 
British Empire over naval impressments and Jefferson’s embargo, Seybert devoted much of his 
speech to detailing why America should follow the British manufacturing model. Like British 
imperial policy dating back to Edward IV, Seybert hoped the American national government 
would provide explicit protection for domestic manufactures. The “present circumstances,” 
meaning Jefferson’s embargo, meant that “within the last eighteen months, the quantum of 
capital devoted to and the number of persons who have engaged in the erection of 
manufactories… far exceed any precedent in the annals of our history.” Seybert hoped that 
                                                           
18 Coxe, An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest, p. 13.  
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America would cease to export cotton wool to Europe, but rather cotton yarn, and yet he also 
pointed to increases in woolen manufactures, chemical pursuits, iron and steel production, tool 
manufactures, and dozens of other goods. Seybert’s point was not to deny the importance of 
cotton, but rather that American economic prosperity encompassed the production of dozens of 
manufactures made by free, and not enslaved laborers.19 
In April 1810, textile capitalist John Howland delivered a lecture to the Providence 
Association of Mechanics and Manufacturers, in which he served as Secretary. While Howland 
did not deny the importance of agriculture, he did not express as much deference to landed 
interests as did Pennsylvanians. He reversed the relationship between agriculture and 
manufactures, arguing that the former was not possible in modern societies without the products 
of artisans. “The mistake,” he said to his audience, “is this: that Agriculture constitutes the first 
rank in useful employments… that all other arts are subordinate thereto… that the good old-
fashioned phrase, WE THE PEOPLE… means nothing more or less than we the farmers…” 
This, Howland countered, was “false doctrine,” because without fabricated implements farmers 
would be relegated to the methods of ancient hunter-gatherers. Howland’s point was not to 
unfairly disparage farming, but to remind his audience how wrong opponents of domestic 
manufacturing were when they argued that government support for manufacturing discriminated 
against agriculture.20 
Howland, descended from a Mayflower passenger of the same name, grounded his 
support for domestic manufactures in the economic and social history of New England from its 
                                                           
19 Adam Seybert, An Oration, Delivered on the 19th of May, at the Meeting of the Manufactures and Mechanics of 
the City of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1809), pp. 9, 13-14.  
20 John Howland, An Address Delivered Before the Providence Association of Mechanics and Manufacturers 
(Providence: Jones and Wheeler, 1810), pp. 7-8.  
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settlement by the English. Here is where an antislavery bias showed, because the history he 
described did not conform at all to the stories recent scholars have told, that New England was 
not just complicit, but reliant on slavery and the slave trade, for its regional economic and social 
development.21 Howland, to be sure, idealized the heroic struggles of his New England ancestors 
in their efforts to establish a subsistence agriculture economy in the “wilderness” of Cape Cod, 
and he most certainly ignored the depredations the English colonists visited upon local Native 
Americans. But the story he told—of the slow development of household manufactures from 
“raising wool and flax,” and the “many years witnessed their privations” in developing wool and 
flax sources—was not wrong. Eventually, his ancestors developed ways to make their own 
spinning wheels and looms, and “in the ever memorable year 1639, the first piece of cloth ever 
wove in what is now the United States of America…” Even if we strip away the hagiography of 
early New Englanders’ work ethic—and we should—the conclusion of Howland’s short history 
of New England manufacturing hammered home an explicit, contemporary political-economic 
point.22 “The genius and enterprize of the northern and middle states,” Howland argued, “will 
not be restrained to manufactures of cotton.” The Northeast, in other words, would not be in 
thrall to the desires of southern planters. “The time has arrived for manufactures in woolen to 
                                                           
21 Much of the inspiration for this interpretation seems to derives from Williams, Capitalism and Slavery 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). See, for example, Ronald Bailey, “The Slave(ry) 
Trades and the Development of Capitalism in the United States: The Textile Industry in New England,” 
Social Science History, Vol. 14 No. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 373-414. A more recent work offers the same 
interpretation as Bailey: Eric Kimball, “‘What Have We To Do With Slavery?’” Seth Rockman has recently 
presented work in which he argues that a “plantation belt” existed in New England in the 19th century, by 
which he means that several shoe and textile factories in New England produced some goods for 
southern plantation markets. The overall significance of New England shoe and textile sales to southern 
plantation markets is unclear, but there is no indication that they approached anything close to a majority 
of industry sales overall.  
22 Howland, An Address, p. 15.  
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claim their share of public attention… and the state of population in the agricultural districts will 




By the end of the decade, American mechanized textile production began to rise, 
especially in response to a decline in British textile production as a result of the Napoleonic Wars 
and the Jefferson administration’s 1808 embargo on British imports. Northeastern capitalists 
piled investment into the  construction of dozens of cotton, woolen, and linen spinning mills, 
hoping to take advantage of the absence of British textiles and establish the region as a world 
player in textile production.24 These investors followed a path trodden beginning in the late 
1780s by men like Rhode Island’s Moses Brown, committed slavery abolitionist and pioneering 
textile capitalist. Southern planters increasingly shifted to cotton production, and the slave states 
also produced manufactured cotton goods of their own. As he had since the 1780s, Tench Coxe 
compiled American economic production statistics in 1810 while serving as the Purveyor of 
Public Supplies, a position to which he had been appointed by in 1803 Thomas Jefferson. The 
tables of statistics Coxe compiled in 1810 are in no way complete, nor did Coxe claim them to be 
                                                           
23 Howland, An Address, p. 20.  
24 Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, pp. 88-121. Meyer terms this period “the foundation of 
the Eastern textile core,” which he argues emerged on the strength of pre-existing transformations in 
northeastern patterns of agriculture which generated higher productivity through farm investments and 
increased crop specialization.  
289 
 
so.25 Nevertheless, they give a reasonable snapshot of American regional production of a number 
of manufactured goods, as well as an indication of American agricultural yields.  
The tables which recorded “Goods for apparel and furniture, of cotton, woollen [sic], 
flaxen, hempen and silken yarn or thread” produced in 1810 reveal significant regional 
difference. Coxe’s correspondents across the nation reported that “families” produced 
16,581,299 yards of cotton goods, while cotton manufacturing establishments made 146,974.26 
Production by families—a system that had existed since at least the 18th century in North 
America, where families either spun yarn or received it from local merchants, and wove it into 
cloths—was heavily skewed towards the slave states and territories, which produced roughly 
three-quarters of  family-made cotton goods. In the slave states and territories, crucially, 
“family” referred to both nuclear free families and plantations, and therefore counted the 
production of enslaved persons. South Carolina led the way, accounting for 3,688,534 yard of 
cotton goods produced by families, unsurprising given the Palmetto State’s booming upcountry 
cotton plantation economy.27 These statistics, moreover, in part contradict a common assertion in 
modern scholarship on slavery and capitalism: that southern cotton was vital to the northeastern 
economy. In the Early Republic, cotton was important to southern household-based (or 
plantation) production of cotton goods, but not to northeastern free-households.  
                                                           
25 U.S. Treasury Department, Tabular Statements of the Several Branches of American Manufactures… 1810 
[hereafter Tabular Statements] (Philadelphia: A. Cornman, 1813).  
26 Tabular Statements, p. 2. As is the case for many of the tables, it is clear that total production in yards far 
exceeded the stated amount, as the return for several states where manufacturing establishments are 
listed do not include yardage totals. Incomplete though they are, Coxe’s statistics were the most complete 
dataset that to which contemporaries had access. For more detail on Coxe’s activities in this period, see 
Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp. 413-432.  
27 Tabular Statements, p. 2.  
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 Cotton manufacturing establishments, like the mechanized spinning mills that 
increasingly peppered the New England and mid-Atlantic landscape near rivers and streams, 
were far less common from the Chesapeake southward. Coxe’s information revealed that two 
hundred and seven cotton manufactories had been established in the Northeast by 1810, while 
the slave states and territories only supported fifty-nine. This accentuated the basic fact of slave-
based economies: capital tied up in the bodies of the enslaved and the lands they forcibly toiled 
was capital not invested in labor-saving machinery.28 In fact, according to Coxe the vast majority 
of labor-saving machinery reported by his correspondents was located in the free states and 
territories, made clear in a table entitled “Instruments and machinery for the manufacture of 
cotton, flax, hemp, wool, and silk into cloths, & c.” Carding machines, which straightened raw 
fibers into long strands suitable for spinning into yarn, significantly reduced the amount of labor 
needed to card cotton, wool, and flax by hand. Of the 1,776 carding machines enumerated in the 
table, the northeastern states contained 1,591. Northeastern manufactories also reported the vast 
majority of other labor-saving textile machinery, including drawing and roving machines, 
spinning mules and jennies, and looms with fly shuttles.29 Just as importantly, the majority of 
foundries and mills which produced labor-saving machinery and their parts were also located in 
the Northeast.30 
Aside from cotton goods, woolens and linens constituted a significant portion of 
American production in 1810, centered mainly in the mid-Atlantic and New England. 
Unsurprisingly, given climate conditions, New England led the way in woolen yarn and cloth 
                                                           
28 On the basic structure and contours of the South’s slave-based system of regional capitalism, see Gavin 
Wright, Slavery and American Economic Development (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006).  
29 Tabular Statements, p. 7.  
30 Tabular Statements, p. 9.  
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production. The Northeast produced more than ninety percent of woolens made in private 
families, while the region contained twenty-one of twenty-four woolen manufacturing 
establishments enumerated in Coxe’s tables. The free states and territories also dominated 
production of flaxen cloths, as free households in New England, the mid-Atlantic, and Ohio 
accounted for almost three-quarters of the national output even though flax was not as limited by 
climate as wool.31 Production of “blended and unnamed cloths and stuffs,” various mixtures of 
cotton, wool, and linen, were more equally distributed across the nation, with the slave states 
producing about sixty percent.32 Overall, Coxe’s tabulations revealed that American production 
of “cloths and stuffs” of all kinds cumulatively totaled $38,785,250. New York, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Massachusetts, in that order, ranked as the most valuable 
textile-producing states; the free states and territories’ average ranking was 12.3, the and slave 
states and territories 13.7.33 Textile production, then, was an important economic activity 
throughout the Union, and each region had relative strength and weaknesses. What is clear is that 
by 1810 the textile manufacturing economies of the Northeast were moving in a different 
direction than the burgeoning Cotton Kingdom, towards mechanization and more efficient 
production techniques. Cotton was important to the South, but not necessarily to the Northeast, 
notwithstanding recent assertions by slavery capitalism historians.  
The statistics presented in Coxe’s 1810 tabulations reflected the effects of Jefferson’s 
1808 embargo on Great Britain and France, which negatively affected the American export 
economies. The embargo angered many New England merchants, especially those with close 
                                                           
31 Tabular Statements, p. 2.  
32 Tabular Statements, pp. 3-4.  
33 Tabular Statements, p. 5. Tennessee was split into East and West Tennessee. Excluding the territories and 
District of Columbia, which were 5 of the 6 smallest producers, the averages are: free states, 9.1; slave 
states, 10.  
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connections to Britain and Europe, who saw their import-export businesses ruined. New 
Englanders also interpreted the embargo as a political and economic attack on Federalists, and 
their region generally, one waged at the insistence of southern slaveholding Republicans and 
their Congressional representatives. “War Hawks” hailed most notably from the slave states, 
leading calls for a declaration of war against Great Britain by slaveholding politicians and their 
political allies in the Jeffersonian coalition.34 After Congress’s declaration of war in 1812, the 
Chesapeake received the brunt of the British war effort, and the nation’s capital famously treated 
to a conflagration by British forces. Just as in the American Revolution, the British Army 
instituted a policy of wartime emancipation in an attempt to undermine southern slave society, 
leading to the emancipation of several thousand slaves from Chesapeake masters. Meanwhile, 
the Hartford Convention discussed New England secession seriously, and officially called for the 
abrogation of the three-fifths clause in the Constitution, arguing that the founding fathers unfairly 
“agreed to consider slaves as men, but as men whose value the loss of freedom has 
depreciated...”35 At the end of war in 1815, Americans from all sections of the country looked 
forward to an economic resurgence.  
                                                           
34 Tench Coxe, well-known for his seeming political opportunism, tepidly supported southern 
Republicans’ calls for war in 1810-11, as the embargo supported his project of promoting domestic 
manufacturing. See Cooke, Tench Coxe. For more detail on Federalist disdain for the Embargo and the 
War of 1812, and how slavery rhetoric informed these conflicts, see Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early 
Republic, pp. 42-74.  
35 Public Documents Containing Proceedings of the Hartford Convention of Delegates; Report of the Commissioners 
While at Washington; Letters from Massachusetts Members at Congress… (Washington, D.C., 1815), pp. 37-38. 
On the War of 1812 in general, see Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, 
Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Knopf, 2010), and on slavery during the war, especially in the 
Chesapeake, Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1777-1832 (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2014). Paul Gilje frames the political and cultural context behind the War of 1812 as one where 
“free trade” and “sailor’s rights” intertwined; the former surely appealed to New England mercantile 
interests, despite their general opposition to the war. Gilje, “Free Trade and Sailor’s Rights: The Rhetoric 
of the War of 1812,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 30 No. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-23.  
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While the mid-Atlantic and New England states shared many economic similarities, 
especially as they concerned support for domestic manufactures, political conflicts related to the 
War of 1812 temporarily complicated efforts to develop a unified base of support for domestic 
industry. Mathew Carey, an Irish immigrant who devoted his life to publishing newspapers and 
magazines which trumpeted Jeffersonian politics and domestic manufactures, struck hard at New 
Englanders for betraying the Union by opposing the Embargo and the War of 1812. In The Olive 
Branch, published first in 1814 and quickly running through more than a dozen updates and 
reprints, Carey’s calumny fell most heavily upon wealthy and politically influential New 
England merchant families, which he accused of disloyalty to the Union. Wealthy merchants, in 
particular those of Boston, had spent several decades using “the most unceasing endeavours… to 
poison the minds of the people of New England towards, and to alienate them from, their fellow 
citizens of the southern states.” According to Carey, Federalists like the Cabots and Lodges 
deceived ordinary New Englanders, and especially farmers, into thinking that southerners were 
“demons incarnate, and destitute of all of the good qualities that dignify or adorn human nature.” 
The root of hatred towards southerners, Carey argued, was a hatred of slavery, and he quoted 
what he believed to be a representative New England merchant position on the subject, offered in 
“Pelham” essays published by the Connecticut Courant in the mid-1790s. “Negroes are,” one of 
the Pelham essays argued, “in all respects, except in regard to life and death, the cattle of the 
citizens of the southern states.”36 
                                                           
36 Mathew Carey, The Olive Branch: Or, Faults on Both Sides, Federal and Democratic. A Serious Appeal on the 
Necessity of Mutual Forgiveness and Harmony, to Save Our Common Country from Ruin, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: 
M. Carey, 1815), p. 253. All subsequent citations from this edition. Despite the subtitle’s pretense towards 
impartiality, The Olive Branch is very clearly anti-New England merchant and anti-Federalist propaganda. 
Shankman, “Capitalism, Slavery, and the New Epoch,” esp. pp. 244-245 describes Carey’s political 
economic thinking during the War of 1812 and after in detail. In general, Shankman portrays Carey as a 
stronger proponent for slavery’s expansion than I would, although I agree with Shankman’s assertion 
that by the Missouri Crisis, Carey had come to realize that the most significant opposition to his vision of 
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 Strong words, to be sure, but did Carey overstate the anti-southern planter convictions of 
wealthy New England merchants? There is reason to believe that he did, in order to bolster his 
overt attack on leading New England Federalists. New England merchants had long been the 
national political allies of southern planters, particularly as it pertained to tariff duties, though 
Jefferson’s Embargo clearly signaled temporary cracks in that alliance. Carey claimed that at the 
time of the “Pelham” essays’ publication, “there were many slaves in Connecticut, who were 
subject to the all the disadvantages that attended the southern slaves.” This statement clearly 
ignored the fact that Connecticut’s 1784 abolition law declared chattel slavery illegal, and 
transferred the status of the enslaved to long-term servitude. Carey further claimed that the “vile 
character” of New England Federalists’ attack on Republican slaveholders was “greatly 
aggravated by the consideration that a large portion of these very negroes, and their ancestors, 
had been purchased, and rent from their homes and families by New Englanders… engaged in 
the Slave Trade.” While it was certainly true that some New England merchants, especially those 
of Newport, Rhode Island, participated in the transatlantic slave trade before and after the 
Revolution, this statement ignored the fact that between 1803 and 1808 almost half of ships 
bound for Africa embarked from South Carolina, most registered from Charleston.37  
Carey’s partisan attack on New England merchants was most directly inspired by his 
dislike for their (surely self-interested) claims that the New England carrying trade was the 
bedrock of national economic prosperity, and therefore the southern plantation economies of 
secondary importance. In his rush to defend his planter political allies, Carey claimed a measure 
                                                           
a fully integrated national economy that encompassed both the slave and free regions was southern 
slaveholders, and not, as he argued in The Olive Branch, “extreme” New England Federalist merchants. 
See Ibid., pp. 249-252.  
37 Of 112,582 slaves disembarked by British North American/United States ships between 1750 and 1815, 
87,313 arrived at the Carolinas and Georgia. TSTD, statistics compiled 15 March 2018.  Carey, The Olive 
Branch, p. 253.  
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of national economic integration that he could not support with actual numbers. His stated 
goal—his “deeper game”—was to disprove several points he claimed New England merchants 
made repeatedly. First, “that New England was supereminently commercial,” and second that 
“the states south of the Patowmac, were wholly agricultural.” Third was the mistaken notion that 
“there is a natural and inevitable hostility between commercial and agricultural states,” a hostility 
which “has uniformly pervaded the southern states.” Finally, he strove to disprove the idea that 
“all the measures of congress were dictated by that hostility; and actually intended to ruin the 
commercial, meaning the eastern states.”38 
Carey provided more than a dozen tables designed to prove that the southern plantation-
export economies were just as vital to national economic prosperity as the New England carrying 
trade. Carey went out of his way to state that this was an attack on a specific subset of the New 
England merchant class, not the yeomanry. “I feel a pride and pleasure in doing justice to the 
New England yeomanry” whom he recognized as “upright, sober, orderly, and regular- shrewd, 
intelligent, and well-informed…” Notwithstanding those virtues, the yeomanry had been 
“egregiously duped” by leading Federalist Boston merchants, especially.39 Carey intended the 
information he included in the tables to undermine the claims of these merchants to economic 
superiority rooted in their supposed dominance of American commerce. Though carefully 
selected statistics and using somewhat misleading categorizations, Carey claimed to prove that 
southern exports were on par with New England and the mid-Atlantic. He lumped together 
“domestic productions and manufactures,” and in doing so was able to show that slave-grown 
                                                           
38 Carey, The Olive Branch, p. 254. Carey was forced to admit that, “I do not assert that these positions 
were ever laid down in regular form, as theses to argue upon,” but nonetheless turned around and 
declared them the basis of “three fourths of all the essays, paragraphs, squibs, and crackers, that have 
appeared in the Boston papers against the [Jefferson and Madison] administration for many years past.” 
Ibid.  
39 Carey, The Olive Branch, pp. 257-258.  
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export commodities constituted a significant economic activity. Between 1803 and 1813, he 
noted that Massachusetts cumulatively exported $54,985,000, while South Carolina lagged just 
behind at $50,523,000. Pennsylvania and Virginia produced export commodities totaling 
$42,833,000 and $44,796,000, respectively, while New York led the nation at $85,283,000.40 
In presenting these numbers, Carey repeatedly claimed that New England did not actually 
produce the bulk of its exported goods, but instead benefitted from re-exporting southern 
commodities. “The naked fact is,” he asserted, “that the demagogues in the eastern states, not 
satisfied with deriving all the benefits from the southern states, that they would from so many 
wealthy colonies… have uniformly treated them with outrage, insult, and injury.”41 These 
claims, however, were only assertions, unsupported with evidence. Carey instead used 
suppositions to prove his point. For example, he wrote “suppose among the exports of New 
England, a million of dollars’ worth of cotton, half a million worth of flour, half a million worth 
of naval stores, all drawn from the southern or middle states,” including Pennsylvania and New 
York, and “[New England] appears two million dollars stronger on the face of the argument… 
and there is no doubt that this is the case to a vast extent.”42 It certainly can be assumed that New 
England merchants did carry a portion of southern products, but Carey’s selective use of 
statistics and his biased assumptions also make it reasonable to question his veracity, especially 
in the context of a work that was clearly designed to make a partisan political argument. 
Moreover, The Olive Branch’s economic analysis almost entirely omitted discussion of one of 
Carey’s life-long causes: promotion of American domestic manufacturing, which at the time was 
beginning to grow in the mid-Atlantic—and, yes, New England. 
                                                           
40 Carey, The Olive Branch, Table C, p. 264.  
41 Carey, The Olive Branch, p. 269.  
42 Carey, The Olive Branch, p. 269.  
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The cumulative effect of Carey’s attack on the New England merchant class was to 
complicate political and economic alliances between the mid-Atlantic and New England states. 
In his rage to defend the key Jeffersonian constituency of southern planters, he unleashed a 
barrage against leading Federalist merchants, some of whom had just begun to shift towards 
industrial capitalism, most famously Francis Cabot Lowell, who founded the first iteration of the 
Lowell manufacturing system in 1814. It was New England merchants, he claimed, who were 
responsible for the “very expensive habits of the planters of Virginia and South Carolina,” 
because New England flooded southern markets with imported goods and luxury items. Blaming 
New England merchants for southern planters’ “expensive habits” was more than a little 
disingenuous, as was claiming that “the solemn truth will be borne in constant remembrance, that 
the southern states are virtually colonies to those states whose demagogues have never ceased 
slandering and persecuting them.”43 Carey imagined a neocolonial relationship between New 
England and the South that did not exist, certainly not in the minds of southern planters 
themselves, nor to promoters of northeastern domestic manufacturing that increasingly believed 
that southern slaveholders had too much, not too little, control over the levers of national 
economic policy.  
The vision of national economic integration that Carey imagined, with the southern 
plantation economies freed from the overbearing persecution of New England merchants, did not 
unfold as he prophesied in The Olive Branch, or in his other writings on American political 
economy in the mid-1810s.44 As Carey began to learn painfully in the years after the War of 
                                                           
43 Carey, The Olive Branch, p. 280.  
44 See, for example, the essays collected in Carey, Essays on Political Economy; Or, the Most Certain Means of 
Promoting the Wealth, Power, Resources, and Happiness of Nations: Applied Particularly to the United States 
(Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 1822).  
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1812, just as southern planters resisted even the faint suggestion of national government 
interference with slavery, so did they resist overtures to use government authority to promote 
domestic manufacturing. Why would they promote manufacturing? Their plantation economies 
did not stand to benefit directly from domestic production of textiles, metal and leather goods, 
and myriad other products that had emerged in Northeast in the first decades of the century. 
Promoting domestic manufacturing, as well as the Whiggish program of internal improvements 
of which Carey also approved, required the use of national government authority to a degree that 
alarmed slaveholders.  
Southern planters, in league with powerful New England merchants, launched an attack 
on the promotion of northeastern manufacturing capability that laid bare deep-rooted conflicts 
and suggested that a single American national political economy might not be possible. In 1816, 
for example, they accused the northeastern textile manufacturers of extortion during the war by 
charging higher prices for American-made goods in the absence of British imports. But 
according to Carey, in a change of heart from his thesis in the Olive Branch, the real extortion 
occurred when planters “raised the price of cotton from thirteen cents per pound to twenty-seven, 
between 1814 and 1816—the tobacco planter, who in 1816 raised the price of tobacco from $96 
to $185.” To be sure, northeastern family farmers had raised the prices of wheat during times of 
high European demand, but it was southern planters, in league with wealthy New England 
merchants, who had done the most damage to his vision of political economy.45  
Sometimes northeastern manufacturing groups tried to appeal to a sense of common 
interest with southern planters. In 1817, for example, the Connecticut Society for the 
                                                           
45 Carey, Essays on Political Economy, Preface, p. viii.  
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Encouragement of American Manufactures went out of its way to assuage southern planters that 
American cotton was vital to the economies of both regions. “American Manufactures,” they 
wrote, “placed upon a proper footing, enjoying the protection of the government and the favour 
of the people, would prove both nationally and individually, Economical and Moral.” The 
Connecticut Society tried to impress upon southern planters that they “are materially concerned” 
in American textile production, because American cotton, “their staple product,” should feed 
American factories and not those of Great Britain. This, they argued, would increase American 
textile consumption, and a rising tide of consumption would lift the all of the American regional 
economies. They imagined a scenario in which the southern states, rather than enrich British and 
European merchants, would keep raw material and specie from leaving American soil. The 
Connecticut Society prophesied—incorrectly, as it would turn out—that “although the Northern 
States have at this time a greater apparent interest” in domestic manufacturing, “the Southern 
states will hereafter (in a short time, perhaps) be as much, nay, yet more deeply, concerned in the 
encouragement of American manufactures.”46 
That southern planters at the time of the Missouri Crisis and the concurrent Panic of 1819 
did not see things this way was a painful lesson for Mathew Carey, and other northeasterners 
with Jeffersonian producerist principles who desired to that American domestic manufacturing 
rise to the level of powerful Great Britain. New Yorker Henry Lord wrote of his experiences 
discussing national economic policy with southern planters that “in the southern states, there is 
but one general interest… the labor is done by slaves who can neither remove or apply their 
                                                           
46 Connecticut Society for the Encouragement of American Manufactures, Address (Middletown, CT: 
Dunning, 1817), pp. 7-8.  
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industry to new objects.” This was almost the exact same point Thomas Paine made to Jefferson 




The American economy struggled to recover after the devastation and embarrassments of 
the War of 1812, and then the Panic of 1819 struck with vengeance. Northeastern manufacturers 
of many varieties of goods, but especially textiles, bore the brunt of economic depression, and 
called into question the supposedly harmonious balance of agriculture, commerce, and 
manufacturing which political economists since the 1780s had trumpeted as the nation’s most 
secure developmental path. Many farmers who had expanded to produce for European markets 
during the Napoleonic Wars found themselves deeply in debt and increasingly insolvent by the 
end of the 1810s. In 1819, rather than harmony, northeastern commentators saw economic 
conflict and political divisiveness, and they blamed southern planters and their merchant allies. 
The Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National Industry (PSPNI), a leading trade group, 
placed the blame squarely on misguided tariff policies that discriminated against domestic 
manufactures. By instituting ill-advised policy prescriptions inspired by Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations, before and after the war the U.S. Congress ruined domestic manufacturing by 
not protecting the home market from imported goods. PSPNI leaders, led by Mathew Carey and 
Tench Coxe, skewered Smithian tariff policy as interpreted by certain factions in U.S. Congress. 
                                                           
47 Eleazar Lord to Mathew Carey, 18 February 1820, quoted in Shankman, “Capitalism, Slavery, and the 
New Epoch,” p. 255.  
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Carey’s dislike of New Englanders had clearly softened, at the same time that his dislike for 
slaveholder’s iron grip on national economic policy increased. These policies, but especially low 
tariffs on dozens of imported manufactures, led the PSPNI to sneer that “the advocates of the 
system of Adam Smith ought to be satisfied with the fatal experiment we have made of it.”48  
 According to the PSPNI, contra the maxims of Smithian political economy, a nation’s 
prosperity rested on eleven principles, all of which congressional policy violated in the 1810s. 
First and most important were high tariffs that protected the American home market from foreign 
competitors. The lack of tariff protection for domestic manufactures pushed many northeastern 
large- and small-scale textile producers to the brink of financial ruin, and many others over the 
cliff. By discouraging American manufacturing, the opposition to domestic manufactures 
violated the precept that “throughout the world, in all ages, wherever industry has been duly 
encouraged, mankind have been uniformly industrious,” and that “the interests of agriculture, 
manufactures, and commerce, are so inseparably connected, that any serious injury suffered by 
one of them must materially affect the others.”49 Home markets existed to consume manufactures 
made at home, they insisted, and to encourage policy to the contrary was selfish and unpatriotic. 
Great Britain had done exactly this in its Tariff of 1818, and the PSPNI provided readers with an 
exhaustive, but not complete, list of eighty-six varieties of manufactures protected by British 
policy, ranging from silk-worm guts to textiles.50 What especially galled Carey and the society’s 
supporters was that the United States contained natural resources almost unparalleled within the 
boundaries of one nation. When casting their eyes toward the textile industries, they inveighed 
                                                           
48 Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National Industry [hereafter PSPNI], Addresses (Philadelphia: 
M. Carey and Son, 1819), Preface: p. x.  
49 PSPNI, Addresses, No. I, p. 20.  
50 PSPNI, Addresses, No. III: pp. 37-38.  
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against allowing British and other foreign textile imports in a nation that could produce wool, 
flax and most cotton in abundance. 
 By the end of the decade, southern planters increasingly shifted their enslaved peoples’ 
energy into cotton production, especially in upland country of South Carolina and Georgia, the 
new state of Mississippi, and as of December that year, the new state of Alabama, accelerating 
after the conclusion of war in 1815.51 By 1819, of course, the Missouri Territory also 
increasingly filled with planters who migrated with their slaves from Kentucky and Tennessee. 
Cotton could generate enormous profits, but British cotton markets could also be highly unstable. 
And yet, the manufacturing promoters fumed, southern planting interests in Congress were 
precisely the faction that led the charge to maintain low tariffs on imported textiles and other 
manufactures. How on earth, the PSPNI wondered, could southern planters, in league with 
wealthier sectors of the coastal merchant class, discriminate against northeastern textile 
manufacturers and maintain their fidelity to the Union? Cottons did not completely dominate the 
northeastern textile sector, as production of woolens and linens remained important, but for 
southern planters to discriminate against their compatriots so that they could maintain good 
relations with British merchants and manufacturers was a step too far.  
 The PSPNI was careful not to entirely blame the southern slaveholders—votes for 
lowering tariffs came from congressmen throughout the Union—but the planters were the most 
united group in favor of low tariffs. “We do not pretend that the low tariff proceeded solely from 
the southern planters,” the society recognized, for “members from every state in the union, 
                                                           
51 Beckert, Empire of Cotton; Hammond, “Slavery, Settlement, and Empire: The Expansion and Growth of 
Slavery in the Interior of the North American Continent, 1770-1820,” Journal of the Early Republic, 32 




except three, voted for the existing rates.” Nonetheless, southern planters had been near-
unanimous in their support for the low tariff schedule so harmful to northeastern manufacturing. 
Only five congressmen from the “five southern states, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia” voted against tariffs on imported cotton goods. Southern planters and 
their congressional representatives had been duly warned about the consequences failing to 
protect domestic industry. Southern planters, they argued, had seen the value of their estates 
plummet by one-third, northeastern commercial interests too often teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy, and manufacturing faced total ruin. This might have been avoided, they added, but 
while “southern planters were admonished” to support tariff protections, they declined to “secure 
a grand home market, independent of the caprice of foreign nations.”52 While respectful in their 
entreaties to southern planting interests and their congressional allies, the society nonetheless 
placed blame for manufacturers’ dire economic circumstances on slaveowners. 
 The PSPNI made this point clearly in a lengthy footnote in its fourth address of 1819, 
published that April. The society intended this particular address to enlighten Americans on the 
stringent protections for domestic manufacturing offered by the Russian Empire, as a 
counterpoint to the United States’ lack of protection. In the midst of this analysis, the address 
clearly pointed to sectional rivalries rooted in slavery as the cause of manufacturer and 
northeastern family farmers’ ills. “It is too common, we apprehend, for many of the farmers and 
planters of the southern states,” it proclaimed, “to regard with disesteem, or, to use a common 
phrase, to look down on manufacturers as beneath them in point of respectability.” Southern 
planters and farmers, then, reliant on chattel slavery and unwilling to concede the advantages of 
the peculiar institution in matters of national economic policy, were the source of “the inflexible 
                                                           
52 PSPNI, Addresses, No. V, pp. 74-75.  
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refusal of that protection.” The PSPNI treaded lightly, not wanting to further stoke sectional 
tensions only two months after New York Rep. James Tallmadge proposed banning chattel 
slavery from Missouri, the opening salvo in the escalating Missouri Crisis. While it was true that 
northeastern manufacturers looked forward to a day when southern cotton could fully supply the 
power looms of northeastern textile works—the special dream of Tench Coxe and his protégé 
Mathew Carey—at every turn they encountered the stiff resistance of southern slave masters, as 
it regarded national economic policy.53 
 Perhaps the PSPNI was too polite in their entreaties to southern slaveholders, but their 
commentary laid bare the fundamental differences in American regional capitalism. “We freely 
ask, and request a candid reply,” they wrote, “can there… be found on the most impartial 
scrutiny any superiority in a South Carolina or Virginia planter, surrounded by five hundred 
slaves, over a proprietor of one of the extensive factories in Rhode Island…?” In the latter, 
unlike on the southern plantation, observers could find “free, independent, and happy workmen, 
with their wives and children… employed.” This comment struck at the heart of the divide 
between slavery and antislavery capitalism. In the latter, which accelerated in tandem with 
northeastern state abolition of chattel slavery, economic development flowed from the 
productivity of free households—patriarchal units in which parents retained legal control of their 
children and were not bound to an external authority. Antislavery commentators had made this 
point repeatedly since the British-American imperial crisis beginning in the 1760s, that to abolish 
chattel slavery would be to unleash, after a period of servitude, free households into labor market 
participation. Undoubtedly, the PSPNI underplayed the often harsh working conditions and 
                                                           
53 PSPNI, Addresses, No. IV, p. 54.  
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seasonal instability of New England textile mills, and not all textile families were completely 
happy and content. But on the other hand, they were not slaves either.54 
 Even without meaningful tariff protections for domestic textiles, the PSPNI pointed out, 
the New England textile mills were still productive. An 1815 memorial to Congress showed that 
within thirty miles of Providence, RI, 140 “cotton manufactories” produced goods valued at six 
million dollars, including the mill originally founded by antislavery capitalist Moses Brown and 
alongside the expert English mechanic Samuel Slater. “We trust this brief view,” commented the 
PSPNI, “will serve to remove the film from the eyes of those citizens who, for want of due 
consideration, have cherished opinions on the subject of manufactures, and manufacturers, so 
diametrically opposite to fact, and so pregnant with ruinous consequences.” Just think, they 
asked, what the northeastern textile mills could produce if properly protected by the national 
government? Unfortunately for northeastern promoters of domestic manufactures, southern 
planters wielded disproportionate power in Congress, and alongside factions of wealthy 
northeastern merchants used it as a cudgel to suppress American manufacturers’ ability to 
capitalize on growing domestic consumption markets in New England, the mid-Atlantic, and the 
Northwest. For all the respectfulness of the PSPNI’s entreaties, however, they also offered a not-
so-veiled warning: “and the manufacturer of cottons, woolens, watches, paper, books, hats, or 
shoes, who ‘acts his part’ has no reason to shrink, and we trust he will never shrink, from a 
comparison with any of his fellow men, whether merchants, farmers, planters, or men of 
overgrown wealth.”55 
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 In streams of memorials to Congress, groups of manufacturers and burgeoning 
industrialists repeatedly asked legislators to use their authority to promote domestic production, 
only to encounter intransigence from slaveholding constituencies and their congressmen, 
especially in the critical years of 1819 and 1820. In December 1819, the Fredricksburg, Virginia 
Agricultural Society submitted a remonstrance to Congress spurred by the conviction that 
northeastern manufacturing societies and their spokesmen had dominated too much of the public 
attention in their pursuit of national protective policies. It opened by appealing to Revolution 
principles, that “hostility… to partial taxation, exclusive privileges, and monopolies” was the 
“primary cause of our glorious and ever-memorable revolution.” That they equated requests for 
domestic manufacturing protection with eighteenth century British imperial monopolies signaled 
the Society’s core point, that “free trade” was more beneficial to the nation than domestic 
industry. Protective duties intended to promote domestic production, therefore, qualified as 
“flagrant violations” of slave-based political economy, which depended on access to 
manufactures as cheaply as possible—even if, ironically for the Society’s appeal to the 
Revolution, they came from Great Britain. In a deeply paradoxical twist coming from 
slaveholders, the Society further claimed that “the prosperity and happiness of [America] depend 
not on immunities, privileges and monopolies granted to one class or order at the expense of 
another.” To entirely exclude or levy discriminatory duties against foreign goods in the name of 
promoting domestic industry, therefore, was unpatriotic. The Virginia Society closed by making 
a perfunctory gesture to northeastern manufacturers, that they felt no enmity and “pledge 
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ourselves to prefer whatever they may manufacture,” assuming relatively equivalent prices and 
quality to foreign goods.56 
 Almost simultaneously, members of the United Agricultural Societies of Virginia, 
including representatives from Prince George, Sussex, Surry, Petersburg, and Brunswick 
Counties, petitioned Congress with an equally strident anti-manufacture protection message. 
Like the Fredricksburg petition, these tobacco planters railed against protective tariffs as unfairly 
monopolistic and favorable to special interests.  They argued that prohibitive duties were 
unnecessary, given that American manufacturers already possessed the advantage of lower tax 
rates than European nations, as well as the “cheap terms on which the chief necessaries of life—
meat, bread, and fuel—can be procured; [and] the abundance in which the raw materials are 
produced…” Thus, American manufacturers’ failure to compete with British and European 
imports came down to two reasons, either a lack of capital or an unwillingness to compete with 
foreign manufactures. “In every nation,” they congratulated themselves, “the landed interest has 
been proverbial for liberality, in comparison with every other class,” unlike northeastern 
manufacturers whom they claimed took umbrage against perceived threats to their interests far 
too quickly. This amounted to a class war, with slaveholding planters and manufacturers arguing 
that the other constituted a special interest that did not deserve government patronage.57  
                                                           
56 “Remonstrance of the Virginia Agricultural Society of Fredricksburg,” 29 December 1819, reprinted in 
Niles’ Weekly Register, Vol. V: New Series, pp. 354-355. Hezakiah Niles’ headline indicated the stark terms 
of debate between the planter and manufacturing interests: “AGRICULTURE VS. MANUFACTURING.” 
The influential Niles’ personal views, which leaned towards Jeffersonian producerism, attempted to split 
the difference, with a measure of hostility towards tobacco planters: “If manufactures are to be protected 
at the cost of agriculture, we say—let them remain unprotected. Our best affections are with the tillers of 
the soil. But believing it advantageous to all the agriculturalists in the United States, except perhaps, the 
growers of one solitary article, tobacco, that manufactures should be encouraged, we must dissent from 
the opinions of the gentlemen from Virginia…” Ibid., p. 337.  
57 “Remonstrance Against an Increase of Duties on Imports. Communicated to the House of 




 That slaveholding Virginia planters claimed not to receive special protection from the 
national government galled many northeasterners, especially in the context of the escalating 
Missouri Crisis. The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of American Manufactures 
communicated its reply to the Virginia petitions in April 1820, little more than one month after 
President James Monroe signed the Missouri Compromise bill shepherded through Congress by 
House leader Henry Clay. The manufacturers took special offense to the planters’ claims to 
superior “liberality,” claiming that “the contrast between this strong assumption, and the object 
of the remonstrance, it no uncommon.” Then they offered an oblique critique of the planter class: 
“Every day’s experience so strongly proves the extreme discrepancy between the profession and 
practice” of the planters’ self-proclaimed liberality, “that no illustration can be necessary.”58  
The Philadelphia Society offered a lengthy rebuttal to the Virginians couched in the 
historic discrimination against domestic manufactures, and the simultaneous government 
protection for commerce and slave-grown export commodities. As evidence for their assertion 
that slave-grown commodities had always received special protection from Congress, the 
Philadelphia Society pointed out that in 1789, cotton, snuff, manufactured tobacco, hemp, and 
indigo received tariff protections that averaged forty-six percent, while imported manufactures 
including cottons, woolens, and iron, received five percent. In 1820, import duties on the same 
slave-grown commodities, with sugar added, averaged fifty-four percent, while in 1818 tariffs on 
foreign textiles and manufactures averaged twenty percent.59 This, the Philadelphia Society 
argued, constituted crystal-clear evidence of the real special interest in American political 
                                                           
58 “Protection to Manufactures,” 15 April 1820, American State Papers 011, 16 Cong. 1 Sess., III: pp. 526-530, 
quotations pp. 526-527.  
59 Ibid., p. 527. In 1789, as in 1820, manufactured tobacco received one hundred percent protection, a point 
the Society made clear in their response to the Virginia petitions.  
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economy. “Of this striking contrast,” the Society reiterated, “adds one to the numerous 
melancholy instances with which history abounds, that where one particular interest 
predominates in a legislative body, the others rarely experience impartial justice.”60 They may 
have well just directly mentioned the three-fifths clause; in the event, they hardly needed to 
remind Congress of the disproportionate power of slaveholders in Congress, certainly not at a 





The introduction of labor-saving machinery, especially in textile manufactories, did not 
have entirely positive effects on the lives of working men, women, and children. Historians have 
long noted that wrenching shifts in work regimes accompanied the rise of mechanized textile 
manufacturing in Great Britain in the 18th century, and later the United States. Older agricultural 
and household textile production patterns in which laborers worked in the home and set their 
own pace of production changed when textile capitalists established mechanized spinning plants 
in many localities. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century water-powered mechanized 
plants like the one funded by abolitionist Moses Brown and operated by Samuel Slater in 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, proprietors operated machinery continuously in twelve hour shifts. 
Textile capitalists’ labor demands often conflicted with the desires of working families to 
maintain some measure of autonomy over their working lives, and proprietors faced constant 
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labor shortages. Thus, according to Samuel Slater’s earliest biographer, the Englishman 
encountered problems in the late 1780s as he tried to train boys to serve as factory operatives in 
Pawtucket, where “nothing of the kind” had been familiar to locals.61 
 Slater replicated the labor system he learned from pioneer English textile manufacturer 
Jedediah Strutt, in which he relied on families to supply labor to his factories on a mixed full and 
part-time basis, as farm families increasingly relied on selling some of their family’s labor for 
wages in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Slater’s method, also known as the Rhode 
Island System, took advantage of labor markets in which farm families faced increasing pressure 
to earn cash in order to compete in market society.62 Until the Lowell system emerged in 
Massachusetts, where manufacturers hired and housed teenage girls from farming families in 
massive plants, variants of the Rhode Island System typified manufacturing labor regimes in the 
first decades of the century. Manufacturers and their allies in politics constantly encountered 
criticisms from their opponents, primarily southern planters and northeastern merchants, that 
manufacturing districts resulted in poverty and social decay. Thus, Slater famously insisted on 
rigid codes of conduct for his workers, and enforced church attendance, all to prove that 
manufacturing improved morality, not destroyed it.63 
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 The rise of mechanized manufacturing in the Northeast, however, did in many cases lead 
to the rise of social problems and increased class differentiation. Poverty and related social 
problems in the early American manufacturing economy were particularly obvious in urban 
areas, where the establishment of manufacturing plants that produced a large variety of goods 
rose in the early nineteenth century. In many cases, social ills stemmed from the fact that 
manufacturing establishments could not always offer year-round employment to workers, an 
especially acute problem in winter.64 Social reform organizations, in conjunction with local and 
state governments, grappled with how to address issues like poverty, drunkenness, crime, and 
domestic violence, and in the process documented the effects of manufacturing economies on the 
lives of laborers.65 
Pennsylvania, a state that produced more than four million dollars’ worth of both iron and 
steel products and textiles in 1810, social ills were especially acute in the Philadelphia area, the 
state’s largest concentration of population and base of manufacturing.66 Some of the city’s 
leading residents formed the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Public Economy 
(PSPPE), dedicated to finding solutions to poverty and related issues in Philadelphia. The 
PSPPE, formed in 1816, undertook research to “investigate the causes which produce the 
unhappy number of persons, who annually require public assistance.” The society’s 
investigations showed that commerce and the building trades were the most unstable, with 
manufacturing running just behind. That winter, the society wrote, “the various manufactories, 
                                                           
64 Seasonal unemployment, it should be noted, was not limited to manufacturing. This problem was most 
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whose operations have been suspended, have heretofore furnished employment to a very 
considerable number of poor, especially women and children.” When those factories suspended 
operations, family finances suffered and many became indigent, reliant on public assistance to 
survive. In a comment that domestic manufacturing promoters surely agreed with, the society 
blamed the lull in manufacturing on the availability of cheap foreign goods. They had “no doubt 
there are in this city from seven to thousand young and old people, who, if manufactures were 
prospering would earn two dollars per week, that are now idling and suffering.”67 Thus, 
according to the statistics compiled by the PSPPE, the effects of the southern planter-
northeastern merchant alliance in favor of promoting cheap foreign imports had a negative 
impact on the lives of Philadelphia’s working people.   
The PSPPE also blamed alcoholism for destroying the moral fabric of Philadelphia 
factory operatives and laborers, a charge which manufacturing promoters like Samuel Slater 
constantly denied. “It is a melancholy fact,” it wrote, “that the excessive use of ardent spirits is 
the cause of poverty, of a very large portion who receive public charity, probably 2-3ds…” The 
instability of the manufacturing economy and related occupations certainly led many operatives 
to drink, but the same was also true of sailors and the other maritime trades. Even though 
alcoholism and related social problems affected the City of Brotherly Love’s working classes, 
the society’s members remained unsure whether the prospect of year-long employment appealed 
to the indigent. Addressing the question, “what portion of the poor are willing to labor if they 
could obtain work all year,” the society admitted that there was significant difference of opinion. 
The poor almost universally claimed to want year-round employment, one researcher noted, but 
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“the fact is not so, and the number who subsist on daily wages does not… exceed the demand.” 
Others believed that “many of the poor are willing to labour if they could procure employment,” 
and that the labor supply exceeded demand.68 The perils of an emergent northeastern 
manufacturing capitalism for the poor, especially in urban areas, undercut the arguments of some 
of the more optimistic promoters of domestic manufacturing, who claimed it could improve the 
workers’ moral fabric as they produced the real article. And yet, manufacturing promoters could 
also claim that the pitfalls of manufacturing on the poor did not come close to the moral 
depravity and stifling of motivation and innovation that defined the labor regime of slavery. 
Though not one of the PSPPE’s stated goals, the 1817 report also illuminated the 
conditions of black Philadelphians, almost thirty years after the Keystone State’s process of 
slavery abolition began on March 1, 1780. The Society expressed surprise that its research did 
not validate the popular opinion that “the greater part of the poor are descendants of Africa.” 
While the available statistics were admittedly imperfect, the city’s Guardians of the Poor 
reported that of 5,679 persons who had received some form of public or private assistance in the 
previous months, blacks numbered 1,040, or 18.5%, a little more than one-sixth.69 But even 
though presumed “experts” on the subject of unemployment disagreed about its root causes, it is 
clear that the bourgeois leaders of the PSPPE believed that black Philadelphians warranted 
special supervision. The society’s report suggested that blacks often “make the wont of work 
only a plea to indulge in idleness.” Europeans and native-born whites did this as well, but the 
society still recommended that the city’s black residents “should be registered and placed under 
[the] strict care” of the city Guardians of the Poor.70 On the other hand, the society also noted 
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that black Philadelphians had fewer scruples about binding their children out as servants or 
apprentices when in dire financial circumstances. The PSPPE suggested that this was a beneficial 
trait, and it is reasonable to assume that many black Philadelphians in 1817 had experienced the 
process of gradual emancipation initiated in March 1780. Perhaps that was why black parents 
were more comfortable binding out their children, or perhaps the pride that black parents felt in 
their children was such that they had rather make sure of their children’s provision than force 




 In addition to the promotion of domestic manufactures, northeasterners continued to 
trumpet agricultural improvements as a key initiative to bolster American economic productivity. 
Since the 1780s, agricultural improvement enthusiasts had promoted a broad array of initiatives 
with the hope of producing larger crop yields at lower labor and financial expense. In oldest-
settled regions of the Northeast, family farmers increasingly converted their farm production to 
supply growing urban areas, one consequence of both increased immigration to the United States 
but also the spread of manufacturing establishments in coastal New England, and in and near 
urban centers like Philadelphia, New York City. Between 1800 and 1820, there was no single 
technological breakthrough that generated a massive spike in productivity; rather, the steady 
accretion of incremental improvements drove farming productivity. Increased market production, 
moreover, had two additional consequences: first, especially in New England, agricultural 
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production for urban markets led to greater stratification with the agricultural classes, as families 
began to release older children to labor in manufacturing establishments, while increasing land 
scarcity drove many into the Northwest Territory seeking fresh lands.72 
 The Massachusetts Society for Promoting Agriculture (MSPA), as it had since the early 
1790s, continued to sponsor contests to promote incremental improvements in farming 
techniques and to introduce new crops and seed varieties to New England farmer. The MSPA 
and other northeastern societies asked members and correspondents to focus their researches on 
crops and techniques which appealed to the capabilities of the free household farm, in which 
labor constraints led farmers to search for more efficient and productive farming techniques in 
the Early Republic. The transition to new and more efficient farming techniques, like the use of 
the molded English plow and nitrogen-rich clover in crop rotations, happened slowly, especially 
in the New England hinterlands, and northeastern agricultural societies believed their chief 
function was to accelerate agricultural production through experimentation and improvement. 
 An 1801 communication summarizing the MSPA’s annual activity, made these priorities 
abundantly clear. The Society extracted a long excerpt of a letter written by Joseph Cooper of 
New Jersey, in which Cooper described himself as a man “in a station of life which obliged me 
to secure a living industry,” by which he meant manual labor, chiefly “in the agricultural line.” 
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This also described the farmers the MSPA hoped to reach, and the rest of Cooper devoted most 
of the letter to describing experiments in various manures, types of potatoes, radishes, and Indian 
corn.73 Other communications included information from me like John Ellis of New York, who 
submitted “Account of a Method of Preventing the Premature Decay of Peach Trees,” from J. 
Kenrick, Jr of Newton, Massachusetts, “On Apple Trees,” and a short letter from Dr. Anthony 
Fothergill of Bath, England, “On Manures.” While mundane, to be sure, attention to such topics 
attested interest in making family farming as efficient and economical as possible.74  
In autumn 1805, the MSPA’s Board of Trustees negotiated a land grant from the state 
legislature, the proceeds of which were intended to establish an endowed chair on Natural 
History at Harvard. The Board also decided to publish a letter from esteemed statesman Timothy 
Pickering on new method of cultivating potatoes “from the Sprouts.”75 The Society continued to 
coordinate the flow of information from its members and correspondents to farmers throughout 
Massachusetts and England, alerting the public to experiments in new grain hybrids like 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire resident Nathaniel Adams’s experiments with “Jerusalem 
Wheat.”76 Other improvements the MSPA sponsored included one Paul Dodge’s new cider mill 
design, as well as referring Society Vice President Aaron Dexter’s dissertation Food For Plants 
for publication, and promoting Justin Ely’s experiments with “the long crooked necked worty 
squash.” 77 The Society not only sponsored premiums for experimentation in fruits, vegetables, 
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and grains, but also for initiatives that bridged the gap between agriculture and textile 
manufacturing. In April 1809, the Board of Trustees offered a reward for “the person who shall 
produce the largest quantity of wool, meat, and tallow, from the smallest number of sheep.”78 
The MSPA repeated this call in 1812, and would continue to do so after the War of 1812.79  
  The premiums the MSPA and other northeastern agricultural societies offered for the 
development and improvement of agricultural techniques were not merely academic, curiosities 
that farmers toyed with in their spare time. The improvements they promoted had real 
implications for promoting free household agriculture, widespread throughout the Northeast, and 
after 1810 shifting towards market production in New England and the mid-Atlantic. These 
complementary priorities—to make family farms more efficient for their own needs, as well as 
able to produce goods competitively for the marketplace—can be seen in the various categories 
in which farmers competed in local and county agricultural fairs. In 1819, for example, the 
Worcester County (MA) Agricultural Society (WCAS) organized a “Cattle Show and Exhibition 
of Manufactures,” which provides a revealing glimpse into the priorities of New England 
agricultural promoters and the capabilities of free household family farms.  
As was often the wont of improvement societies, the WCAS pleaded for more financial 
support from the local community, in order to supplement “the most munificent provision” the 
Massachusetts state legislature made for its projects. More money, the members said, would 
mean higher prizes for the contests they sponsored. Among these were cattle competitions, with 
the highest prize of twenty-five dollars for the best yoke of working oxen, and fifteen dollars for 
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the second-best yoke. The WCAS also offered rewards for the best merino and “native” sheep, as 
well as prizes for boars, pigs, bulls, and milch cows. The society’s criteria for judging the cattle 
demanded that the owners be “practical farmers,” and they weighed “the strength… and docility 
of the Cattle as well as to their size and appearance, with a view to decided highly in favor of 
such, as in their judgement, are the most valuable for labor.” Clearly, the WCAS had the 
capability of free household farms in mind.80 
The WCAS held two different sets of competitions for agricultural improvements and 
experiments. In the former, it offered rewards for “satisfying evidence for practical experiments” 
in clearing brush for pasture, for improved methods of making cider, and for “satisfactory 
evidence resulting from actual experiment of the relative value of Potatoes or other vegetable 
boiled or steamed for fattening beef or pork,” the most valuable award at fifteen dollars. Contests 
for agricultural experiments included a reward for growing the most wheat per acre, as well as 
for growing the largest number of carrots and turnips on less than one-quarter acre. The society 
also offered competitions in two categories of manufacturing, in “domestick” and “household” 
manufactures. Domestic manufactures included textiles made in the home with cotton, linen, and 
wool yarn distributed to families by textile mills, in addition to “manufactured calf skins” and 
“Soal Leather” for shoemaking. Household manufacture prizes included manufacturing 
processes completed with materials produced directly by the household, although there was some 
overlap with “domestick” manufactures. These prizes awarded six dollars for “the best piece of 
woolen cloth of household manufacture not less than 3-4 wide and at least 15 yards in length,” 
five dollars for more than five pairs of woolen hose, and five dollars each for the best tub of 
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butter of at least fifty pounds, and the best cheese of one hundred pounds or more. The WCAS, it 
seems, offered agriculture and manufacturing contests to free household family farms that 
simultaneously produced for personal consumption and external markets. These free household 
units, according to manufacturing promoters like Tench Coxe and Mathew Carey, were the 
precise constituency that domestic manufacturers could serve, especially as their increased 
production for the market simultaneously deepened their consumption of manufactured goods.81 
 In a speech delivered to the WCAS to open the 1819 Cattle Show, Levi Lincoln Jr., the 
son of an eminent lawyer and former Attorney General in the Jefferson administration, 
highlighted the importance of agriculture and the economic significance of the free household 
farming-household manufacturing family. While Lincoln did not deny that commerce was 
important, he reminded his audience that agriculture and household production were the bedrock 
of the local and regional economies. “It is hardly considered,” said Lincoln, “that even 
Commerce consists of an exchange of the productions of the soil…” In emphasizing the 
importance of agriculture, Lincoln aptly summarized the transition within northeastern regional 
capitalism that free household producers experienced in the Early Republic. To Lincoln—unlike 
much modern scholarship—increased penetration of market relations into rural counties like 
Worcester was a positive, rather negative development.82 
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 Contrasting New England with the Chesapeake and Lower South, Lincoln noted that “in 
many of the most fertile parts of our country, the grower of the produce is either unable to make 
sales, or must receive the avails reduced by the charges of tedious and expensive 
transportation…” Lincoln wondered what good would it do to people the western territories, 
which many had trumpeted as the foundation of future prosperity, “if the use for the product” of 
western lands “be limited by the consumption of the grower?” The famously stony soil of New 
England was not a hindrance to economic prosperity, precisely because agricultural 
improvements and access to external markets allowed free household farmers to achieve a level 
of economic independence that many white southerners—who were not slaveholders—could not 
attain. “Ask the returning Emigrant from the West or South, which now he most highly 
appreciates,” Lincoln challenged his audience, “the rough and hard, but vigorous soil of the East, 
with the necessity of labour to subdue and improve it… or the extent of territory, useless fertility 
and idleness, in a situation where the neighborhood is unknown, the means for educating 
children denied…?”83 As Lincoln spoke those words, the Missouri Crisis continued to escalate in 
the nation’s capital. He did not make direct reference to the political battle over slavery’s 
expansion, but the implications of his argument in support of northeastern agricultural 
improvement and domestic manufacturing traced the same contours as the debate over slavery’s 
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As was the case on a national scale, settlement in the Old Northwest divided along a 
North/South axis in the individual states. New Englanders settled the northern portions of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois nearer the Great Lakes, while pioneers from Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee settled the southern sections along the Ohio River. This brought conflicts over slavery 
to the Old Northwest states, in which chattel slavery was formally banned as per the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787. Masters from the Upper South moved to the Old Northwest, and deviously 
transferred their slaves’ status to lifetime indentured servitude in order to settle with their slaves 
in north of the Ohio River.  In Illinois, a particularly vicious political fight was triggered over the 
proposals of a slave-holder dominated state legislature to legalize slavery between 1819-1823, 
which antislavery Governor Edward Coles (a converted former Virginia slaveholder) 
successfully squashed. Illinois, in particular, developed political-economic dynamics in which 
the interests of southern masters in the southern portions of the state clashed with those of 
settlers originally from New England in its northern portions, leading a recent historian to 
describe the state from which Lincoln emerged “the nation’s conflict over slavery in 
miniature.”84  
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As the Northwest Territory states rapidly filled with settlers, especially New Englanders 
flocking to the Western Reserve in Ohio beginning in 1803, many brought with them the instinct 
for agricultural improvements and a desire to promote domestic manufacturers that gripped the 
Northeast. Pioneers brought the free household model prevalent in New England with them, and 
many of the reform-minded preoccupations of the rural middle classes. In 1819, family farmers 
in the Western Reserve county of Trumbull, Ohio, joined together to form an agriculture and 
manufacturing improvement society. The reform proposals spelled out in the society’s Articles 
of the Association had a distinctly western flavor, though in broad strokes they followed the lead 
of their eastern brethren. The society’s defined agriculture as “the art of so managing the earth, 
as to make it produce the best crops, and in the greatest abundance.” Believing that lazy 
techniques and a “prejudice” against using modern ploughing methods presented significant 
obstacles to the expansion of productive family agriculture in the reserve, the society promoted 
teaching family farmers the proper techniques for plowing fields.  
The Trumbull County society further desired to promote “rural economy” and domestic 
manufactures, which like easterners they viewed as critical adjuncts to crop and dairy 
production. The society defined rural economy as all farm activities exclusive of ploughing fields 
and raising crops, which “teaches the whole duty of a farmer as such, both in the management of 
his farm, as well as his household interests.” The society defined domestic manufactures, the 
second pillar of rural economic prosperity, in terms that made clear its free household priorities. 
“By ‘domestic,’” they wrote, “we mean the productions of family industry.” Family industry—
pointedly, for there were no suggestions that slavery had any role to play in the schema of the 
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Trumbull Co. society. The society’s proposals were tinged with a hint of disdain for the poorer 
sort of farm families, whom they believed lacked industry and industriousness: domestic 
manufactures should be encouraged, they argued, because “idleness is destructive to every social 
as well as moral principle. Many families are idle because of the very best of reasons—they have 
nothing to employ themselves about.” Therefore, they purchased cheap foreign articles, 
simultaneously hurting themselves and the national interest. The Trumbull Co. society concluded 
its debut communication by directly addressing its opponents, “the selfish [who] have already 
begun to whisper their enmities against the society.” They strongly implied that these “selfish” 
citizens included local merchants that depended on sales of imported goods to farm families, as 
well as large landholders whose interest it was to “keep you and all of us, in a state of profound 
ignorance as regards ‘rural economy.’”85  
As was the case in New England, societies like Trumbull County’s offered rewards for 
agricultural and domestic manufacturing improvements geared towards the capabilities of free 
household farms who did not desire, or have access to bound labor. In summer 1819, the 
Trumbull society offered cash rewards to the farmer who raised “the best three-fourths an acre of 
flax,” the best piece of woolen cloths, and “the best specimen of linen diaper, not less than ten 
yards…” The society’s capstone premium was indicative of their free household priorities: they 
offered a reward to “the person who shall cultivate a farm of not less than twenty acres, in the 
neatest and best manner, and at the least expense; view being had to the most lasting 
improvements thereon.”86 
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Throughout Ohio, free household farmers kept abreast of domestic manufacturing trends 
and proposed methods to increase household farm and factory production in the late 1810s and 
early 1820s. Newspapers across Ohio reprinted publications of domestic manufacturing 
promotion groups like the PSPNI, concluding for themselves that “industry is the only sure 
foundation for national virtue, happiness, and greatness,” and should be promoted by national 
government policy.87 Initiatives to promote the cultivation of flax in the Old Northwest intended 
to benefit both household mechanized industrial manufactures were disseminated throughout 
Ohio. In 1821, for example, the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture’s proposal for 
elevating mechanized spinning to the level of cotton textiles, reprinted in the Ohio Gazette, 
distributed experimental plans for a mechanized linen thread spinning machine and encouraged 
family farmers to grow flax as means of abetting the expansion of linen cloth production.88  
In Scioto County, Ohio an agricultural society formed in 1821 with the aim of furthering 
domestic manufactures on the free household scale, even though the county was located along 
the Ohio River, near Cincinnati and Louisville—and therefore, along the borderland of slavery 
and freedom. The society’s concern was to encourage the domestic agricultural and 
manufacturing economies in the wake of the Panic of 1819; concerned over the “low price of the 
products of the soil,” it urged experimentation with techniques that would maximize production 
while utilizing “the least amount of labor.” Dependence on foreign manufactured goods had 
rendered the Ohio Valley’s family farms and artisan workshops idle, its labor “misguided.” “We 
must choose one of two alternatives,” the society’s leaders urged: “to be in a state of dependence, 
clothed in foreign manufactures, or be independent, clothed in homespun, the products of our 
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own labor.”89 Promoting homespun manufactures was especially important for the rapidly 
growing western states and territories because their distance from the eastern seaboard increased 
the costs of foreign-made goods. Before the Erie Canal opened in 1825 and before railroads 
stretched their tentacles westward beginning in the 1820s, largely along an east-west axis.90 
Like northeastern improvement societies, those in Ohio like the Scioto County 
organization urged free household farm families to purse domestic manufactures and agricultural 
activities in the interest of promoting industry and industriousness. In offering improvement 
premiums, the Scioto society argued that “nothing but industry, rightly directed with economy, 
can relieve us of our present embarrassments.” This referred to the earliest stages of household 
manufactures in recently settled areas like southern Ohio. Farm families would have to make do 
with somewhat crude household productions at first—just as they needed to be patient in 
establishing their farms as productive units. “It is true,” the society’s leadership acknowledged, 
“that in the first attempts to manufacture, the articles produced are more rude in their appearance, 
than those of the same kind imported.” Two alternatives existed, as far as improvement societies 
were concerned: either the new western states remained dependent on imported foreign 
manufactures, or “be independent, clothed in homespun, the produce of our own labor.”91  
Conflicts over slavery and the political economy in the Early American west reached a 
crescendo in 1819, just as Ohio, Indiana, and finally Illinois increasingly peopled with free 
household farming communities. Simultaneously, southern planters desiring to force through the 
legalization of chattel slavery made concerted political efforts in the Indiana and Illinois state 
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legislatures to overturn the ban on chattel slavery in the Northwest Ordinance. The collision 
between “slaveholding nationalism”—the notion that slaveholders could force federal and state 
government recognition of their property rights in the enslaved anywhere in the states or national 
domain—clashed with a rising “popular antislavery politics,” opposition to slavery’s expansion 
into formally free territories rooted in a moral and political economy which disdained the 





 The 2nd Session of the 16th Congress’s agenda faced issues fraught with major 
consequences for the nation’s future, and the men involved knew it. In 1819-1820, the first three 
decades of regional political, social, and economic change merged in the crucial debates over 
whether to accept Missouri into the Union as a slave state. Widely recognized by historians as a 
critical turning point in the politics of slavery and antislavery, the Crisis (and resulting 
Compromise) marked a transition point where the politics of chattel slavery’s legality in the 
states and territories became nationalized. Thus, in many ways the years 1819-1820 marked the 
final chapter in the northeastern state processes of chattel slavery abolition. While some African-
Americans remained in a state of long-term servitude in New England and the mid-Atlantic 
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through the 1820s, slavery’s rapid decline in the Northeast, within the span of one generation, 
neared completion as the Missouri debates in Congress grew progressively more vitriolic.93 
 The divide between the political and economic interests of slaveholders and non-
slaveholders that the Missouri Crisis brought to national attention conflicts over national 
economic policy between 1800 and 1820. While it would be incorrect to say that all promoters of 
northeastern manufacturing development were explicitly antislavery, the substance of their 
visions of economic development premised on the absence of slavery in the Northeast—not 
southern chattel slavery, even as manufactured goods like cotton textiles required raw material 
inputs produced by slaves on southern plantations. But to reduce the United States’ path towards 
industrial capitalism to cotton textiles ignores the panoply of goods that manufacturing 
promoters like Tench Coxe envisioned as the bedrock of northeastern regional capitalism. 
Furthermore, reducing northeastern capitalism to cotton textiles ignores the social relations of 
production within the New England and mid-Atlantic states. When Thomas Paine wrote to 
President Jefferson in 1805 to oppose the slave trade’s legalization in Louisiana on both moral 
and economic grounds—slavery was wrong, but it also economically inefficient because it 
retarded domestic consumption—he imagined patterns of economic development for Louisiana 
that mimicked those of Pennsylvania and Westchester County, New York, his adopted American 
homes.  
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  While the Missouri Crisis marked the end of northeastern state slavery abolition, it just as 
surely opened the beginning of a new chapter of slavery politics. The creation of the 36° 30´ 
parallel, of course, did not end conflict over slavery’s expansion, and southern cotton production 
increased in the decades after 1820. The northern regional economies grew more tightly 
connected after 1820, as free household agriculture expanded in the Old Northwest states, while 
farmers in the Northeast increased their production for market, both to supply the needs of 
rapidly expanding urban areas and their growing industrial cores. With the exception of some 
mercantile and finance firms in cities like New York which dealt in southern cotton, the decades 
after 1820 witnessed increasing economic divisions between the North and South, not the mutual 
dependence described by slavery capitalism historians.  
 Near the end of his life in March 1820, Tench Coxe wrote to former president James 
Madison to express his dismay over the Missouri Crisis, and his retrospective thoughts on the 
state of American domestic manufacturing, which he spent his public life promoting assiduously. 
Like many aged political elites of the founding generation, Coxe was aghast at the divisive tenor 
of the Missouri debates. “I have been deeply impressed with the delicacy, delicacy, and high 
inconveniences of the agitation of the Missouri question,” he wrote, and he believed that 
Congress could not constitutionally prohibit slavery’s expansion into the Louisiana Territory. 
Coxe latched on to the tired Jeffersonian idea of the diffusion of slavery, “in order to facilitate 
and render safe, at the earliest day, their gradual abolition.” He also expressed interest in the 
rising African colonization movement, but was unconvinced that voluntary colonization would 
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work,” believing that African-Americans “would not go” to the newly founded American 
Colonization Society colony in northwest Africa, Liberia.94 
 Coxe still remained confident that domestic manufacturing would become the basis of 
American economic prosperity, and yet unlike earlier writings in which he castigated southern 
slaveholders for opposing policies that would promote it, in 1820 he hoped that some kind of 
compromise could be reached. Perhaps it was his growing worry over the Missouri Crisis 
talking, but Coxe wrote Madison that “I remain convinced that [domestic manufactures] are 
not… in need of more than necessary revenue from foreign goods does and will (with the 
charges of importation) give them.” By that point in this life, Coxe no longer promoted domestic 
manufacturing through prohibitive tariffs on foreign goods at all costs. “Agriculture, the laborer, 
the improver, the industrious, the frugal cannot wisely be burdened to promote more rapidly our 
great & growing manufactures,” he concluded.95 Yet Coxe’s apparent backtracking hinted at the 
tensions in his thought in his old age. He moved away from promoting manufacturing 
protections, precisely because domestic manufacturing continued to grow, and he would not live 
to see the northeastern industrialization in the 1840s and 1850s. And while Coxe did not choose 
to promote domestic manufacturing as forthrightly as he did earlier in his life, other 
northeasterners were more than happy to carry the mantle. 
 An 1820 broadside poem entitled “Home Industry: The Most Direct Road to National 
Prosperity,” encapsulated promoters’ expansive vision for national economic development. The 
poem celebrated national industry and the cultural attribute of industriousness, both long used by 
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northeastern abolitionists as critiques of chattel slavery and the power of southern planters.  The 
poem’s opening lines expressed the dual meanings of northeastern industry: 
 
Sages conven’d from delegating States, 
Who bears the charge of unborn millions fates, 
From early systems states their habits take, 
And morals more than climes a difference make, 
The give to toil a bias aid his cause, 
With all the force and majesty of laws;  
While you preside in useful arts direct, 
Create new fabrics and the old protect.96 
 
 
The poem, of course, did not offer a direct critique of chattel slavery and slaveholders, 
but the reference to “morals” and “climes” had a telling resonance in the unfolding political-
economic conflict between slave labor and free labor regimes in 1820 and after. And just as 
economic policy had become nationalized in the debates over tariff policy and promotion of 
domestic manufacturing versus prioritizing foreign imports and commodity crop exportations by 
1820, so would slavery politics become nationalized as a result of the Missouri Crisis. 
Northeastern state slavery abolition was, by definition, a state-level phenomenon, but after 1820 
political abolitionists began to develop plans for national abolition. Benjamin Lundy, a Quaker 
abolitionist originally from New Jersey, began to publish the Genius of Universal Emancipation 
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in 1821, the first step in what would become a new, more aggressive tack for abolitionism that 











Conclusion: Abolitionism, Antislavery Political Economy, and the Roots of the Civil War 
 
 
For much of 1832, Quaker abolitionist Benjamin Lundy traveled overland through the 
Deep South—slave country, a dangerous move for an outspoken abolitionist—to the Mexican 
state of Texas. Lundy hoped to secure land grants there in order to settle a colony of free black 
Americans, part of his career-long interest in emigration schemes, first to Haiti in the mid-1820s 
and later Texas. By the early 1830s, Texas was increasingly swollen with white American 
settlers, chiefly from the Upper and Deep South states. They brought plantation slavery with 
them, viewing Texas as the next, most logical territory for slavery’s expansion. During his 
travels, Lundy noted the productivity of four cotton plantations near present-day Gonzales, 
Texas, between San Antonio and the Gulf of Mexico, to demonstrate the suitability of slave labor 
there. The four plantations' combined forty-six slave “hands” produced 162,545 pounds of 
cotton, 3,533 each for that growing season. Lundy envisioned that free black settlements in 
territories like Texas- contiguous to the southern United States but not yet part of the union- 
could function as bulwarks against slavery's expansion, while at the same time demonstrating 
blacks’ capacity for self-governance.1 
Born in New Jersey, Lundy made himself front and center during the Missouri Crisis, 
having moved to St. Louis from Mt. Pleasant, Ohio in 1819 to “[devote] myself sedulously to an 
exposition, in the newspapers of Missouri and Illinois, of the evils of slavery.”2 Lundy 
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participated in, and in many ways was responsible for, the expansion of political abolitionism to 
the west during the 1810s and 1820s, a product of the nation’s rapid western expansion.3 The 
Missouri Crisis and residence in slave country taught him that slavery had to be fought through 
political means. Lundy began developing a plan for the abolition of slavery in the mid-1810s, as 
a founding member of Tennessee’s Union Humane Society and traveling agent for Elihu 
Embree’s antislavery newspaper the Philanthropist. After founding abolitionist newspaper, the 
Genius of Universal Emancipation in 1821 in Greeneville, Tennessee, he frequently reprinted his 
abolition plan throughout the 1820s. As his biographer notes, although Lundy did not view his 
plan dogmatically and often modified it, his emphasis on political abolitionism was consistent.4 
He viewed the national government as an indispensable agent in promoting the abolition of 
slavery, and assumed that antislavery interests needed to take control of the national Congress, in 
addition to state legislatures. While Lundy never lost interest in promoting the implementation of 
state-level gradual abolition laws, he ultimately believed that southern slaveholders would not 
submit to such legislation without external pressure from political abolitionists working through 
the national government. In late 1823, Lundy made this point explicitly in his newspaper. “I 
would wish it to be understood that I do not expect to ‘persuade’ the advocates of slavery to do 
justice,” he wrote, because slaveholders were inherently dishonest. Lundy’s solution was simple 
and direct: “WE MUST VOTE THEM DOWN,” he thundered, and “something more effectual 
than ‘persuasion’ will be brought to bear upon the iniquitous and unprincipled conduct of 
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Tyrants in disguise.” “The subject of universal emancipation is a political one,” he wrote 
elsewhere, “in the most emphatic sense of the word…”5 
Lundy’s abolition plan was a forerunner of the policy of slavery “denationalization” that 
political abolitionists in the 1840s later developed into antislavery party politics. He began the 
plan with the blanket argument that the federal government should abolish slavery in districts 
under its exclusive constitutional control, most importantly Washington D.C., while 
acknowledging the “federal consensus,” that the national government could not interfere with 
slavery in states where it was legal. Next, Congress should use its constitutional authority to 
prohibit the introduction of slavery into United States territories, for “the purpose of guarding 
more effectually against its extension.” As a veteran of the Missouri Crisis, Lundy knew that the 
non-extension of slavery was a crucial pillar of political abolitionism. His and other early 
antebellum abolitionists' emphasis on non-extension was the precursor of the “cordon of 
freedom” policy developed by the next generation of political abolitionists. He also argued for 
continued vigilance in suppressing the illegal foreign slave trade, and that the internal slave trade 
should be made illegal through Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Lundy 
proposed that all free blacks should immediately be given the legal status of aliens, therefore 
making them eligible for national citizenship on the same terms as European immigrants.6 In 
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addition, he argued that the slave states should make legislation for the “certain” emancipation 
of slaves, repeal laws that forced freed blacks to leave their states upon gaining their freedom, 
and to accord them the same legal status as the free states granted their black inhabitants. Finally, 
Lundy argued for a constitutional amendment to abolish the three-fifths clause, a source of 
political strength for the slave states.7 
Although the Genius of Universal Emancipation never achieved high circulation numbers 
and was never a profitable enterprise, the scope of Lundy’s network of abolitionist acquaintances 
was impressive, especially given the hostility abolitionists often encountered in the post-Missouri 
Crisis context.8 In 1822, Lundy printed a list of seventy-four men he hoped would act as agents 
for the Genius, presumably abolitionist subscribers who he thought would not mind being 
publicly identified. The bulk of them resided in the Upper South and Old Northwest states, 
which made sense given that abolitionism had expanded westward in the midst of the Missouri 
Crisis. Still, Lundy’s network included residents of almost every state in the Union, including 
individuals in South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and West Florida. By publishing 
abolitionist correspondence from across the nation Lundy made the Genius a crucial resource for 
sounding out the various abolitionist positions that circulated in the 1820s. Because 
correspondents used noms de plume, the loss of his personal papers in a Philadelphia anti-
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abolitionist riot in 1838 makes it difficult to identify individual members of the antislavery 
network he worked to develop.9 Even so, the correspondence included in the pages of the Genius 
is evidence of the array of abolitionist arguments circulating in the 1820s. Often militant in their 
denunciations of slavery, they deployed language and style that would be familiar to readers of 
1830s Garrisonian “moral suasion” literature.  
A Tennessee citizen writing as “The Farmer” in 1822 espoused a brand of back-country, 
republican, abolitionist political economy that Lundy was well acquainted with from his time in 
Ohio and Missouri. “The Farmer” argued for non-extension of slavery, citing the inability of 
poorer non-slaveholding farmers to obtain western lands in competition with slaveholders.10 
Slaveholding, according to “The Farmer,” was wrong for this reason alone, and “the toleration of 
slavery” was the source of the nation’s “political evils.” He cited Montesquieu as authority to 
support this argument, before launching into a denunciation of his fellow citizens for failing to 
engage in antislavery politics. “The Farmer” complained that although non-slaveholders 
throughout the trans-Mississippi west were aware of the incompatibility of slavery and 
republicanism in the abstract, yet “we fill our legislatures with persons who live and feed on the 
blood and sweat” of their slaves. After lengthy quotations from slaveholding republicans like St. 
George Tucker and Thomas Jefferson to prove the moral and political dangers of slavery, he 
repeated his frustration by proclaiming that “we cannot expect to be blessed with just & 
equitable laws while we continue to fill our legislatures with such who are deaf to justice, mercy, 
and humanity.” The “Farmer” concluded his missive by denying that his views were influenced 
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by membership in an antislavery society, claiming that he only represented “the society of 
farmers.” 11 Abolitionist farmers, it might be added, small ‘r’ republicans who believed that 
slavery’s expansion was not just the problem of moral abolitionists, but all non-slaveholders. 
Lundy's network of abolitionist correspondents, whether as individuals or in abolition 
society statements, presented antislavery arguments that varied in their relative radicalism. But at 
their core, they were defined by the conviction that antislavery politics were necessary to achieve 
universal emancipation. The Tennessee Manumission Society made this exact point in its 1822 
Annual Report. Signed by President James Jones, the Society urged its network of local branches 
to use political means to fight slavery. They acknowledged that while many Americans believed 
Congress had no power to “interfere with slavery, as practised in the United States of America,” 
they argued that in fact the opposite was true. Congress could “mitigate slavery in several ways”: 
through abolishing it in the nation's capital, pressuring slave states to pass post-nati emancipation 
legislation, and taxing the sellers and purchasers of slaves on the domestic market to discourage 
that traffic. The Society also urged its supporters to “indeavor to be unanimous in giving their 
suffrage” to antislavery candidates for office at all governmental levels. On the ground, the 
antislavery political project could only be accomplished through the distribution of antislavery 
materials in the Deep South- which alarmed slave state authorities.12 
That same year, South Carolina governor Thomas Bennett noted the effect of political 
abolitionism in a statement that clarified his administration’s handling of Denmark Vesey’s 
abortive slave rebellion. After explaining the details of Vesey’s plan and the actions of his co-
conspirators at length, Bennett specifically noted that northern members of Congress had 
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inspired Vesey and his conspirators to action. Antislavery speeches in Congress during the 
Missouri Crisis, he said, “gave a serious and imposing effect to the machinations” of Vesey and 
his colleagues as they planned their slave uprising. The larger problem, according to Bennett, 
was that antislavery literature was making inroads into his state. Vesey’s “artful and insidious 
delusions were kept in perpetual exercise” because of the efforts of Lundy’s antislavery network. 
They had made sure that antislavery pamphlets had been “abundantly furnished” throughout the 
Palmetto State. Bennett called the abolitionists “culpable mercenaries” in the Vesey rebellion, 
insisting that the proposed abolition of slavery would fatally destabilize the United States and 
result in widespread violence and horror. But abolitionists like Lundy, while concerned to about 
the possibility of racial violence, ultimately would not be deterred from their ultimate objective: 
freeing slaves and destroying the political and economic power of slaveholders.13 
In 1826 and 1829, Lundy pushed the American Convention of abolition societies to pass 
official resolutions based on aspects of his abolition plan, including pressing for petitions to 
Congress to abolish the interstate slave trade and slavery in Washington D.C., and legislation to 
ameliorate the physical conditions of slavery and affirm slaves' competency to testify in court. 
As the 1820s progressed, Lundy and his abolitionist network continued to forge ahead in the face 
of a national political climate increasingly hostile to discussion of slavery-related questions.14 
After moving to Baltimore in 1824, Lundy and abolitionist colleague Daniel Raymond set about 
constructing an antislavery political coalition in a slave state. Their efforts failed spectacularly. 
Raymond ran twice for the Maryland general assembly as nominee of the Maryland Anti-Slavery 
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Society with disastrous results. Running on an antislavery platform with planks derived from 
Lundy’s “Plan For Abolition,” Raymond received only 974 of 13,312 votes in 1826, and 186 of 
7,769 in 1829.15 Soon thereafter, Lundy took on an abolitionist apprentice to help operate the 
Genius of Universal Emancipation who would soon far outstrip him in notoriety, William Lloyd 
Garrison. Even though efforts to develop an effective antislavery political coalition failed in the 
1820s, they set the template for antislavery politics in the succeeding decades. As the 1830s 
began, Lundy continued to operate the Genius and promote direct political agitation against 
slavery, though he steadily diverted his attention to developing his Texan emigration scheme and 




 While early antebellum abolitionists like Lundy forged ahead with their political 
campaigns attempts to sway public opinion in their favor, by the 1830s agrarian and industrial 
capitalism rapidly expanded in the Northeast and Old Northwest states. In the antebellum period, 
the free household model prevailed throughout the Northwest, and family farms formed the 
bedrock of the region’s agricultural economy. In contrast to the slave-based plantation system, 
free household farms relied on family and temporary wage labor, which incentivized the 
adoption of farm machines when financially possible, like the horse-drawn McCormick reaper 
which became widely available in the 1840s and 1850s.16 Family farmers shipped corn and 
                                                           
15 Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, pp. 114-115, 150-151. 
16 Daniel Rood, “An International Harvest: The Second Slavery, the Virginia-Brazil Connection, and the 
Development of the McCormick Reaper,” in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, pp. 87-104, 
340 
 
wheat to growing northeastern cities and towns through conduits of internal improvement like 
the Erie Canal and an expanding network of smaller canals that reached their tendrils across the 
free states.  
By the 1840s and 1850s, burgeoning northwestern cities like Chicago developed into 
hubs for commodity crop collection and distribution, and rapidly expanding railroad networks 
complemented and ultimately superseded canals and turnpikes as the sinews of free state 
capitalist commodity distribution. In addition to grain products, family farms near urban clusters 
supplied city dwellers with garden vegetables, dairy products, and fresh beef, chicken and pork 
products, further tightening economic connections between the cities and countryside. The 
growth of agricultural production for internal markets, spurred by investment in farm structures 
and modernized equipment, laid the basis for the intense industrialization of the North in the 
antebellum period. 17 
 Farm and agricultural equipment values suggest that the American regional agricultural 
economies developed divergent characteristics by 1850—divergences rooted in the absence of 
slavery in the North and its significant expansion in the South. That year’s federal census 
recorded that the free states and territories contained farmland and buildings valued at $2.2 
billion dollars, sixty-seven percent of the national total. These statistics do not take into account 
the fact that slaveholders’ chief capital investment was in the bodies of the enslaved, thus 
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rendering it more difficult to invest in plantation buildings and mechanized production. Southern 
farms (including plantations), however, were larger on average, 332 acres compared to 203 for 
the free states and territories. This reflected the fact that non-slaveholding whites tended to farm 
smaller, poorer plots of land, while southern plantation owners possessed larger landholdings. 
But even though southern agricultural landholdings remained larger in terms of size, free state 
and territory farms’ valuations averaged $280 more than their southern counterparts, which 
reflected both land scarcity (particularly in the Northeast), as well as the fact that the average 
northern farm family had invested more capital in farm structures and machines, unlike the debt 
that many southern slaveowners often contracted to increase their holdings of commoditized 
human beings, and thus their individual paper wealth.18 
 To say that the American regional agricultural economies increasingly diverged by mid-
century, however, is not to suggest that they co-existed as an exaggerated “clash of extremes” in 
the same polity before the Civil War.19 Agricultural innovations, for example, touched all regions 
of the country. Southern planters had long demonstrated an interest in improving the productivity 
of their land and slaves through practicing modern management techniques and experimenting 
with new seed varieties and methods of farm production. Their zeal to improve plantation 
productivity was evident in the proliferation of journals and magazines aimed at the planter class, 
which offered advice and marketed new seeds and farm implements.20 Biological innovations 
that helped to produce newer, more adaptable, hybrid crop varieties found adopters throughout 
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the nation, spurring production gains over the course of the antebellum period.21  Clearly 
southern planters were not backward-looking remnants of a feudalistic pseudo-aristocracy, but 
modern-minded men with capitalistic, profit-making instincts, just as free household farmers, 
manufacturers, and mercantile interests in the North sought to maximize production and profits 
as did good capitalists. But King Cotton’s leaders and complicit subjects proudly perpetuated an 
oppressive system of labor which bred social and economic instability.   
 The abolition of chattel slavery in the Northeast and the pre-emptive ban on the 
institution in the Northwest constituted the key difference between the antebellum northern and 
southern agricultural economies, one that everyone at the time noticed—which antebellum 
abolitionists like Benjamin Lundy and many others hoped to eliminate for moral and political 
reasons. The sharply different political economies of southern slave, and northern free household 
and wage labor regimes, led not to unbreakable economic bonds between the regions, but instead 
toward political and social conflict. In terms of long-term economic development, the most 
critical regional divergence had an indirect, yet still powerful connection to southern slave and 
northern unbound labor regimes: industrial manufacturing, by the antebellum period the most 
important divergence between the North and South. Capitalism cut several different ways in 
Early and Antebellum America, and the industrial variety clearly differentiated the slave and 
non-slave regions of nineteenth century America.  
 From origins in the free household domestic manufacturing economy in seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, individuals and partnerships that operated extractive industry sites like iron 
mines and foundries, and the attempts of men like Moses Brown and Samuel Slater to develop 
                                                           
21 Alan L. Olmsted and Paul W. Rhode, Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
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modern mechanized spinning plants, northeastern industrial capitalism skyrocketed in the 
antebellum period. Northeastern industrial plants and workshops of many sizes, though not to the 
scale of Great Britain or later post-bellum American industrial facilities, produced a wide variety 
of consumer goods and heavy industry components by the 1830s. From relatively meager 
beginnings, northern industrial production of consumer products spiked and so did the spread of 
industrial wage work. These developments carried with them negative consequences for the 
many working men, women, and children that experienced often horrifying work regimes in 
industrial plants. Southern slaveholders defensively took to calling industrial work “wage 
slavery,” while northern workingmen’s unions and organizations responded to industrial 
capitalists’ growing economic and political power with stringent calls for labor reform and on-
the-ground resistance to strict work regimes. Yet notwithstanding the critiques of slaveholders, 
for as much economic dislocation and misery that industrialization visited upon the northern 
industrial working classes, it was industrialization that economically separated the North and 
South. Oppressed as they were, wage workers in the North owned their own bodies, and 
maintained secure legal right to their families. Southern slaves did not. 
The conjunction of the rise of heavy industrialization and the westward expansion of free 
household agriculture into the Northwest by the antebellum period was reflected in the rise of the 
northern railroad system and the development of farm machines increasingly produced by wage 
laborers with industrial methods, a development that had no real counterpart in the Upper or 
Lower South, nor the southwestern Cotton Kingdom.22 As settlement and free household 
                                                           
22 There were exceptions, most importantly iron mines and foundries in Virginia and Maryland. But 
comparatively, the states where slavery remained legal after the Revolution developed very little 
industrial capacity compared to the Northeast, and to a lesser extent the Northwest. For a synthesis on 
industrialization in the nineteenth century, see Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth 
Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).  
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agriculture expanded in the antebellum period, so did railway networks that flowed from east-to-
west to accommodate the need for commodity crop transportation to major consumption markets 
nearer the eastern seaboard. The southern railroad system, by contrast, was famously 
underdeveloped in the antebellum period, with tracks of mismatched gauges common and lines 
that ran not in a discernible pattern that followed migration flows, but from interior regions to a 
handful of ports to facilitate cotton exports to Great Britain and the Northeast, to a lesser extent. 
Concurrent with these developments was the construction of banking and finance networks to 
serve the needs of family farms, an explosion of investment by northeastern, and also British, 
financial interests that underwrote westward expansion. Meanwhile, a separate regional finance 
system emerged to grease the wheels of slavery-based cotton production, with bedrock collateral 
that differed wildly from the systems of finance in the North: chattel slaves. While banking 
partnerships in the Northeast did business with southern planters, especially in New York City, it 
would be a mistake to characterize the regional finance systems as inextricably co-dependent.23  
For all their differences, the slave-based plantation and free household and wage labor 
political economies managed to co-exist, albeit uneasily, in a polity rooted in republican 
governance and concepts of liberty and equality for white men. But in the aftermath of the 
Missouri Crisis, faith in those concepts, even among white men, increasingly fractured over the 
political question of slavery, and the social and economic structures that flowed from the spread 
of the peculiar institution. Abolitionists like Benjamin Lundy faced considerable hostility from 
                                                           
23 The co-dependence of northeastern finance and the southern plantation economy is a core contention of 
the “slavery’s capitalism” historians, particularly Calvin Schermerhorn, Edward Baptist, and Sven 
Beckert. See the introduction of Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 
does extensively address the role that European (especially British) banks played in supporting southern 
plantation agriculture, and Schermerhorn notes the important role England’s Baring Bros. played in 
providing lines of credit to southern planters to pursue slave acquisitions. But the “slavery’s capitalism” 
literature does not recognize the significance of northeastern finance in promoting western expansion, 
and domestic consumption, in the free states and territories.  
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southern quarters, as well as free state Democrats who feared suggestions of racial equality that 
flowed from plans for slavery abolition. Conflicts over national political and economic policy—
from import tariffs, to proposed federal and state government support for domestic 
manufacturing, to western expansion and proposed methods of land distribution—all issued from 
a fundamental divide over slavery that was unleashed during the Revolutionary Era. The 
achievement of national independence set in motion a national paradox, unleashing northeastern 
state slavery abolitionism, but also leading to the construction of a federal government over 
which slaveholders maintained considerable sway. The balance of power often shifted towards 
slaveholders and their political allies in the northeastern merchant allies before 1820, and 




On December 4, 5, and 6, 1833, sixty-four delegates attended a convention in 
Philadelphia convened to reorganize political abolitionism by laying the foundation for a new, 
national antislavery society. The Anti-Slavery Convention's Constitution owed much to 
Benjamin Lundy's abolition plan, which he had tirelessly promoted for years. It recognized the 
“federal consensus,” that “each state, in which Slavery exists, has, by the Constitution of the 
United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to abolition in said State...” Still, the 
Convention called for slavery's “immediate abandonment, without expatriation.” How did they 
propose to do that? Supporters of the new American Anti-Slavery Society pledged to 
“endeavour, in a constitutional way, to influence Congress to put an end to the domestic slave 
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trade, and to abolish slavery in all those portions of our common country,” beginning with 
Washington D.C. They also called for antislavery political action to “prevent the extension of 
[slavery] to any State that may hereafter be admitted to the Union.” The delegates acknowledged 
Lundy's influence: they resolved, “That in the opinion of this Convention the early, disinterested 
and persevering labors of BENJAMIN LUNDY, in the cause of Emancipation, deserve the lively 
gratitude of this Convention, and the friends of human rights across the world."24 
In 1830, Lundy reached the same conclusion that Abraham Lincoln would arrive at in 
1854. He reminded his readers that “the politics of this Republic are verging to one important 
point, namely, the Question of Slavery.” In a statement Lincoln would echo twenty-eight years 
later in his series of debates with Stephen Douglas, Lundy argued that “no harmony- no 
LASTING union- can possibly exist between the advocates of freedom and the advocates of 
slavery.” American national politics had always pivoted on the slavery question, because “In 
every Presidential contest the struggle for power has been measurably between northern and 
southern politicians.”25 Lincoln and the Republican Party’s victory in the 1860 presidential 
election was the apotheosis of the decades-long development of antislavery party politics. 
Benjamin Lundy, his predecessors in the abolitionist movement like Moses Brown, and the many 
members of abolition societies from the Revolutionary Era to the antebellum period would have 
been pleased. 
                                                           
24 Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia, December 4, 5, and 6, 1833 (New York: 
Dorr and Butterfield, 1833), pp. 6-7, 11. 
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